JUDGMENT V. V. Kamat, J. 1. The limitations on this Court exercising extra ordinary and supervisory powers under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of an Award of the Central Government Labour Court, Ernakulam, acting on a reference of the Government of India, relating to the justifiability of the action of the petitioner's management as regards retrenchment and / or termination, are well known and established. However the Court is made aware of the limitations set down by the decisions cited. 2. Under Art.226, the decision of the subordinate Tribunal can only be annulled, whereas under Art.227 appropriately further directions can be issued by the High Court Workmen of Nellikkai Estate v. Superintendent, Nellikkai Estate 1960 KLT 764 . Jurisdiction under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is not different and superintendence both judicial and! administrative does not widen. The powers are to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the ambit and bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors Malabar Products Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam 1957 KLT 1271 . In this situation, interference by the High Court is not obligatory if justice of the case does not warrant such interference. It is only in matters when the tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in vindication of the principles of natural justice or refuses to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law or there is an error apparent on the face of the record and all these aspects have resulted in manifest injustice Kerala Solvent Extracts Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan and others 1993 (2) KLJ 739 . This makes the powers to disturb the findings on questions of fact more than difficult in exercise of extraordinary powers. 3. Normally, interference by this Court in writ proceedings with the findings of fact would amount to re-appreciation of evidence of its reappraisal and reaching different conclusion on. a matter to be exclusively decided by the tribunal would not be permissible. A wrong finding could never be characterised a perverse one Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. and others 1966 (1) LLJ 535 . a matter to be exclusively decided by the tribunal would not be permissible. A wrong finding could never be characterised a perverse one Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. and others 1966 (1) LLJ 535 . The High Court would interfere in cases where there is complete absence of evidence to support the finding, where the conclusions are arbitrary, perverse or capricious, when there are cases where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion that is recorded, if there is erroneous admission of in admissible evidence. However, adequacy or sufficiency of evidence, possibility of a different conclusion or that the conclusion was improper would not be the occasions for interference Assistant Security Officer, Pothannur v. Kullinga Gounder 1976 KLT 673 . If the finding is recorded without adverting to material pieces of evidence or the evidence is appreciated in a callous manner or with an indifferent attitude drawing casual inferences, the interference gets justified. However these are only the parameters of an illustrative character, and are not exhaustive K.A. Abdul Salam v. The District Judge and other 1991 (1) KLJ 541 . 4. In this petition, when C.M.P. No. 7403 of 1993 seeking orders under S.17 B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming for payment of full wages pending the proceedings of this Original Petition came up for orders, there was an occasion for this Court to go through the Award and then the Original Petition itself was taken up for hearing and decision. Reading of the impugned Award with the counsel for the parties presented incongruous aspects leading to carefully going through the evidence, translated and the record of documents. 5. Certain observations from the impugned award would need reproduction ad-verbatim. However, necessary factual matrix would have to be laid in the first instance. Mr. M. E. Thomas is the Employee. He joined M/s W. H. D'cruz & Sons as an Accountant on and from 2nd September, 1974. His working hours from beginning to end were from 10.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. throughout. He was the sole Accountant. Another Accountant was appointed in 1985. The Management on 11th February, 1987 by notice brought to his notice that working hours are from 9.00 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. and failure to attend accordingly would invite disciplinary proceedings. The explanation dated 14th February, 1987 was not acceptable. He was the sole Accountant. Another Accountant was appointed in 1985. The Management on 11th February, 1987 by notice brought to his notice that working hours are from 9.00 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. and failure to attend accordingly would invite disciplinary proceedings. The explanation dated 14th February, 1987 was not acceptable. In fact, the management issued a charge sheet dated 27th February, 1987. Enquiry notice was also served on 3rd March, 1987. Domestic Enquiry which had commenced, but by the communication dated 11th January, 1988, Mr. Thomas was informed that it was closed and dropped. On 21st April, 1988, the Management served retrenchment notice stating that the part-time services of the Employee Mr. Thomas were not needed and he was retrenched. Notice pay and retrenchment compensation as due under law were sent and are received under protest. The dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 that is raised is that the retrenchment is in violation of the provisions (S.25F and 25G) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the employee being a permanent employee not having been retrenched against the principle, "last come first to go". The dispute was referred to the Central Government Labour Court, Ernakulam and was registered as Industrial Dispute No. 12 of 1988, and in the impugned award dated 31st March, 1992 reinstatement with back wages in full has been awarded. 6. The question to be determined is whether the employee Mr. Thomas is a permanent employee or a part-time employee. At the hearing of the petition it is crystalised plainly that if the employee is a part-time employee then the action is correct in law and justified and there is no dispute even with regard to the payment of dues in pursuance of the Notice of the retrenchment and it is plainly stated that legal dues are paid and received under protest, the protest being only on the ground that the Employee is permanent and therefore, there is violation of S.25-F and 25-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 7. On reading of the impugned Award, the following observations created incongruities with the final conclusion of the Labour Court that the employee is permanent one and this led to the probe through the entire record : 1. It is an admitted fact that M. E. Thomas was employed by the management as an Accountant with effect from 2nd September 1974. On reading of the impugned Award, the following observations created incongruities with the final conclusion of the Labour Court that the employee is permanent one and this led to the probe through the entire record : 1. It is an admitted fact that M. E. Thomas was employed by the management as an Accountant with effect from 2nd September 1974. It is also an admitted fact that his working hours is from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. It is come out in evidence that the working hours of the management establishment is 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. 2. The workman was examined as M.W. 1 who would depose in support of the averments in the claim statement. He would further depose that he was employed in the management establishment from 1974 and his working hours was from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. He was only an Accountant who was working there at that time. 3. He was not shown as part-time Accountant in any of the records kept by the management. He would further depose that he was ready to work for 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m., if he was paid salary properly. 4. He would depose in the cross examination that working hours of the company was from 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. for all other employees and he alone was working from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and after 1 p.m. he was working in his firm wherein he is also one of the partners. He would further depose that he was never asked to do work from 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. by the management. 5. When he (the employee) was asked to work for 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. which is the working hours of the establishment the worker was not prepared to do the work. Hence, in 1985 another Accountant was appointed as full-time Accountant. He has received the gratuity, and provident fund amount. 8. 5. When he (the employee) was asked to work for 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. which is the working hours of the establishment the worker was not prepared to do the work. Hence, in 1985 another Accountant was appointed as full-time Accountant. He has received the gratuity, and provident fund amount. 8. In the light of these aspects, the following, conclusion drawn by the Labour Court : "In the absence of any evidence to show he was appointed as part-time Accountant it is to be held that he was appointed as an Accountant in the establishment fixing the working hours from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. It is also pertinent to note that no distinction is drawn in the definition of workman as defined in the I.D. Act as part-time workman or full-time workman. At any rate the employee will come within the ambit of the definition of workman as defined in the I.D. Act." being completely incongruous, the evidence and the documents required examination and scrutiny to see whether the conclusion recorded by the Labour Court that the employee is a permanent workman is congruent with some of the glaring facets found herein above. 9. Obviously certain legal rights flow from the position, if established that Mr. Thomas was a permanent employee. This factual position has to be seen from various facets apart from and independent of averments of the parties. If this Court finds that vital and important aspects are wholly left out of consideration, and a casual approach to the question floats on the surface of the record, rendering the ultimate conclusion wholly in congruent. it would not be necessary for this Court on grounds of dignity to term the conclusion on such question perverse, inconsistent with the reasonable approach keeping in mind that this Court also has to approach the Labour Court's reasoning on basis of respect to the Court. However, even then, many facets that emerge from the evidence shatter the conclusion rendering it in congruent for sustenance. They are: (A) From the evidence of Mr. Thomas Employee: Examinations-in-chief : 1. I am the worker in this case. I joined in the establishment of the opposite party on 2nd September, 1974 as Accountant. I prepared the final accounts and connected works. From 1974 my working time was 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. There was no complaint about my work. Thomas Employee: Examinations-in-chief : 1. I am the worker in this case. I joined in the establishment of the opposite party on 2nd September, 1974 as Accountant. I prepared the final accounts and connected works. From 1974 my working time was 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. There was no complaint about my work. It is true that I was a part-time employee. 2. All the rest of the employees were given the increase in D.A. 3. I am prepared to work from 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. but salary was to be given accordingly. Cross examination: 1. The working time of the management establishment is 9.30 to 4.30. Except me all the employees are working from 9 to 4.30. I alone worked from 10 to 1 p.m. After 1 o'clock I attended the establishment of which I was a partner. Even now I am working there. 2. John D'Cotha was appointed as Accountant in 1985. His work was from 9 to 4.30. I was not asked to work from 9 to 4.30 at any time. If asked I would have worked so. Enquiry was conducted on the ground that I was not working from 9 to 4.30 p.m. 3. I had not written to the management that 1 would work from 9 to 4.30 if my salary was enhanced. 4. From 1985 there was increase in the turnover in the company. (B) From the evidence of the Manager Mr. Fernandez: Examination-in-chief: 1. I am the Manager of the Management establishment. There was only one Accountant till 1985. He was attending work from 10 to 1 o'clock. But office time of the establishment is 9 to 4.30 p.m. There was some change in the accounting system from 1985. Thomas was asked to work full-time, but he was not prepared. The reason stated was that he was a partner in the company where he has to attend work after 1 o'clock. 2. In 1987 also Thomas was asked to work full-time, but he was not prepared. There was no work both for full-time Accountant and part-time Accountant. Therefore part-time Accountant was retrenched. Thomas received retrenchment compensation, notice pay and gratuity. He withdrew also provident fund. He is working full-time in the firm of which he was a partner since then. Cross examination :Before the Assistant Labour Commissioner he has stated that he was prepared to work from 9 to 4.30. Therefore part-time Accountant was retrenched. Thomas received retrenchment compensation, notice pay and gratuity. He withdrew also provident fund. He is working full-time in the firm of which he was a partner since then. Cross examination :Before the Assistant Labour Commissioner he has stated that he was prepared to work from 9 to 4.30. But he did not inform his readiness to the company at any time. He has stated in his statement before the conciliation officer that he was prepared to work from 10 to 4.30 and recorded in the minutes before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Ext. W-9 is the minutes. 10. Similarly, from the documents, following aspects have a staring effect on the question to be decided and settled. (A) As far back as in 1981 as seen from Ext. W-l Mr. Thomas is shown as part-time Accountant, in the information supplied on 23rd December 1881 to the Labour Enforcement Officer. (B) In the salary certificate Ext. W-2 dated 27th January 1986 Mr. Thomas is shown as an Accountant with Rs. 1.000 as salary per month. (C) In a character certificate Ext. W-3 dated 2nd December 1985, Mr. Thomas is referred to as the Chief Accountant. Only one Accountant is described in the character certificate as the Chief Accountant. (D) Even upto 14th December 1987 (Ext. W-6) Mr. Thomas took the stand that change from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. cannot be changed as it is a change in the service condition. It is seen from the following: "Now, I am informed by your letter dated 11th February 1987, that my working hours in the establishment is from 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. I submit that change in the conditions of service, namely working hours ; of me has not been so far informed to me nor any notice of the change in the service conditions has been served on me. Any change in the conditions of service regarding the working hours etc., has to be informed to me. Notice must be given to me in the prescribed manner regarding the changes. No opportunity to consider the effect of the change of service conditions is afforded to me to present my View on the change. Therefore I request you not to change my service conditions in the establishment. I submit that I have not violated any direction. Notice must be given to me in the prescribed manner regarding the changes. No opportunity to consider the effect of the change of service conditions is afforded to me to present my View on the change. Therefore I request you not to change my service conditions in the establishment. I submit that I have not violated any direction. Therefore I request you not to alter the change of service conditions in my working hours, which I am observing from 1974 onwards." (E) Management's reply dated 19th February 1987 (Ext. P-6) is eloquent and if the following portion is seen the position would be clear. It reads : "It is incorrect to state that your working hours in this establishment is limited from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. as we would vehementally repudiate that far back in 1984 when there was a change in the management set up, you were personally impressed of your working hours from 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. in line with the rest of the office staff. We also deny that your salary was fixed on the limited working hours as averred by you as no specific working hours were fixed for you and there was no special consideration of whatsoever for your working hours and we would reiterate that your working hours has no exemption nor for that reason any exception from the other office staff working hours." (F) Prom the reply at the end dated 19th December 1987 (Ext. W-7), Mr. Thomas has taken the following stand . "There was no Accountant in the Company other than myself from 1974 onwards and I have been working there from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. since 1974. That is my working hours in the company. I am not a part-time employee as described by you. My working hours is from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. I reiterate that I am the Chief Accountant of the Company ever since 1974 and I am a full-time employee with working hours from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m." 11. It would clearly appear that there is an admission of Mr. Thomas that he was a part-time employee. The learned counsel saw the record himself in Malayalam-in-original and had difficulty and was left with nothing more than to state that it was a mistake. Apart therefrom, it is established that the working hours are from. 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. and Mr. Thomas that he was a part-time employee. The learned counsel saw the record himself in Malayalam-in-original and had difficulty and was left with nothing more than to state that it was a mistake. Apart therefrom, it is established that the working hours are from. 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. and Mr. Thomas was only one whose timing was from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and it is further admitted by him that after 1 p.m. he was looking after his own partnership business for all these years. The evidence is that even thereafter he looks after his own partnership business. These aspects go more than a long way to find any element of congruency with the conclusion recorded by the Labour Court. Probe in the record was necessitated on the bare reading of the impugned Award and consequent scrutiny and careful examination thereof made me more than difficult to accept the conclusion. In fact, the employment, admittedly for three hours have deep intrinsic elements to make it more than clear that the appointment was part-time and this impact apart from other aspects shown from the evidence on record, the engagement of Mr. Thomas in looking after his own partnership business lent enough assurance to the difficulty to support the conclusion of the Labour Court. The learned counsel for the employee, relied on S.6 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960 providing the outer limit of 8 hours as daily working hours and 48 hours as weekly working hours. This is of no help in any way to consider the nature of the employment in this petition. 12. For the above reasons, the petition succeeds, impugned Award dated 31st March, 1992 in, I .D. No. 22 of 1988 of the Central Government Labour Court, Ernakulam gets quashed and set aside and thereby the reference as per order dated 21st December 1988 of the Government of India stands rejected with no orders as to costs. 13. The judgment requires a post-script with regard to the provisions of S.17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The said provision enacts a statutory form of a separate and independent right available to a workman during the pendency of the proceedings. The two decisions cited (a) Bharat Sing v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis 1986 (2) LLJ 217 Supreme Court. (b) K. Bhaskaran v. R. Janardhanan Pillai 1988 FJR 342. The said provision enacts a statutory form of a separate and independent right available to a workman during the pendency of the proceedings. The two decisions cited (a) Bharat Sing v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis 1986 (2) LLJ 217 Supreme Court. (b) K. Bhaskaran v. R. Janardhanan Pillai 1988 FJR 342. make the position crystal clear. 14. In this petition, such an order is passed earlier by this Court on May 31, 1993 in C.M.P. No. 7403 of 1993 (Mohammed, J.) and being an independent and separate right adjudicated and also being final between the parties, the said order is binding on the petitioner, there being no appeal therefrom. In fact, the employee preferred Contempt Petition (C.C.C. 95 of 1994) and the Division Bench therein by order dated 8th June 1994 passed the following order : "Having heard both sides, we hold that the following order would be sufficient: Respondent is directed to pay Rs. 12,000 in three equal monthly instalments, the first instalment to be paid on or before 5th of July, 1994. The second instalment (Rs. 4,000) should be paid on or before the 5th of August, 1994 and the third instalment has to be paid on or before 5th of September, 1994. If the aforesaid condition is not complied with, it is open to the petitioner to take necessary action in accordance with law." 15. This is while disposing of the Contempt Case submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order decides C.M.P. with modification has no substance. The order only grants relief to get over the rigor of Contempt keeping the order under S.17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intact. In fact the Contempt Petition itself was based on the order under S.17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It being relating to an independent right after the award and being of the Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction would remain intact in this petition. 16. Be that as it may, it is a lesion to this Court. Normally, no party has or gets any vested right in the life of the litigation in this or any other Court. It is observed such way times without number. 16. Be that as it may, it is a lesion to this Court. Normally, no party has or gets any vested right in the life of the litigation in this or any other Court. It is observed such way times without number. However, S.17B of the I.D. Act is a statutory exception and creates liability in favour of the workman and against the employer and the inevitable elongated life of the litigation in such a case becomes necessary to be watched and controlled by the parties and the system by a process of expedition or characterisation of such petitions as a separate priority-category having preceding position as compared to other pending proceedings. In my judgment some thought is necessary in the direction. This much is sufficient in the context. In the result, petition succeeds in terms of para 12 of this Judgment. Order dated 31st May 1993 in C.M.P. 7403 of 1993, as stated above, has already become final. No order as to costs.