Judgment :- Thomas, ag. C. J. A wholesale dealer in cigarettes as agent of Golden Tobacco Company is apprehensive of third degree methods being resorted to by the senior Intelligence Officers of the Anti-Evasion Directorate under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (for short the act ). Therefore, he seeks protection from this court by directing the respondent to permit him to be assisted by a legal practitioner during the time when he is interrogated. As the respondents did not oblige, he has filed the original petition contending first that he is not liable to be summoned and in the alternative for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to question him only in the presence of a lawyer of his choice. Learned single judge did not accede to the prayers and hence dismissed the original petition filed under Art.226 of the Constitution. Hence this appeal. 2. It seems that a raid has been conducted in the business premises of this appellant on 20.1.1995 and some documents were recovered by the senior Intelligence Officer of the Anti Evasion Directorate of the Cochin unit. A summons was issued to the appellant to be present on 31.5.1995 for the purpose of examination under Sec. 14 of the Act. Pursuant to the summons he appeared before the said off icer and he was asked to come again on another day to which also he submitted. Later on Exts. P4 and P5 summons were issued by the second respondent, a senior Intelligence Officer of the Madras unit of the Directorate requiring the appellant to be present on 16.8.1995. He submitted to the said summons and was interrogated. Again he was asked to be present for continuation of the interrogation, but he returned home and requested the second respondent that he be interrogated in future only in the presence of a legal practitioner of his choice. Presumably the said request would have been declined and that would have precipitated the matter and he has filed the original petition.' 3. Sec. 14(1) of the Act reads thus: "14. Presumably the said request would have been declined and that would have precipitated the matter and he has filed the original petition.' 3. Sec. 14(1) of the Act reads thus: "14. Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents in inquiries under this Act (1) Any Central Excise Officer duly empowered by the Central Government in this behalf shall have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is making for any of the purposes of this Act. A summons to produce documents or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or things' or for the production of ali documents or things of a certain description in the possession of 'under the control of the person summoned," it is apparent from the said section that a person can be summoned only "in any inquiry which such officer is making for any of the purposes of this Act." Learned counsel tried to distinguish the exercise sought to be made through Exts. P4 and P5 summons from the inquiry envisaged in the sub section on the premise that the second respondent was actually conducting an investigation which is different from inquiry. To support the contention reference has been made to S.14A of the Act which has been inserted in the parent Act as per S.76 of the Finance Act 1995. The new section is titled "special audit in certain cases". Material portion of sub-section (1) of the new section reads as follows: "If at any stage of enquiry, investigation or any other proceedings before him, any Central Excise Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise is of the opinion that the value has not been correctly declared or determined by a manufacturer or any person, he may direct such person....It. Learned counsel laid emphasis on the split up expressions "enquiry, investigation or any other proceedings" and contended that investigation is different from enquiry. 4. We do not think that the mere employment of the word "investigation" would convert the proceedings adopted by the 4th respondent as investigation different from an enquiry envisaged in S.14. The word "investigation" in S.14A need not necessarily be an enquiry contemplated in S.14. 4. We do not think that the mere employment of the word "investigation" would convert the proceedings adopted by the 4th respondent as investigation different from an enquiry envisaged in S.14. The word "investigation" in S.14A need not necessarily be an enquiry contemplated in S.14. But that does not make the enquiry under S.14 as part of investigation mentioned in the newly added section. We have no doubt that Exts. P4 and P5 summons were issued for the purpose of conducting enquiry contemplated in S.14 of the Act. Hence, the argument based on the nice distinction between enquiry and investigation is not sufficient to help the appellant in this case. 5. !n support of the next limb of the contention that appellant has a right to be accompanied by a legal practitioner during the time of interrogation learned counsel heavily banked on the ratio contained in Nandini satpathy v. P. L Dani(AIR 1978 SC 1025). There it has been held that "lawyer's presence is a Constitutional claim in some circumstances in our country also and in the context of article 20(3) is an assurance of awareness and observance of the right to silence". But Their Lordships added that a legal principle is not laid down that accused must secure services of a lawyer and All that was meant is that "if an accused person expresses the wish to have his lawyer by his side when his examination goes on, this facility shall not be denied". This decision was distinguished by the Supreme Court in the context of the enquiry envisaged in the Customs Act (Vide Poolpandi v. Superintendent, Central Excise (AIR 1992 S. C. 1795) pointing out that in the former it was a case of an accused entitled to protection under Art.20(3) and the officers were policemen, whereas in the case under the Customs Act the person does not become an accused during the enquiry stage nor the customs officials police officers. Their Lordships declined to share the apprehension that secret interrogation by denying legal assistance, where he is subject to the uncontrolled and invisible exercise of power by Government Officials, would be unconstitutional. The following observations in para. Their Lordships declined to share the apprehension that secret interrogation by denying legal assistance, where he is subject to the uncontrolled and invisible exercise of power by Government Officials, would be unconstitutional. The following observations in para. 11 of the judgment is apposite in this context: "The purpose of the enquiry under the Customs Act and the other similar statutes will be completely frustrated if the whims of the persons in possession of useful information for the depart ments are allowed to prevail. For achieving the object of such an enquiry if the appropriate authorities be of the view that such persons would be dissociated from the atmosphere and the company of persons who provide encouragement to them in adopting a non-co-operative attitude to the machineries of law, there cannot be any legitimate objection in depriving them of such company. The relevant provisions of the Constitution in this regard have to be construed in the spirit they were made and the benefits thereunder should not be "expanded" to favour exploiters engaged in tax evasion at the cost of public exchequer. Applying the "just, fair and reasonable test" we hold that there is no merit in the stand of appellant before us." 6. in he above context, we may also refer to two decisions, one in Romesh Chandra Manta v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1970 SC 940) and the other in //as v. Collector of Customs, Madras (AIR 1970 SC 1065). It was held in the former case that the person who was asked to give a statement under the Sea Customs Act is not an accused and in the latter it was held that statement made to a customs officer is not hit by S.25 of the Evidence Act since Customs officers are not police officers for the purpose of the enquiry contemplated in the Act. The principles laid down in the above two decisions have also been taken into account by the Supreme Court in AIR 1992 SC 1795 in laying down the principle 7. We do not think that the above principle which is made applicable and relevant under the Customs Act is alien to an inquiry conducted under S.14 of the Central Excise and Salt Act. Both Acts have been treated as similar endowments by the Supreme Court in the decision cited supra. We do not think that the above principle which is made applicable and relevant under the Customs Act is alien to an inquiry conducted under S.14 of the Central Excise and Salt Act. Both Acts have been treated as similar endowments by the Supreme Court in the decision cited supra. We have no reason to treat the claim of the appellant to be protected by a legal practitioner's presence during the oral examination as different from Poolpandi's case (cited supra) 8. We therefore conclude that appellant cannot claim a right to be assisted or accompanied by a legal practitioner of his choice during the time of inquiry under Section 14 of the Act. 9. The last part of the decision of the learned single judge contains a direction to the Customs officials to issue fresh summons to the appellant. It cannot be construed as a peremptory order that summons must, under any case, be issued to the appellant. We regard it as indicating that appellant need be present before any of the respondents only if a fresh summons is issued for his examination, it is not intended to be direction to the respondents that summons must necessarily be issued even if his examination is unnecessary. 10. All the same,we make it clear that every endeavour should be made to close the examination of the appellant before sunset and if for any reason it cannot be so closed, the same should be resumed only on the next day morning. This provision is enough to alleviate the apprehension of the appellant that he would be detained during night time also inside the office of respondents. Subject to the above observations, we dispose of this writ appeal.