S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. The petitioner, a member of a disciplined force, who holds the post of an Inspector (Civil Police) was transferred from district Mirzapur to Meerut Zone by, an order passed by the inspector-General of Police, dated 28-2-1994. This order was sought to be implemented by the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur, vide his order, dated 26-2-1994. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has approached this court seeking redress praying for the quashing of the order transferring him from Mirzapur. 2. I have heard Shri R. P. Tripathi, the learned Counsel for the peti tioner and the learned Standing Counsel representing the respondents as well as Sri S. P. Singh, Advocate who represents the respondent No. S and have carefully perused the record. 3. It appears that Ram Raj Singh, the respondent No. 5 was involved in case crime No. 217/1991 under Section 353 I. P, C. and 124, 129 (iii), 130 (ii), 132 (iii) and 124-A and 136 (2), Peoples Representation Act as well as in case crime Nos. 204 and 204-A of 1993 under Section 395/337, I. P. C. and had also been arrested by the petitioner in case crime No. 204 and 204-A of 1993. The aforesaid respondent had been arrested by the petitioner on 25-5-1995. 4. The petitioner has asserted that the aforesaid Ram Raj Singh along with his supporters made a request to Sri Ram Lakhan Verma, State Minister (Panchayat) on 27-1-1994 to transfer him from Mirzapur and it was on the recommendation made by Sri Verma that the impugned order of transfer had. been passed against him. It has been further assented that the impugned order has been passed on the basis of casteisra and political pressure and was mala fide, arbitrary and illegal. It has also been asserted that the aforesaid order is in flagrant: disregard of the provisions contained in paras 520 and 524 of the U. P. Police Regulations. 5. The claim of the petitioner has been contented by the respondents No. 1 to 4 denying the allegations made by the petitioner and asserting that the transfer order in question had been passed against him on account of administrative exigencies. 5. The claim of the petitioner has been contented by the respondents No. 1 to 4 denying the allegations made by the petitioner and asserting that the transfer order in question had been passed against him on account of administrative exigencies. It has also been asserted by the learned Standing Counsel that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the provisions contained in paras 520 and 524 of the U. P. Police Regulations are not at all attracted and no ground at all has been made out for any interference by this Court while exorcising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the impugned order stands vitiated on account of mala fide. The only assertion made in this regard in the writ petition is that the Inspector-General of Police, Lucknow had passed the aforesaid order on the recommendation of Sri Ram Lakhan Verma, the State Minister (Panchayat), U. P. Although the petitioner has alleged mala fide against the Inspector General of Police, impleaded in his official capacity as respondent No. 2, who had passed the impugned order of transfer he has not cared to implead the said respondent co-nominee in his personal capacity. Even Sri Ram Lakhan Verma, the State Minister (Panchayat) who is alleged to have recommended for the petitioners transfer from Mirzapur has act been impleaded as a respondent in the writ petition. 7. The charge of mala fides against an authority is more easily made than made out or proved. The burden of proving mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it, and the very seriousness of such allegations demand proof of a higher order of credibility. It seems to me that where the transfer of a Government employee is made in the exercise of executive discretion the same cannot be challenged in court unless such exercise is wholly an abuse or misuse of the power or is mala fides. However, in, the absence of specified pleadings with particulars of mala fides the allegations in this regard cannot be entertained. Further to make out a case for interference in matter of transfer there should be concrete material which should be unimpeachable in character leading to the irresistible conclusion that the order stood vitiated on account of mala fides. However, in, the absence of specified pleadings with particulars of mala fides the allegations in this regard cannot be entertained. Further to make out a case for interference in matter of transfer there should be concrete material which should be unimpeachable in character leading to the irresistible conclusion that the order stood vitiated on account of mala fides. The allegation of mala fides, therefore, must be concrete, clear and sufficiently articulated for the other side to meet and for the Court to appreciate objectively. 8. It may further be noticed that the charge of mala fides action can only mean want of good faith. So far as good faith is concerned it refers to an action which is done honestly irrespective of the fact whether it is done negligently or not. Where mala fides is pleaded it is for the petitioner to establish by sufficient material that the impugned action stood vitiated on account of malice or illwiil on the part of the official concerned and in the result of such malice or illwiil. There may be a situation where the use of the discretionary power may amount to abuse or misuse of that power and/or its exercise is for an unauthorised purpose which may be to please some politician or any particular person or such a discretionary power is exercised on a total non-application of mind or discloses favourtism or nepotism or is exercised on an extraneous consideration which may render the action so taken irretrievably vitiated. 9. It may not be lost sight of that governmental functions based on exigencies of administration are not normally justiciable. Administrative decisions in exercise of discretionary powers on subjective terms are normally accepted to have been taken in good faith on relevant considerations. However, this Court in its decision in the case of Mohammad Ilyas v. C. M. Superintendent reported in 1993 ACJ 411 had cautioned that in our cons titutional andet up no one had uao. idku or absolute power. The rule of law subordinates every functionary to its regulatory process. The activities of the State and the public authorities should be fair and their dealings should be above board without aversion or affection and should never be even suggestive of discrimination. Nothing should be done by them which gives an impres sion of bias, favourtism or nepotism. 10. The rule of law subordinates every functionary to its regulatory process. The activities of the State and the public authorities should be fair and their dealings should be above board without aversion or affection and should never be even suggestive of discrimination. Nothing should be done by them which gives an impres sion of bias, favourtism or nepotism. 10. While it may be difficult to obtain information and evidence regarding activities carried on with foul motives inference could however, be drawn from proved facts which would be clear and unambiguous The allegations of bias or mala fides against persons who are not parties to the writ petition as indicated hereinbefore, cannot be entertained as they cannot have any opportunity to reply to the allegation of the petitioner. The burden of establishing the charge of bad faith is on him who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order but mala fides need not be improved by direct evidence alone. However, vague assertions of mala fides are of no conse quence. It is necessary that in case the plea is raised clinching evidence has to be brought to the notice of the Court besides giving opportunity to the person concerned against whom mala fides or bias is pleaded to meet such allegations. Where such an official against whom scales of bias or mala fide is raised has not been impleaded as a party co-nominee in the petition such a plea cannot be allowed to be raised. It must be remembered that possibility of suspicion of mala fides would not be a sufficient ground to justify an order nullifying an administrative action, on the ground of mala fide. There must be real and substantial ground to sustain the suspicion which cannot be taken to be a substitute for proof. 11. In this connection the observation of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Bihar v. P. A. Sharma reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 may be carefully noticed. In the aforesaid case it was observed mala fide means want of good faith personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. The deter mination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely, (i) whether there is personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirement and condition of a valid exercise of administrative powers. The Apex Court laid considerable emphasis on the fact that an action must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such consideration. Mere assertion of a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances in a given case. 12. While considering the requirement of impleading the person against whom allegations of mala fide are made or the effect of non-joinder of such a person it was observed that "it is settled law that the person against whom mala fide or bias was imputed should be impleaded co-nominee as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no enquiry into those allegations would be made. 13. It may be noticed that in the aforesaid case the persons against whom the allegations of mala fide had been made had not impleaded as respondent co-nominee. On the effect of such non-joinder the Apex Court observed on this ground alone the High Court should have stopped enquiry into the allegations of mala fide or bias alleged against them. 14. The contention of the petitioner in regard to the question relating to mala fides has to be examined in the aforesaid background. 15. In the aforesaid view of the matter when a petitioner seeks to nullify an order passed by an executive authority in the exercise of his dis cretionary jurisdiction, it is all the more necessary to implead the authority concerned in his personal capacity also so that he may be in a position to effectively reply to the allegations of mala fides levelled against him. The deliberate omission of the petitioner to implead the authority co-nominee in his personal capacity whose order is sought to be attached on the ground of mala fides clearly indicates that the petitioner has no courage to confront the said authority with the allegations of mala fides made against him so as to create a situation where the correctness of the assertions may not be verified. It must be remembered that the allegation of mala fides alone are not sufficient to fault the impugned action of an authority like the respondent No. 1 which is quite high up in the hierarchy of the authorities under whom the petitioner has to function. 16. The omission on the part of the petitioner to implead co-nominee the officials whose action is sought to be nullified on the ground of mala fides has to be treated as fatal so far as the plea of mala fides is concerned, 17. In the present case, in reply to the allegations made in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent authorities categorically denying the assertions of the petitioner in regard to the mala fides and asserting that the impugned order had been passed on account of administrative exigencies, the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit asserted that the transfer order had been passed on written direction of Sri Ram Lakhan Varma, the Minister, and pursuant to that direction the Director General of Police had issued the transfer order. The assertions in this regard contained to para 9 of the rejoinder affidavit are sworn on the basis of the perusal of record, the details whereof have not been disclosed. There is, however, a reference to a file in para 9 of the rejoinder affidavit to which the petitioner could not have any access. Moreover, in the writ petition it has been asserted by the petitioner that Sri Ram Lakhan Verma had recommended for the transfer of the petitioner and it was on this recommendation that the Inspector General of Police had passed the order of transfer. In the rejoinder affidavit the case taken up by him appears to be that Sri Ram Lakhan Verma had issued a direction to the Director General of Police who in his turn had issued some direction for the transfer of the peti tioner which ultimately resulted in the impugned order. In the rejoinder affidavit the case taken up by him appears to be that Sri Ram Lakhan Verma had issued a direction to the Director General of Police who in his turn had issued some direction for the transfer of the peti tioner which ultimately resulted in the impugned order. No such case having been pleaded in the writ petition, no reply could be expected from the respondent-authorities in this regard. In the circumstances, the petitioner, in spite of knowledge as claimed by him, having omitted to take up such a case in the writ petition itself cannot be allowed to take any advantage of the new case set up in the rejoinder affidavit for the first time based on a perusal of the record to which apparently he could not have any access. 18. In the circumstances indicated hereinbefore, taking into considera tion the shifting stand of the petitioner as contained in the writ petition and the rejoinder affidavit and further his omission to implead co-nominee, the official whose action is sought to be nullified on the ground of mala fides, in his personal capacity, it seems to me, it will be. wholly inappropriate to interfere, while exercising the extraordinary enquiry jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India sustaining the plea of mala fides for upsetting the impugned order. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner have vehemently relied on Regulations $20 and 524 of Chapter XXXIV of the U. P. Police Regulations which provides that transfers which result in officers being stationed far from their home should be avoided as much as possible. Regulation 524 provides that officers incharge of police station shall ordinarily be retained in their charges for at least two years and that the subordinate officers at police station should not be transferred without good reason. It has also been pointed out that Regulation 520 of the aforesaid Regulation so fat as Sub-Inspectors and Head Constables are concerned provides that they should not be allowed to stay in a particular district for nine years and ten years respectively and in a particular police station not more than three years and five years respectively. It has also been pointed out that Regulation 520 of the aforesaid Regulation so fat as Sub-Inspectors and Head Constables are concerned provides that they should not be allowed to stay in a particular district for nine years and ten years respectively and in a particular police station not more than three years and five years respectively. The contention is that in the present case, the petitioner held the post of an Inspector and was also incharge of a police station being station House Officer, Police Station Chunar and as such being an officer in charge of a police station, he ought to have been retained at Chunar for at least two years. It is also urged that in any case, he could not have been transferred without good reason specifically recorded in the transfer order itself. It is also urged that when Sub-Inspectors and Head Constables are allowed to remain in a particular police station for three years or more, there can be no justification for disturbing the petitioner who was of a higher rank. 20. The learned Standing Counsel has, however, urged that the provi sions contained in paragraph 520 of the U. P. Police Regulations relating to Sub-Inspectors and Head Constables are not at all attracted in a case of Inspector. The learned Standing Counsel further urged that the provisions contained in Regulation 520 relating to Sub-Inspectors and Head Constables places only another limit of stay at a particular police station but does not prohibit their transfer within that period. So far as the provisions contained in paragraph 524 of the aforesaid Regulations are concerned learned Standing Counsel has urged that the said provisions only stimulates that Officer In charge of police station shall ordinarily be retained in their charges for at least two years. It is urged that the competent authority has ample jurisdic tion to transfer even an Officer Incharge of the police station within the period of two years on administrative exigencies. 21. The provision contained in Regulation 524 of the U. P. Police Regulation stimulates that officers incharge of police station shall ordinarily be retained in their charges for at least two years. The word ordinarily can have different shades of meaning. It seems to me that this expression has not been urged in the aforesaid Regulation in the sense that there can be no exception. The word ordinarily can have different shades of meaning. It seems to me that this expression has not been urged in the aforesaid Regulation in the sense that there can be no exception. As observed by the Full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Municipal Board, Kanpur v. Janki Prasad, reported in AIR 1973 All 433 , the word ordinarily does not mean permanently nor does it mean universally. It also does not mean generally. It seems to me that it should not be taken to mean invariably or always. It leaves sufficient margin of discretion with the competent authority and gives a certain amount of elasticity to the Regulation whereunder the discretion contemplated therein can be exercised depending upon the circumstances and the exigencies of the situation on adequate grounds. 22. The provision in Regulation 524 clearly draws a distinction between Officer Incharge of a police station and subordinate officer at police station. Regulation 43 of the Regulation provides that the officer-in-charge of a police station is a Sub-Inspector within the limits of his charge he conducts the police administration and has authority over all branches of the force. He is responsible for the efficiency of his subordinates in regard to the ^various duties which stand cast upon them. 23. The provision contained in Regulation and relating to subordinate officers at a police station which requires their transfer for good reason has to be read along with the provisions contained in paragraph 520 of the Regula tions relating to Sub-Inspectors and Head Constables who may be continued in a particular district up to a period of nine years and ten years respectively and in a particular, police station up to a period of three years and five years respectively. These provisions are not at all attracted in the case of an Inspector or an Officer Incharge of a police station. 24. A transfer as in the present case, is an incidence of service. Such orders are passed in exercise of the discretionary executive jurisdiction taking into consideration the exigencies of the administration. Being an administra tive decision in exercise of power in subjective terms by a competent authority, it is to be presumed to have been made in good faith and on relevant consideration unless established to the contrary. 25. Such orders are passed in exercise of the discretionary executive jurisdiction taking into consideration the exigencies of the administration. Being an administra tive decision in exercise of power in subjective terms by a competent authority, it is to be presumed to have been made in good faith and on relevant consideration unless established to the contrary. 25. In any view of the matter, the provisions contained in paragraph 524 heavily relied upon by the petitioner do not envisage recording of good reasons in the transfer order itself. Moreover, in the present case the petitioner has filed only the copy of the consequential order not that of the main order of transfer. Nothing has been disclosed as to what prevented his filing the same. The contention raised by the petitioner in this regard is, therefore, not acceptable, in the aforesaid view of the matter. 26. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance upon the decision of a learned Single Judge in the case of Kkhusi Ram Arya v. Director of Education, U. P. , Allahabad, reported in A!ld. CJ 482 in support of the writ petition urging that an order of transfer made on allegations of reports is an order by way of punishment and cannot be sustained. He further relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State o/u. P. v. Sheshmani Tripathi reported in 1992 All CJ 74 wherein it has been observed that if an officer is transferred merely because a com plaint is made against him it cannot be called a valid transfer. This decision was noticed in another Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Regional Manager v. Pradeep Gael reported in 1992 (1) AH CJ 274 wherein after clarifying the entire legal position and nothing that what is of the essence in a decision in its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made therein it was observed that in that particular case the transfer order had been quashed on the ground that it had been passed in an arbitrary manner without there being any valid basis. In this connection it may further be noticed that is observed by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of U. P. v. Sheshnarain Tripathi, (Civil Appeal No. 1856 of 1992, decided on 27-4-1992 where imme diate and prompt action is required one of the remedies is transfer. 27. It may further be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh Bhatt reported in 1993 (Supplement) JT (SC) 485 had observed that it is entirely for the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting. It was further observed that ordinarily the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer. It was further observed that the High Court is not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a matter where on the face of it no injustice was caused. 28. It appears from the record that the petitioner had submitted a representation on 26-2-1994 addressed to the authority which had passed the impugned order seeking the recall of the said order setting forth various grounds for the same. A true copy of the said representation has been filed as Annexure 9 to the rejoinder affidavit. The learned Standing Counsel representing the respondents has stated that the aforesaid representation is still pending and has not been disposed of on account of the pendency of this writ petition. 29, In the circumstances indicated hereinabove, no justifiable ground has been made out for interference in the impugned order, while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. However, the respondent No. 2 is directed to consider and dispose of the representation of the petitioner referred to hereinabove within a period not later than one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him. There shall, however, be no order as to cost. Petition dismissed. .