ORDER S.K. Dubey, J. 1. This revision petition is directed against the order of bail imposing conditions, dated 19-12-1994 passed in B. A. No. 3559 of 1994 by the Fifth Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior. 2. Facts giving rise to this petition are these - On a report lodged by the complainant, Dr. Sadhna a case under Sections 498A and 406, Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, has been registered at Crime No. 43 of 1994 by Police Station Mahila Thana, Padav, Gwalior against the petitioner, his wife Dr. Puspalata and his son Dr. Arvind, the husband of Dr. Sadhna. According to the complainant after marriage on 8-2-1992 at Gwalior Dr. Sadhna was subjected to cruelty on a demand of 5 tolas of gold and Rs. 1.50 lakhs for getting Dr. Sadhna admitted to M. S. Gynecs in College at Bangalore (Karnataka) and another Rs. 1.50 lakhs for opening a nursing home. That demand was, however, not met and, therefore, the complainant, Dr. Sadhna was being treated with cruelty from time to time by her husband and in-laws. Ultimately, Dr. Sadhna came back to Gwalior on 27-6-1994 and thereafter lodged a report at Police Station, Padav. On 13-12-1994 the petitioner was arrested and so also his wife Dr. Puspalata. The petitioner is a retired Dean of Veterinary Sciences, Mathura and an old man of 67 years. The petitioner applied for bail which was granted on an added condition that the petitioner shall hand over medical books, clothes, ornaments and other articles- as per the list and cash to Police Station, Padav, on 30-12-1994. It is this onerous condition which has been challenged in this revision as arbitrary and illegal. 3. The petitioner contends that as the petitioner was in jail, the petitioner's counsel was not instructed to make a statement to return all the articles mentioned in the list. Even if the petitioner's counsel has stated so, such a condition cannot be imposed on the petitioner as it does not fall within the purview of the conditions enumerated in Section 437(3), Criminal Procedure Code which are to be imposed, while granting the bail. It is also submitted that the petitioner tried to return the medical books and the clothes of the complainant, but she refused to take. 4. Shri J.P. Gupta, Sr. It is also submitted that the petitioner tried to return the medical books and the clothes of the complainant, but she refused to take. 4. Shri J.P. Gupta, Sr. Advocate with Shri Raghuvir Singh, counsel for the petitioner, Shri J. D. Suryavanshi, Government Advocate, for the State and Shri Arun Pateria with Shri Aditya Ballabh Tripathi, Counsel for the complainant are heard. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it is true that while granting bail, the various considerations such as nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, the circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, the reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at trial, apprehension of Investigating Agency to proceed with the investigation fairly and properly, larger interest of the public and/or the State and similar other considerations which arises when a Court would ask to admit an accused on bail in a non-bailable offence. However, the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. There are only two material conditions for grant of bail - whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering the evidence, while considering a case for bail and if it is made out for grant of bail. The onerous condition, like the one imposed in the present case would virtually amount to denial of bail and, therefore, such a condition cannot be imposed. Not only this, as the present case is under Sections 406 and 498A, Indian Penal Code, it amounts to compelling the petitioner to produce evidence against himself through the terms under the order of the Court which is violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. It further amounts to taking away the personal liberty of the accused as such a condition has no sanction of law behind it. Hence, discretion so exercised is arbitrary and fanciful, capricious and is contrary to law. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a catena of decisions such as Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ; Babusingh and Ors. v. State of U. P., AIR 1978 SC 527 ; Motiram and Ors. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a catena of decisions such as Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ; Babusingh and Ors. v. State of U. P., AIR 1978 SC 527 ; Motiram and Ors. v. Stale of M. P., AIR 1978 SC 1594 ; Gudikanti Narasimhalu v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1978 SC 429 ; Hussain Ara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, AIR 1979 SC 1360 ; Free Legal Aid Committee v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 SC 1463 ; Keshab Narain Banerjee v. State of Bihar, AIR 1985 SC 1666 ; Ram Sahodar v. State of M. P., 1985 MPLJ 722 (DB); Sakariya v. State of M. P., 1991 MPLJ 878 ; Shaik Layak v. The State, 1981 Cri.L.J. 954 (AP); Inderjit Laherilal Verma v. The State of Maharashtra, 1986 (I) Crimes 169 (Bombay); Koli Tikaram Jiory and Anr. v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1969 Guj. 69 . 6. Shri Arun Pateria, learned counsel for the complainant supported the order and contended that in the offences against women, which are growing and for which the Parliament has thought fit to make special law, if the accused is released casually, people's confidence will be shaken, therefore instead of refusing bail the condition was imposed. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in case of Badri Prasad v. State of M.P., 1993(2) MPJR 249 . The condition relating to return of articles and ornaments, cash etc. in dowry cases, cannot be said to be illegal as it will fall within clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 437 which lays down that a Court may impose a condition which is otherwise in the interest of justice. 7. Shri J.D. Suryavanshi, Government Advocate fairly conceded that such a condition in the eye of law cannot be imposed. 8. To appreciate the contentions it would be appropriate to look to Section 437(3) and Section 439 of the Code, which I quote : "437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. - (1)........... (2)........... 7. Shri J.D. Suryavanshi, Government Advocate fairly conceded that such a condition in the eye of law cannot be imposed. 8. To appreciate the contentions it would be appropriate to look to Section 437(3) and Section 439 of the Code, which I quote : "437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. - (1)........... (2)........... (3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit any such offence is released on bail under sub-section (1) the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers necessary - (a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, or (b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or (c) otherwise in the interests of justice." ** ** "439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. - (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct. - (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section, (b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified : Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person, who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. (2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody." 9. (2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody." 9. A bare look to Section 439 and Sub-section 437(3) of the Code shows that it gives power to High Court and Court of Session to admit an accused of a non-bailable offence in custody to be released on bail if the offence is of nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section, that is, in order to ensure that such person shall continue to appear in accordance with the bond executed under this Chapter or in order to ensure that such person, shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is an accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or otherwise in the interest of justice. Therefore, it would be evident that there is a wide power in the Court to impose any conditions which are considered necessary for the purposes mentioned in the three clauses of sub-section (3) of Section 437. The discretion vested in the Court in imposing conditions particularly in the light of clause (c) of Section 437(3) is of a wide amplitude to take in its sweep the facts and circumstances of any case in which the Court grants bail. However, wise and unfettered the discretion may be, it is the discretion which is to be exercised judicially by a Court. It is well settled that the discretion of a Court of justice means sound discretion guided by law and governed by rule and not by humour, whim or caprice. Judicial discretion cannot be arbitrary or vague or fanciful. It is required to be used with due care and caution. In fact, an awareness of the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its use, is the hall-mark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion. See, Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 ; Jalsinghan v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 and Ram Sahodar's case (supra). 10. See, Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 ; Jalsinghan v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 and Ram Sahodar's case (supra). 10. In the backdrop of the settled position of law for exercising the judicial discretion and the fact that the law presumes an accused to be innocent till guilt is proved, an accused is entitled to all the fundamental rights guaranteed to a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of India which lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Personal liberty is precious and the Courts have to zealously guard it against any onslaught from any quarter. Subtle inroads into this valuable right under the cover of legal power or procedural requirement have to be vigilantly watched and averted whenever it is found that such inroads are not strictly in accordance with the procedure established by law. Deprivation of personal liberty by detention before proof of guilt is permitted in the Code of Criminal Procedure not as a measure of possible punishment for the offence alleged but only to ensure fair and proper investigation and trial. Deprivation of personal liberty does not merely mean complete deprivation; even partial deprivation is deprivation. Any restraint on personal liberty of an accused who has been granted the bail, should indisputably be in accordance with the procedure established by law. The conditions that can be imposed should not be such as to render the very order of bail nugatory nor can conditions be imposed in derogation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to an accused person under the Constitution. 11. Article 20(3) of the Constitution provides that "no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself". While the discretion of the Court in imposing conditions under Section 437(3), Criminal Procedure Code, is unqualified, as pointed already, it is a judicial discretion and it is to be guided only by settled principles of law. An accused can shut his mouth in the course of an investigation. It is no part of the duty of an accused to help the Investigating Agency in collecting evidence against him. An accused can shut his mouth in the course of an investigation. It is no part of the duty of an accused to help the Investigating Agency in collecting evidence against him. The duty of the Investigating Officer and his right are to collect evidence and he has no power to compel an accused to aid him in the investigation so as to prove the alleged guilt of the accused person. Certainly, a discovery can be made at the instance of the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but an accused cannot be compelled to produce incriminating articles. When an accused cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, how the Court while granting bail, under Section 437(3) may impose conditions beyond the purposes mentioned in the three clauses of sub-section (3). Imposition of conditions under Section 437(3), does not mean that a Court can impose conditions which have no reference at all either to the provisions of law or Constitutional guarantee available to an accused person. The condition that a Court can impose would only be for the purposes of ensuring proper and fair investigation which cannot be impeded or hampered by the fact of the accused being at large. Conditions can be imposed for securing the attendance of the accused as and when required either by the Investigating Officer or by the Court. Conditions can be imposed for securing the right of the Investigating Agency to proceed with the investigation fairly and properly. Conditions can also be imposed to secure a fair trial by the witnesses who may be examined during the trial being free and uninterfered with by the accused. Any condition which has no reference to the fairness or propriety of the investigation or trial, cannot be countenanced as permissible under the law. In imposing conditions, while granting bail to an accused person, the Courts must be extremely chary and see that they maintain a balance between the personal liberty of the accused and the investigational rights of the police. The conditions should not be such as might enable an unfair advantage to the accused or to the Investigating Agency. An essential requirement in the imposition of any condition is that it should result in minimum interference with the personal liberty of the accused and the rights of the police to investigate into the case. The conditions should not be such as might enable an unfair advantage to the accused or to the Investigating Agency. An essential requirement in the imposition of any condition is that it should result in minimum interference with the personal liberty of the accused and the rights of the police to investigate into the case. It would not be permissible for the Court, while granting bail to direct an accused person that he should aid the investigating officers by accompanying them to any particular place. A condition may be imposed that the accused should make himself available for interrogation by the police as and when required. The Court, however, cannot give a direction that the accused should truly answer all the questions that may be put to him by the police, even if the answers should incriminate him. It would not also be open to the Court to direct an accused person to show the place or places wherefrom the police can recover the properties concerned in a case. It would not also be open to the Court to direct an accused to make a confession before a Magistrate as from the remand report it is disclosed that the accused person had already confessed before the police. Such directions would be beyond the discretionary power provided under Section 437(3), Criminal Procedure Code. See, Shaik Layak's case (supra). 12. The Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Nath Sharma v. Khalil Khan, 1988 All. L.J. 105, has held that grant of bail is not like a commodity to be bargained about by the Court with the accused. It is clearly beyond the competence of the Courts to indulge in such bargaining while granting bail to the accused. The accused cannot be subjected to any conditions other than that contemplated in Section 437(3), Criminal Procedure Code. The Courts must refrain from contracting a bargain with the accused while granting bail. A duty is cast upon Courts to ensure that the conditions imposed on the accused are in consonance with the intendment and provisions of Section 437, Criminal Procedure Code. The Courts must refrain from contracting a bargain with the accused while granting bail. A duty is cast upon Courts to ensure that the conditions imposed on the accused are in consonance with the intendment and provisions of Section 437, Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the Court held that for an offence under Section 14-A of the Panchayat Raj Act and under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, the Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have directed the accused to hand over charge of office of Pradhan after his election was set aside, to the officer concerned within 10 days of his release on bail, or he would be liable to pay Rs. 4000/- to Government as penalty, as such a condition is outside the purview of Section 437(3), Criminal Procedure Code. 13. In the case in hand, even though the counsel for the petitioner, while the petitioner was in Jail might have stated that all the articles which are said to be in trust with the petitioner and of which a breach of trust is said to have been committed, shall be handed over to the complainant, this condition cannot be imposed as it is outside the purview of the three clauses under Section 437(3) of the Code and amounts to compelling the petitioner to give evidence against himself as it would be an incriminating evidence relating to the offence registered against him. Moreover, it would amount to giving a decision without investigation, inquiry or trial. Therefore, the condition so imposed cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. 14. However, as the offence alleged against the petitioner and other accused persons is of breach of trust and the petitioner's counsel before the Court stated that the articles including ornaments and cash, mentioned in the list shall be handed over to the complainant by 30-12-1994, I am of the view that to ensure if in case the offence is proved against the petitioner, those articles including ornaments and cash shall be returned to the complainant, and for that the petitioner may be directed to furnish a security so that after the trial is over and if the petitioner is found guilty of the offence, the Court may direct the return of the articles to the complainant, as it is her Stridhan, which cannot be misappropriated by the husband or his relatives. For that I take support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 628 . 15. The petitioner shall furnish the security within a period of 15 days from today before the Competent Court or where the petitioner furnished the bail-bonds. 16. In the result, the revision is allowed in the manner aforesaid and the order imposing the condition of return of articles is quashed.