Judgment S. K. HOMCHAUDHURI, J. 1. With the consent of the parties, this petition is heard on merit at the admission stage and is being disposed of. 2. 2. This petition is directed against the order dated May 24, 1995, passed by respondent No.3, the Commercial Tax Officer, Investigation Bureau, Ranchi Circle, Ranchi, imposing penalty of Rs.1,48,300.29 on the petitioner under section 33 (5) (b) of the Bihar Finance Act (hereinafter mentioned as "the Act" ). A copy of the impugned order is annexed as annexure 4 to to the petition. In an amendment application, the petitioner has also impugned the order dated May 29, 1995, passed by respondent No.3, rejecting the petitioners application for release of the goods seized by respondent No.3 on furnishing security as provided under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983 (hereinafter mentioned as "the Rules" ). 3. 3. The petitioners case is that he opened and inaugurated a shop on April 26, 1995, for carrying on the business of ready-made garments, hosiery wears and school uniform of the students. At the time of opening the shop the petitioner purchased some goods locally valued at Rs.6,913.66 and thereafter during the period from May 15, 1995 to May 20, 1995, the petitioner purchased the goods worth Rs.3.5 lacs from Calcutta and transported the same to Ranchi and the goods so transported from Calcutta reached Ranchi on May 23, 1995. Petitioner brought the said goods to his shop in the morning of May 24, 1995 and that during arranging those goods/garments purchased from Calcutta, around 11.45 a. m. on May 24, 1995, the officers of the Commercial Tax Department as well as the Investigation Bureau came to inspect the petitioners shop and asked the petitioner to produce the documents of the purchased goods. As the relevant documents of purchase of the goods had been lying in his residence, the petitioner requested the officer to depute a person with him to bring the documents from his residence for the production thereof. As the relevant documents of purchase of the goods had been lying in his residence, the petitioner requested the officer to depute a person with him to bring the documents from his residence for the production thereof. But his request was turned down and the officers of the Commercial Tax Department as well as the Investigation Bureau seized the goods purchased from Calcutta and prepared a seizure list and arbitrarily fixed the price of the seized goods at Rs.6,20,000 and thereafter served a notice on the petitioner asking him to show cause by 2 p. m. on the spot as to why penalty under section 33 (5) (b) of the Act, should not be imposed for his failure to account for the goods. Respondent No.3 within few minutes of issuance of the show cause notice, passed the impugned order imposing a penalty of Rs.1,48,300.29 on the petitioner in the exercise of power under section 33 (5) (b) of the Act. 4. 4. Petitioners further case is that the impinged order has been passed arbitrarily and illegally without giving any reasonable opportunity to him to show cause and of being heard, in violation of principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Petitioner filed an application on May 29, 1995, before respondent No.3 for release of the goods so seized on May 24, 1995, on furnising security as per the provisions of the Rules. 5. 5. This petition was filed on May 31, 1995. By interim order dated June 1, 1995, operation of the impugned order (annexure 4) was stayed and respondent No.3 was directed to dispose of the petitioners application dated May 29, 1995, on and before June 15, 1995. 6. On June 12, 1995, an application for modification of the order dated June 1, 1995, was filed by the respondents contending, inter alia, that the application filed by the petitioner on May 29, 1995, had already been disposed of on May 29, 1995, in the presence of the petitioners counsel, who moved application, but that fact was suppressed in the writ petition and also before this Court when the interim order was obtained on June 1, 1995. The petitioner in his rejoinder to the application for modification has stated on oath that petitioners counsel engaged to move that application, did not intimate hims about the order passed on the application dated May 29, 1995 and consequently he had no information about the order passed when this petition was filed on May 31, 1995 and moved on June 1, 1995. The petitioner has further contended that on June 1, 1995, when the petition was heard, respondent No.3 was present in court but did not instruct the learned Government Advocate about disposal of the application. The petitioner has also filed an application for amendment of the writ petition challenging the order dated May 29, 1995, passed by respondent No.3 on his application for release of the goods seized by the concerned authority. 7. 6. The respondents have filed counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit, the respondents have contended that the petition is premature inasmuch as the petitioner has adequate alternative remedy against the impugned order by way of preferring appeal before the higher authority under the provisions of the Act. The respondents have contended that on May 24, 1995, during the course of inspection, the petitioner could not account for the huge stock of goods in his shop except of the goods worth Rs.6,913.66. The petitioner not having accounted for the goods valued at Rs.6,12,558, it was normally presumed that the goods valued at Rs.6,12,558 was kept unaccounted for evasion of tax and consequently in exercise of power under section 33 (5) (a) of the Act, the goods were seized. The respondents have further contended that before imposing penalty, the petitioner was given opportunity to show cause under the provisions of the Act and the Rules and the impugned order imposing penalty was passed in accordance with law and does not suffer from any infirmity. 8. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate. 9. 8. 8. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate. 9. 8. The respondents in their counter-affidavit have not denied the statements of the petitioner on oath that when the respondents asked the petitioner to account for the stock of goods, the petitioner told the officers of the Commercial Tax Department and the Investigation Bureau that the relevant documents in support of the purchase of gods, were lying in his residence and requested them to depute one person to go with him for bringing the said documents from his residence and production thereof but that opportunity was not given to the petitioner. The respondents have also not disputed the statement of the petitioner on oath that after preparation of seizure list, the petitioner was asked to show cause on the spot by 2 p. m. on that date and thereby he was given only few minutes time to show cause as to why the penalty as contemplated under section 33 (5) (b) of the Act, should not be imposed. 10. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order was apparently passed without giving any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to satisfy the concerned authority that the goods found in the shop during the inspection, were purchased from Calcutta and goods were valued at Rs.3.5 lacs, by bringing the relevant supporting documents from his residence. The petitioner was also not given reasonable opportunity to show cause before imposition of penalty. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of East India Transport agency V/s. State of Bihar reported in [1995] 97 STC 222. In that case, time of one day was granted to show cause. This Court found that time of one day to show cause could not be considered as a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing. In the instant case, undisputedly, only few minutes time was given to the petitioner to show cause as to why the penalty shall not be imposed under section 33 (5) (b) of the Act. This Court found that time of one day to show cause could not be considered as a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing. In the instant case, undisputedly, only few minutes time was given to the petitioner to show cause as to why the penalty shall not be imposed under section 33 (5) (b) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted tat under section 33 (5) (c) of the Act, the authorities seizing the goods, are bound to release the seized goods on furnishing security of the amount equivalent to three times of the amount of tax payable on the value of the goods and, as such, rejection of the petitioners application dated May 29, 1995 for release of the goods on furnishing security as per the provisions of the Rules, by the impugned order dated May 29, 1995, is arbitrary and illegal. 11. 10. Learned Government Advocate, on the other hand, submitted that the decision in the case of East India Transport Agency [1995] 97 STC 222 (Pat) has no application on the facts of the present case inasmuch as in that case, penalty was imposed by invoking sub-sections (2b) and (3) of section 31 of the Act and the petitioner in that case was entitled to reasonable opportunity of hearing, as contemplated under sub-rule (1) of the rule 19 of the Rules. But in the instant case, proceeding being under clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 33 of the Act, petitioner was entitled to reasonable opportunity of hearing under sub-rule (2) of rule 19 of the Rules, which provides that the person proceeded against may be required to rebut the accusation and to have his say forthwith. 12. 11. To appreciate the rival contentions, it is appropriate to have a look into the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules - which are set out below : 13. 12. 11. To appreciate the rival contentions, it is appropriate to have a look into the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules - which are set out below : 13. " Sec.33 (5) (a) - An authority referred to in sub-section (1) shall have the powers to enter into and search any office, shop, godown or any other place of business or any building or place of the dealer, or of a dalal, or of an owner of a warehouse, or of a clearing, booking or forwarding agent, or of a person transporting goods carrier and seize any goods which are found therein but not accounted for by the dealer or the dalal, or the owner of the warehouse, or the clearing, booking or forwarding agent, or the person transporting goods in his books, accounts, registers and other documents : 14. Provided that a list of all the goods seized goods seized under this sub-section shall be prepared by such officer and be signed by the officer, the dealer or the person in-charge of goods or the person incharge of premises, and not less than two witnesses. 15. (b) The authority referred to in clause (a) shall in a case where the dealer or the person in-charge of goods as mentioned in clause (a) fails to produce any evidence or satisfy the said authority regarding the proper accounting of goods impose a penalty, after allowing an opportunity of hearing in the prescribed manner to the dealer or such a person which shall be equal to three times the amount of tax calculated on the value of such goods and the goods shall be released as soon as the penalty is paid. 16. (c) If the dealer or the person in-charge of goods as mentioned in clause (a) demands time for production of necessary documents in support of proper accounting, the authority referred to in clause (a) shall release the goods on the condition that the dealer or such a person deposits a security equivalent to three times the amount of tax calculated on the value of the goods. 17. (d) If penalty imposed under clause (b) is not paid forthwith or no security is furnished as provided in clause (c) or the goods are not claimed by any person the authority referred to in clause (a) shall arrange for the safe custody of goods. 18. 17. (d) If penalty imposed under clause (b) is not paid forthwith or no security is furnished as provided in clause (c) or the goods are not claimed by any person the authority referred to in clause (a) shall arrange for the safe custody of goods. 18. " Rule 19 : Opportunity of hearing.- (1) The authority referred to in rule 18 shall, in the matter of a proceeding under sub-sections (8) and (9) of section 16 sub-section (2) of section 19, sub-section (1) of section 20, sub-section (3) of section 26, sub-section (3) of section 321, sub-section (3) of section 32 and section 50, serve or cause to be served upon the person proceeded against a notice which shall contain a gist of the accusations, a date of hearing which shall in no case be more than 15 days from the date of issue of notice and the time of hearing. 19. (2) An authority appointed under section 9 but not below the rank of the Commercial Taxes Officer shall, in the matter of a proceeding under clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 33 or section 35, shall serve or cause to be served upon the person proceeded against a notice containing the same particulars as notice under sub-rule (1) subject, however, to the condition that the person proceeded against may be required to rebut the accusation and to have his say forthwith. " 20. 12. Although sub-rule (2) of rule 19 provides that in the matter of a proceeding under clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 33, the person proceeded against may be required to rebut the accusation and to have his say forthwith, the term "forthwith" cannot be taken literally. The opportunity of hearing is not an empty formality and/or a mere ritual, but must be meaningful and reasonable sand fair and that reasonable time must be given to a party to show cause and to met the allegation. What should be the reasonable time, depends on the facts and circumstance of a particular case. If may according to circumstances - days, week or weeks. What should be the reasonable time, depends on the facts and circumstance of a particular case. If may according to circumstances - days, week or weeks. In this connection, it is appropriate to refer to pages 101 and 102 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner - wherein it is observed" "a reference to the power of a court being exercisable at any time thereafter will receive a literal construction. But where something is to be done forthwith by some person or body, a court will not require instantaneous compliance with the statutory requirement". "forthwith", Harman L. J. has said, "is not a precise time and, provided that no harm is done, forthwith means any reasonable time thereafter, and so may, according to the circumstances involved action within days or years. " 21. 13. Undisputedly, after the petitioners shop was raided by the officers of the Commercial Tax Department and the Investigation Bureau at 11.45 a. m. on May 24, 1995, the petitioners request to depute someone along with him to bring the relevant documents in support of purchase of the goods found in the shop, from his residence, was turned down and that a show cause notice was served on the spot asking the petitioner to show cause by 2 p. m. on that date and the petitioner hardly got few minutes time to show cause before penalty was imposed by the impugned order. No harm world have been caused in the proceeding, if the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to bring the relevant documents from his residence to satisfy the authorities that the goods found in the petitioners shop during inspection, were actually purchased by him from Calcutta and transported to Ranchi and he received the goods only on that date. No harm would have been also caused if the petitioner was given reasonable time to show cause against the proposed imposition of penalty. From the undisputed facts and the circumstances of the case, it becomes apparent that the opportunity of hearing given to the petitioner was mere a formality and mechanical ritual. That being so, the impugned order of imposing penalty is vitiated by denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to show cause and of being heard and as such, cannot be sustained. 22. 14. That being so, the impugned order of imposing penalty is vitiated by denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to show cause and of being heard and as such, cannot be sustained. 22. 14. For the reasons stated above, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated May 24, 1995 (annexure 4), imposing penalty on the petitioner, is set aside. However, liberty is granted to the respondents to pass order afresh in accordance with law in th light of the observation made above after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to show cause. Respondents are further directed to release the petitioners goods so seized, on May 24, 1995, on his furnishing any mode of security as contemplated under rule 39 of the Rules. 23. GURUSHARAN SHARMA, J.- I agree. 24. Petition allowed.