Judgment S. N. Jha, J. 1. -tn these writ petitions the petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the Special Director (Secondary Education) in exercise of the appellate power under Sec.28 of the Bihar State Madarsa Education board Act, 1981 (Act 52/82) (here in after referred to as the Act) on the ground, inter alta, of lack of jurisdiction. The point being common they are disposed of by this common order. 2. The Act provides for constitution of Bihar State Madarsa Education board (in short-the Board) as an autonomous body for development and better supervision of Madarsa Education. Sec.7 lays down the powers and functions of the board. Sec.13 enumerates the powers of its Chairman. Sec.28 provides for appeal against the orders passed by the Boald and the Chairman It also prescribes the forum of appeal, namely the State government. The State Government has authorised the Special Director (Secondary Education) to hear and decide appeals under Sec.28 vide notification No.280 dated 11th March 1993 of the Education Department. The point urged is that the statute having created the forum of appeal and vested the appellate powers in it, in the absence of any provision permitting delegation of powers and functions, the authorisation is ultra vires. 3. It is well settld that an appellate function, even where the appeal is from an administratiue order and the appellate power is vested in another administrative authority is a quasi judicial function. Reference may be made to the case of Hari Nagar Sugar Mills Ltd. V/s. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1868. lt is equally well settled that a function which is a quasi judicial in nature cannot be delegated to another person or body unless such delegation is authorised by the statute expressly or by necessary implication. 4. On behalf of the respondents attention was drawn to the Bihar State madarsa Education Board Control (Appeal) Rules.1983 framed Purportedly under section 27 of the Act vide Notification No.269 dated 11th March 1983 (hereinafter referred to a the Rules), laying down the procedure of filing and manner of disposal of appeals under Sec.28 of the Act. Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the Managing Committee or any person aggrieved b the order of the Board or its Chairman can prefer appeal before the authority as may be authorised by the State Government under notification. Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the Managing Committee or any person aggrieved b the order of the Board or its Chairman can prefer appeal before the authority as may be authorised by the State Government under notification. Notification no.260 dated 11th March 1993 (supra) authorising the Special director. Secondary Education to hear the appeals has been issued under the said Rules. 5. Section 27 of the Act under which the Rules have been framed empowers the State Government to give direction to the Board as may be necessary to achieve the objects of the Act, to call upon the Board to furnish necessary information or explanation for the above purposes etc. The rule making power has been conferred upon the State Government under Section 25. which runs as follows ; 26. Power of the State Government to make Rules :- (1) The State government may by notification is the official gazette make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act, and (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this Act, such rule may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely :-It may be stated that sub-section (2) enumerates as many as 13 topics. It docs not specify filing and manner of disposal of appeal under Sec.28. The point is whether omission to specify particular matter or topic disables the State Government to frame rules with respect thereto. In other words, whether the State Government is not competent to frame rules with respect to such a matter under sub-section (1) for carrying out the purposes of the act. It should be kept in mind that if the statute provides for appeal, it would only be logical to say that the rules have to be framed to make the appellate provision meaningful and effective. The point is well settled by catena of decisions. 6 In the case of Emperor V/s. Sibnath Bonerji, AIR 1945 Privy Council 156, the Federal Court had struck down Rule 26 of the Defence of India rules as being beyond the rule, making power conferred upon the Central government under Sec.2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939. Sec.2 of that Act empowered the Contral Government to make rules as might appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, public safety, maintenance of public order ete. Sec.2 of that Act empowered the Contral Government to make rules as might appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, public safety, maintenance of public order ete. The subjects with respect to which the rules could be framed were specified in sub-section (2) "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (I)". Their lordships observed (at page 160 of the Report ). "the function of Sub-section (2) is merely an illustrative one ; the rule making power is conferred by Sub-section (1), and the "rules" which are referred to in the opening sentence of Subsection (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under Sub-section (1); the provisions of Sub-section (2) are not restrictive of Sub section (1), as indeed is expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by Sub-section (1)". The decision of the Privy Council was followed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In Samtesh Kumar Join y. State, AIR 1951 Supreme court, 291, the Cpurt while considering the validity of the Sugar and Sugar produce Control Order 1947 issued by the Provincial Government of Bihar in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Sec.3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Power) Act, 1946 by virtue of the dalegation of the powers of the Central Government to make orders in relation to food stuffs under section 3 (2) (j) of that Act, stated. It is manifest that Sub-section (2) of section 3 confers no further or other powers on the Central Government than what are conferred under Sub-section (I), for it is "an order made thereunder that may provide for one or the other of the matters specifically enumerated in Sub-section (2) which are only illustrative, as such enumeration is "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (i)". In the case of Afzmal Ullah V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh the same question was agitated in relation to cartain bye-laws framed by the municipality. In the case of Afzmal Ullah V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh the same question was agitated in relation to cartain bye-laws framed by the municipality. The court referred to the case of Sibnath Bonerji and stated that even if the clauses of Sec.29s of the U. P. Municipalities Act referred to in the bye laws did not justify the impugned bye-law, there can be little doubt that the said bye-law could be justified by the general power conferred on the Board by Sec.298 (1 ). It was observed that it is now well settled that specific provisions, such as, are contained in several clauses of Sec.29s (2) are meraly illustrative and they cannot be read as restrictive of the generality of the power prescribed by Sec.298 (1) It was also observed that the validity of the provisions must be tested by reference to the question as to whether the Board has the powers to make the provisions. If the power is otherwise established, the source and the source of the power is incorrectly and inaccurately enumerated would not make the bye-laws invalid. In Sudarshan Mineral V/s. Co. Union of India, AIR 1975 Supreme Court, 946, again the point came to be considered in the context of the rule making power of the State under Sec.13 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulations and Development) Act, 1957. Clause (c) of Sub-rule (l)of rule 27 was impugned as being ultra vires on the ground that it transgressed the rule making power under Sec.13 (2) (g) of the Act. The Court observed, "as is well settled the power to made rules in regulating grant for prospective licences and mineral leases in respect of minerals and for the purposes connected therewith if it is issued in Sub-section (1) of Sec.13, sub-section (2) merely illustrates the nature of the power It does not restrist the general power under Sub-section (1)". The Court observed, "as is well settled the power to made rules in regulating grant for prospective licences and mineral leases in respect of minerals and for the purposes connected therewith if it is issued in Sub-section (1) of Sec.13, sub-section (2) merely illustrates the nature of the power It does not restrist the general power under Sub-section (1)". The same view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of K Pamnathan V/s. State of Tamil nadu I AIR 1995 Supreme Court 660] and Ajay Canu V/s. Union of India [air 198-A Supreme Court 2027) In the latter case the question was whether rule 4984 of the A. P. Motor Vehicles Rules requiring driver of moter cycle or scooter to put on a helmet was in excess of rule making power Section 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 empowered the State Government so make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect provisions of this Chapter. Subsection (2) enumerated the matter "without prejudice to generality of the foragoing power. "the argument was that clause (3) of Sub-section (2) of section 91 empowering the State Government to make rules for the prevention of danger, injury or nuisance to the public or any person or of danger or injury to property or of obstruction to traffic did not cover the abovesaid rule. The argument was rejected observing even assuming that rule 498-A does not come within the purview of clause (1) of sub-section (2) of Sec.91, contains illustration and does not in any way restrict the general power under Sub-section (1 ). Thus, even assuming that Rule 498-A is not covered by clause (I) of Sub-section (2) it is quite immaterial inasmuch as such a rule can be framed in exercise of a general power under Sub-secsion (1) for the purposes of carrying into effect Chapter vi relating to control of traffic. 7. Sant Saral Lal V/s. Parsuram Sahu [air 1988 Supreme Court 1852] is a converse case on the point. The High Court on construction of the provisions of Rule 3 (3) of the Bihar Money Lenders Rules 1938 and contents of the prescribed from of Registration Certificate (Form II) had negatived the claim of the plaintiff-money lenders beyond Rs 6999/-as, accofding to it. in view of the said provisions it could not transfer money lending business in excess of the amount mentioned in the certificate. in view of the said provisions it could not transfer money lending business in excess of the amount mentioned in the certificate. The Supreme Court did not agree with the conclusion of the High Court. It held that Sec.27 empowers the State Government to prescribe, inter alla, the form of the registration certificate and the particulars to be contained in the application for registration but the rule making power of the Government does not extend to the fixation of any upper limit for the loan remaining out standing at any particular time. In that connection it was observed (at page 1985): "it is significant to note that rule making power given to the State government is not prescribed in the usual form i. e. , is not to the effect that the State Government may make rule for the purpose of the Act. The rule making power is limited to what stated in els. (a) to (e) of Sec.2? and these clauses do not empower the State Government to prescribe the limit upto which the loans advanced by money lenders are to remain outstanding at any particular moment of time. " In other words, according to the Supreme Court, had the usual clause that the Government may make rule for carrying out the purposes of the Act been there, mentioned in the section, it would have been competent to the government to also prescribe the upper limit, as menioned in the certificate. 8. It may be stated that in all the cases cited, above except, to course, the case of Sant Saral Lal the Act conferred power to the Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and the topics with respect to which the rules could be framed were specified "without prejudice to generality of the rule making power of the Government", as in the instant case The supreme Court has thus consistently held that the enumeration of subjects is merely illustrative in nature and does not restrict the general power of the government to frame rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the i983 Rules relating to filing and manner of disposal of appeals fall within the ambit of rule making power of the state Government. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the i983 Rules relating to filing and manner of disposal of appeals fall within the ambit of rule making power of the state Government. Ia other words, the State Government was competent to frame rules and make provisions regarding delegation of the appellate functions. 9. Ordinarily, a power which involves exercise of discretion is not to be delegated. The ordinary rule again is that a quasi judicial function cannot be delegated unless delegation is permissible exeressly or by necessary implication. [vene V/s. National Deep Labour Board, (1936) 3 All Edn. Rep. .9391. Halsbury in his Laws of England [vol. I, 4th Edn. para 32] states. "in accordance with the maxim delagatees non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised by the body or officer in which whom it has been confided unless sub-delagation of the power is authorised by express words or by necessary implication. There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative, judicial or disciplinary as impliedly outhorising sub delegations and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind. " The Supreme Court, however, said in Barium Chemicals Ltd. V/s. Company Law Board [air 1967 supreme Court 296 at p.312] observed. "but the maxim "delegation non potest deegare" must not be pushed so far. The maxim does not embody a rule of law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other instrument conferring an authority. Prima facie, a discretion conferred bv a statute on any authority is intended to be exercised by that authority and by no other. But the intention may be negatived by any contrary indications in the language scope or object of the statute. The construction that would best achieve the purpose and object of the statute should be adopted. " 10. I have said above that neither the competence of State Government to frame rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act can he disputed nor the validity of the 1983 Rules caa be questioned as being ultra vires the rule making power. Now Rule 3 contemplates delegation. Delegation of the appellate function, therefore, must be held to be permissible by necessary implication. Now Rule 3 contemplates delegation. Delegation of the appellate function, therefore, must be held to be permissible by necessary implication. The jurisdiction of the Special Director (Secondary Education)to decide appeals under Sec.28 of the Act, therefore, cannot be questioned and the orders passed by her, impugned in these writ petitiones, cannot be said to be bad on that ground. The result is that I do not find any merit in the writ petitions which are, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to cost. Petition dismissed.