JUDGMENT - Bhairavia V.H., J.:—This petition is purported to be filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for quashing and setting aside the order of extension of time for the conclusion of the chapter proceedings passed by the Special Executive Magistrate, Girgaon Division, Bombay dated 6-6-1994 and further, the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gr. Bombay in Revision Application No. 328 of 1994 dated 8-8-1994. 2. The petitioner is a resident of Bombay having owned some immovable property known as Bramhanwadi, situated at Dr. D.B. Marg, Bombay. This property consists of 300 rooms occupied by the tenants. It is submitted that this property has been purchased by the petitioner and his relatives in 1989 and by virtue of the sale transactions, he became the owner of said Bramhanwadi property along with other co-owners. It is submitted that because of some dispute regarding the right of tenancy and occupancy between the petitioner-owner and the tenants, counter complaints have been filed against each other. Some civil proceedings were also initiated against the tenants for eviction of the rental premises occupied by the tenants. It is submitted that some of the tenants have filed complaints against the petitioner in the Police Station. It also reveals from the petition that about 11 criminal complaints were alleged to have been filed during the period from 1989 to 1993. All the complaints were regarding non-cognizable offences. Because of this bunch of complaints, the Senior Inspector of Police initiated proceeding under section 107 of Chapter-VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code and the prosecution has been lodged in the Court of Special Executive Magistrate, Girgaum Division, Bombay. The enquiry proceedings were initiated, on 19-11-1993. Thereafter, the show cause notice was issued on 10th December, 1993 to the petitioner, calling upon him to appear before the Court on 14th December, 1993. It is submitted that accordingly, the petitioner appeared before the Court. The case of the petitioner was registered as Court case No. 10 of 1993. On perusal of the report submitted by the Externment Officer of Dr. D.B.Marg Police Station, the learned Magistrate by his order dated 10th December, 1993, directed the petitioner to execute an interim bond under section 116 sub-section (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The case of the petitioner was registered as Court case No. 10 of 1993. On perusal of the report submitted by the Externment Officer of Dr. D.B.Marg Police Station, the learned Magistrate by his order dated 10th December, 1993, directed the petitioner to execute an interim bond under section 116 sub-section (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner challenged that interim order by filing Criminal Writ Petition No. 238 of 1994 and execution of the interim order was stayed by the order of this Court dated 23rd February, 1994. However, it reveals from the record that the said petition came to be disposed of as become infructuous on 15-4-1994. Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings in the Court of Special Executive Magistrate was continued. It reveals from the Roznama that right from issuance of the show cause notice i.e. 14-12-1993 to 19-5-1994, no evidence came to be recorded by the learned Magistrate and the case was being adjourned from time to time for the reason best known to the learned Magistrate. It is submitted that as the enquiry could not be completed within six months under sub-section(7) of section 116 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the statutory time was to be expired, the externment officer moved with an application on 6-6-1995 for extension of time for further six months for completing the enquiry. It is submitted that the said application (Exh.'D') purported to be submitted to the Court for extension of time behind the back of the petitioner-opponent and it also reveals from the record that the learned Magistrate was pleased to pass an order behind the back of the petitioner on the same day, extending the time for six months further for completing the enquiry under section 116 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is submitted that the petitioner was not supplied the copy of the said application presented by the Senior Police Inspector for extension of time. Further, it is submitted that the learned Magistrate has not heard the petitioner-opponent before passing the impugned order. It is submitted that the petitioner filed an application on 15th June, 1994, for placing on record the position of automatic termination of the enquiry on the expiry of 6 months i.e. within the statutory period, but no order was passed on that application. It is submitted that the petitioner filed an application on 15th June, 1994, for placing on record the position of automatic termination of the enquiry on the expiry of 6 months i.e. within the statutory period, but no order was passed on that application. It is further submitted that on 22nd June, 1994, the petitioner submitted another application, requesting the certified copy of the order passed on the application dated 15th June, 1994 and the Roznama of the proceedings but it was not supplied to him and on utter surprise, he received a copy of the order dated 6-6-1994 regarding the extension of time on 23-6-1994. Thereupon immediately, the petitioner presented an application to the Court on 23-6-1994 (Exh. 'H') stating that the copy of Roznama demanded by the petitioner has been denied to him and also stating that despite five adjournments i.e. on 6-6-1994, 8-6-1994, 11-6-1994, 16-6-1994 and 22-6-1994, no order of extension of time was given to the petitioner. It reveals from the record that application dated 23-6-1994 presented by the petitioner in the Court does not figure in the Roznama. It is submitted that thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision application in the Court of Session for Greater Bombay under section 116(7) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was the specific allegation of the petitioner therein that the order regarding extension of time dated 6-6-1994 was passed without hearing the petitioner and in support of this averment, the learned Advocate Mr. Merchant who appeared on behalf of the petitioner-opponent before the Special Executive Magistrate, filed an affidavit inter alia, stating therein that as the chapter proceeding's time was over on 10-6-1994, till 14-6-1994, the learned Special Executive Magistrate has not passed the order of extension and as the six months time expired on 10-6-1994, the chapter proceedings automatically came to an end from 10-6-1994. Therefore, he filed application on 15-6-1994. It is further stated in para 9 of his affidavit that no application for extension of time for further six months was presented to the learned Magistrate on 6-6-1994 by the Senior Inspector of Police, D.B. Marg Police Station. He has also denied that the learned Special Executive Magistrate heard him from 6-6-1994. The Revision Application No. 328/94 came to be rejected by the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 8th August, 1994. He has also denied that the learned Special Executive Magistrate heard him from 6-6-1994. The Revision Application No. 328/94 came to be rejected by the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 8th August, 1994. Hence this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and also purported to be under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 3. Heard the learned Counsel Mr. Soochak for the petitioner. The crucial point involved in this petition is regarding the date of commencement of proceedings under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the expedition of the statutory time of six months came to an end. After that period, the order of extension of time for six months for continuing the enquiry under section 107 would be justified and legal for the purpose of exercising the power under section 107 r/w. 116 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Counsel Mr. Soochak for the petitioner emphatically submitted that the order of extension of time dated 6-6-1994 is bad-in-law as it is passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and no special reasons were recorded for extension of time as required under section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code. No special reasons were also recorded for extension of time. The proceedings under Chapter VIII of Criminal Procedure Code was initiated on 19-11-1993 by the Senior Police Inspector in the Court of Special Executive Magistrate and the Court was pleased to issue show cause notice on 10-12-1993 under section 111 read with section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, calling upon the petitioner-opponent to appear before the Court on 14-12-1993 and accordingly, he appeared before the Court and the interim order regarding obtaining the security bond was also passed by the learned Magistrate. In pursuance to the show cause notice, the petitioner appeared before the Court on 14-12-1993. These are the relevant dates for the purpose of deciding the issue in this writ petition. 4. The preliminary objection of the learned A.P.P. Mr. Mirajkar is that the High Court cannot go into the question in writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed in revision by the Sessions Court unless the order is apparently perversed. 4. The preliminary objection of the learned A.P.P. Mr. Mirajkar is that the High Court cannot go into the question in writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed in revision by the Sessions Court unless the order is apparently perversed. The learned Public Prosecutor emphatically submitted that the enquiry proceedings deemed to be commenced from the date of show cause notice dated 10-12-1993 and therefore, the order regarding extension of time passed by the learned Magistrate on 6-6-1993 is before the expiry of six months and in view of this factual position, it is submitted that this petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. It is not possible for me to accept the arguments of A.P.P. The crucial point involved in this petition is regarding the actual date of initiation of proceeding under Chapter-VIII. Section 116(6) reads as under:- “The enquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.” 6. The date of commencement of the enquiry is to be considered in the light of the consistent view taken by this Court and by the other Courts while deciding the identical question. The learned Counsel Mr. Soochak cited several authorities on this point but need not be cited all before this Court. In the case of (Raj Kapoor and others v. State (Delhi Administration) and others)1, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 258 regarding limitation of inherent powers it has been observed that “Inherent powers-Exercise of- Limitations-Revisional powers whether bars exercise of inherent powers-Rejection of application under section 482 on ground that revision lies-Revision also not entertained on procedural technicality-Not proper.” 7. The next contention is regarding the commencement of inquiry under section 116. This Court has observed in the case of (Dwarkanath Ramchandra Angachekar and others. The next contention is regarding the commencement of inquiry under section 116. This Court has observed in the case of (Dwarkanath Ramchandra Angachekar and others. v. The State of Maharashtra and another)2, 1977 Cri.L.J. 120, thus:- “Having regard to the provisions of section 112 and sub-section (1) of section 116 and the fact that a summons procedure is prescribed for an enquiry by sub-section (2) of section 116 it would appear that in the case of a person who is present in Court when the order under section 111 is passed, the said order must be read over to him and the substance thereof explained to him if so desired by him, on that very day and, therefore, the enquiry in his case shall be deemed to have commenced on that very day irrespective of the fact whether the Magistrate records his plea or not. In the case of an opponent who is not present in Court when the order made under section 111 is passed, but whose presence is secured by a summons or a warrant, as provided under section 113, it would appear that since there is nothing to prevent the Magistrate from reading the accusations to him and recording his plea on the very day when he so appears or is brought before the Magistrate and on the other hand there is a legislative mandate to proceed to inquire into the truth of the accusation on the happening of such an event it would appear that, irrespective of the fact whether the Magistrate records the plea of the opponent or not and irrespective of the fact whether the Magistrate proceeds with the inquiry or not, the inquiry in the proceedings must be deemed to have commenced against such a person on the very day when his presence is thus secured on the day fixed by the Court.” 8. In the instant case, admittedly, in response to the show cause notice dated 10-12-1993 the petitioner appeared before the Court on 14th December, 1993 and in view of this observation, the date of commencement of the enquiry is deemed to be the date of appearance of the petitioner in the Court on 14th December, 1993. In that case, the period of six months expires on 13th June, 1994. In that case, the period of six months expires on 13th June, 1994. If we read order dated 6-6-1994, passed by the learned Magistrate extending the six months period, obviously seems to be before the expiry of six months and in compliance with section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, but having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly the Roznama of the proceedings does not inspire my confidence to accept the date in question. It reveals from the record that the petitioner was present in the Court along with his Advocate on 6-6-1994 and in their presence, no such application for extension of time was presented before the Court and no such order thereon was passed. If such application would have been presented on behalf of the Senior Externment Officer, the Court should have obtained the endorsement of the opponent or his Advocate abdictedly. However, there is no such endorsement thereon. In my view, the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate is nothing but miscarriage of justice which deserves to be rectified by exercising the inherent power under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Advocate for the petitioner-opponent who appeared in the Court has categorically denied that no such application was submitted and no such order was passed there on 6-6-1994. Therefore, if we take the fact as it is, the application dated 6-6-1994 purported to be submitted for extension of time behind the back of the petitioner and the order passed thereon without hearing the petitioner, is in violation of principles of natural justice and on that count also, the impugned order is vitiated and is not binding on the petitioner. Further, the learned Special Executive Magistrate has not recorded any special reasons for extending the time for completing the enquiry under Chapter VIII of Criminal Procedure Code. This Court has taken view in the case of (Ghanashyam Natu and others. v. The State of Maharashtra)3, 1987 Cr.L.R. 242, that “It is clear that no proceeding, unless special reasons are recorded, can go on before the Executive Magistrate after the expiry of the period of six months.” 9. This Court has taken view in the case of (Ghanashyam Natu and others. v. The State of Maharashtra)3, 1987 Cr.L.R. 242, that “It is clear that no proceeding, unless special reasons are recorded, can go on before the Executive Magistrate after the expiry of the period of six months.” 9. In the case of (Salik Roy and others v. State of Bihar and another)4, 1984 Cri.L.J. 688, it has been observed that - “The extension of the life of the proceeding is not dependent upon the condition that only when any application is filed by any party, the life will be extended, but in absence of any extension of the period in accordance with law, the proceeding will come to an end automatically.” 10. In view of this clear and legal settled position, the order dated 6-6-1994 of the Special Executive Magistrate extending the time for further six months is set aside and deserves to be struck down. The order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in revision, rejecting the revision application of the petitioner is also required to be quashed and set aside. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order dated 6-6-1994, passed by the learned Magistrate at Exhibit 'D' and the order dated 8-8-1994 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gr. Bombay at Exhibit 'F' are quashed and set aside. Petition allowed. -----