Mr. P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) THE police file has been opened and seen by us during thecourse of the arguments. ( 2 ). An Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, vide his judgment dated 23/12/1989, has convicted the accused Sukhbir Singh for the offencepunishable under Section 394 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code andhad convicted the appellant-Jaivir Singh for the offence punishable under Section394 read with Section 34 and Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and vide hissubsequent order dated 8/01/1990, has sentenced Sukhbir Singh to threeyears rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500. 00 and in default to undergo onemonth rigorous imprisonment more and has sentenced the appellant-Jaivir Singhto undergo life imprisonment for offence punishable under Section 302 of theindian Penal Code and sentenced him to three years rigorous imprisonment anda fine ofrs. l,000. 00 and in default to undergo three months rigorous imprisonmentmore for the offence punishable under Section 394 read with Section 34 of theindian Penal Code with the direction that the substantive sentences shall runconcurrently. ( 3 ). Sukhbir Singh has not filed any appeal against his conviction and sentenceand it is only Jaivir Singh who has challenged his convictions and sentences byfiling the present apeal. ( 4 ). The case of the prosecution is that PW9 Vinay Arora, who was having ashop in Chandni Chowk, was residing in house No. 38,hemkunt Colony, Greaterkailash-l, New Delhi, at the relevant time and accused- Sukhbir Singh wasworking as an employee in his shop since some time prior to this occurrence andused to sleep at his house after performing his duties at the shop. The aged motherof Vinay Arora was living with him in the said place. It is the case of theprosecution that on 8/12/1987, Vinay Arora had left for Kanpur by trainfor some business and was to return after two days. He had come back to his housefrom Kanpur on 10/12/1987, at about 9 A. M. and had found his househaving been ransacked and discovered the dead body of his mother lying on thebed while Sukhbir Singh was found tied to a pillar in his drawing room and hismouth having been gagged. He had come back to his housefrom Kanpur on 10/12/1987, at about 9 A. M. and had found his househaving been ransacked and discovered the dead body of his mother lying on thebed while Sukhbir Singh was found tied to a pillar in his drawing room and hismouth having been gagged. He removed the gag from the mouth of Sukhbir Singhand Sukhbir Singh gave out that some persons had come during the interveningnight of 9th and 10th of December 1987 and had gained entrance in the houseon mentioning that they had come from Roamy, a friend of Vinay Arora. Sukhbirsingh tried to show that some unknown persons had committed the murder ofvinay Arora s mother, namely, Smt. Leelawati and had also robbed the house ofvarious valuables including some currency. The police were informed and on thestatement of Vinay Arora Ex. PW9/a, a case was registered at the Police Station. ( 5 ). It is the case of the prosecution that on De 12/12/1987, Sukhbir Singhand Jaivir Singh were arrested and on the disclosure statement by Jaivir Singh,from a room allegedly hired by Jaivir Singh in house No. 611/11, Lane No. 9,village Maujpur, Ghonda, recovery of cash of Rs. 12,551. 00 and certain goldenjewellery items, silver articles, an attache-case and an iron box and a basket wasmade. All these recoveries were proved through the statement of Vinay Arorawhich are Exs. PI to P33. Some of the blood stained clothes were also recoveredfrom that place. It is also the case of the prosecution that the appellant had alsomade a disclosure statement which led to the recovery of the knife from somebushes near the Nehru Market. The case property was sent to the Central Forensicscience Laboratory. One of the shirts recovered from the said room was foundto have human blood of the same group as the blood of the deceased. Both theaccused were then charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences. The appellant andsukhbir Singh had pleaded not guilty to the charges but the Additional Sessionsjudge had believed the circumstantial evidence appearing against the appellant aswell as Sukhbir Singh and had passed the impugned judgment and the order. Wemay mention that certain finger prints were lifted from the place of occurrencefrom various articles including jewellery box and almirah which was ransackedand the said finger print? were opined by the finger print expert to be those ofslikhbir Singh. Wemay mention that certain finger prints were lifted from the place of occurrencefrom various articles including jewellery box and almirah which was ransackedand the said finger print? were opined by the finger print expert to be those ofslikhbir Singh. It has also come out in evidence that sample finger prints ofsakhbir Singh and also of Jaivir Singh were taken by the experts when they werebrought before the said experts by the police on December 11, 1987. ( 6 ). The learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended thatimplication of the appellant on the basis of the evidence led has not beenestablished beyond doubt. She has REFERRED TO to disclosure statement allegedlymade by Jaivir Singh and has pointed out that the original disclosure statementon the face of it shows that the disclosure pertaining to the alleged knife wasincorporated after completing the full disclosure statement and the normal gapswhich appear in between different lines were not there in the last three lines whichpertain to the disclosure of the knife which appear to have been recorded aftercompleting the disclosure statement. She has also urged that the room fromwhich the recoveries had been affected was alleged to have a lock and a key andit is the case of the prosecution that it is the appellant who supplied the key with which the lock of the room was opened, but surprisingly neither the lock nor thekey have been taken into possession by the police and produced in this case. Shehas urged that according to the Investigating Officer, who arrested the appellant,he had carried out personal search of the appellant and had prepared the personalsearch memo Ex. PW14/b which reveals that no such key has been shown to berecovered from the appellant. She has urged that after arrest the appellant spersonal search had been taken and no key has been shown to be found on hisperson and the appellant remained in police custody all along. It is not understoodhow the appellant could have produced any key which opened the lock of thatrented room from where the recoveries were made. She has urged that the learnedadditional Sessions Judge has REFERRED TO to variouscircumstances which accordingto the Additional Sessions Judge have been well established and beyond shadowof doubt but most of the circumstances relied upon by the Additional Sessionsjudge are not based on any legal evidence. She has urged that the learnedadditional Sessions Judge has REFERRED TO to variouscircumstances which accordingto the Additional Sessions Judge have been well established and beyond shadowof doubt but most of the circumstances relied upon by the Additional Sessionsjudge are not based on any legal evidence. She has also urged that before takingthe house search for effecting the recoveries the Investigating Officer had not takenany steps to call any two respectable witnesses from the locality so that theprovisions of Section 100 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be complied with. ( 7 ). On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the State has argued that hugerecoveries had been effected of the valuables robbed from the house in question at the instance of the appellant and minor discrepancies appearing in the case orlapses made by the Investigating Officer should not destroy the main substratumof the prosecution case. He has argued that the landlord of the room which washired by the appellant has not only supported the prosecution case that on 8/12/1987, the appellant had hired that room for a specific purpose ofconcealing the robbed property in that room and recoveries had been effectedin presence of the said landlord who is an independent witness and thus, the saidrecoveries alone should be sufficient to bring home the offence to the appellant. He has also urged that the knife had been also recovered at the instance of the appellant and the evidence with regard to the same should be believed. ( 8 ). The learned Additional Sessions Judge has relied on nine circumstancesmentioned in para 36 of the judgment and we will deal with all the circumstancesin order to see whether the circumstances relied upon by the Additional Sessionsjudge have been established from cogent legal evidence available on the recordor not. CIRCUMSTANCE No. d) "that accused-Jaivir Singh and accused Sukhbir Singh hail from the samevillage and had come to Delhi insearch of job almost together. CIRCUMSTANCE No. d) "that accused-Jaivir Singh and accused Sukhbir Singh hail from the samevillage and had come to Delhi insearch of job almost together. Both theaccused used to work at the shops in Chandni Chowk, which were almostopposite to each other, lt was rather at the instance of accused-Sukhbir Singhthat accused-Jaivir Singh was employed by Satish Gupta, the owner of theshop at Chandni Chowk and as such Sukhbir Singh had revealed to Jaivirsingh about the wealth of the complainant and also the fact that whenever thecomplainant went out of Delhi in connection with his business, his oldmother remains all alone in the house. (This has been sufficiently provedthrough the testimony of PW-Vinay Arora and Satish Gupta ). " ( 9 ). We have gone through the statement of Satish Gupta PW6 and Vinayarora PW9 and we find that nowhere it is deposed by them that the appellant andsukhbir Singh had come from the same village in search of job almost togetherand it was at the instance of Sukhbir Sighgh that appellant was employed by PW6satish Gupta. There is not even a sentence appearing in their statements thatsukhbir Singh had revealed to the appellant about the wealth available at thecomplainant s house and that complainant whenever went out of Delhi inconnection with his business his mother alone remained in the house. It appearsthat the Additional Sessions Judge had perhaps looked into the detailed confessional statements of Sukhbir Singh and Jaivir Singh-appellant recorded by thepolice after their arrest for referring to these facts. The Additional Sessions Judgehas forgotten the law that confessional statements made by the accused in custodyof the police are not admissible unless and until such confessional statement ledto the disclosure of some fact and that portion of the statement alone which leadsto discovery of fact is admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Indianevidence Act. lt would have been proper for the Additional Sessions Judge to havescrutinized the evidence in order to see that only legal admissible evidence is reliedupon in order to decide whether a particular fact stands proved or not. In this firstcircumstance the Additional Sessions Judge has on the one hand REFERRED TO to thefacts which are. not proved by any legal evidence then had REFERRED TO to theinferences drawn treating them as facts proved on the record. In this firstcircumstance the Additional Sessions Judge has on the one hand REFERRED TO to thefacts which are. not proved by any legal evidence then had REFERRED TO to theinferences drawn treating them as facts proved on the record. When a case is basedon circumstantial evidence the duty of the Court is to see that each and everycircumstance is established as a fact on the basis of cogent and legal evidence andthereafter the Court has to see whether those circumstances which are soestablished lead to any inference or not pointing out the guilt of the accused. Ithas also to be borne in mind that the chain of circumstances should be so completeas to lead to one and the only inference that the accused is guilty of the offence. Any circumstance which leads to the inference that perhaps the accused is notinvolved would lead to breaking of the chain of circumstances. ( 10 ). Second circumstance relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge is to the following effect:circumstance No. (ii) "that two days before the occurrence, accused Jaivir Singh demanded somemoney from his employer Satish Gupta on the pretext that his sister hadcome from the village and he had to go to meet her sister and Satish Guptagave him RS. 100. 00 which was used by him as advance paid to the landlord atmaujpur for renting out the room. (This has been amply proved by thetestimony of PW3-Ram Chander and Satish Gupta-PW)" ( 11 ). Again we find that the Additional Sessions Judge has not scrutinizedthe evidence for recording these findings that that circumstance stands proved onthe record from the testimony of Ram Chander and Satish Gupta. As narratedabove, this is evident from the testimony of Ram Chander if he is to be believedthat the appellant had come to hire the room in his house on 8/12/1987 andhad given an advance ofrs. l50. 00 and the rent settled was Rs. 250. 00. Satish Gupta,on the other hand, has deposed that it was on 9/12/1987, that he had giventhe advance of RS. IOO. 00 to the appellant as the appellant had mentioned that hewas to meet his sister. So, obviously the advance payment received by theappellant on 9/12/1987, could not have been utilised by him for giving theadvance rent to the landlod PW3-Ram Chander. IOO. 00 to the appellant as the appellant had mentioned that hewas to meet his sister. So, obviously the advance payment received by theappellant on 9/12/1987, could not have been utilised by him for giving theadvance rent to the landlod PW3-Ram Chander. So, this circumstance which hasbeen relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge is not a circumstance whichcould point to the guilt of the appellant that he had hired the room out of themoney advanced to him by PW-Satish Gupta. ( 12 ). The third circumstance relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge is tothe following effect:circumstance No. (iii) "that accused-Sukhbir Singh knew as to when Vinay Arora was to returnand Jaivir Singh came to know as he was working at the shop opposite to theshop of Vinay Arora as well as from accused-Sukhbir Singh that Vinay Arorahad left for Kanpur and would be back after two days and this was the mostopportune moment for them to execute the plan. " ( 13 ). We find that the facts mentioned in this circumstance are not alluded to byany of the witnesses of the prosecution. These are perhaps the surmises which theaddtional Sessions Judge has drawn from some other facts improperly brought onthe record. So, he could not have treated this circumstance as proved on the recordby any cogent and convincing evidence led on the record. It was incumbent uponthe Trial Court to have first REFERRED TO to the facts which have been established onthe record on the basis of the legal evidence led before him. The inferences whichare to be drawn from the facts would have come later on. The inferences could notbe treated as the circumstances proved on the record. ( 14 ). The next circumstance relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge is to the following effect:circumstance No. (iv) "that the persistent interrogation of accused-Sukhbir Singh led to the arrestof accused-Jaivir Singh on 12/12/1987 and Sukhbir Singh took thepolice party to the shop at Chandni Chowk where accused-Jaivir Singh waspresent. " ( 15 ) IT appears that the Additional Sessions Judge was much persuded fromthe disclosure statement which was given by Sukhbir Singh which was not at alladmissible in evidence as the disclosure statement has not led to any discovery ofany fact which was not known to the Investigating Officer earlier. In this case it isevident from the perusal of the CFSL report Ex. In this case it isevident from the perusal of the CFSL report Ex. PW7/a that both, appellant aswell as accused-Sukhbir Singh had been brought by the police for taking their fingerprint impressions on December 11, 1987. So, it is evident that appellant as a suspectin this case was known to the Investigating Officer even on December 11, 1987. So,it cannot be said that disclosure statement of Sukhbir Singh had led to the arrestof appellant-Jaivir Singh. So, this circumstance being relied upon by theadditional Sessions Judge is not based on any admissible legal evidence and thus, has to be ignored. ( 16 ). The Additional Sessions Judge has then relied upon the following circumstance:circumstance No. (v) "that the accused left the house of the complainant in the early hours of themorning at about 4 A. M. on 10/12/1987, with a basket and attache-caseand hired the taxi and he was dropped at the Railway Station (Provedthrough the testimony of PWS-Nasib Chand, taxi driver, whose taxi washired by this accused ). " ( 17 ). So, it is the statement of Nasib Chand PW5, who is a taxi driver, whichhas been relied upon for holding that this particular circumstance stands established. PW5 was examined twice, once on 10/08/1988. At that time he statedthat at about 4. 20 A. M. on 10/12/1987, the appellant had come to his taxistand and lured the taxi for going to Railway Station and at that time he wascarrying Ex. PI basket containing some clothes and one attache case. Ex. P2 and heliad left him at the Railway Station. On the request of the defence, later on theadditional Sessions Judge had permitted this witness to be again examined aspw20 on 19/10/1989. His examination-in-chief was again carried on by theprosecution which was not required to be done because he was permitted to berecalled for further cross-examination, yet the Court permitted the prosecutor toexamine this witness again and in examination in chief a confusion worst confounded by deposing that it was sukhbir singh who hired the taxi that morning. In cross-examination he turned turtle and at first he stated that he wasnot in a position to identify that boy who had hired the taxi on that day but at onepoint of time he deposed that he earlier stated in Court rightly that it Was theappellant whi hired the taxi. In cross-examination he turned turtle and at first he stated that he wasnot in a position to identify that boy who had hired the taxi on that day but at onepoint of time he deposed that he earlier stated in Court rightly that it Was theappellant whi hired the taxi. This witness has subjected to necessarytrouble of coming to the Court again when his complete statement had beenrecorded on 10/08/1988. There was no reason for the Additional Sessionsjudge to have permitted his recalling and being examined as if he was a newwitness as PW20. Be that as it may, the testimony of this witness cannot be givenany importance in view of the fact that this witness must have seen the appellantonly in a casual manner when he took him as a passenger from his taxi stand to therailway Station. It is evident that Investigating Officer must have come to knowabout this fact during investigation. So, it should have been clear to the Investigating Officer that the test identification parade of the appellant would be necessaryfor testing the memory of PW5 Nasib Chand as to whether he would be able toidentify a passenger whom he had carried in his taxi on a particular morning. Butthe Investigating Officer appears to be not alive to this fact and he had accordingto the police record examined this witness on 12/12/1987 and had shownthe appellant to him. ( 18 ). In the State of Maharashtra v. Sukhde and Singh and Another, JT 1992 (4) SC73, the Apex Court has held that the direct evidence regarding identity of culpritscomprises of (i) identification for the first time after a lapse of considerable timein Court or (ii) identification at a test identification parade. In the case of totalstrangers, it is not safe to place implicit reliance on the evidence of witnesses whohad just a fleeting glimpse of the person identified or who had no particular reasonto remember the person concerned, if the identification is made for the first timein Court. In the case of totalstrangers, it is not safe to place implicit reliance on the evidence of witnesses whohad just a fleeting glimpse of the person identified or who had no particular reasonto remember the person concerned, if the identification is made for the first timein Court. It was observed that the test identification parade if held promptly andafter taking the necessary precautions to ensure its credibiity would lend therequired assurance which the Court ordinarily seeks to act on it and in the absenceof such test identification parade it would be extremely risky to place implicitreliance On identification made for the first time in Court after a long lapse of timeand that too of persons who had changed their appearance. ( 19 ). In the present case PW5, however, had deposed in Court that he wasexamined by the Investigating Officer after 15-20 days. It appears that it was notbrought to his notice by way of confrontation by the prosecutor that his statementwas recorded on 12/12/1981 and not after 15-20 days. Be that as it may,the shifting testimony of PW5 could not be relied upon in absence of any corroborative evidence to hold that in fact, he had given a taxi ride to appellant on thatcrucial morning. It is also not understood how PW5 could have been in a positionto identify Exs. p1 basket and P2 attache case for the first time when he appearedin the Court on 10/08/1988, when these goods were not put to him in the testidentification parade. The witness has not given any special features of the saidarticles which could have been retained in memory so that he could have beenin aposition to identify the same when appearing in the witness box after lapseof 8-9 months. One another fact which must be highlightd at this stage is that PW5has not deposed that he had seen the appellant coming out from the house ofvinay Arora. According to him, a boy had come to his taxi stand and hired the taxi. We are not told in evidence as to where that taxi stand is located and what is thedistance from the house of Vinay Arora and the said taxi stand. Be that as it may,we find that this particular circumstance has not been established beyondreasonable doubt from any legal evidence appearing in the case. ( 20 ). The Additional Sessions Judge has then relied upon the following. Be that as it may,we find that this particular circumstance has not been established beyondreasonable doubt from any legal evidence appearing in the case. ( 20 ). The Additional Sessions Judge has then relied upon the following. circumstances:circumstance No. (vi) "that the disclosure statement of accused-Jaivir Singh led to the discovery offactum of his having taken a room on rent only on 9. 12. 1987 i. e. two daysprior to this occurrence and from that room those very attache case, iron boxand basket were recovered. CIRCUMSTANCE No. (vii) "that from the basket and attache case etc. large number of silver utensils,cash of more than Rs. 12,000. 00 and large number of ornaments wererecovered pursuant to the disclosure statement of accused-Jaivir Singh. Allthese ornaments and silver utensils were the robbed properties belonging tothe complainant and his mother. "circumstance No. (ix) "that the recovery of the bloodstained clothes of the accused which he waswearing at the time of occurrence and which when sent to CFSL were foundto have the blood of the same group as that of the deceased. (Refer to CFSLreport Ex. PA and PB)" ( 21 ). In case these circumstances which have been pin pointed by theadditional Sessions Judge could be considered to have been established beyondreasonable doubt, perhaps we would have no hesitation in sustaining theconviction and sentences of the appellant. These were very material and crucialfacts which indicated that soon after the murder of the said lady and the robberywhich took place at her house, the appellant was found to be in possession of the robbed property and also blood stained clothes. But unfortunately for theprosecution the Investigating Officer had really blundered in this case. ( 22 ). Now we come to the evidence which is relied upon to prove these circumstances. ( 23 ). On 12/12/1987, it is alleged that appellant had made a disclosurestatement to the effect that he had hired a room in Maujpur and had kept therobbed property in that room and he could get the same recovered and then heis said to have led the police party to the house of PW3 and got recovered thecase property including the blood stained shirt of the appellant having the sameblood group as of the deceased. It is stated by the Investigating Officer PW17hukam Singh SI that he had arrested the appellant on 12/12/1987. It is stated by the Investigating Officer PW17hukam Singh SI that he had arrested the appellant on 12/12/1987. It is quiteevident from the evidence that appellant was available to the police from thedayof occurrence itself as he was taken to finger print expert on 11/12/1987,for taking his specimen finger print. Be that as it may, the Investigating Officerhad carried out the personal search of the appellant when he was arrested on 12/12/1987 and his personal search memoex. PW14/b was prepared. Thecontents of the said document do not show that any key has been recovered fromthe appellant. The appellant then is stated to have been taken to the house of PW3ram Chander and Ram Chander deposed that appellant had handed over a key tothe police and the police had opened the lock of the room from where the valuableswere recovered. According to the Investigating Officer, this appellant himself hadopened the lock from that key. The Investigating Officer has given a fantasticreason for not taking possession of the key when he took personal search of theappellant that the appellant had stated that he would open the lock of the said roomand he was allowed to keep the key but the Investigating Officer admits that he hadnot recorded this crucial fact either in the case diary or in the personal search memoprepared at the time of arrest of the appellant. It is also really surprising that it didnot strike the Investigate" Officer to take into possession the said key and the lockand produce the same during the evidence. This mystery of the key which couldhave solved the mystery of this crime has not been solved by us in this case. Thus,a very crucial piece of evidence due to incompetency of the Investigating Officerhas been allowed to disappear from the case. ( 24 ). The learned Counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice ajudgment given by the Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Singh and Another v. Stateof Madhya Pradesh and Another, AIR 1972 SC 1557 . The relevant facts pertaining tothat case were that two appellants and Hatesingh, who had been specificallynamed in the FIR and in the dying declaration, were arrested by the police the sameafternoon. Next day, i. e. on 11/01/1966, according to the prosecution, onsome disclosures made by the appellants, blood stained clothes were recoveredfrom the room in which the appellants lived. The relevant facts pertaining tothat case were that two appellants and Hatesingh, who had been specificallynamed in the FIR and in the dying declaration, were arrested by the police the sameafternoon. Next day, i. e. on 11/01/1966, according to the prosecution, onsome disclosures made by the appellants, blood stained clothes were recoveredfrom the room in which the appellants lived. A dagger was recovered from nearappellant No. l s father s house in Jaiheda. Human blood was detected on thesame and principally on this evidence the prosecution charged the appellant. Blood was also detected on the shirt of Hatesing and on that evidence Hatesinghwas also made a co-accused, ln the said case,it was found that the appellants wereliving in aroom close to the Police Station and they were arrested in the afternoonof 10th. It is observed by the Supreme Court that one should have expected thepolice to search the room immediately but it does not appear from the record thata search was made at the time. On arrest, the person of Gopalsingh was searchedand an iron key with an iron ring attached to it was found on his person, but thesame was not taken into possession and sealed by the police. It was held that it wasobvious that the police had the key at all time although the police Pancha witnessmadan Lalin that case claimed that appellant-Gopal singh produced the key withwhich the door of the room was opened next day at 2 P. M. The Supreme Court,however, held that as the key must have been in possession of the police at allrelevant time, in these circumstances the said recovery effected allegedly at theinstance of the accused was held to be doubtful. ( 25 ). The facts of that case to some extent are identical to this case. Here alsothe key which was used to open the lock of the particular room obviously wasavailable to the police at all time because police had not cared to take that key andget it sealed if the key was found on the person of the appellant when his personalsearch was taken. In this view of the matter the recoveries effected from that room,in our view, could not have been held to be at the instance of the appellant. Therehave also appeared some discrepancies as to which was the actual room hired out"to the appellant by PW3 Ram Chander. In this view of the matter the recoveries effected from that room,in our view, could not have been held to be at the instance of the appellant. Therehave also appeared some discrepancies as to which was the actual room hired out"to the appellant by PW3 Ram Chander. Ram Chander has stated that he wasreading in a house at some distance from another house in which he had given aroom on hire to the appellant. But while giving his residential address this witnesshas given the number of the same house from where the said recoveries had beeneffected. It is not brought out by the prosecution as to which was the other housewhere the appellant was residing. Ram Chander had admitted that there wereother tenants living in that house in which one room was allegedly let out to theappellant on 10/12/1987. None of those tenants has been joined by thepolice for investigation. The police surprisingly while carrying out house searchand for effecting recovery of the robbed property did not comply with theprovisions of law. As required by Section 100 (4) of the Code of Criminalprocedure, it was incumbent upon the police to have joined at least tworespectable persons of the locality before effecting the search in that house. Theinvestigating Officer stated in his evidence that he did not think it necessary to callany other person from the locality as at the time of the search of the house Ramchander PW3 was there who was residing in the locality and he was accompaniedalso by the complainant of the case. The Investigating Officer forgets that lawrequires joining of two witnesses of the locality and not one witness. He ought tohave made some efforts to join someone from the locality as witness before enteringthe said house for carrying out the search. The Investigating Officer had not caredto keep in view the requirement of law in that connection. For all these reasons,we have to come to the conclusion unfortunately that these recoveries aredoubtful and cannot be stated to have been effected at the instance of theappellant. CIRCUMSTANCE No. (viii) "that immediately thereafter accused Jaivir Singh took the police party tonehru Place and got the weapon of offence recovered, which was stainedwith little blood and earth. It has been opined in the post-mortem reportaswell as report of CFSL that the injuries found on the person of the deceased could be caused with this weapon. CIRCUMSTANCE No. (viii) "that immediately thereafter accused Jaivir Singh took the police party tonehru Place and got the weapon of offence recovered, which was stainedwith little blood and earth. It has been opined in the post-mortem reportaswell as report of CFSL that the injuries found on the person of the deceased could be caused with this weapon. " ( 26 ). The weapon of offence i. e. knife which is stated to have been recoveredfrom some bushes at a public place in the Nehru Place is sought to be Ilinked withthe appellant on the basis of the disclosure allegedly made by the appellant whichis portion A to A inex. PW14/c. We have seen the original disclosure statementand we find that it is a confessional statement which also includes disclosurestatement with regard to the valuables and it is recorded at the end of thedisclosure statement that the disclosure statement had been completed. Afterrecording these words, two and a half lines have been added mentioning thatappellant had thrown the weapon of offence in the hedge near the Nehru Placeandcould get the same recovered. The spacing between the lines of disclosuresatement which is there in the whole of the disclosure statement has been givena go by byinserting two and a half lines after completing the disclosure statement. A look at the original disclosure statement shows that in all probability thedisclosure with regard to the knife appears to have been inserted afterwards. Itis also to be mentioned here that the knife is stated to have been recovered fromthe bushes in a public place i. e. Nehru Place. It is not stated by the Investigatingofficer that at the time the knife was recovered from the bushes it stood concealedin the bushes and was not visible to the open eye. If that is so, such arecoverymade from an open public place cannot be given any important. (See Koraghaasiv. State of Orissa, 1983 SCC (Cri) 387 ). It must also be mentioned here thatsufficient blood was not detected on the blade of the knife for analysis to show thegroup of the blood appearing on that knife so that it could be linked with themurder of the said lady. So, this particular circumstance, in our view, also has notbeen established beyond reasonable doubt. ( 27 ). It must also be mentioned here thatsufficient blood was not detected on the blade of the knife for analysis to show thegroup of the blood appearing on that knife so that it could be linked with themurder of the said lady. So, this particular circumstance, in our view, also has notbeen established beyond reasonable doubt. ( 27 ). So, in view of the above discussion we find that the could not have been convicted on the basis of the evidence on the record which has been fully discussed by us above. ( 28 ). We allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentences of the appellant and direct that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case.