G. T. NANAVATI, C. J. ( 1 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has urged four contentions before us. ( 2 ) THE first contention is that the wakf board itself should have passed an order after the law committee conducted the enquiry and passed the order declaring that the appellant was not the mutawalli. In our opinion this contention is without any substance. Section 22 of the Wakf Act, 1954 provides for delegation of powers. It provides that the board may authorise any committee thereof to exercise any of its powers and duties under the act. It is not in dispute in this case that the law committee has been authorised by the board to hold an enquiry of this type. The law committee held an enquiry and decided that there was no evidence to show that the appellant was ever appointed as the mutawalli of the trust. The said decision according to us amounts to the decision of the board itself and therefore it was not required to be further approved or ratified by the board. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant based upon Section 15 of the act is in our opinion erroneous because once the function is delegated the decision of the delegatee becomes a decision of the original authority which has the power to delegate that function. Section 45 of the act also lends support to the view we are taking. It was however urged that the practice of the wakf board has been to pass fresh orders in all such matters. Even if that is so the order lawfully passed cannot be declared as illegal merely because there has been a departure from the practice followed so far. ( 3 ) IT was next contended that the law committee consists of three persons, but in this case only the chairman has signed the order and it has not been signed by the other two members; and hence the order should be regarded as illegal. In our opinion there is no substance in this contention also. The order sheet shows that the decision was taken by all the three members together and it was pronounced by the committee as a whole. Merely because the copy of the order is signed by only one person, namely, the chairman the decision of the committee cannot be said to be illegal. The order sheet shows that the decision was taken by all the three members together and it was pronounced by the committee as a whole. Merely because the copy of the order is signed by only one person, namely, the chairman the decision of the committee cannot be said to be illegal. Even if we assume that the decision is required to be signed by all the three persons the said omission would amount to irregularity only and will not result in invalidating the order itself. ( 4 ) IT was next contended that according to Rule 17 (7) of the rules, the inquiry officer has to pronounce a decision within 15 days from the date on which an inquiry is concluded. Though the word "shall" has been used in the said Rule, in our opinion it is only a directory provision and it has to be read as "may". There can be many reasons why the order cannot be pronounced within 15 days from the date on which enquiry is concluded. To invalidate the decision merely on that technical ground would not achieve any good purpose but will result into failure of justice. Therefore, the said provision will have to be regarded as a directory provision. It has to be interpreted to mean that as far as possible the decision should be pronounced within 15 days from the date of conclusion of the enquiry. Merely, because the decision is not given within 15 days, that non-compliance by itself will not render the decision null and void. Moreover, this point was not at all raised by the appellant before the learned single judge. We therefore do not know as to when the enquiry had commenced and on what date it was concluded. Therefore, we cannot say that the order was not pronounced within 15 days from the date of conclusion of the enquiry. If such a point had been taken the respondents could have explained whether it was in fact declared within 15 days or not and want was the reason for the delay. Therefore, this contention is also rejected. ( 5 ) IT was lastly contended that the committee had adopteddouble standard in receiving certain documents. If such a point had been taken the respondents could have explained whether it was in fact declared within 15 days or not and want was the reason for the delay. Therefore, this contention is also rejected. ( 5 ) IT was lastly contended that the committee had adopteddouble standard in receiving certain documents. The learned single judge after considering the evidence has pointed out that even if the documents produced by the other side were not taken into consideration, there was sufficient material before the committee and it supports the finding recorded by it. Therefore we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned single judge. ( 6 ) AS we do not find any substance in any of the contentions raised by the appellant, this appeal is dismissed. --- *** --- .