H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiffs second appeal from the judgment and decree dated 7th november, 1984 delivered by additional civil judge, (c. j. m. mandya) in regular appeal no, 93 of 1982 arising from the judgment and decree dated 1-9-1982 delivered by the learned munsiff, nagamangala in 6. s. No. 135 of 1974 dismissing the plaintiffs appeal and affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs suit in toto. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief axe that the plaintiff has filedthe aforementioned suit for relief of declaration of title as to the land in dispute mentioned in the schedule to the plaint as well as for decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants-respondents and their men, servants and agents as well as other persons from interfering in any manner with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff of the suit schedule land. It has also been prayed that in case the Hon'ble court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property on the date of suit, alternatively for possession of the suit schedule property from the defendant and for mesne profits. In other words, the decree for possession may also be granted. The property in dispute has been described in the schedule as under: the property situated at maddenahatti village, devalapura hobli, nagamangala taluk, bearing survey No. 92 (old survey No. 18) 1 acre 05 guntas, asst. 1. 45 ps bounded on the east by : 1st defendant's land; west by : chikkamma, mariyamma's land; north by: river; and south by: plaintiffs land. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff claimed himself to be the owner and in possession of the aforementioned land in the schedule on the basis of the grant made by the tahsildar, nagamangala, as per Order No. Gdr 29/66-67 and the grant of saguvali chit (title deed) dated 22-4-1966, the plaintiff claimed to be in possession and enjoyment by raising crops. The plaintiffs case had been that defendants had no title to the property mentioned in the suit schedule. But the respondents according to plaintiffs case without any right were trying to interfere with the plaintiffs possession over the land in suit as well as were trying to dispossess the plaintiff from suit land with an intention to grab the said land. But the respondents according to plaintiffs case without any right were trying to interfere with the plaintiffs possession over the land in suit as well as were trying to dispossess the plaintiff from suit land with an intention to grab the said land. The plaintiff has filed the above suit for the reliefs mentioned above. The defendants filed a written statement and denied the plaint allegations. The defendant did not admit the grant of the said land but instead put the defendants to strict proof of the alleged grant and delivery of possession therein. The defendants-respondents denied the allegations to the effect that the defendants were trying to interfere with the plaintiffs possession over the land belonging to the plaintiff. The defendants asserted that the defendants have been in the authorised possession of the land measuring 7 guntas i. e. , survey No. 18 of maddenahatti village. According to the defendants' case, the revenue authorities prepared a sketch in respect of 17 guntas of land in survey No. 18 in favour of defendant 1 and issued saguvali chit dated 30-5-1967 and on the basis thereof the defendant 1 claims to be the owner thereof in possession and enjoyment of the said land. The defendants asserted so far as this land is concerned, it has been granted to defendant i. e. , 17 guntas of land in survey No. 18, the defendant has been always in possession and enjoyment thereof and the plaintiff had not been in possession of the property in question. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain suit for injunction as the plaintiff is not in possession at this stage. It may be mentioned it is after this written statement, the plaint was amended and the relief for possession alternatively is prayed. By filing additional written statement, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff is not entitled for relief for declaration and possession. As according to the defendants, the plaintiff was not the owner of any portion of suit schedule property nor was entitled to the property. The suit had originally been decreed by the trial court by the judgment and decree dated 14th july, 1979 and from that judgment, it appears the regular first appeal had been filed in regular appeal No. 102 of 1979 and the appeal was allowed. The suit had originally been decreed by the trial court by the judgment and decree dated 14th july, 1979 and from that judgment, it appears the regular first appeal had been filed in regular appeal No. 102 of 1979 and the appeal was allowed. The judgment of the trial court had been set aside and thereafter the case was remanded to the trial court with directions contained in the judgment of the first appellate court i. e. , the principal civil judge, mandya, Sri C. N. Aswathanarayana Rao, prior to the remand, and the case being sent for trial, it appears, to the four issues, originally two as well as more issues were framed. The issues read as under:1. Whether the plaintiff proves his possession of 1 acre 5 guntas (1. 05) in survey No. 18 (old survey No. 92) of maddanahatti village ? 2. Whether the interference set up by the plaintiff is true? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of in junction ? ( 4 ) TO what reliefs the parties are entitled ?the two additional issues which were framed later on read as under:5, whether the plaintiff proves that he is the owner of the suit schedule property ? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit schedule property as prayed for ? 4. After remand, as mentioned earlier, it appears that the munsiff while dictating the judgment recast and amended the existing issue and the issues as amended read as follows: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves he is absolute owner of the plaint schedule land ? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is in lawful and exclusive possession of the plaint schedule land ? 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable ? 4. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? ( 5 ) THE trial court after perusal of the records held andrecorded the finding as under:"if the sketch ex. D-4 is accepted both the parties will get what they the extent of land what they get under the respective title deeds. For these reasons, I hold that the portion enclosed by letters abcde in ex. D-4 is the land allotted to the plaintiff. Once the suit land is identified, there is no difficulty to hold that the plaintiff is the owner of the portion marked as abcdef in ex. D-4". For these reasons, I hold that the portion enclosed by letters abcde in ex. D-4 is the land allotted to the plaintiff. Once the suit land is identified, there is no difficulty to hold that the plaintiff is the owner of the portion marked as abcdef in ex. D-4". ( 6 ) AFTER recording this finding, the trial court for the robserved as the plaintiff has given the northern boundary to the suit land as the river shimsa in ex. D-8, the commissioner stated that the space measuring 33 feet in width by side of the shimsa river was found reserved when the records of the taluk office were examined by him. The northern boundary given by the plaintiff is therefore incorrect. He is claiming his title over the reserve land also, reserve land which is situated towards the north of the suit land. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be granted a declaration of ownership over the suit land wherein the reserve land belonging to the government is included and as such it recorded a finding on issue No. 1 in negative. The lower appellate court recorded a finding that the first defendant is cultivating 17 guntas of land granted to him and he has not encroached any portion in the suit schedule land. The plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendants is in unauthorised possession of 6 guntas of land which the plaintiff claims to be in defendant's unauthorised possession. The court below further held the suit is not maintainable and the plaintiff is not entitled for the reliefs claimed in the suit. ( 7 ) HAVING felt aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 1st september, 1982, the plaintiff filed regular appeal No. 93 of 1982. The lower appellate court after having heard the plaintiff-appellant's counsel and having examined the records, affirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. It held that the court cannot come to the conclusion that 6 guntas of land which is shown in ex. P-10 the sketch overlaps the suit schedule land and the plaintiff fails to make out a case for interference of the judgment of the trial court. But it made criticism of the trial court's amending to issues when deciding the case. The two courts below have placed reliance on ex. D-4. P-10 the sketch overlaps the suit schedule land and the plaintiff fails to make out a case for interference of the judgment of the trial court. But it made criticism of the trial court's amending to issues when deciding the case. The two courts below have placed reliance on ex. D-4. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the plaintiff has come up in appeal. ( 8 ) I have heard the appellant's learned counsel, Sri Yoganarasimha and Smt. Bharathi Bhat holding brief for Sri B. Rudregowda, learned counsel for the respondents. On behalf of the appellant, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the court below atleast ought to have granted a decree of declaration of plaintiffs title over the suit land. He fairly submitted, as appears from the evidence of P. W. 5 as stated by the court below that defendant-respondent has been cultivating 17 guntas of land in survey No. 18 and he has never encroached or trespassed the plaintiffs land and the defendant did not encroach any portion of suit land. The learned counsel contended that decree for possession could not be granted but in the evidence it has come the defendant removed the crops and committed an ACT of trespass and therefore, the plaintiff was entitled for relief of declaration and injunction. The learned counsel further contended that ex. D-3 earlier had not been considered and at a later stage had not been properly considered. When commissioner's report was there, why dex. D-3 is ignored. It is submitted that ex. D-3 should -have been accepted. On behalf of the respondents, the appellant's contention has been challenged and contraverted. The scope of second appeal is a limited substantial question of law as framed. Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as under: (1) save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the high court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) an appeal may lie under this Section from an appellate decree passed ex parts. (2) an appeal may lie under this Section from an appellate decree passed ex parts. (3) in an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for the reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it if it is satisfied that the case involves such question". ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter, if the questions to be considered were the substantial questions of law as framed arises or not. The question of law that has been framed reads as under:" have the two courts below committed factual mistakes while considering ex. P-2, certified copy of the tippani, ex. P-6, ex. P-10 and exs. D-3 and d-4, the sketches relating to the subject-matter of the suit and come to an erroneous conclusion ?. ( 10 ) NO other questions were framed. As regards the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that decree for declaration should have been granted, it is well settled principles of law that the court has to decide the case as pleaded. One thing is to be taken note of that the courts below have held and declared that the plaintiff is the owner of the land marked as abcdef in ex. D-4. That it has determined the plaintiffs title in respect of the land but the declaration could not be granted. As the declaration has been claimed with reference to the boundaries mentioned in plaint and in which on the northern side, it is mentioned as river. The learned counsel emphatically submitted the river even that portion was to be excluded which was reserved, he submitted that whatever earmarked for the river is a river. As the declaration has been claimed with reference to the boundaries mentioned in plaint and in which on the northern side, it is mentioned as river. The learned counsel emphatically submitted the river even that portion was to be excluded which was reserved, he submitted that whatever earmarked for the river is a river. Therefore, in this case, the government has marked 10 guntas of land from the suit land of the plaintiffs claim and reserved that for the purpose of floods and submersion of water, etc. But in ordinary parlance, the description of northern boundary is mentioned as river. The plaintiff has not explained that thing either in the appeal or made any statement to that effect. That being the position, the court below opined that the plaintiff wanted to include that land which was lying in between the river in fact and the land granted to the plaintiff and therefore, the court below took the view that the declaration as claimed cannot be granted. But anyway the plaintiff has been held to be the owner of the land as defined vide ex. D-4 with reference letters abcdef. But the declaration as claimed was rightly not granted though the court had decided and by recording the finding impliedly granted the relief to the extent it could be granted. No doubt it has been fairly submitted that relirffor possession could not be granted. As regards the relief of injunction, no cause of action has been mentioned nor alleged in plaint that the defendants illegally cut the crops standing on the land belonging to the plaintiff. Had that been alleged by the plaintiff and defendant would have denied the same and the issue would have been framed whether the defendants illegally cut the crop of the plaintiff or crop standing on the land. No such issue having been pressed before the court below, the evidence if it is led cannot be looked into in view of the law laid down in the case of Siddik Mahomed Shah v. MT. Saran and others. The privy council laid it down that no evidence can be looked in respect of plea not raised in pleadings. This view has been followed with the approval of the lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Hiralal and others v. Badkulal and others. Saran and others. The privy council laid it down that no evidence can be looked in respect of plea not raised in pleadings. This view has been followed with the approval of the lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Hiralal and others v. Badkulal and others. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, the plaintiff has himself admitted that the defendants had never encroached upon the plaintiffs land and had been cultivating and using his own land and so no occasion did arise for grant of relief of decree of injunction and in my view the court below rightly refused the reliefs sought for by the appellant. The learned counsel submits that on ex. D-3 should have been relied upon instead of relying upon d-4 in light of deed. The courts below have dealt with that aspect of the matter and given reasons why ex. D-3 was not relied. That observations are contained at page 16 of the paper book and in the judgment of the trial court. In brief it may be taken that if ex. P-3 is accepted then the plaintiff will get 10 guntas of excess land than what he was entitled to as per ex. P-1 and the first defendant will get about 6 guntas less land then he claims one under ex. D-1 and further it does not represent correct facts but ex. D-4 represented what parties get under respective title deeds. The lower appellate court has also in this connection dealt with the matter and after having considered the reasoning given by the trial court observed that the trial court has not erred in relying on ex. D-4 as well as ex. D-8. The court below held that d-3 is not reliable and acceptable for the reasons mentioned therein. It may be noted that even if the concerned courts be taken to have committed a mistake and that comes within the scope of appreciation or misappreciation of evidence which does not come within the scope of second appellate courts jurisdiction under Section 100, C. P. C. the learned counsel submitted that there has been misreading of exs. D-3 and d-4. It is well settled principle of law under Section 100 of C. P. C. that it is not interpretation of every documents that involves question of law. D-3 and d-4. It is well settled principle of law under Section 100 of C. P. C. that it is not interpretation of every documents that involves question of law. It is only interpretation of document of title or document forming the basis of suit that may involve and give raise to question of law but of no other documents. It has been so laid down in the case of the Midnapur Zamindari Company Limited v. Uma Charan Mandal and others, that construction of documentary evidence produced by the parties unless it relates to deeds of title, the question of construction documents, other than the documents of title forming basis of the claim, ordinarily does not raise or involves the question of law. See also Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and others and Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao. ( 12 ) THUS considered, in my opinion, the second appeal is devoid of force and merits. As observed earlier the respondents were refused the declaratory decree as sought, but a clear finding has been that the plaintiff is the owner of the land demarcated by letters abcdef in old survey No. 18 new No. 92 as per report and map ex. D-4. The appellant has no real cause to file the second appeal as impliedly limited declaration has already been granted. The appeal is hereby dismissed subject to the above observations. The costs of second appeal are made easy. --- *** --- .