JUDGMENT - Lodha R.M., J.:—Heard Smt. K.V. Sirpurkar, learned Counsel for the applicant. Rule returnable forthwith. Shri K. S. Dhote, Additional Public Prosecutor, waives service on behalf of the State. At the request of both the learned Counsel, this revision application is heard and disposed of at this stage finally. 2. The first and foremost point which requires to be considered before I advert to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the applicant, is whether the lower Appellate Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has power to suspend the sentence or grant bail to enable the accused to prefer Revision Application before High Court after the appeal against the conviction and sentence has been decided. In large number of cases, it has been found that the Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge, the Joint Sessions Judge, or the lower Appellate Court as the case may be, suspends the sentence for some time even after disposal of appeal against the conviction and sentence to enable the accused to prefer Revision Application before High Court and obtain appropriate orders. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not confer any inherent jurisdiction on the lower Appellate Court to directly or indirectly suspend the sentence after decision of the appeal. Nor there is any specific power conferred on the lower Appellate Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure to suspend the sentence on decision of appeal against the Judgment of conviction and sentence. Obviously, the power of suspension of sentence can only be exercised if the Code of Criminal Procedure so permits and not otherwise. There is neither any power of suspension of sentence nor grant of bail implicit in the lower Appellate Court after decision of the appeal against the Judgment of conviction and sentence, nor such power is inherent. Once the lower Appellate Court hears and decides the appeal against the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, it becomes functus officio and ceases to have any power in the matter to suspend the sentence or grant bail even temporarily to enable the accused to approach High Court by filing revision application and to obtain appropriate orders from High Court. 3. 3. Smt. Sirpurkar, the learned Counsel for the applicant, however, submits that such power is vested in the lower Appellate Court and even after the appeal against the conviction and sentence is decided by the lower Appellate Court and the sentence is maintained or modified, the lower Appellate Court has power to suspend the sentence, and in that connection she relies upon the provisions of sections 386(e) and 389(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Shri Dhote, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that the lower Appellate Court does not have any power to suspend the sentence after the decision in the appeal, and exercise of such power by the lower Appellate Court is without any jurisdiction and does not flow from any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the powers of the Appellate Court and sub-section (e) thereof, referred to by the learned Counsel for the applicant, reads as under: “386. Powers of the Appellate Court.—After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears and the Public Prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may – (a) … … … (b) … … … (c) … … … (d) … … … (e) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper : Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement: Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal.” 5. A look at the said provision would, on its face, show that the power of the Appellate Court to make any amendment in the order passed by the trial Court or any consequential or incidental order, which may be found just and proper by the Appellate Court, refers to a stage at the time of disposal of the appeal and not after the appeal has been disposed of by the Appellate Court. As observed, the powers of the Appellate Court contained in section 386 refers to the powers of the Appellate Court at the time of hearing and deciding the appeal and no post-decision of the appeal. 6. Another section referred to by the learned Counsel for the applicant is section 389(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that provision reads as under: “389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail.— (1) *** *** (2) *** *** (3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall- (i) Where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment, for a term not exceeding three years, or (ii) Where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail, unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub-section (1); and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended. (4) *** *** 7. It may be observed that section 389 deals with suspension of sentence pending appeal and not after the appeal has been decided and disposed of. The very language used in sub-section (3) of section 389 provides that where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the said Court may suspend the sentence or grant bail if the case is so covered under sub-section (3), inasmuch as where such person, being on bail, is not sentenced to imprisonment exceeding three years or where such person has been convicted for a bailable offence and he is already on bail. Thus, under sub-section (3) of section 389, power is given to the trial Court to suspend the sentence or grant bail if the convicted person intends to prefer an appeal, on the conditions, viz., that such person being on bail has been sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding three years or such person has been convicted for a bailable offence and is on bail. Such power is not applicable to the Appellate Court after the appeal has been decided, disposed of and the conviction has been maintained or altered and the sentence has been accordingly passed by the Appellate Court. The power under section 389(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is exercisable by the trial Court, if the convict intends to file an appeal against conviction and sentences and the conditions in sub-section (3) are satisfied. 8. The learned Counsel for the applicant could not show any provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which empowers the lower Appellate Court to suspend the sentence after disposal of appeal arising out of conviction and sentence to enable the accused-convict to prefer Revision Application before the High Court and obtain appropriate orders. In this view of the matter, the lower Appellate Court is not empowered to suspend the sentence or grant bail in any form after the decision in the appeal by such Court to enable the accused to approach High Court in Revision Application. Thus while maintaining the conviction of the accused/applicant under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and affirming the sentence passed by the trial Court it was not proper on the part of the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur to suspend the sentence awarded by the trial Court and maintained in appeal or by giving time to the applicant to surrender to the bail bonds to enable the applicant to file present revision. 9. Smt. Sirpurkar, the learned Counsel for the revisionist, argued the present revision application as if she was arguing the appeal and read the entire evidence led by the prosecution to demonstrate that the evidence was not properly appreciated. The learned Counsel for the accused applicant also submitted that there are material contradictions in the evidence led by the prosecution, viz, P.W. 2 Anita (victim), P.W. 1 Chokha (father) and P.W. 4 Sita (mother). The learned Counsel for the accused applicant also submitted that there are material contradictions in the evidence led by the prosecution, viz, P.W. 2 Anita (victim), P.W. 1 Chokha (father) and P.W. 4 Sita (mother). The learned Counsel for the accused/applicant submitted that from the prosecution evidence it is established that the father of the accused and P.W. 1 Chokha were on enimical terms over the dispute about some platform and that on that count the accused/applicant has been falsely implicated. It is also urged by the learned Counsel that the first information report was lodged two days after the date of the incident and the explanation submitted by the time prosecution is inconsistent. Lastly, the learned Counsel contended that at the time of the incident, the accused/applicant was 17 years old and, therefore, looking to his age, character and antecedents, he should be extended the benefit of probation. 10. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the accused/applicant and in my view, the trial Court has rightly relied upon the deposition of P.W. 2 Anita and the minor contradictions here and there are not material and in any case not sufficient to discard the testimony of P.W. 2 Anita. The contradictions shown by the learned Counsel in the testimony of P.W. 2 Anita, P.W. 1 Chokha and P.W. 4 Sita are only on collateral facts and do not shake the trustworthiness of the said witnesses and the trial Court rightly found that the prosecution has been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. Since the Appellate Court was satisfied with the reasoning given by the trial Court, he did not deal with the evidence elaborately, but the observation made by the Appellate Court that there is no adverse circumstance in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 Chokha, P.W. 2 Anita and P.W. 4 Sita to disbelieve the prosecution story, appears to be proper after due consideration of the evidence on record. The concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below that the accused/applicant on 20-1-1991 at mouza Dahegaon sat on the chest of P.W. 2 Anita and pulled her to the ground, and sat on her chest with intention to outrage her modesty, is based on evidence on record. The concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below that the accused/applicant on 20-1-1991 at mouza Dahegaon sat on the chest of P.W. 2 Anita and pulled her to the ground, and sat on her chest with intention to outrage her modesty, is based on evidence on record. This Court while sitting in revisional jurisdiction under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not and cannot re-appreciate and re-apprise the evidence and the finding of fact recorded by the two courts below can only be interfered with if such findings are perverse or based on no evidence or suffer from any error of law. I am satisfied that the concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below holding the accused guilty for the offence under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code is based on evidence, warranting no interference by this Court. 11. The learned Counsel for the accused/applicant brought to my notice the School Leaving Certificate of the accused/applicant, which showed his date of birth as 14-3-1974. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor does not dispute the correctness of this certificate and that shows that on the date of the incident i.e. 20-1-1991, the accused/applicant was about 17 years old. Though the victim on the date of the incident was 14 years old and the act done by the accused/applicant was indecent and against the public morality, yet looking to the age of the accused/applicant and the fact that he is not previously convict or habitual offender, in my view, taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances, the accused/applicant deserves to be extended the benefit of probation under section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12. Consequently, this criminal revision is partly allowed. The conviction of the accused/applicant for the offence under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code is maintained. However, instead of directing the accused/applicant to suffer imprisonment immediately, it is ordered that he be released on probation on his furnishing a P.R. bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- for maintaining good behaviour and conduct for a period of two years. Order accordingly. Order accordingly. -----