S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ). The petitioner has by this C. R. A. challenged the legality and validity of the order passed below Exh. 19 in R. C. S. No. 474 of 1991 by the Civil Judge (J. D.), anand. The application is given under Order 1, Rule 10 C. P. Code for impleading the present petitioner as party-defendant on the premise that the present petitioner- navnitbhai Patel has by agreement to sell, dated 21-1-1991 agreed to purchase the parcel of land admeasuring 3 acres at a price of Rs. 60 lacs out of which he has paid amount of Rs. 5 lacs as earnest money. The said agreement is admittedly entered into with Patel Ambalal Kalidas-respondent No. 2 herein who is the father of respondent Nos. 3 and 7. The execution of agreement to sell is not in dispute before this Court. ( 2 ) ). It appears that thereafter Patel Rameshbhai Ambalal present respondent No. 1 instituted R. C. S. No. 474 of 1991 in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.), Anand for partition of joint family properties wherein he impleaded his father - Patel Ambalal kalidas as defendant No. 1. The parcel of land in dispute is bearing S. No. 71 admeasuring 20 acres and 24 gunthas situated at Anand-Vidyanagar Road. The agreement to sell is a registered agreement. Since the present petitioner came to know about institution of suit for partition wherein S. No. 71 is included as coparcenary property liable to partition, he applied to the trial Court under Order 1, Rule 10 of C. P. Code for the purpose of being impleaded as party- defendant as according to him he has enforceable legal right of specific performance of agreement to sell, he can also apply for return of earnest money as well as for damages arising from non-fulfilment of agreement to sell. It is his case that, therefore, he is necessary party, or at least proper party who has direct interest in one of the suit properties which is the subject-matter of partition in a suit filed by the son. It is his further case that suit for partition is collusive suit filed by one of the sons at the instance of the father. It is his further case that suit for partition is collusive suit filed by one of the sons at the instance of the father. It is his case that if the properties are partitioned and the property in question is given over in partition to party other than the father, his agreement to sell would be rendered unenforceable and a mere piece of paper. It is his further case that his remedy of specific performance of agreement and of recovering damages as well as remedy of recovering earnest money back from the father would also have been rendered meaningless. Therefore, he prayed before the trial Court that he is a necessary party who is required to be impleaded as party-defendant or in any case he is a proper party whose presence before the Court would help the Court in finally adjudicating upon the issue effectively without jeopardising the right of the third party. ( 3 ) ). Such an application is contested tooth and nail by filing reply at Exh. 40 whereby it was contended before the trial Court that the third party is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. It was also declared before the Court that the third party has also filed suit for specific performance being C. S. No. 292 of 1992 and therefore, also the application is required to be rejected. ( 4 ) ). The trial Court has by the impugned judgment and order, dated 28-4-1994 rejected the application, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner-third party is not a necessary party in a suit for partition filed by one of the sons against his brothers and father. The trial Court has in reaching the said conclusion relied upon the decisions of various High Courts. ( 5 ) ). Mr. S. J. Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-third party relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, reported in AIR 1958 SC 886 and contended that under Order 1 Rule 10 C. P. C. in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he should have direct interest in the subject-matter of litigation, whether it be the question relating to moveable or immovable properties. In the case before the Supreme Court the appellant instituted the case against the third respondent inter alia for a declaration that appellant was his lawfully married wife. The third respondent filed his written statement admitting the claim but on the same date respondent Nos. 1 and 2 made an application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of C. P. Code for being impleaded in the suit as defendants on the grounds that they were respectively the wife and son of third respondent and that they were interested in denying the appellants status as wife and the status of children as the legitimate children of the third respondent; that the suit was the result of collusion between the appellant and the third respondent and that if the appellant was declared to be lawfully wedded to the third respondent, the rights and interests of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the estate of the third respondent would be affected. The application was contested by both the appellant and the third respondent. The trial Court allowed the application and the order was confirmed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The question in the appeal before the Apex Court was whether the lower Court did not exceed their powers in directing the addition of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as party-defendants in the suit. His Lordship justice Mr. J. C. Shah speaking for the majority said that a declaratory judgment in respect of a disputed status will be binding not only upon parties actually before the Court but also upon persons claiming through them respectively. The Court laid down the law that in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. Where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character the rule of presence of direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the controversy. In cases covered by the statutory provisions of Secs. In cases covered by the statutory provisions of Secs. 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act the Court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant. If the Court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission the result of a declaratory decree on the question of status such as the controversy in that suit affects not only the parties actually before the Court but the generations to come and in view of that consideration the rule of present interest as evolved by case law relating to disputes about property does not apply with full force. A clear distinction has been drawn between suits relating to property and those in which the subject-matter of litigation is a declaration as regards status or legal character. In the former category the rule of present interest as distinguished from the commercial interest is required to be shown before a person may be added as a party. ( 6 ) ). The learned Counsel appearing for third party also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the recent case of Ramesh Hiranand Kundanmal v. The municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, reported in 1992 (2) JT 116 . After referring to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Razia Begum (supra) the Apex Court made pertinent observations in paras 5, 6 and 8 of the reported judgment which are required to be reproduced herein below :"5. It was argued that the Court cannot direct addition of parties against the wishes of the plaintiff who cannot be compelled to proceed against a person against whom he does not claim any relief. Plaintiff is, no doubt, dominus litis and is not bound to sue every possible adverse claimant in the same suit. He may choose to implead only those persons as defendants against whom he wishes to proceed though under Order 1 Rule 3 to avoid multiplicity of suit and needless expenses all persons against whom the right to relief is alleged to exist may be joined as defendants. However, the Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of the parties. A party can be joined as defendant even though the plaintiff does not think that he has any cause of action against him. However, the Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of the parties. A party can be joined as defendant even though the plaintiff does not think that he has any cause of action against him. Rule 10 specifically provides that it is open to the Court to add at any stage of the suit a necessary party or a person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit. 6. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on the record. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touch-stone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 8. The case really turns on the true construction of the Rule, in particular the meaning of the words whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the Rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. If the Intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject-matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join the Intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions. " ( 7 ) ). If the Intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject-matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join the Intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions. " ( 7 ) ). From the aforesaid observations made by the Apex Court it becomes clear that the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action. The question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of rule between the direct interest or legal interest or commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the final result of the action, i. e. to say that the result of the litigation should not be such which would affect him illegally, i. e. , by curtailing his legal rights. ( 8 ) ). Ordinarily, it is true that it is the plaintiff who is dominus litis and he decides as to who would be the parties in his suit. It is also true that in a suit for partition, ordinarily, the coparceners are only, strictly speaking, the necessary parties. However, when one of the coparceners being a father of the family or Karta of the family agrees and transfers one of the properties to the third party, receive substantial amount of earnest money and thereafter the suit for partition is got filed by one of his sons impleading his brothers and father for partition question does arise as to : (i) Whether any legal right of banakhat-holder is likely to be adversely affected in case the property in question which is agreed to be sold may fall to the share of persons other than executant of banakhat ? (ii) Whether legal right flowing from agreement to sell of getting specific performance of agreement would be defeated, if the property in question is given over to the share of party other than one which has executed the banakhat ? (ii) Whether legal right flowing from agreement to sell of getting specific performance of agreement would be defeated, if the property in question is given over to the share of party other than one which has executed the banakhat ? (iii) Whether the right of the banakhat-holder to receive back the earnest money and/or to receive damages, in case his suit is decreed, would be rendered ineffective and meaningless, if the very property in question is given over to other coparceners excluding the coparcener who is the executant of banakhat ? ( 9 ) ). In the broad perspective of law, if aforesaid questions are put to judicial scrutiny of the Court, the only answer is that the presence of the said party is necessary for the purpose of effectively and finally deciding the rights of the parties so as not to adversely affect or prejudicially affect the right of the third party in whose favour because of agreement to sell right to get any of the aforesaid reliefs exist. This Court would at once, concede to the position that in a suit for partition of undivided coparcenary property, a third party of this nature can have only limited interest, i. e. , one of safeguarding his interest, vis-a-vis the particular suit property which is the subject-matter of agreement to sell. He can request the Court that if the partition is to be effected that much portion of that survey number should go to the share of the father, or father should be put to a specific condition that if a decree from any other property, which may fall to his share. Ordinarily, while effecting the partition by metes and bounds the Civil Courts are always effecting the partition in such a way that a person whose right over a particular share is in cloud in other pending proceedings is given that very property so that collusive decree of partition rights of such third party are not prejudicially affected to their disadvantage in their absence. The presence of such third party, therefore, in such fact-situation becomes absolutely necessary so that properties are partitioned clearly and in a manner not giving any rise to the future dispute or litigation. One of the objects of Order 1 Rule 10 C. P. Code is to avoid multiplicity of litigation are finally and effectively adjudicated upon by the Courts of competent jurisdiction. One of the objects of Order 1 Rule 10 C. P. Code is to avoid multiplicity of litigation are finally and effectively adjudicated upon by the Courts of competent jurisdiction. ( 10 ) ). It is contended by the learned Counsel, Mr. P. J. Patel and Mr. D. C. Dave, appearing for the respondents that the observations made by this Court and ultimate final order which this Court may pass should not preclude the respondents (plaintiffs and defendants in partition suit) from challenging or disputing execution of agreement to sell allegedly executed by the father. In the opinion of this Court, such a contention itself justifies the need of the third party as party-defendant to safeguard or protect his rights only with regard to the property covered by agreement to sell. It is clarified that any of the observations made in this judgment shall not preclude respondents from disputing execution of agreement to sell allegedly executed by the father. ( 11 ) ). In view of the aforesaid observations, this Court finds it difficult to subscribe to the view expressed by the trial Court. The judgment and order of the trial Court is, therefore, required to be quashed and set aside and same is hereby quashed and set aside, and the present petitioner-third party is permitted to be impleaded as partydefendant to the suit subject to conditions pointed out hereinabove. The third party will have no other right to interfere with the proceedings of partition vis-a-vis properties excepting the property which is the subject-matter of agreement to sell. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .