JUDGMENT Ruma Pal, J.: According to the plaintiff, shop or stall No. 76 in New Market originally belonged to one Murarilal Boolchand Ahuja. Murarilal Boolchand Ahuja died. The other shops which were owned by him were sold by the defendants Nos. 1 & 2 claiming to be the heirs of Murarilal. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendants Nos. 1 & 2 had contracted with him to sell shop or stall No. F-76 in New Market in the form of a lease at a price of Rs. 7 lakhs. In consideration for such transfer the plaintiff has alleged that 6 lakhs had been paid to the defendants Nos. 1 & 2. The payment of six lakhs was made mostly by cash and a portion was by repairing and renovating and furnishing the residence of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. According to the plaintiff the intention of the parties was that the plaintiff would be solely entitled to carry on business in the said shop. According to the plaintiff on 23rd September 1991 the defendants Nos. 1 & 2 forcefully occupied a portion of the shop and commenced carrying on business therein. In the plaint it has been claimed that the plaintiff was "in overall possession and control of the shop" and was "sharing the selling counter" with the defendant Nos. 1 & 2. According to the plaintiff it subsequently transpired that Murarilal Boolchand Ahuja had other heirs who were co-owners of the said shop namely, the defendants Nos. 3, 4, 5 & 6 being the heirs through the first marriage of Murarilal. 2. In the circumstances the plaintiff filed a suit in this Court inter alia for a decree declaring his right, title and interest in the shop, a decree declaring that the defendants Nos. 1 & 2 had no right to interfere with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the shop and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 & 2 from obstructing disturbing, meddling or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff's occupation and enjoyment of the shop and business therein in any way whatsoever. The plaintiff has expressed his readiness to deposit the balance 1 lakh in Court as there was a dispute regarding the right of the defendants inter se as to the shop. 3. On 12th January 1994 the plaintiff made this application for grant of a temporary injunction restraining the defendants Nos. The plaintiff has expressed his readiness to deposit the balance 1 lakh in Court as there was a dispute regarding the right of the defendants inter se as to the shop. 3. On 12th January 1994 the plaintiff made this application for grant of a temporary injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 1 & 2 from selling the suit shop and other rights and entitlement in respect thereof to any third party or otherwise from encumbering the suit shop by executing or creating any deed of lease or other kind of transfer or assignment of the same. The defendant Nos. 5 and 6 have supported the plaintiff. 4. The application has been opposed by the defendants Nos. 1, 2, and 3. On the merit it was stated that by opposing the defendants the case of the plaintiff could not be believed as there was no proof of payment of the amount of Rs. 6 lakhs as alleged. In the plaint the following documents have been relied upon: 1. Receipts of payments and the vouchers of advances made. 2. Accounts Records with endorsement and notes therein. 3. Income Tax Returns showing a few payments. 4. Bank Pass books and Bank statements of accounts of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 showing periodical deposits of lump sum amounts therein corresponding to plaintiff's payment. 5. Income Tax Files and Returns with entries of payments made of defendants and wife of defendant No.2. 6. Tape Recordings of the admission statements made by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 his wife and other traders while trying conciliation. 5. The written statement has been filed by the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 without asking for inspection. 6. The receipts having been referred to and relied upon in the plaint this Court directed the plaintiff to give those defendants inspection of the same. The original receipts which were also produced in Court prima facie supported the case of the plaintiff that payment had in fact been made to the defendants Nos. 1 & 2. The signatures on the written statement (of which production had been given), as well as on an application by the defendants No.1, 2 and 3 for extension of time to file the written statement as well as on the affidavit in opposition filed in this proceedings appeared prima facie to tally with the signatures on the original receipts. The signatures on the written statement (of which production had been given), as well as on an application by the defendants No.1, 2 and 3 for extension of time to file the written statement as well as on the affidavit in opposition filed in this proceedings appeared prima facie to tally with the signatures on the original receipts. The plaintiff offered to play the cassette which the Court declined. 7. The defendants No.1, 2 & 3 thereafter submitted that the suit itself was barred under s: 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act. Section 41 (h) provides that an injunction cannot be granted where equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust. Reliance has been placed on the decision of M/s. Jawahar Theaters Pvt. Ltd. vs. Smt. Kasturi Bai & Anr., AIR 1961 MP 102 at p. 103 para 7 & Satish Bahadur vs. Hans Raj & Ors., AIR 1930 (P & H) 351. It is also stated no leave under Order 2 Rule 2 had been prayed for and as such it would not be open to the plaintiff to file a separate suit for specific performance subsequently. 8. As a corollary to this argument it has been submitted that since the main relief could not be granted on facts or in law, therefore interim relief should not be granted. 9. I am not prepared to hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to the prayer for injunction at this stage. The facts as pleaded in the plaint do not reflect a simple case of contract between the parties. In this case the plaintiff has pleaded the lack of full title in the defendants Nos. 1 & 2 to effect transfer of the whole interest in the shop to the plaintiff. Apart from the prayer for permanent injunction the plaintiff has asked for a declaration that he has a right to carry on business in the shop. A prayer for specific performance of the contract with the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 would not affect the remaining defendants. The relief of specific performance would not in the circumstances be either certain or equally efficacious. It cannot be said at this stage that the reliefs claimed as they stand are not maintainable or that the suit is barred. A prayer for specific performance of the contract with the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 would not affect the remaining defendants. The relief of specific performance would not in the circumstances be either certain or equally efficacious. It cannot be said at this stage that the reliefs claimed as they stand are not maintainable or that the suit is barred. Even if the Court were to hold that the suit in so far as it related to the prayer for permanent injunction could not be granted then too the Court could allow appropriate amendments to be made in the plaint. 10. The decision of a Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Satish Bahadur (supra) is distinguishable. In that case the first order was passed on an application made by the defendant for dismissal of the suit. Secondly, in that case the only prayer was for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from dealing with land which had been agreed to be sold by the defendant to the plaintiff. It may however be noted that in that case the Learned Judge directed that the plaintiffs may be given an option to amend the plaint if they are so advised and only upon failure to amend the suit would stand dismissed. 11. In M/s. Jawahar Theatres Pvt. Ltd. vs. Smt. Kasturi Bai and Anr., the parties had entered into an agreement for lease of a cinema theatre. A suit was filed by the proposed lessee only for an injunction restraining the defendant from leasing out the theatre to any other person. The right to claim specific performance was expressly reserved. The question before the Court was whether the suit had been properly valued. In that context it was held that ordinarily Court should be disinclined to give liberty to reserve a claim for specific performance for a subsequent suit. In the facts of that particular case it was held that the plaintiff should not be permitted to split up his claim and to reserve the relief for specific performance for a later suit as then the Court trying the suit would lose the primary jurisdiction to entertain it. 12. The next contention of the opposing defendants is that this application is barred by principles akin to res judicata as the plaintiff had filed an earlier application for the same relief which had been dismissed for default. 12. The next contention of the opposing defendants is that this application is barred by principles akin to res judicata as the plaintiff had filed an earlier application for the same relief which had been dismissed for default. The opposing defendants have claimed that in any event a second application without applying for restoration of the first application would amount to abuse of process and that the Court should not exercise any discretion in favour of the petitioner. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra kumar & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 993 . Reliance has also been placed on the observation of the Division Bench of this Court in an unreported decision dated 12th July, 1995 in Appeal No. 70 of 1994 arising out of the Suit No. 306 of 1993 (United Bank of India vs. BTW Industries Ltd. & Ors.) The decision in Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar & Ors., placed no absolute embargo on a second application for the same relief as contended by the defendant. The passage on which reliance has been placed reads as follows: “13. It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders are of various kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the Court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations, which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of the Court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fail into a different category. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fail into a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status quo, or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit." (Emphasis supplied). 13. The application in this case does not come within the second category of orders, but within the first. It is to be noted that the Court was not considering a situation where an earlier application had been disposed of without considering the merits and only on the ground of default. It would appear from the passage quoted that the Supreme Court was considering a situation where the earlier order had been passed on the merits. The Supreme Court observed that even in such cases "normally" only on proof of new facts could a second application be entertained. 14. In the case of United Bank of India vs. BTW Industries Ltd., the earlier applications had been dismissed and applications for restoration was made. Those applications for restoration were pending. A second application was filed for the same relief on the ground that discovery of new materials during the pendency of the application for restoration. Also it appears that appeals had been preferred from the original orders which were sought to be varied by the applications which had been dismissed. In that context the Court said that: "In these circumstances, we are unable to pass any order to make investigation into the correctness of the entries made in the books of accounts, as such prayer was earlier made and rejected and the application was dismissed for default and the restoration applications are still pending. In that context the Court said that: "In these circumstances, we are unable to pass any order to make investigation into the correctness of the entries made in the books of accounts, as such prayer was earlier made and rejected and the application was dismissed for default and the restoration applications are still pending. We also do not find any fresh ground or cause of action to entertain this application when these points are subject matter of the earlier application." "In case the applications are restored in that event the Court can decide those questions, but once an application has been dismissed and not yet restored the same question could not be agitated by filing another application in the name of discovery of new grounds when as a matter of fact, we do not find any new ground of cause of action, on the basis of which, we can pass an order on the application and considering the prayers made in the application we also make it clear that if the applications are restored our order will not prevent the Court to consider those prayer and pass appropriate order as to the Court think, fit and proper. During the pendency of those applications we are unable to go into the question, as we are not the appellate authority nor we can decide the correctness of these orders having concurrent jurisdiction or reopen the same." 15. The decision cannot be cited as an authority for the proposition that where an earlier application is dismissed for default a second application for the same relief cannot lie. 16. Following the decision in Arun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar the first submission of the opposing defendants must be rejected namely, that the second application is barred by res judicata or principles akin thereto. Furthermore, the first application having been dismissed for default, there was no decision on merits at all on the dispute whether prima facie or otherwise. In my view, there is no law which debars a second interlocutory application being filed for the same relief even on the same grounds whether the first application has been dismissed for default. At the highest, it might be contended that in the circumstances the Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of such an applicant. In my view, there is no law which debars a second interlocutory application being filed for the same relief even on the same grounds whether the first application has been dismissed for default. At the highest, it might be contended that in the circumstances the Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of such an applicant. But in the exercise of discretion the Court will consider the nature of the application namely, whether it is otherwise frivolous on merits and filed only with a view to harass the defendants and with no bona fide motive. This view finds support from a decision of other High Courts. 17. In Medam Sankaranarayan vs. J. T. Rao, AIR 1971 AP 332 a Learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a Second interlocutory application for the same relief on the same grounds was maintainable where the first was only dismissed for default. This view was followed in the case of Kanhu Gauda vs. D. Kodandi Dora & Ors., AIR 1986 Ori 191 , R. C. Pattanaik said: “In AIR 1971 Andh Pra 332 (Medam Sankaranarayana vs. Goddala Tirupathi Rao,) an application for amendment had been dismissed for default. It was held that a fresh application was maintainable. There can be no quarrel over this proposition because there was no decision on merits and Order 9 Rule 9 has no application to dismissal of applications of interlocutory nature for default." 18. In the present case it appears prima facie that the plaintiff has made some payments to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. There is also some basis for the plaintiff's claim that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2's rights as the sale heirs of Murarilal Boolchand Ahuja is in dispute inasmuch as a partition suit has been filed in this Court by the defendant Nos. 4, 5 and 6 against the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 claiming to be co-heirs to Murarilal's estate being suit No. 739 of 1991. In any event there is a subsequent fact. It has not been denied by the opposing defendants after filing of the first application the opposing defendants have obtained a Succession Certificate to be the estate of Murarilal without making the defendents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 parties and are claiming to be solely entitled to the shop room and competent to sell the same. It has not been denied by the opposing defendants after filing of the first application the opposing defendants have obtained a Succession Certificate to be the estate of Murarilal without making the defendents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 parties and are claiming to be solely entitled to the shop room and competent to sell the same. The threat to the rights claimed by the plaintiff is in the circumstances more imminent. 19. Having regard to the facts and nature of the dispute 1 would hold that the application must be allowed. Accordingly, there will be an order of status quo as far as the shop room is concerned and the respondents are restrained from transferring, encumbering or otherwise affecting any right thereto in any I fashion whatsoever until the disposal of the suit. Costs in the cause. 20. All parties to act on a xerox signed copy of the minutes of this order on usual undertaking. 21. Stay is prayed for and is refused. 22. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this Judgment and Order on usual undertaking. Application allowed.