Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. These four appeals are directed against the orders passed by the learned single Judge in O.A. Nos.196 and l97 of l995 in CS.No.301 of l995.The plaintiff in the suit is the appellant before us. The relevant facts are as follows: The plaintiff filed O.S. No.586 of 1994 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, for an injunction restraining the defendants therein from proceeding with the award of contract for offers in tender No. CW/19/E/G/91 dated 9. 1991 and direct the defendants to discharge and cancel the said tender and publish it anew. The grievance of the plaintiff in the suit was that the plaintiff being a cooperative society was entitled to preference over all other tenderers and when the railways published a tender notice on 9. 1991 in the local dailies inviting offers for purchase and removal of earth and debris from their workshop for a period of 12 months, the plaintiff participated in the tender after complying with the stipulation of earnest money deposit. According to the plaintiff the tender was opened on 10. 1991 and the defendants stopped all further proceedings on the ground that one of the tenderers had filed a suit and obtained orders from court. That suit was later withdrawn on 110. 1993. The plaintiff, claimed a preferential right of contract from the railways. The third defendant in the suit was one M/ s. Sri Balaji Contract Wings and the fourth defendant in the suit was M/s. Pushpam Steels, represented by its partner. It was the fourth defendant who was the contesting party in the suit, besides railways. The allegation in the plaint was that has steps were being taken by the railways for finalising the contract in favour of the fourth defendant which will prejudice the rights of the plaintiff. In these circumstances, the plaintiff prayed for the reliefs set out above. 2.The plaintiff filed I.A. No. 1107 of 1994 restraining the defendants from entering into a contract. I Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court heard the application and passed an order on 16. 1994 granting an junction as prayed for by the plaintiff. Against that order, an appeal was filed by the Railways in C.M.A. No.135 of 1994 and another appeal was filed by the fourth defendant in C.M.A. No.73 of 1994. I Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court heard the application and passed an order on 16. 1994 granting an junction as prayed for by the plaintiff. Against that order, an appeal was filed by the Railways in C.M.A. No.135 of 1994 and another appeal was filed by the fourth defendant in C.M.A. No.73 of 1994. Both are pending on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. Then, the plaintiff chose to file a suit in this Court C.S. No. 174 of 1994 with a prayer for declaration that it is entitled to the award of contract for the aforesaid tender and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to execute the contract pertaining to the said tender. That suit was filed on 10. 1994. Though the plaint made a reference to the suit in O.S. No.586 of 1994, the plaint did not set out what exactly were the prayers made in the said suit. But paragraph 9 of the plaint would state that the plaintiff had been advised to withdraw the prayer No. 13(b) in the said suit. The plaintiff did not take care to state what the prayer was. The fact that one of the prayers in the earlier suit was to discharge and cancel the tender and publish it anew was not brought to the notice of this Court in the plaint in C.S. No.1711 of 1994. In the said suit O.A. No.6702 of 1994 was filed by the plaintiff for obtaining mandatory injunction pending, disposal of the suit. That application came before a learned Judge of this Court on 211. 1994. The following order was passed by the learned Judge: "This is not an usual case and yet, the prayer at the first blush may appear somewhat unusual. The prayer is for a mandatory injunction, directing the respondents to award the contract to the applicant- plaintiff. I heard the learned counsel at length in view of the circumstances of the case. It is brought to my notice that the Technical Committee of the Railways had considered the matter in a depth and had come to a conclusion that the contract should be given to the applicant-plaintiff. It is incomprehensible how Railways could overlook the recommendations of the exports in the Technical Committee, and can decide otherwise. The contract is such that it does not require always the supervision of the court. It is incomprehensible how Railways could overlook the recommendations of the exports in the Technical Committee, and can decide otherwise. The contract is such that it does not require always the supervision of the court. Therefore, the plaintiff, in my view, has made out a very strong case for the grant of mandatory injunction. Accordingly, I direct the Railways to grant the contract in favour of the plaintiff. It is also brought to my notice that there is an order of injunction by City Civil Court against the Railways from granting a contract to the fourth defendant. One would expect the Railways to consider matters impartially taking into account which are relevant eschewing matters not relevant and act in public interest. The applicant plaintiff is a Co-operative Society. As per the Directive Principles of State Policy, Co-operative movement has to be encouraged. That is what prompts me to act even at this stage to issue the order prayed for by the applicant. Accordingly, there shall be a mandatory injunction as prayed for. The contract shall’ be given to the applicant- plaintiff within two weeks. Notice returnable in four weeks." .3. It is really shocking that learned Judge has passed an order of interim mandatory injunction even before ordering notice to the respondents and practically granting the relief prayed for in the suit. It can even be said that the learned Judge has passed a decree in the suit at the interlocutory stage. However, the learned Judge ordered notice returnable in four weeks after passing the interim order. When the railways were served with the order, they had to obey the same as it was a direction to enter into a contract by mandatory injunction. Fearing an action in contempt, the railways executed a contract in favour of the plaintiff herein on 112. 1994. The fourth defendant was not aware of the same. When the fourth defendant came to know of the said order of this Court, it filed applications to vacate the interim order in O.A. Nos.55 and 56 of 1995. Those applications were filed on 1. 1995. When the said applications were filed, the plaintiff cleverly withdrew the suit on 1. 1995. The suit was dismissed as withdrawn on that day. 4. The fourth defendant also filed LA. Those applications were filed on 1. 1995. When the said applications were filed, the plaintiff cleverly withdrew the suit on 1. 1995. The suit was dismissed as withdrawn on that day. 4. The fourth defendant also filed LA. No.400 of 1995 in the City Civil Court for an injunction restraining the plaintiff and the Railways from in any way doing the work of purchase and removal of earth and debris from the Carriage and Wagon Workshop of Southern Railway which was allotted earlier in favour of the fourth defendant. In that application, the fourth defendant had alleged that by virtue of the dismissal of the suit, the interim order of mandatory injunction passed in favour of the plaintiff had come to an end and thereafter, the plaintiff was not entitled to continue with the performance of the contract. That contention was accepted by the City Civil Judge and he passed an order on 12. 1995 granting injunction in favour of the fourth defendant. That order was passed only after hearing the plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed an appeal against the said order which is pending as C.M.A. No.222 of 1995 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras. .5. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed C.S. No.301 of 1995 in this Court for a declaration that the agreement dated 112. 1994 entered between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 as legal, valid and binding and for an injunction restraining the railways from cancelling the agreement and for a mandatory injunction directing the railways to grant gatepass to the plain- tiff for the entire period of contract commencing from 112. 1994 and to permit the plaintiff to remove the earth and debris from the Carriage Wagon Workshop, Southern Railways, Madras-23. The plaintiff also filed O.A. Nos.196 and 197 of 1995 for interlocutory reliefs during the pendency of the suit in C.S. No.301 of 1995. In O.A. No. 196 of 1995 the prayer is for an injunction restraining the railways from in any way interfering with the rights of the applicant in removing the earth and debris from the Carriage and Wagon Workshop, Southern Railway, Madras-23. In the other application, the prayer is for a mandatory - injunction directing the railways to grant gate-pass to the applicant for the entire period of contract commencing from 112. In the other application, the prayer is for a mandatory - injunction directing the railways to grant gate-pass to the applicant for the entire period of contract commencing from 112. 1994 and to permit the applicant to remove the earth and debris from the Carriage and Wagon Workshop; Southern Railway, Madras-23. When these applications came up for arguments on 3. 1995, the learned single Judge herd the arguments and reserved orders. 6. It is stated now by learned counsel for the appellant that the Junior Counsel, who was representing the plaintiff before the learned single Judge at that time requested the learned Judge to pass orders on that date itself and the learned Judge got angry and passed an order dismissing the applications without giving any reasons. Soon thereafter, the Senior Counsel tendered apology to the learned Judge and requested him to pass a considered order on any date he chooses. The learned Judge agreed to pass a considered order. But, unfortunately, this aspect of the matter was not taken note of by the Court Officer or the concerned short-hand writer who had already written an order on the docket that both the petitions were dismissed who obtained the initials of the learned Judge on the said order. Obviously, the learned Judge did not notice that he was signing an order on those applications in which he had reserved orders as requested by the Senior Counsel. We find on the docket of the application a note to the office to issue the copy of the order that day itself and that direction is initialed by the shorthand writer. It may be presumed that such a direction was made by the learned Judge as soon as he passed the order dismissing the applications. Pursuant thereto, the copies of fair order and decretal order were supplied to the plaintiff. 7. The learned judge passed a considered order on 3. 1995 giving his reasons for dismissing the applications. O.S.A. Nos.l00 and 101 of 1995 are against the orders passed on 3. 1995 and O.S.A. Nos102 and 103 of 1995 are against the order passed on 3. 1995. .8. The first contention of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that the order dated 3. 1995 is not valid inasmuch as there cannot be two orders on the same application and there was already an order passed on 3. 1995. 1995 and O.S.A. Nos102 and 103 of 1995 are against the order passed on 3. 1995. .8. The first contention of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that the order dated 3. 1995 is not valid inasmuch as there cannot be two orders on the same application and there was already an order passed on 3. 1995. We are unable to accept this contention. Even as per the facts stated by learned Senior Counsel, the learned Judge did not treat the order pronounced on 3. 1995 in the open Court in fit of anger as the order on the applications. For all purposes he only reserved the orders on the applications after the Senior Counsel tendered apology. But, obviously he had forgotten about that aspect of the matter and signed the order which was written on the docket. That does not mean that there was an order on 3. 1995 which prevented the passing of a reasoned order on 3. 1995. 9. The matter can be viewed in another angle also. The order dated 3. 1995 can be taken as the order pronounced by the learned Judge to be supported by the reasons to be given by him later. No doubt, the Supreme Court has deprecated such a practice and normally in this Court such a practice is not adopted. But, in one case of extraordinary urgency, such a course was adopted and thus, there is a precedent. But, merely because reasons are given subsequently in a particular case, the order will not become invalid. We can hold that the order dated 3. 1995 is supported by the reasons given by the order dated 3. 1995. Normally, the order containing reasons should also bear the date 3. 1995. Because the learned Judge was under the impression that there was no order on 3. 1995, he pronounced an order on 3. 1995. Moreover, there is no conflict between the two orders. 10. The second contention of learned counsel is that if the order dated 3. 1995 is invalid, the order dated 3. 1995 is unsustainable, because, it is a non-speaking order. Even if it is so, we are not inclined to set aside the same, in view of the facts of the case. 10. The second contention of learned counsel is that if the order dated 3. 1995 is invalid, the order dated 3. 1995 is unsustainable, because, it is a non-speaking order. Even if it is so, we are not inclined to set aside the same, in view of the facts of the case. We will justify the order passed by the learned single Judge, even if, it is nonspeaking, because, the plaintiff has played fraud in this Court and got an order of ad-interim injunction to which we have already made a reference. We have pointed out earlier that without disclosing to the Court the prayer asked for in O.S. No.586 of 1994, the plaintiff filed a suit for mandatory injunction in this Court which will run counter to the prayer in the earlier suit and got an ad interim ex parte order which will amount to a decree in the suit itself. In view of the fraud played by the plaintiff, he is not entitled to contend in this Court that the order dated 3. 1995 should be set aside because, it is a non-speaking order. We can uphold the order as a just and correct order on the facts of the case. .11. On merits learned counsel for the appellant contends that after the mandatory injunction was granted by this Court, a contract has been entered between the parties, viz., the President, Union of India, represented by the Chief Workshop Manager, carriage and Wagon Workshop, Southern Railway and the plaintiff-Society and the dismissal of the suit will not invalidate or nullify the contract, with the result, the defendants are bound to continue with the contract and carry out the same. There is absolutely no merit in this contention. No doubt, in case of mandatory injunction, if that has been carried out, a contention may be raised that by the dismissal of the suit whatever had been done pursuant to the mandatory injunction will not get nullified. But in the present case, an order of mandatory injunction has been obtained by fraud. Moreover, the order is a nullity inasmuch as it has been passed without notice to the defendants in the suit. We have already said that the learned Judge has granted decree in the suit at the interlocutory stage without any notice to the defendants and such a decree cannot be sustained. Moreover, the order is a nullity inasmuch as it has been passed without notice to the defendants in the suit. We have already said that the learned Judge has granted decree in the suit at the interlocutory stage without any notice to the defendants and such a decree cannot be sustained. We have no hesitation to hold that the order dated 211. 1995 passed by the learned single Judge in O.A. No.6702 of 1994 in C.S. No.1711 of 1994 is null and void. It cannot have any effect in law. Therefore, the contract said to have been entered pursuant to that order between the plaintiff and the railway is not valid in law. 12. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contends that an order passed by a Judge of the High Court cannot be treated as a nullity and there is always a presumption that it has been validly passed. It is also contended that a Judge of the High Court takes into consideration all the relevant facts and the circumstances of the case. The learned Judge has passed an order of mandatory injunction and the same cannot be treated as null and void. We are unable to accept this contention. The order which had been passed flouting all the principles of natural justice and against all the settled principles of law will be nullity even if it is passed by a Judge of the High Court. In Sundaram Pillai, S. v. Govindaswami, 97 L. W. 630, a learned Chief Justice of this Court had to consider an order of interim mandatory injunction passed by the trial court. A question arose whether such an order could be interfered with by the High Court under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even when it was ad-interim order. Learned Chief Justice observed that the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Sec.15 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot allow an order which amounts to an abuse of the powers vested in the trial court to stand, once such an order comes to the notice of the High Court. By applying the reasoning, we can say in this case that the order dated 211. 1994 would amount to abuse of power vested in the single Judge of this Court. 13. By applying the reasoning, we can say in this case that the order dated 211. 1994 would amount to abuse of power vested in the single Judge of this Court. 13. In Kamalam and Rajan v. V. Gopal, (1991)2 L. W. 135, one of us (Srinivasan, J.) considered a similar question and relying upon the judgment in The Management of Oriental Mercantile Agency case, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1143, held that an order allowing a C.M.A. at the stage of admission without notice to the respondents was not binding on the said respondents. The same principle will apply here. 14.. We have already set out the interim order. We find that the learned Judge has only taken into account the averments contained in the plaint in the affidavit filed in support of the application. Learned Judge had not even thought that the defendants may have a contention to be decided by the Court. He proceeded as if the statutory authorities, viz-, the Railways were bound to execute the contract on the complaint made by the plaintiff in the plaint. There was also no such urgency which could prompt the learned Judge to pass such an order, It was not as if heavens would have fallen down, if the mandatory injunction had not been granted on that day. The matter could have waited very well till notice was served on the defendants. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff cannot claim any right whatever on the basis of an order of mandatory injunction dated 211. 1994 or the contract dated 112. 1994. Applications in O.A. Nos.196 and 197 of 1994 have been rightly dismissed. 15. This is a case in which appellants ought not to have pursued the matter by filing appeals. Hence, the appeals are dismissed with costs. Fourth defendant has entered appearance by filing caveat. Hence, the appellant must pay cost to the fourth defendant. Counsel fee Rs.5,000.