JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– By this Writ Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the Writ Petitioner Partha Roy Chowdhury (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) has prayed the Court for issue of "a Writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Respondents to do this Public Duties in accordance with law and to forbear from giving any effect or any further effect to the impugned order of contained in memo. No. 1711/WBSTC dated 26/28th September, 1994 (Annexure 'S') issued by the Managing Director WBSTC Ltd. and/or rescind/revoke/cancel/withdraw the same", along with the other reliefs prayed for, for the reasons stated therein. 2. A Disciplinary Proceedings under Charge-Sheet No.1628A/WBSTC dated 9.12.92 was initiated against the petitioner, who was Traffic Officer under the Respondent No.2, West Bengal Surface Transport Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as WBSTC ), on 9 separate charges on the allegations made therein. On a Writ Application filed by the petitioner against the same, a Learned Single Judge of this Court by Order dated 6.5.93 (In the matter of : Partha Roy Chowdhury.........petitioner) had disposed of the same by directing the Respondent-Authorities to allow the petitioner to have the service of a Defence Helper in terms thereof, further directing that the Enquiry Proceedings will continue and final order may also be passed and communicated, but shall not be given effect for a period of a fortnight from the date of communication (vide Annexure "P" to the Writ Application). 3. In terms of the aforesaid direction of this Court an enquiry was held in which the petitioner had duly participated and all reasonable opportunity appears to have been given to him of being heard in the matter. After due enquiry, the Enquiry Officer had found, upon consideration of evidence presented in the matter and for the reasons recorded at length in his Report, that the Articles of Charges II, V, VII and portion of Charge No. IV had been established against the petitioner, but the Articles of Charges Nos. I, III and portion of IV had not been established. 4. While furnishing a copy of the Enquiry Report to the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority (for short D. A.) had informed him (Petitioner) by a Letter dated 10.8.94 that he (D. A.) had agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer (for short E. O.) regarding the Articles of Charges II. 4. While furnishing a copy of the Enquiry Report to the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority (for short D. A.) had informed him (Petitioner) by a Letter dated 10.8.94 that he (D. A.) had agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer (for short E. O.) regarding the Articles of Charges II. V, VII and portion of IV, but did not agree with his (E. O.'s) findings on the Articles of Charges I, III and portion of IV; and proposed to hold that the said letter Articles of Charges I, III and portion of IV had been established by the evidence on record, for the reasons stated therein, and had offered him (Petitioner) thereunder an opportunity to submit his comments there against within 7 days from the date of the receipt of the said letter (vide Annexure "O" to the Writ Application). The petitioner also appears to have made representation by his Letter dated 17.8.94 against the findings of the Enquiry Officer on Articles of Charges II, V, VII and portion of IV as also against the proposed finding of the Disciplinary Authority in respect of Articles of Charges I, III and portion of IV for the reasons stated at length therein, and had further submitted in the concluding paragraph thereof that none of the charges against him had been established and had requested the Disciplinary Authority to exonerate him (Petitioner) from the said charges, as appearing from Annexure "R" to the Writ Application. 5. The Disciplinary Authority, after consideration of the petitioner's aforesaid representation, by his impugned Letter/Order dated 26/28.9.94, being Annexure "S" to the Writ Application, had agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on Articles of Charges II, V, VII and portion of IV finding him (Petitioner) guilty thereof, and had also found that the Articles of Charges I, III and IV have been fully established beyond any reasonable doubt, differing from the findings of the Enquiry Officer thereon, upon consideration of the evidence on record, for the reasons stated at length therein The Disciplinary Authority had accordingly held thereunder that the Articles of Charges I, II, III, IV, V and VII, out of 9 charges framed against the petitioner, have been duly established. And, having regard to the nature and gravity of the charges against the petitioner, he had directed that the petitioner, the Charge-Sheeted Officer, be dismissed from service of the Corporation, further directing that the Rs. 76,481.75, being the less caused by him (Petitioner) to the Corporation, be recovered from him. 6. With things as they are, the petitioner appears to have been given all reasonable opportunity of being heard till the stage the Disciplinary Authority had come to a finding/decision on the charges framed against him (Petitioner). The Learned Advocate for the petitioner had referred me to the decision in (1) Union of India & Ors. v. Md. Ramjan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 , wherein the Learned Judges had observed as follows :– "We make it clear that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the Disciplinary Authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter." 7. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner had also referred to the decision in (2) Uttar Pradesh Government v. Sabir Hossain, 1975(4) SCC 703 , wherein it has been held that Non-supply of findings of the Enquiry Officer and his recommendations to the delinquent Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity. So also held by the Supreme Court in (3) Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., 1993 (4) SCC 727 , referred to by the Learned Advocate for the Respondents, holding that Delinquent has a right to reasonable opportunity to represent against findings of Enquiry Officer. So also held by the Supreme Court in (3) Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., 1993 (4) SCC 727 , referred to by the Learned Advocate for the Respondents, holding that Delinquent has a right to reasonable opportunity to represent against findings of Enquiry Officer. This pertains to the first stage of the Inquiry when Disciplinary Authority takes decision on the basis of the enquiry report along with delinquent employee's reply to it and other evidence which constitute an integral part of the inquiry––Right to show cause against penalty proposed which has been taken away by the 42nd Amendment pertains to the second stage of the inquiry when Disciplinary Authority takes decision on the question of penalty imposable on the delinquent––Denial of right to copy of the enquiry report amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity and violation of Articles 14 and 21 and principles of natural justice." 8. There could clearly be no dispute on the aforesaid proposition of law. Undisputedly, the petitioner was furnished with a copy of the Report of the Enquiry Officer by the Disciplinary Authority by his Letter dated 10.8.94 wherein the latter (D. A.) had clearly indicated that he was in agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer regarding the Articles of Charges II, V, VII and portion of IV, which were found to be established; and he could not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer regarding the Articles of Charges I, III and portion of IV, which had been held by the Enquiry Officer to have not been established. The Disciplinary Authority had further clearly indicated in his aforesaid letter to the petitioner that he proposed to find that the Articles of Charges I, III and IV are also fully established for the reasons stated therein. By the said letter, the Disciplinary Authority had offered opportunity to the petitioner to submit his comments there against (vide Annexure "Q" to the Writ Application). The petitioner also appears to have made representation there against by his Letter dated 17.8.94 (vide Annexure "R" to the Writ Application), and had stated therein that none of the charges against him could be said to have been established and he had requested the Disciplinary Authority to exonerate him from the charges framed against him for the reasons stated at length therein. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there could be no question of violation of the principles of natural justice or denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner till the stage the Disciplinary Authority had come to a finding/decision on the charges framed against him (Petitioner). 9. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner had submitted that he had not been served with a Notice (Second Show-cause Notice) stating the punishment proposed and the grounds therefor, to which he is entitled under Rule 10(12) (b) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as Rules). There is no denying that in the absence of any Rule framed by the Respondent-Authorities in connection with Disciplinary Proceedings, the aforesaid Rules had been adopted by them, which had been holding the field and is applicable in the case of the petitioner. Rule 10(12) (b) of the aforesaid Rules provides that the Disciplinary Authority shall :–– "give him a notice stating the punishment proposed and the grounds therefor and calling upon him to submit within a specified time such representation as he may wish to make on the punishment proposed but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry." 10. Admittedly, no such notice had been given to the petitioner. Nor, was he called upon to submit representation, as he might wish to make, on the punishment proposed. The order of dismissal dated 26/28.9.94 passed by the Disciplinary Authority against the petitioner under Annexure "S" to the Writ Application would not clearly stand as such. That was neither disputed by Mr. Malay Kr. Basu, the Learned Senior Advocate for the Respondents, during the bearing, in his usual wisdom and fairness. 11. The Learned Advocate for the Petitioner had sought to submit by referring me to the decision in (4) Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 600 , that the order of suspension made against the Petitioner pending the relevant enquiry had lapsed with the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority, and the said dismissal order not being according to law, the order of suspension, which did not exist, could not revive; and he would accordingly be entitled to be reinstated. It would be pertinent, in this context, to refer to the following observation of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. It would be pertinent, in this context, to refer to the following observation of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., 1993(4) SCC 727 at Para 35 (v) thereof : "When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest, and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an unnatural expansion of natural justice which in itself is antithetical to justice". 12. It was further held in Paragraph 31 thereof that if the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the Non-supply of the Enquiry Report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished, as is regrettably being done at present. The Courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. In the case in hand, the Enquiry Report was supplied to the petitioner herein and opportunity was given to him to make representation there against and the proposed finding of the Disciplinary Authority. The Courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. In the case in hand, the Enquiry Report was supplied to the petitioner herein and opportunity was given to him to make representation there against and the proposed finding of the Disciplinary Authority. The second notice and opportunity for making representation against the proposed punishment only was not given to him. Had the said notice been given to him that would not have made any difference to the ultimate findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and the proposed finding of the Disciplinary Authority and/or the punishment given. No prejudice could thus be said to have been caused to him. 13. Having regard to the foregoing observations of the Supreme Court, the facts and circumstances of the matter, the nature and gravity of the allegations made and charges framed against the petitioner, I do not feel inclined to set aside the Order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority against the petitioner which would amount to his reinstatement. 14. As already indicated above, before passing the final order of dismissal dated 26/28.9.94 against the Petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority had not given him a notice stating the punishment proposed and the grounds therefor, and calling upon him to submit such representation, as he might have wished to make, on the punishment proposed, as required by Rule 10(12)(b) of the aforesaid Rules. In the circumstances, the aforesaid order or dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority, being the Managing Director, WBSTC Ltd., dismissing the Petitioner thereunder cannot be given effect to. 15. In view of the discussions above, I dispose of the Writ Application by directing the Respondent-Authorities not to give effect to the aforesaid dismissal Order dated 26/28.9.94, being Annexure "S" thereto, till the Petitioner is given a notice stating the punishment proposed and the grounds therefor, calling upon him to submit such representation, as he may wish to make, on the punishment proposed in terms of the Rule 10(12)(b) of the aforesaid Rules. After hearing the Petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority shall be at liberty to pass such appropriate penal order against him (Petitioner), as the circumstances of the case may warrant. After hearing the Petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority shall be at liberty to pass such appropriate penal order against him (Petitioner), as the circumstances of the case may warrant. The Disciplinary Authority shall give notice to the Petitioner in terms of this order and the aforesaid Rule within two weeks from the date of communication of this Order, giving him (latter) four weeks time to make such representation, as he may wish to make; and shall dispose of the relevant Proceedings, as early as possible, preferably within a period of ten weeks from the date of communication of this Order. 16. The Petitioner shall be entitled to subsistence Allowance during the period of his suspension, as may be admissible according to Rules. If there is any arrears in respect thereof, the Respondent-Authorities shall release the same in favour of the petitioner within three weeks from the date of communication of this order. Let plain copies of the operative part of this Judgment, duly countersigned by Assistant Registrar (Court), be made over to the Ld. Advocates for both sides, as prayed for.