JUDGMENT O.P.Pradhan (1.) THIS revision by the convict is directed against the judgment and order dated 22.3.1983, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 202 of 1982 by V. Additional Sessions Judge, Gonda whereby he affirmed the conviction and sentence, recorded against the revisionist by the VII Additional Munsif-Magistrate, Gonda in connection with offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act). (2.) BRIEFLY speaking, the facts giving rise to this revision are that on 12.9.1989 at about 2 p.m., the Food Inspector, Abdul Rauf Siddique purchased from the revisionist 1500 gram, Laddoo for analysis by the Public Analyst. After observing the formalities required by law, one sample was sent to the Public Analyst, who reported on 15.10.1980 that the sample was coloured with 'Metanil Yellow', a prohibited coal-tar (Dye). After obtaining the requisite sanction from the Local Health Authority, a complaint against the revisionist was instituted by the Food Inspector in the competent court. The learned Magistrate after going through the evidence adduced before him, found the revisionist guilty for the offence under Section 7/16 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo six months' R.I. and pay a fine of Rs. one thousand and in default to undergo three months' more R.I. An appeal was carried to the Court of Sessions Judge, Gonda. This gave rise to Criminal Appeal No. 202 of 1982. It was heard and dismissed on 22.3.1983 by V Additional Sessions Judge, Gonda. Still aggrieved, the convict preferred this revision. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the lower court record including the impugned judgment. (3.) IT has been contended on behalf of the revisionist that the sanction for prosecution of the revisionist is invalid inasmuch as the Local Health Authority did not apply his mind while according the sanction. IT has also been pointed out that in the sanction order Ex. Ka.-8, the date given at the top is 10.12.1980 while the date given below the signature of the C.M.O. is 9.12.1980. IT has, therefore, been urged that the sanction has been ante timed. So far as this contention goes, it may be pointed out that this point was also raised in the court below and has been negatived. The sanction as per Ex. IT has, therefore, been urged that the sanction has been ante timed. So far as this contention goes, it may be pointed out that this point was also raised in the court below and has been negatived. The sanction as per Ex. Ka-8 fulfills the requirements of law and it cannot be said that the Sanctioning Authority did not apply his mind to the facts and other materials before according the sanction. As rightly pointed out by the court below, the C.M.O. has put in his initials on Exs. Ka-1 to Ka-5 which indicates that he did go through these Exs. before according the sanction. So far as the discrepancy in the dates at the top and bottom is concerned, it may be pointed out that the C.M.O. signed the sanction order on 9.12.1980 while the sanction order was despatched to the Food Inspector with enclosures on 10.12.1980. Obviously, the despatch of the sanction order would follow the actual sanction and therefore, it is not open to argue that sanction Ex. Ka-8 has been ante-timed. This argument is lit to be stated to be rejected. (4.) IT has further been urged by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the report of the Public Analyst does not indicate the quantity of adulteration nor does it go to indicate what test, if any, was conducted by the Public Analyst to reach the conclusion. In this behalf, the learned counsel also contended that the Public Analyst ought to have furnished the data and the technical process by which the presence of the dye was identified. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon the case reported in AIR 1958 Allahabad 34, State v. Sahati Ram and 1968 Criminal Law Journal 746, Manka Hari v. State of Gujarat. I have gone through both these reported cases but we have also the case of Nagar Mahapalika of Kanpur v. Sri Ram reported in AIR 1964 Allahabad 270 which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Ballab v. State (Delhi Administration). Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also extracted the following dictum from AIR 1964 Allahabad 270. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also extracted the following dictum from AIR 1964 Allahabad 270. "that the report of the public analyst under Section 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 need not contain the mode or particulars of analysis nor the test applied but should contain the result of analysis, namely, data from which it can be inferred whether the article of food was or was not adulterated as defined in Section 2 (j) of the Act." Thus the report of the Public Analyst need not contain the mode or test applied but should contain the result of analysis which would be the data from which it could be inferred whether the article of food was or was not adulterated. In the instant case, the Public Analyst has opined that the sample was coloured with 'Metanil Yellow' which is a prohibited coal-tar. Under Rule 28 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. 1955 no coal-tar (food-colour) or a mixture thereof except those mentioned in the Rule shall be used in food. Metanil Yellow is not mentioned in the said Rule. Thus the use of 'Metanil Yellow' is prohibited and an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated, if any colour other than the prescribed colour is used. In such a case, the food, in question will come within the meaning of Section 2 (ia)(j) of the Act, The Laddoo' purchased by the Food Inspector was coloured yellow and on analysis, it was found coloured with 'Metanil Yellow'. Where the analysis at the hands of the Public Analyst shows that a prohibited coal-tar (food-colour) is used, the food-stuff must be considered adulterated under the Act. A similar view was also adopted in the case reported in 1985 Cr. Law Journal 56. State of Assam v. Bhawarilal Kundalia and another. (5.) SO far as the case reported in 1968 Cr. Law Journal 746 is concerned, it may be pointed out that in the courts below, no challenge was made with regard to the identity of the sample, analysed by the Public Analyst. The lower court record does not indicate that such a contention was raised in the lower court. I am of the view that nothing of particular importance turns upon the case reported in 1968 Cr. The lower court record does not indicate that such a contention was raised in the lower court. I am of the view that nothing of particular importance turns upon the case reported in 1968 Cr. Law Journal 746 which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the revisionist, to say that the Public Analyst should return container with his report so as to eliminate any doubt as to wrong sample being reported. (6.) FOR what has been said above, there is no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the report of the Public Analyst ought to have contained data or the process of technical examination resorted to by him. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the revisionist that there was non-compliance of Section 10(7) of the Act, inasmuch as no public witness was examined in the court to corroborate the testimony of Food Inspector, A.R.Siddique. The learned counsel has placed reliance in this behalf on the case reported in 1983 LLJ 13, Fateh Bahadur Srivastava v. State. I have gone through this reported case which lays down that it is in the own interest of the Food Inspector to take independent witness, else his solitary statement is liable to be rejected. However, it has been further held in this case that non-observance of the provision of Section 10 (7) will not affect the legality of the action taken by the Food Inspector. As I read Section 10 (7) of the Act what appears necessary for the Food Inspector is to call one or more independent persons to be present at the time he takes action under clause (a) of sub-section(l) of the Act. Examination of such witnesses in court is not necessary as also held in Sabir Khan v. State of U. P., 1988 Cr LJ 1245 (All), Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also laid down in the case of Ram Labhaya v. Municipal Corporation Delhi, 1974 (4) SCC 491 that non-presence of one or more independent persons at the relevant time would not vitiate the trial or conviction. In the instant case, the Food Inspector, A. R. Siddique did take the signature of Kaushal Kishore Tiwari on Ext. Ka-1, Ka-2, Ka-4 and also mentioned Kaushal Klshore Tiwari as a witness for prosecution in the complaint instituted against the revisionist. In the instant case, the Food Inspector, A. R. Siddique did take the signature of Kaushal Kishore Tiwari on Ext. Ka-1, Ka-2, Ka-4 and also mentioned Kaushal Klshore Tiwari as a witness for prosecution in the complaint instituted against the revisionist. However, Kaushal Kishore Tiwari was not examined in the trial court as a witness for prosecution. This by itself would not be enough to discredit the testimony of Food Inspector, A. R. Siddique. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has laid down in the case of Babulal Hargovind Das v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1971 (1) SCC 767 that the Inspector is not an accomplice and that his evidence, if believed, can be relied on for proving that the sample was taken as required by law. In the instant case, the testimony of Food Inspector, A.R.Siddique has been accepted by both the Courts below and no compelling reason has been assigned in this court to show that the testimony of Food Inspector is not reliable. 1 find myself in agreement with the Courts below to say that the evidence of Food Inspector can be safely relied upon in support of the prosecution case. Therefore, too, the contention raised on this score by the learned counsel for the revisionist cuts no ice. (7.) LASTLY, it was contended on behalf of the revisionist that there was violation of Section 13 (2) of the Act. The memorandum Ex. Ka.-11 was sent to the revisionist at the address indicated therein by registered post of which the postal receipt is Ext. Ka-10. Courts' below have considered the evidence, adduced by the parties on this score and have reached the conclusion that the address is not incorrect. In view of the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts' below on this score, there is no scope for interference in revision on this point. Moreover, this point was half-heartedly pressed in this court by the learned counsel for the revisionist. The contention raised on this score has no substance and is rejected. (8.) NO other argument was raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist. The conviction of the revisionist is well-founded and he has been awarded minimum sentence permissible under the law. Accordingly no interference is called for in this revision which is found devoid of merit. (9.) IN the result, this revision is dismissed. The revisionist is on bail, granted by this Court. The conviction of the revisionist is well-founded and he has been awarded minimum sentence permissible under the law. Accordingly no interference is called for in this revision which is found devoid of merit. (9.) IN the result, this revision is dismissed. The revisionist is on bail, granted by this Court. He will surrender forthwith to serve out the sentence, awarded to him. Interim stay order regarding realization of fine is also vacated. (10.) RECORDS of the courts below be sent back within fifteen days positively. Revision dismissed.