Judgment A.K.GANGULY, J. 1. In this writ petition the validity of a certificate proceeding being Certificate Case No. 3 (Sairat) of 1994-95, pending before the Sub-Divisional Officer-cum-Certificate Officer, Dhalbhum, has been impugned. In the said certificate proceeding a notice (Annexure-1) under S. 7 of the Bihar Public Demand Recovery Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been issued by the Certificate Officer to the petitioner-company raising certain demands mentioned in the said notice. 2. In order to appreciate the controversey raised between the parties, the following facts may be briefly noted :The admitted position is that the petitioner, a well known Public Limited Company, is carrying on its business in the Industrial town of Jamshedpur which had been established on acquisition of various plots of land which have been transferred to the said Company by various deeds of conveyance with which this Court in this proceeding is not concerned. After some litigation between the parties things settled down and a lease agreement was entered into between the petitioner-company and the State of Bihar (hereinafter referred to as the said lease agreement.) By that agreement it was, inter alia, decided that the petitioner-company will make payment of arrears of rent and others dues with interest from 1-5-1956, the date of commencement of the lease till 1984, the date of the agreement. The relevant clauses of the said agreement, namely, Cls. XII, XV and XX are set out below :- "(xii) That in respect of the period from 1-1-1956 to 31st March, 1984 all rents and dues from the Company to the Government particularly in respect of sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (v), (vi), (ix) and (x) hereinmentioned before shall be paid in three equal annual instalments with interest, the first of such instalments being paid on or before 31-12-1984. Interest will be calculated at the rate of 9.5% from 1-1-1956 to 31-12-1974 and at the rate of 13% from 1-1-1975 to 31-3-1984.(xv) That the existing hats, melas, bazars, jalkars, fisheries and other Sairats shall be settled by the Government with the Company on fixed Jama for a period of five years at a time and the Company shall carry on the management and administration thereof on payment of the entire amount of the fixed Jama to the State Government by the Company. Provided that the State Government shall have the right to revise the fixed Jama for such settlements after every three years. The entire amount realised towards such items by the Company since 1-1-1956 up to 31-3-1984 shall be paid to the Government in three equal annual instalments, the first of such instalments being paid on or before 3lst December, 1984 and along with the last instalment, interest on such dues at the rate of 9.5% per annum for the period 1-1-1956 to 31-12-1974 and at the rate of 13% per annum from 1-1-1975 to 31-3-1984 shall be paid.(xx) That it is further agreed that recovery of arrears of land rent and charges for the aforesaid services rendered by the Company may be effected under the Public Demands Recovery Act. " 3. The sole controversey in this case is whether the payment of interest of rent would be on the basis of lump sum amount or whether such payment of interest will be on annual basis. The petitioners case is that the petitioner-Company has already made payment of all interest on rent on the basis of Cl. (xii) calculated on lump sum basis and the averments in support of those facts have been made in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the writ petition. The further case of the petitioner is that those payments were also accepted by the respondents. 4. Therefore, the present demand of the respondents for the payment of interest on rent calculated on an annual basis is unsustainable. 5. The main objection of the petitioner-Company to the present demand is that such a demand is not a public demand and secondly that on a plain reading of Cl. (xii) of the said lease deed, such a demand cannot be raised. 6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has, without exhausting the remedy provided under the provisions of the said Act rushed to this Court and filed the instant writ petition challenging the said impugned demand raised vide Annexure-1, mainly on the ground that the demand raised therein is not a Public Demand. 7. On an examination of the said contention that the said demand is not a Public Demand, the Court is unable to accept the case made out by the petitioner-Company for the following reasons indicated hereunder :"Public Demand" has been defined under Sub-sec. 7. On an examination of the said contention that the said demand is not a Public Demand, the Court is unable to accept the case made out by the petitioner-Company for the following reasons indicated hereunder :"Public Demand" has been defined under Sub-sec. (6) of S. 3 of the said Act which runs as follows :- "Public demand" means any arrears or money mentioned or referred to in Schedule I, and includes any interest which may, by law, be chargeable thereon up to the date on which a certificate is signed under Part II."Item No. 7 of Schedule I of the said Act is relevant and is set out below :-"Any demand payable to the Collector by a person holding any interest in land, pasturage, forest rights, fisheries or the like, whether such interest is or is not transferable, when such demand is a condition of the use and enjoyment of such land, pasturage, forest right, fisheries or other things."This Court is of the view that as interest on rent in this case is payable by the petitioner-Company to the Collector, the present demand is squarely covered by the first part of Item 7 in the Schedule I, namely, "demand payable to the Collector by a person holding any interest in land." This position is accepted by the parties as would appear from Cl. (xx) of the said agreement between them. Clause (xx) of the said lease agreement has been extracted above. 8 Faced with such problems the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner-Company being a lessee, its interest is not covered by the expression pasturage, forest-right, fisheries or the like. In support of this contention, he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Bai V/s. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1958 SC 532 . Relying on paragraph 23 of the said judgment, the learned counsel contended that in lease one enjoys the property but has no right to take away any produce therefrom whereas in a case of profit a prendre one has a right to enter on the land not for the purpose of enjoying it but to remove some thing from it, namely, part of the produce of the soil. As such the said Item No. 7 of the first schedule is not attracted in the case of a lease deed between the parties. As such the said Item No. 7 of the first schedule is not attracted in the case of a lease deed between the parties. This Court is unable to appreciate the said submission inasmuch as Item No. 7 of the Schedule is wide enough to cover the lease hold interest also inasmuch as in the first limb of the said entry expression used is "any interest in land." 9. Therefore, the demand being a demand on payment of interest on rent will be certainly included within the sweep of Cl. 7 of Schedule I read with sub-sec. (6) of S. 3 of the said Act. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the demand in question is a public demand. In coming to the said conclusion, the Court has also taken into consideration the import of Cl. (xx) of the said-lease hold agreement as has been pointed out hereinabove. 10. The next question which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that assuming that the same is a public demand, the same is barred under S. 94 of the Evidence Act which is set out below :"Exclusion of evidence against application of document to existing facts - When language used in a document is plain in itself, and when it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that if was not meant to apply to such facts." 11. The said provision of S. 94 of the Evidence Act is contained in Chapter Vl thereof and provides for exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence. In this case the dispute is not about the interpretation of existing facts. In fact the mode of payment of interest has not been mentioned in the said Cl. (xii). Dispute about the mode of payment of interest which is to be paid in future falls for interpretation here. The agreement is dated 4th August, 1984 and the first instalment of such payment is to be made on or before 3lst December, 1994. In connection with the interpretation of such a document, the application of S. 94 of the Evidence Act is not attracted. The cardinal principle of interpretation of a document is that it has to be construed as a whole. Judging by that principle also Cl. (xii) of the said agreement cannot be interpreted in isolation. 12. In connection with the interpretation of such a document, the application of S. 94 of the Evidence Act is not attracted. The cardinal principle of interpretation of a document is that it has to be construed as a whole. Judging by that principle also Cl. (xii) of the said agreement cannot be interpreted in isolation. 12. In support of the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has chosen to rely upon a decision in the case of Soenska Handelsbankar V/s. Indian Charge Chrome, reported in AIR 1994 SC 626 . In paragraph 46 of the said judgment S. 92 of the Evidence Act has been quoted. But the ratio of the said decision does not have any application to the controversies raised here. 13. On the question of non-exhaustion of statutory remedy provided under the said Act, learned counsel for the petitioner states that in this case the question whether the mode of payment of interest will be annual or lump sum being a question of law, having regard to the provision of S.94 of the Evidence Act, this Court ought to decide this question and the said question need not be decided by the Certificate Officer. This Court has already held, for the reasons stated hereinabove, that S. 94 of the Evidence Act is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case. As such this Court is of the view that no such question of law is involved in determination of the mode of payment of interest as cannot be decided by the Certificate Officer. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the fact that the statutory remedy need not be exhausted in this case, placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of owners and parties interested in M. V. Vali Pero V/s. Fernandeo Lopez, reported in AIR 1989 SC 2206 . In paragraph 6 of the said judgment, the Hon ble Judges of the Supreme Court observed as follows while dealing with the question of alternative remedy :"We shall first dispose of the preliminary objection of Shri Ramamurthi. He has very fairly stated that he does not challenge the maintainability of these petitions but only assails their entertainability under Art. 136. In paragraph 6 of the said judgment, the Hon ble Judges of the Supreme Court observed as follows while dealing with the question of alternative remedy :"We shall first dispose of the preliminary objection of Shri Ramamurthi. He has very fairly stated that he does not challenge the maintainability of these petitions but only assails their entertainability under Art. 136. In our considered opinion pragmatism and assurance of shortening this unduly protracted litigation are by themselves sufficient and eloquent reasons to grant leave in these matters and to decide the above question on merits forthwith instead of deferring that decision to a later date. Technically, Sri Ramamurthi is right that ordinarily special leave need not be granted where remedy of a statutory appeal being available has not been exhausted. However, in the particular facts of this case when the decision in Letters Patent appeal appears to be a foregone conclusion, the appropriate course which commends to us is to grant leave and decide the matter straightway instead of deferring that decision to a later stage after exhaustion of the futile remedy of Letters Patent Appeal in the High Court. "It is clear from the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Vali Pero (supra) the said decision was arrived at in the peculiar facts of that case. (Emphasis supplied) and the said decision does not lay down any general proposition on the question of non-exhaustion of statutory remedy before invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 14. In this connection, I am reminded of the Division Bench judgment of the Patna High Court on the requirement of exhaustion of statutory remedy in a proceeding under the said Act. In that judgment (Sawar Mal Chowdhury V/s. State Bank of India), reported in 1986 Pat LJR 660 : ( AIR 1988 Pat 185 ) their Lordships of the Division Bench on a consideration of various decisions came to the conclusion that a writ petition by-passing the statutory remedy provided under the said act is not maintainable. The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court is binding on me and I am also in respectful agreement with the said decision. 15. The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court is binding on me and I am also in respectful agreement with the said decision. 15. Another point which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in this case the Certificate Officer is bound to face difficulty in the free exercise of discretion in view of the direction of the State Government which has been disclosed in the affidavit filed by the Certificate Officer before this Court. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner refers to the Government circular which is at Annexure-A at page 11 of the said affidavit filed by respondent No. 2. In support of the said submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sasa Musa Sugar Factory V/s. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1955 Pat 49 . In paragraph 18 of the said judgment the learned Judges of the Patna High Court annulled the certificate proceeding in question, inter alia, on the ground that the same was based on a Government decision which is without jurisdiction and as such in view of that fact the learned Judges came to the conclusion that Certificate Officer cannot have any valid satisfaction which is required under S. 4 of the said Act. Here that is not the case. No Court has yet pronounced that the Government communication dated 29th October, 1993 is invalid or without jurisdiction. As such the said decision has no application here. This Court cannot assume that while acting as a quasi-judicial authority, respondent No. 2 will act in a prejudged manner and will not apply his judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. It would be doing great injustice to the competence and integrity of a quasi-judicial authority if this Court, without any factual basis, assumes bias and prejudice of such authorities on whose conscientious and judicial discharge of duties rests the success of the hierarchical structure of our judicial system. 16. These are the only points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of case. But this Court is unable, for the reasons aforesaid, to accept any one of them. 17. 16. These are the only points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of case. But this Court is unable, for the reasons aforesaid, to accept any one of them. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents stated that whenever the question of interest is mentioned, such interest is calculated annually and in this connection, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions of S.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The attention of the Court has also been drawn to the decision in the case of A. K. Srinivas Naidu V/s. S. Jayaram etc., reported in AIR 1977 Mad 56 . This Court does not express any opinion whether the interest in this case has to be calculated on annual basis as this Court thinks that the said question must be decided by the Certificate Officer in an appropriate proceeding under the said Act. 18. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is unable to entertain the writ petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed as not maintainable primarily on the ground that the demand raised by Annexure-l is a Public Demand and in accordance with the provisions of S. 9 of the said act, it is open to the petitioner to raise all objections denying their liability to pay the same. If such an objection is raised, the same must be decided in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the said act. Since the said question has to be decided by the Certificate Officer, this Court refrains from making any observation on the said question whether the interest has to be paid annually or in a lump sum manner. This Court is, therefore, of the view that it is open to the petitioner to raise objection under S. 9 of the said Act within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment. If such an objection is raised, the Certificate Officer must without insisting on the period of limitation decide the same on merits as a quasi-judicial authority and without being influenced by any discussion or observations made in this judgment. If such an objection is raised within the period aforesaid, the same must be decided by the Certificate Officer within a period of two months thereafter. This time frame is peremptory. If such an objection is raised within the period aforesaid, the same must be decided by the Certificate Officer within a period of two months thereafter. This time frame is peremptory. Till such decision is arrived at the demand against the petitioner-Company will not be enforced by any coercive measure. 19. If no such objection is filed within the period as aforesaid, it is open to the Certificate Officer to proceed in accordance with law. 20. Subject to the above directions, this writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs.Order accordingly.