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1995 DIGILAW 432 (GUJ)

Dahyabhai Kalidas Patel v. Jalamsingh Girja Vasawa

1995-09-29

R.K.ABICHANDANI

body1995
R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner challenges the order of the Motor Accident Claims tribunal (Main), Surat passed on 23. 2. 1995 rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing of the claim petition made by the petitioner. The accident had occurred on 18th May, 1989. The claim petition was filed on 19. 9. 1990 i. e. nearly 1 year and 4 months after the date of the accident. The application for condonation of delay was objected to on the ground that the claim petition was beyond the prescribed period of limitation. ( 2 ) AT the relevant time when the accident occurred and the claim petition was preferred, period of limitation as prescribed in Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 was six months from the date of occurrence of the accident. If sufficient cause was shown for delay in making of the claim petition, the claims Tribunal could entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months, but not later than 12 months as per the proviso to Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 came to be deleted only with effect from 14. 11. 1994. Therefore, at the relevant time since that provision was operating, the Tribunal was required to decide the matter in context of the period of limitation which was prescribed by Sec. 166 (3) of the Act. In this view of the matter, reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner on the decision of this Court in Shardaben wd/o Sitaram Mohanlal vs. M. I. Pandya, XII GLR 97 cannot assist the petitioner inasmuch as that decision was rendered in context of a different provision contained under Sec. 110a (3) of the Act of 1939, which empowered the Tribunal to entertain a claim petition beyond the prescribed period of 60 days, if it was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. In that provision there was no outer limit of 12 months as was prescribed by Sec. 166 (3) of the act of 1988. In this view of the matter, there is no warrant for interference with the impugned order of the Tribunal which has been validly made in lawful exercise of its powers. The petition is therefore, rejected. .