Judgment : Pursuant to the notice of motion ordered on 212. 1994 in this second appeal, I have heard learned counsel for the plaintiff- appellant as well as learned counsel for the defendant- respondent. The plaintiff has failed in both the courts below. 2. The suit is for declaring the correct date of birth of the plaintiff as 111. 1937 in her S.S.L.C. Book and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to effect change of plaintiff’s date of birth as 111. 1937 instead of 24. 1937. 3. The suit has been concurrently dismissed by both the courts below. Though learned counsel for the appellant argues that pursuant to Ex.A.3, the horoscope of the plaintiff, Ex.A-1, the birth certificate issued by the municipal authority relating to the plaintiff, the relevant Government orders and the oral evidence the courts below ought to have decreed the suit as prayed for, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the suit itself is not maintainable under Sec.34 of the Specific Relief Act since the employer of the plaintiff, viz,, Meenakshi College, in which the plaintiff is a lecturer, has not been impleaded in the suit and there is no cause of action against the defendant- Director of School Education, the plaintiff having left the school about 37 years back. Learned counsel for the respondent also submits that the suit is also barred by limitation under Art.58 of the Limitation Act, since, though the plaint states that on 1. 1990 the plaintiff consulted an astrologer about her future as per her horoscope and that then only she discovered the defect in her date of birth in her S.S.L.C.Book Even P.W.I, the plaintiff (the sole witness on the side of the plaintiff) did not depose that she discovered the alleged defect only on 1. 1990 and in fact she did not refer to any date at all in this connection but only said. 4. In view of the abovesaid contention taken by the respondent regarding the maintainability of the suit on the ground of non-impleading the proper person I have to first consider the said aspect. 5. First paragraph of Sec.34 of the new Specific Relief Act (corresponding to Sec.42 of the old Act) runs as follows: "34. 4. In view of the abovesaid contention taken by the respondent regarding the maintainability of the suit on the ground of non-impleading the proper person I have to first consider the said aspect. 5. First paragraph of Sec.34 of the new Specific Relief Act (corresponding to Sec.42 of the old Act) runs as follows: "34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right: Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title in such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled and that the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief." [Italics supplied] The contention of learned counsel for the respondent is that the defendant- respondent is not such a person "denying or interested to deny." In this connection, he relies on the decision in D.Arul Raj v. The Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, (1973)1 L. W. 643 and the judgment of this Court in S.A. No.108 of 1958 relied on therein. The following passage in (1973)1 L.W. 645 is relied out by him: "Jagadeesan, J., in Second Appeal No.108 of 1958 held that the plaintiff in the suit was not entitled to a declaration under Sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act and the plaintiff had no cause of action at all against the Director of Public Instruction. That was a case where the plaintiff was serving in the Corporation of Madras was made a party in the second appeal for the first time.....In the view that the Director of Public Instruction was not in any way interested in denying the correct date of birth, the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration under Sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff there asked for a declaration of his correct date of birth as against the Director of Public Instructions who was absolutely unconcerned and disinterested in the matter and that the plaintiff had no cause of action at all against the Director of Pubic Instructions." 6. Learned counsel for the respondent also points out that in the written statement itself, the defendant has raised the plea that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party, viz., the employer of the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the respondent also points out that in the written statement itself, the defendant has raised the plea that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party, viz., the employer of the plaintiff. Yet the plaintiff did not choose to implead the said employer. 7. I see great force in the contention of learned counsel for the respondent regarding the maintainability of the suit, particularly in the light of D.Arul Raj v. The Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, (1973)1 L.W. 643 and the unreported judgment in S.A. No. 108 of 1958. I have also held similar view in my own judgment dated 29. 1994 in a similar second appeal, viz., S.A.No.399 of 1994, which is also relied on by learned counsel for the respondent. There too, after referring to (1993)1 L. W. 645 and the above referred to old Sec.42 and the present Sec.34 (which is almost same as old Sec.42), I observed as follows: "So, such a declaration suit can be filed against any person denying or interested to deny plaintiff’s title. In that context only, this Court held in the above referred S.A. No.108 of 1958 as stated in (1993)1 L. W. 645 which also implicitly approved the said decision in the said second appeal. So, the present declaration suit, which also has been filed under the abovesaid Sec.34 is not strictly maintainable, against the present defendant, viz., the Director of School Education since long back the had left the school in 1968 itself and the defendant herein cannot be said to be in any way interested in denying the alleged correct date of birth of the plaintiff on the date when the suit has been filed in 1982. Now, the person who may be interested in denying the said date of birth is plaintiffs employer. But, the said employer has not been impleaded." 8. No doubt, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the correction of the entry in the S.S.L.C. book can only be done by the respondent and so there is cause of action by the respondent. But, I am unable to accept this submission. Long after the plaintiff has left the school, the respondent is totally unconcerned and disinterested in the matter and it cannot be said that when the suit is filed, there is cause of action against the Director of School Education (defendant). But, I am unable to accept this submission. Long after the plaintiff has left the school, the respondent is totally unconcerned and disinterested in the matter and it cannot be said that when the suit is filed, there is cause of action against the Director of School Education (defendant). Learned counsel for the appellant also sought to distinguish one fact in the above S.A. No.399,of 1994 with the present one, by saying that while in that case, there was no reply from the Director of School Education to the suit notice, denying the claim made by the plaintiff therein, in the present case, the claim of the plaintiff is denied in the reply notice Ex.A-8. But the said denial cannot be said to be actual with the reference to the actual date of birth of the plaintiff. Even the trial court, in its judgment, states that under the abovesaid Ex.A-8, the defendant replied stating that since already she had written the examination of school final, there cannot be thereafter, any alteration in the S.S.L.C. book regarding her date of birth. So, all that is stated in Ex.A-8 appears to be that the alteration sought for the in S.S.L.C. book cannot be done after such a long time. So, it cannot be said that there is denial in the present case, satisfying the relevant expression used in Sec.34 of the Specific Relief Act. 9. Further, I must also point but that Director of Public Instruction v. Mohandas, (1953)1 M.L.J. 488 (D.B.), has strictly the application to the present case since that case arouse under Sec.45 of the old Act viz., Specific Relief Act, 1877, which was somewhat similar to the remedy provided under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and after coming into force of the Constitution, the Magistrate had omitted the said provision contained under Sec.45 in the new Act, viz., the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The net result is, I have to hold that the suit itself is not maintainable against the defendant. 10. In the view thus I have taken regarding the maintainability of the suit, there is no necessity to go into the question of limitation of the arguments relating to merits of the case. Hence, the second appeal is not admitted, but dismissed. No costs. 11. 10. In the view thus I have taken regarding the maintainability of the suit, there is no necessity to go into the question of limitation of the arguments relating to merits of the case. Hence, the second appeal is not admitted, but dismissed. No costs. 11. C.M.P.Nos.2183 and 3349 of 1995 are also dismissed since I have held that the suit, out of which the second appeal has arisen, itself is not maintainable against the defendant. No costs.