G. P. SHIVAPRAKASH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the order passed by the Executing Court dismissing the application filed by the petitioner purporting to be under Order 21, Rule 97 read with section 151 of C. P. C. ( 2 ) THE decree under execution was obtained by the first respondent decree-holder, in an eviction proceeding instituted by him on 11-12-1980 under Section 21 (l) (h) and (p) of the karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('the Act for short ). Since the second respondent judgment-debtor represented by the father of the petitioner herein, after filing its statement of objections remained absent, the Court on 8-12-1983 passed a considered order of eviction placing the second respondent ex parte. The second respondent filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 901 of 1983 in the Trial Court to have the said ex parte order set aside. 2a. On 18-4-1984 the second respondent also filed Revision petition No. 1491 of 1984 before this Court questioning the legality and correctness of the ex parte order of eviction without mentioning that it had filed the miscellaneous petition. This court on 30-5-1984 at the stage of admission, without issuing notice to the first respondent-landlord, dismissed the revision petition granting time to the second respondent till 31-12-1986 for vacating the premises in question, thus confirming the order of eviction. ( 3 ) ON 8-6-1984 Miscellaneous Petition No. 901 of 1983 presented by the second respondent for getting the ex parte order set aside was allowed by the Trial Court. Consequently, the ex parte order of eviction was set aside by the Trial Court and the proceeding in H. R. C. No. 8838 of 1980 got revived. Obviously, the second respondent did not bring to the notice of the Trial court in the aforesaid miscellaneous proceeding the order passed by this Court in the revision petition presented by it in which this Court had granted time to vacate the premises till 31-12-1986. The first respondent had no notice of the revision petition and he was totally unaware of the order made by this court on 30-5-1984. The first respondent had no notice of the revision petition and he was totally unaware of the order made by this court on 30-5-1984. ( 4 ) ON 10-10-1984 an application was filed by the first respondent in the revision petition bringing to the notice of this court the conduct of the second respondent in filing miscellaneous Petition No. 901 of 1983 before the Trial Court suppressing the fact that it had filed a civil revision petition before this Court and the order of this Court in the revision petition granting time to vacate the premises till 31-12-1986. ( 5 ) THE second respondent in the revision petition before this Court, on 18-1-1985 filed an application with a prayer for recalling the order dated 30-5-1984 granting time to vacate the premises till 31-12-1986. On the said application this Court without directing notice to the first respondent by order dated 6-2-1985, recalled the order dated 30-5-1984. On 25-2-1985, the first respondent having come to know of the order dated 6-2-1985 of this Court filed an application for recalling the order dated 6-2-1985 under which the order passed by this Court on 30-5-1984 granting time to the second respondent to vacate the premises till 31-12-1986 was recalled. The said application filed by the first respondent was dismissed by this Court on 18-6-1985. ( 6 ) AGAINST the said order, the first respondent preferred Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14253 of 1985 before the supreme Court. The Supreme Court by interim order dated 29-7-1986 stayed further proceedings in H. R. C. before the Trial court. On 4-3-1987 the Special Leave Petition was allowed and the order dated 18-6-1985 of this Court dismissing the application of the first respondent was set aside and the matter was remanded to this Court to hear the said application afresh. ( 7 ) THIS Court heard the said application of the first respondent to recall the order dated 6-2-1985 and allowed the said application on 29-9-1988, thus recalling the order dated 6-2-1985. Consequently, the order passed by this Court in C. R. P. No. 1491 of 1984 dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner and granting him time till 31-12-1986 became operative. The application filed by the second respondent on 18-1-1985 for recalling the order dated 30-5-1984 was dismissed by this Court on 27-2-1989. Consequently, the order passed by this Court in C. R. P. No. 1491 of 1984 dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner and granting him time till 31-12-1986 became operative. The application filed by the second respondent on 18-1-1985 for recalling the order dated 30-5-1984 was dismissed by this Court on 27-2-1989. ( 8 ) ON 15-4-1989 an application was filed by the first respondent before the Trial Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 901 of 1983 bringing to its notice the order dated 30-5-1984 of this Court granting time to the petitioner to vacate the premises thus confirming the order of eviction, and therefore the Trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the miscellaneous petition. In the said application a prayer was made to recall the order dated 8-6-1984 of the Trial Court under which the miscellaneous petition was allowed, since the order passed by this Court in the revision petition had not been brought to its notice by the second respondent. The said application filed by the first respondent was dismissed by the Trial Court on 25-1-1990. Against the dismissal of the application, the first respondent preferred revision petition to this Court in C. R. P. No. 3123 of 1990. On 25-10-1994 the said revision petition was allowed by this Court and the order passed by the Trial Court in the miscellaneous petition restoring H. R. C. No. 8838 of 1980 was set aside. Against the said order of this Court, the second respondent preferred special Leave Petition No. 3476 of 1995 before the Supreme court, but the same was rejected on 20-2-1995. On 9-3-1995 the first respondent has put into execution the decree dated 8-12-1983 since it had become final. ( 9 ) THE above chronology of events discloses the resourcefulness of the second respondent, represented by sampathraj Jain, the father of the petitioner, and the disingenuous methods adopted from the very beginning of the institution of the eviction petition to pervert the legal proceedings by dishonest means. ( 10 ) IN the present execution proceedings an application was filed by the petitioner, who is no other than one of the sons of the said Sampathraj Jain, purporting to be under Order 21, Rule 97, c. P. C. In the said application the petitioner posed himself as an obstructor/third party in possession of the suit schedule property independent of the rights of the second respondent judgment-debtor. In the affidavit in support of the application, the petitioner has stated inter alia thus at para 1:"i submit that M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain is a firm of associated members founded by the ancestors of Dalichand ji and Jayantilal Ji, decades ago. The said firm has been carrying on the family business forming the associated members of the firm and the said firm is having association of the members: (1) Sri Jayantilal Sampathraj Jain; (2) Sri Ashok Kumar Sampathraj Jain; (3) Sri Naresh Kumar Sampathraj Jain; (4) Sri Sanjay Kumar Sampathraj Jain". At paragraph 4 of the affidavit the petitioner has stated as hereunder:"i submit that the firm of Dalichand Jugraj Jain is an as sociation of members and duly registered as partner under Income Tax Act, and Sales Tax Act, and doing business as if the associated members are the partners. Hence, M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain is consisting of associated members stated supra and the name is a compendious name". In the affidavit the petitioner has stated that he had no knowledge of the eviction proceedings between the first respondent and the second respondent and that "each associated member of the firm of Dalichand Jugraj Jain is having individual right, title and interest in the leasehold premises and these rights are independent though jointly held". ( 11 ) IT appears from the records an identical application had also been filed by the other three members of the family. The said application was also dismissed by the Trial Court by the order under revision. ( 12 ) THOUGH the petitioner asserts that the eviction petitionagainst the second respondent firm which was represented in the eviction proceeding by Sampathraj Jain, who as noticed above, is no other than his father, was a collusive one between the first respondent and the said Sampathraj Jain, strangely, in the execution proceeding an affidavit is filed by the said sampathraj Jain. In the said affidavit, Sampathraj Jain has stated as hereunder:"i submit that M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain, is a business firm having association of members of Hindu family and the associated members are: (1) Jayantilal Sampathraj Jain; (2) Ashok Kumar Sampathraj Jain; (3) Naresh Kumar Sampathraj Jain; (4) Sanjaya Kumar Sampathraj Jain; (5) Suraj Kumar Sampathraj Jain. "the said firm has been founded 60 years ago by the ancestors of the family by name Dalichand Ji Jugraj Ji. "the said firm has been founded 60 years ago by the ancestors of the family by name Dalichand Ji Jugraj Ji. It is in this context since M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain has been described as partnership firm and each one of the associated members is individual entity in the partnership firm ( 13 ) IN the affidavit the said Sampathraj Jain refers to the in ception of the tenancy and emphasises that it was necessary that each individual member of the family ought to have been made parties in the eviction proceeding and in their absence the said decree would not bind the other "associated members" in the family business. In the last paragraphs of the affidavit, sampathraj Jain avers as hereunder:"now that the other partners on their own have been acting rightly at the appropriate stage, it has become necessary for me to clarify the position to this Hon'ble court that at no point of time, I have represented any other partner/partners of the firm M/s. Dalichand Jugraj jain and my participation is only as individual partner of the firm M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and my attorney represents me alone and nobody else. For placing the materials straight on record, I am filing this affidavit, so that D. Noor Mohd. , the decree-holder in a manner hood-winking the law, should circumvent the law itself for his ulterior purposes". ( 14 ) FROM the affidavit filed by Sampathraj Jain, whorepresented the second respondent firm in the eviction proceedings throughout these 15 years, it is obvious that if at all there is collusion it is between the petitioner and the second respondent. From the applications made by the petitioner and the affidavits of the petitioner and his father Sampathraj Jain, it is apparent that the second respondent is a business family "having association of members of Hindu family consisting of five members" and it is not a partnership firm constituted under the Indian Partnership Act, ( 15 ) SRI R. B. Sadashivappa, learned Counsel for the petitioner,submitted that since second respondent firm is a compendious name for the partners constituting it, the firm could not have been sued in its own name without the partners being impleaded. In this regard, he invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mis. Chhotelal Pyarelal, The partnership Firm and Others v Shikharchand. In this regard, he invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mis. Chhotelal Pyarelal, The partnership Firm and Others v Shikharchand. In the said decision, the Supreme Court was considering certain provisions of C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Kent Control Order (1949 ). With reference to the provisions of the said Act, the ruling of the Supreme Court is reproduced below: "2. Now, there can be no doubt that since the Code of civil Procedure does not apply to proceedings under the h. R. C. Order, no application for eviction can be maintained against a firm in the firm name. The firm is merely a compendious name for the partners constituting it and it is only by virtue of the provisions of Order 30 of the Code of civil Procedure that a firm can sue and be sued in its own name without the partners being impleaded eo nomine. It is therefore clear that the firm M/s. Chhotelal Pyarelal could not be sued in the firm name by the respondent insofar as the application for eviction under the H. R. C. Order was concerned. ( 16 ) THE aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court has no application to the instant case since Rule 35 of the Karnataka rent Control Rules, 1961, expressly provides that in deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided for by these rules, the Court shall as far as possible be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Besides, Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure also enjoins that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction. ( 17 ) IN view of the above provisions, I hold that the provisionsof Order 30 of the C. P. C. , in its entirety are applicable to a proceeding under Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner next contendedthat whenever an application is made under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C. P. C. , it is incumbent on the part of the Executing Court to hold a detailed enquiry before proceeding further in the execution. ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner next contendedthat whenever an application is made under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C. P. C. , it is incumbent on the part of the Executing Court to hold a detailed enquiry before proceeding further in the execution. The Trial Court has considered this contention and has held that the allegation in the application that there was collusion between Sampathraj Jain and the first respondent cannot be believed. ( 19 ) IN Mis. Paramound Industries and Metal Finishers vsmt. CM. Malliga1, a Division Bench of this Court has ruled that, if a person causes obstruction to the execution of a decree, it becomes necessary for the Executing Court, whether or not the decree-holder files an application for removing the obstruction under Order 21, Rule 97, C. P. C, to decide the objections of the obstructor and determine the question as to whether the objector/obstructor is bound by the decree or not. This determination falls under, and shall have to be made in accordance with Rules 97, 98, 100 and 101 of Order 21 of the c. P. C. Such determination also attracts Rules 103 and 104 of order 21 of the C. P. C. Until those objections are decided, the executing Court cannot proceed to execute the decree. ( 20 ) AS noticed above, the Trial Court has considered the objections of the obstructor and has come to the conclusion that the allegation that there was collusion between Sampathraj who represented the second respondent firm and the first respondent in the H. R. C. proceeding was baseless. The Trial Court has also held that the objections filed was only intended to protract the proceedings. The contention of the learned Counsel on this point has no substance. The Trial Court has also held that the objections filed was only intended to protract the proceedings. The contention of the learned Counsel on this point has no substance. ( 21 ) SRI S. S. Ramdas, learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent, submitted that in the H. R. C. proceeding, the second respondent was represented by one of the partners (assuming that the second respondent was a partnership firm) and therefore, it was not necessary to implead every one of the partners of the firm in view of the provisions in Order 30 of the c. P. C. He invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme court in Shah Phoolchand Lalchand v. Parvathi Bai , wherein the Supreme Court while considering the inordinate delay in raising a particular objection has observed that when an objection has not been raised till the stage of Special Leave it is surely not open to the party to raise such an objection at a very later stage and thereby delay matters for a number of years. ( 22 ) FROM the averments in the application of the petitioner it is difficult to ascertain whether, according to the petitioner, the second respondent was a partnership firm in terms of the provisions contained in the Indian Partnership Act or whether it was a business of Hindu Joint Family. The petitioner in the affidavit does not spell out in clear terms the status of the second respondent. It looks as though he is trying to confuse the issue as regards the status of the second respondent firm. The affidavit of the father of the petitioner Sampathraj Jain in support of the application of the petitioner, far from clarifying the position confounds the issue regarding the legal character of the second respondent firm. Whatever be the legal status, the fact remains that the second respondent firm was duly represented by Sampathraj Jain as its partner and he has been successful in retarding the progress of the eviction proceeding for almost 15 years. ( 23 ) IN Mst. Surayya Begum v. Mohd. Usman and Others, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "9. The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. ( 23 ) IN Mst. Surayya Begum v. Mohd. Usman and Others, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "9. The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. A karta of a Joint hindu Family has always been recognised as a representative of the other members of the Joint Hindu family, and so has been a trustee. In cases where the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted a named party in a suit represents the other persons interested in the litigation, and likewise a receiver appointed in one case represents the interest of the litigating parties in another case against a stranger. Similarly the real owner is entitled to the benefits under a decree obtained by his benamidar against a stranger and at the same time is also bound by the decision. Examples can be multiplied. It is for this reason that we find explanation VI in the following words in Section 11 of the code of Civil Procedure:"explanation VI. Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating". This, of course, is subject to the essential condition that the interest of a person concerned has really been represented by the others; in other words, his interest has been looked after in a bona fide manner. If there be any clash of interests between the person concerned and his assumed representative or if the latter due to collusion or for any other reason, mala fide neglects to defend the case, he cannot be considered to be a representative. The issue, when it becomes relevant, has, therefore, to be answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. There may be instances in which the position is absolutely clear beyond any reasonable doubt one way or the other and the question can be settled without any difficulty; but in other cases the issue may have to be decided with reference to relevant evidence to be led by the parties". There may be instances in which the position is absolutely clear beyond any reasonable doubt one way or the other and the question can be settled without any difficulty; but in other cases the issue may have to be decided with reference to relevant evidence to be led by the parties". ( 24 ) IN the H. R. C. proceeding the interest of the second respondent was fully taken care of by Sampathraj Jain by obstructing its progress at every stage. He has gone up to the supreme Court and has failed, but has not as yet given up his game. He appears to have immense faith in his ability to hoodwink the law and frustrate the well-earned decree secured by the first respondent. For over fifteen years, this clever manipulator has outwitted the Courts and made a mockery of the system, of course aided by forensic skill. ( 25 ) THIS revision petition is dismissed with the contempt it deserves with exemplary costs of Rs, 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand) payable to the first respondent, to be borne equally by the petitioner and the second respondent represented by sampathraj Jain, the father of the petitioner. The Executing court would now proceed with the execution of the decree without any pause. Date: 8-9-1995 the learned Counsel for the petitioner requests that the execution proceeding may be stayed for a period of 30 days to enable the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court. The oral request is rejected. application were to be made by either of the parties for certified copy of this order, let the same be issued forthwith. --- *** --- .