Judgment : The debtor in LP. No.82 of 1972 has filed this appeal against the order, dismissing an application for setting aside the sale. 2. The appellant has filed the application for setting aside the sale held on 26. 1976 on the ground that there was no proper notice and for the auction held on 26. 1976 notice was given only on 26. 1976. The other ground is that except the first respondent there is no other bidders in view of the want of notice and the price which it fetched is also very low. There are irregularities in the conduct of the sale because of the lack of proper publication of the notice. 3. The first respondent has filed counter, denying the averments made by the appellant in the application and also contended that the application filed by the appellant is barred by limitation. 4. It is the case of the appellant that the sale was held on 26. 1976 and the same was confirmed on 212. 1976. The application for setting aside the sale was filed on 21. 1977, since the appellant came to know about the sale only on 11. 1977. The application is within the period, if the date of knowledge of the appellant is taken into consideration. The trial court by its order dated 112. 1981 has dismissed the M.P. No. 16 of 1977 in I.P. No.82 of 1972 finding that the price fetched in the auction is reasonable and there is no collusion between the Official Receiver and the creditors. The trial court further found that the petitioner ought to have filed the petition within 30 days from the date of sale and since there is no proof that the petitioner came to know about the sale only on 11. 1977, the petition is barred by limitation. The appellate court also on the same view, dismissed the appeal C.M.A. No.98 of 1982 filed by the appellant herein. Against that the present second appeal has been filed. 5. The points for consideration in this appeal are: .(1) Whether the sale held on 26. 1976 is liable to be set aside? .(2) Whether the application filed by the appellant is barred by limitation? 6. Heard both sides. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that for the sale held on 26. 1976, the notice was issued only on 26. The points for consideration in this appeal are: .(1) Whether the sale held on 26. 1976 is liable to be set aside? .(2) Whether the application filed by the appellant is barred by limitation? 6. Heard both sides. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that for the sale held on 26. 1976, the notice was issued only on 26. 1976, which may not amount to proper service of notice and virtually the debtor was not served with any notice even on earlier occasions in respect of the adjournment of sale. In the absence of any notice, the debtor has filed the application for setting aside the sale within 30 days from the date of knowledge about the sale and hence the sale has to be set aside. .7. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that there was proper notice and there was proper publication about the auction also. Further the sale was held on 26. 1976 and the application for setting aside the sale was filed on 21. 1977 and as such the application is barred by limitation. The learned counsel for the respondents also referred to Sec.68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and contended that the limitation is 21 days for filing the appeal against the order of the Receiver. The applicant ought to have filed an appeal against the order of sale and that too within 21 days from the date of sale. He cannot file an application for setting aside the sale and as such the findings of the courts below are correct and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that even though there is no need to file an appeal, but still the appellant could have filed an application for setting aside the sale under Sec.68 of the said Act. 8. Issue No. 1: With regard to the issue of notice to the debtor, I find from the records that Exs.B-14 to B-18 have been marked by the Official Receiver. Of these, Ex.B-14 is said to be the office copy of the notice. The other exhibits are the notices sent to the appellant and they were returned unserved with an endorsement ‘no such addressee’ and ‘left’, Ex.B-18 is the notice sent to the appellant informing him about the auction date on 26. 1976. Of these, Ex.B-14 is said to be the office copy of the notice. The other exhibits are the notices sent to the appellant and they were returned unserved with an endorsement ‘no such addressee’ and ‘left’, Ex.B-18 is the notice sent to the appellant informing him about the auction date on 26. 1976. From the postal seal, I find that the notice has been despatched only on 26. 1976 for the auction to be held on 26. 1976. The notice was sent to the appellant only on the date of the auction. Hence, there is no possibility for the appellant to receive the notice of auction prior to the auction date. Whatever may be postal endorsement on the earlier notices, the Official Receiver, having decided to send the notice to the appellant he ought to have sent earlier. Even otherwise, when four notices have been returned unserved, the Official Receiver ought to have taken care to make a paper publication so that the appellant could have been served by substituted service. The Official Receiver has not taken that much of care to see at least the appellant is served by way of substituted service. Hence I am of the view that the contention of the appellant that he was not served with any notice in respect of the sale held on 26. 1976 is established. Without the notice to the debtor, the sale ought not have been held. Hence the sale is liable to be set aside. .9. The appellant further contended that there was no proper advertisement with regard to the sale and the price fetched is very low. I find from the records that even though earlier auction notices had been filed in respect of earlier original proclamations Exs.B-3, B-7 and B-9 to B-13, all these proclamations relate to the various earlier dates notifying the auction. In these proclamations, there are endorsement to the effect that there were some publication by torn torn. So far as the proclamation of sale for the auction on 26. 1976 is concerned, no copy of the proclamation has been produced by the respondents. If any sale proclamation has been issued in respect of the sale held on 26. 1976, naturally it ought to have been produced before the court in order to establish that there was due publication of the sale. 1976 is concerned, no copy of the proclamation has been produced by the respondents. If any sale proclamation has been issued in respect of the sale held on 26. 1976, naturally it ought to have been produced before the court in order to establish that there was due publication of the sale. The respondents have not produced even the paper publication or advertisement in respect of the sale held on 26. 1976. As contended by the appellant, if proper publication or advertisement had been given, the property would have fetched more. Whether the property would fetch a price more than the one now it had fetched, is immaterial. But the court has to take care that the Official Receiver has to follow the procedure and he cannot give a go by to the rules and regulations framed under the statute. The Official Receiver is the officer of the court and he is expected to follow the procedure laid down under the law. In the absence of evidence to show that there was proper advertisement, I have no hesitation to hold that the sale is bad as there was no proper proclamation, publication, as well as advertisement in respect of the sale in question. 10. With regard to the limitation, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that as there was no notice to the debtor, he did not know about the sale held on 26. 1976 and hence he came to know about the sale only on 11. 1977 through his counsel and immediately he filed the application for setting aside the sale. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to Sec.68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which runs as follows: “68. Appeal to court against receiver: If the insolvent or any of the creditors or any other person is aggrieved by any act or decision of the receiver, he may apply to the court, and the court may confirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of, and make such order as it thinks fit: Provided that no application under this section shall be entertained after the expiration of twenty-one days from the date of the act or decision complained of.” Relying upon this section, he contended that the appellant ought to have applied to the court for setting aside the sale within 21 days from the date of sale. Even the section refers that ‘he may apply! Even the section refers that ‘he may apply! it should only refer to an appeal to be filed by the parties before the court. The learned counsel further contended that the proviso makes it clear that no application under this section shall be entertained after the expiration of 21 days and the proviso is a mandatory and hence the application filed for setting aside the sale ought not have been entertained. 11. At the outset I have to hold that the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is unsustainable. Even though the proviso to Sec.68 prescribes the period of limitation, Sec.78 of the Provincial Insolvency Act makes it clear that Sec.5 of the Indian Limitation Act shall apply to appeals and applications under the said Act. When once there is no exclusion of the application of the Limitation Act by the said enactment, normally the provisions of Limitation Act would apply. In this Act, there is a specific provision which makes the Sec.5 of the Limitation Act applicable. Moreover, I am of the, view that Sec.68 has no application for the present proceedings. 12. It is worthwhile to refer Sec.5 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which reads as follows: “5. General powers of courts: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the court, in regard to proceedings under this Act, shall have the same powers and shall follow the same procedure as it has and follows in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction. (2) Subject as aforesaid, High Courts and District Courts, in regard to proceedings under this Act in courts subordinate to them, shall have the same powers and shall follow the same procedure as they respectively have and follow in regard to civil suits.” This section specifically makes it clear that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable. Hence for setting side the sale the provisions laid down under O.21 of Code of Civil Procedure has to be applied. If the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable then it is 30 days. In fact, before the courts below it has been contended by the respondents themselves that the application has been filed beyond 30 days. It is not their case that the application ought to have been filed within 21 days as per Sec.68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In fact, before the courts below it has been contended by the respondents themselves that the application has been filed beyond 30 days. It is not their case that the application ought to have been filed within 21 days as per Sec.68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In view of my finding that the appellant has not been served with any notice, there is no chance for the appellant to know about the sale and hence he has to file the application for setting aside the sale only after coming to know of the sale. The applicant has stated in his petition that he came to know about the sale only on 11. 1977 and the application has been filed on 27. 1977. Even though the respondents have filed counter, they have not denied the same. The courts below have proceeded on the basis that the appellant has not proved that he came to be aware of the sale only on 11. 1977. For the knowledge no evidence can be let in and only statement has to be made. When the respondents have not denied, the statement it has to be accepted. Hence, the application filed by the appellant is not barred by limitation. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to the judgment reported in Anamohur v. M/s.G.V. Dada Chintamani Patravali, A.I.R. 1987 Karn. 102, wherein it has been held that if the Official Receiver has committed any illegality and it is brought to the notice of the court before confirmation of the sale, the question of limitation of 21 days could not arise and the court can at any stage of the proceedings rectify the illegality and irregularities. In the case on hand the appellant was not aware of the sale and hence there is no possibility for him to bring it to the notice of the court within the period fixed by the Act. As soon as he came to know about the same, he has brought it to the notice of the court and the court has to consider whether there is any illegality or irregularity. When once it has been found that there was illegality or irregularity in the conduct of the sale, the sale is liable to be set aside. 14. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.