JUDGMENT Surya Kumar Tiwari, J. : This petition has been filed against the order dated 25.2.1992 passed by Sri J. Banerjee, Additional Sessions Judge, 4th Court, Murshidabad, in Sessions Serial No. 192/91. 2. The petitioner who happens to be a complainant lodged complaint in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, complaining that the opposite party Nos. 1 to 11 had assembled in an unlawful assembly and had voluntarily caused grievous hurt to him. 3. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, in whose court the case was transferred upon commitment, found that there is nothing on record on the basis of which the accused persons can be charged and hence the opposite party Nos. 1 to 11 were discharged. As against this order of discharge, this revisional petition has been filed. 4. After going through the order of the Learned Additional; Sessions Judge, I find that he has not discussed the statements recorded under s. 161 Cr. P.C. by the police. He has considered only the fact that incident took place on 31st October, 1988 and the complaint was filed in the court of Magistrate on 7th December, 1988. Hence the Complaint was clearly belated. The• Learned Additional Sessions Judge further found that no specific injury has been noted. A xerox copy of the injury report has been shown to me during the course of arguments and it clearly discloses the presence of two compound fractures. 5. The third circumstances which weight with the learned Judge is that it is stated in the FIR that accused Debashis Bhattacharya had a revolver but no such revolver was seized from his possession and the prosecution has not stated as to why the accused Debashis Bhattacharya did not use the revolver. All these considerations are certainly extraneous and should not have been taken into consideration at the time of framing of charge. 6. The Supreme Court in case of Superintendent Remembrancer vs. Anil Kumar (AIR 1980 SC page 52) has laid down as below : "The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding, the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence". 7. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties has relied on the case reported in 1979 Criminal law Journal, page 154 (Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Shyamaf) wherein it has been laid down that while considering the question of framing of charge the court has power to sift the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. This is what the learned Sessions Court has not done. Instead of discussing the statements recorded under s. 161 Cr.P.C. he has discussed whether the story put forward by the prosecution could be believed or not, for the purpose of conviction. This approach of the learned Trial Judge is basically wrong. 8. The Supreme Court in case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh ( AIR 1977 SC 2018 ) has laid down thus: "Reading Ss. 227 and 228 together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and• judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under s. 227 or s. 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end to end in his conviction". 9. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end to end in his conviction". 9. The court further observed in the same case: "Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused." 10. In the light of the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Supreme• court, I am clearly of the view that the learned Sessions Court was wrong in discharging the accused persons. 11. The revisional petition is, therefore, be allowed and the order of discharge is set aside. The learned Trial judge is directed to hear arguments afresh on the point of framing the charge in the light of the aforesaid proposition of law. 12. With these direction this petition is disposed of. Application disposed of. Direction given to the Trial Judge to hear arguments afresh on the point of framing the charge in the light of the aforesaid proposition of law.