JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner Raj Kumari, in this petition has prayed to quash the criminal proceedings pending against her in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk, in Case No.170/ 85. It has also been prayed to quash the order dated June 22, 1993 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate whereby her application to drop proceedings against her was dismissed. 2. In brief, the facts of the case are that a sample of cotton seed refined oil was obtained by the Food Inspector from co-accused Suraj Mal, Proprietor of the firm M/s. Suraj Mal Govind Narain, on 1.10.80. The oil was found adulterated on examination by the Public Analyst vide report dated 30.10.80 as the sample did not conform to the prescribed standards of purity. After necessary formalities, a complaint was filed on 4.2.81 by the Food Inspector in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk, against, Suraj Mal, Srikant, Smt. Raj Kumari (petitioner) Tonk and M/s. Suraj Mal Govind Narain, Tonk and M/s. Srikant Ramakant Lakhotia, Jaipur under Sect ions 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Srikant, Snit. Raj Kumari and the firm M/s. Rama Kant Srikant Lakhotia, Jaipur were made accused in the case on the ground that the oil in question was purchased by the firm Suraj Mal Govind Narain, Tonk from the firm M/s. Ramakant Srikant Lakhotia, Jaipur. On 21.12.82 an application was moved on behalf of the petitioner with a prayer to drop proceedings against her on the basis of two grounds. The first ground was that the petitioner was a sleeping partner of the firm M/s. Rama Kant Srikant Lakhotia and in the absence of any material on record to the effect that she was in-charge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, her prosecution was not sustainable. The second ground was that there was a nomination under Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected the said application vide order dated 21.12.82 holding that the said application shall be considered at the stage of framing charge. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Tonk, who allowed the revision. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected the said application vide order dated 21.12.82 holding that the said application shall be considered at the stage of framing charge. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Tonk, who allowed the revision. The order dated 21.12.82 was set aside and the case was sent back to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate with a direction that before proceeding with the case, he shall first decide the application dated 21.12.82 filed by the petitioner Smt. Raj Kumari after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Thereafter, the application of the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by impugned order dated June 22, 1993. For nomination, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate observed that there was over-writing in the date, as such, it required inquiry as to when the nomination was filed before the concerned authority. The plea of the petitioners of being a sleeping partner was also turned down on the ground that the agreement dated 4.1.79, in which she was described as sleeping partner, was still a matter of inquiry. Smt. Sumati Bishnoi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, vehemently contended that the sample of oil was taken by the Food Inspector from Co-accused Suraj Mal, Proprietor of the firm M/s. Suraj Mal Govind Narain, Tonk and that the partners and the firm Rama Kant Srikant, Jaipur were impleaded as accused on the ground that the oil in question is said to have been purchased from their firm by the firm of Tonk. Learned Counsel contended that the petitioner has been impleaded as an accused on the principle of vicarious liability of the firm in which she was a sleeping partner. Learned Counsel contended that the petitioner has been impleaded as an accused on the principle of vicarious liability of the firm in which she was a sleeping partner. Learned Counsel drew my attention to the averments made in the complaint and other material on record to show that there was nothing on record that the petitioner who is a lady, was Incharge of the firm M/s. Rama Kant Srikant Lakhotia, Jaipur and was responsible to the said firm for the conduct of its business and in the absence of any material on record proceedings against her should be quashed.Section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Act of 1954 reads as under: (i) 17(1)(a) "The person, if any, what to has been nominated under Sub-section (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company (hereinafter in this section to be referred as the person responsible) shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence." The expression "Company" has been defined under Sub-section (4) of Section 17 as "Company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals" and the word "Director" has been defined in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. 3. In relation to the prosecution of a lady partner or a minor partner of a partnership-firm the question was considered by me in a matter under the Essential Commodities Act in Damodar and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 1992 RCC 18 . Section 10(l) of the Essential Commodities' Act is para-materia to Section 17 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The definition of' Company' and 'Director' in relation to the firm is also para-materia to the provisions of Essential Commodities Act as per explanation of Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act. Section 10(l) of the Essential Commodities' Act is para-materia to Section 17 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The definition of' Company' and 'Director' in relation to the firm is also para-materia to the provisions of Essential Commodities Act as per explanation of Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act. After considering the various relevant judgments of the Apex Court of the Country and our High Court, the legal position was summarised as under in the case of Damodar v. State of Rajasthan (supra) : "(i) There can be no vicarious liability in criminal law unless the statute specifically provides for it and Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act does not create such vicarious liability. (ii) The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 10 placing burden on the accused to prove that the offence took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such offence arises only when the prosecution establishes that the requisite condition mentioned in Subsection (1) is established. The requisite condition is that the partner was carrying on the business and was during the relevant time incharge of the business. (iii) That the prosecution must allege and prove that a partner of a firm was responsible for carrying on the business and was, during the relevant time incharge of the firm before he can be convicted. (iv) In case of lady or minor partner, who are generally admitted for the benefit of partnership there should be a strict compliance of the above condition contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act and there should be specific averments in the charge- sheet/complaint about their individual acts in the conduct of the business of the firm to show that they were responsible for carrying on the business and were, during the relevant time, incharge of the business. In the absence of such specific averments in the complaint /charge-sheet about their acts in the conduct of the business their prosecution should not be permitted. In the absence of such specific averments in the complaint /charge-sheet about their acts in the conduct of the business their prosecution should not be permitted. (v) In case of adult male partner/partners, keeping in view his/ their status in the firm, rights and the duties, the question that he/they was/were incharge of and was/were responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm should be left to be decided at the stage of trial and cognizance should not he refused simply on the ground that in the complaint/charge- sheet such averments were not made." 4. Applying the aforesaid principles in the present case, the prosecution against the petitioner deserves to be quashed as there is no averment in the complaint that she was incharge of and responsible for the conduct of the burning of the firm. There is also no material on record to that effect. Hence, without deciding the question of nomination, this petition deserves to be allowed on the aforesaid ground. 5. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 22.6.93 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk, in case No.170/ 85 is set aside and the proceedings against the petitioner in criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk are set aside.Petition allowed. *******