JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by P. SHANMUGAM, J. - this is a typical case of circumventing the tax liability by resorting to judicial device to divert the enforcement machinery successfully for 35 year. In the earlier round Sukumaran, J. ([1991] 83 STC 377 [State of Kerala v. Pareed Pillai]) justifiably characterised the case as a standing monument of bureaucratic indifference with added complications due to the criminal neglect of officers. Petitioners in the original petitions are the appellants. The appellants are partners of a firm, M/s. A. Pareed Pillay and Brothers. It has three brothers a partners, namely, A. Pareed Pillay, A. Mohammed Pillay and A. Khader Pillay. The firm was doing business in coconut oil and was assessed to tax both under the State Act which was then the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act (11 of 1125 ME) and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. There is no dispute that the partnership firm was a registered dealer and that for the assessment years 1958-59 to 1962-63 the firm was assessed and the liabilities accrued under the State Act at Rs. 1,124.29 and under the Central Act at Rs. 12,71,591.21. There is also no dispute that these amounts were in arrears as due from the partnership firm from the year 1963. Only after 15 years thereafter the authorities could initiate proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act and issue necessary certificate for attachment of 21/40 shares of the three partners in the properties left by their father. At that stage one of the appellants, A. Pareed Pillai filed a suit O.S. No. 307 of 1979 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Perumbavoor, against the authorities for an injunction to restrain them from proceeding with the recovery steps. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court reversed the decision and decreed the suit. On appeal in S.A. No. 756 of 1984 this Court justified the recovery proceedings ([1991] 83 STC 377 [State of Kerala v. A. Pareed Pillai]) and also held that the suit filed without complying with the mandatory requirement of section 80(1) of C.P.C. was not maintainable. Special leave petition, S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1014 of 1991 filed against the second appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on January 29, 1991. 2. Special leave petition, S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1014 of 1991 filed against the second appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on January 29, 1991. 2. Another brother A. Mohammed Pillay thereafter filed a suit O.S. No. 485 of 1984 after issuing section 80(1), C.P.C. notice, on the file of the Munsiff Court, Parur, claiming similar reliefs as his brother. The trial court decreed the suit and the appeal filed against the said judgment is still pending. 3. The appellants submit that "emboldened" by the second appeal judgment of this Court the Tahsildar, Aluva, issued notice, exhibit P12, in August, 1991, for the sale of 21/40 shares of the appellants for the tax arrears. O.P. No. 9516 of 1991 (W.A. No. 1575 of 1995) was filed seeking to quash the sale notice, exhibit P12, and for a declaration that the petitioner therein is not liable for the arrears of tax and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to proceed against him and his properties. O.P. No. 9519 of 1991 was filed for a declaration that the individual properties of the petitioner therein, viz., A. Khader Pillay (appellant in W.A. No. 1604 of 1995) are not liable for tax arrears and to quash exhibit P6 sale notice issued in respect of those properties, as illegal unauthorised and without jurisdiction. 4. Thus all the three brothers have initiated legal proceedings against the sale notices. In so for as A. Pareed Pillay is concerned, he has filed a suit which culminated in the S.L.P., O.P. No. 9516 of 1991 (decided on October 20, 1995) and the present appeal W.A. No. 1575 of 1995. The suit filed by Mohammed Pillay was decreed and the appeal filed against that judgment is pending. 5. The O.P. filed by A. Khader Pillay, viz., O.P. No. 9519 of 1991 [Reported as Khader Pillai v. Sales Tax and Agricultural Income-tax Officer [1996] 101 STC 152 (Ker)] is now under appeal in W.A. No. 1604 of 1995. 6. The suit filed by Mohammed Pillay was decreed and the appeal filed against that judgment is pending. 5. The O.P. filed by A. Khader Pillay, viz., O.P. No. 9519 of 1991 [Reported as Khader Pillai v. Sales Tax and Agricultural Income-tax Officer [1996] 101 STC 152 (Ker)] is now under appeal in W.A. No. 1604 of 1995. 6. The main contention urged on behalf of the appellants is that the judgment of Sukumaran, J., in S.A. No. 756 of 1984 [State of Kerala v. Pareed Pillai [1991] 83 STC 377 (Ker)] in reference to tax liability will not operate as res judicata since the suit was found not maintainable by virtue of non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of section 80(1) of C.P.C. Therefore, it is submitted that the question regarding the tax liability and the competency of the authorities to proceed to recover the same by invoking the Revenue Recovery Act is left open and the issue was not decided in a suit as held by the learned single Judge in O.P. No. 9516 of 1991 (W.A. No. 1575 of 1995). Since the issue is to be decided in O.P. No. 9519 of 1991 [Reported as Khader Pillai v. Sales Tax and Agricultural Income-tax Officer [1996] 101 STC 152 (Ker)] (W.A. No. 1604 of 1995) unaffected by the civil court decree, we have proposed not to go into the question of res judicata. We therefore proceed to consider on the liability of the partners for the tax due from the firm even in spite of the said decision. 7. According to the learned counsel, the firm is a dealer under the Central Act and the partners are not liable for the tax due from the firm. His contention is that the partners enjoy immunity under the provisions of the Central Act and it is not competent for the State to legislate for the destruction of the said immunity by exercising the agency power granted under section 9 of the Central Act. 8. We heard the counsel in detail. Section 9 of the Central Act dealer with the levy and collection of tax and penalties. 8. We heard the counsel in detail. Section 9 of the Central Act dealer with the levy and collection of tax and penalties. Sub-section (2) of section 9 enables the authorities to assess, reassess, collect and enforce payment of tax including any penalty payable by a dealer as if the tax or penalty payable by such a dealer under the Central Act is a tax or penalty payable under the General sales tax law of the State and for that purpose the authorities are empowered to exercise all or any of the powers they have under the General sales tax law of the State and the provisions of such law. 9. Under the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, the firm is an assessable entity. But no provision was made under the said Act to make the partners specifically liable. The General Sales Tax Act had been repealed by the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, with effect from April 1, 1963. Section 61 of the 1963 Act provides for the consequences of repealing and also about the recovery of the dues. Besides there was a change in reference to the liability of the firms in the form of section 21 of the 1963 Act, which is as follows : "21. Liability of firms. - (1) Where any firm is liable to pay any tax, fee or other amount under this Act, the firm and each of the partners of the firm shall be jointly and severally liable for such payment." The question that arises for consideration is whether the liability of the firm could be recovered from any one of its partners ? 10. Learned counsel for the appellants referred and strongly relied on the decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Radhakisan [1979] 43 STC 4 where the Supreme Court held that under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, a partnership firm is a legal entity and is a dealer for the purposes of the said Act and in the absence of a specific provision making the partners of a firm liable for the tax assessed on the firm, the partners of the firm cannot be made liable or be prosecuted for the default of payment of tax and penalty by the firm. The Supreme Court referred to two earlier decisions in the said judgment, viz., State of Punjab v. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate [1966] 17 STC 326 (SC) and Kapurchand Shrimal v. Tax Recovery Officer [1969] 72 ITR 623 (SC) and held that these two cases clearly establish that a firm in a partnership is recognised as a legal entity and as such proceedings can only be taken against the firm and the partners cannot be made liable for the tax assessed against the firm. While holding so the Supreme Court took note of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, section 18 wherein it was specifically provided that where any firm is liable to pay tax under the Act, the firm and each of the partners of the firm shall be jointly and severally liable for such payment. It we held that in the absence of a specific provision as found in section 18 of the Bombay Act the partners of the firm could not be held liable for the tax assessed on the firm. In the light of the observation of the Supreme Court referring to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, this judgment may not be of any help to the appellants since there is a specific provision under the Kerala State Act. 11. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ouseph and Sons [1985] 154 ITR 598 a Full Bench of this Court held that although under the partnership law a firm is not a legal entity but consists of only persons who are partners for the time being, under the Income-tax Act, a firm is an independent and distinct juristic person for the purpose of assessment as well as for recovery of tax as it is a "person" within the meaning of section 2(31) of the Act, having its own entity under and personality. It is also a separate entity under the sales tax law. This judgment is in reference to the provisions of the Income-tax Act and also based on the premises that it is a separate entity under the sales tax law also. The court did not consider the effect of section 21 of the State Act. 12. In State of Punjab v. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate [1966] 17 STC 326, the Supreme Court has clearly held that unless there is a statutory provision permitting the assessment of a dissolved firm, there is no longer any scope for assessing the firm. The court did not consider the effect of section 21 of the State Act. 12. In State of Punjab v. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate [1966] 17 STC 326, the Supreme Court has clearly held that unless there is a statutory provision permitting the assessment of a dissolved firm, there is no longer any scope for assessing the firm. The Supreme Court has specifically taken note of the fact that there can be an express provision to the contrary. The above decisions cited on behalf of the appellants would not be of any help to the appellants in the light of the specific provision under the State Act, viz., section 61 and section 21 of the Act. 13. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shah Sadiq and Sons [1987] 166 ITR 102, the Supreme Court while dealing with the interpretation of statutes held that rights which have accrued are saved unless they are taken away by the repealing statute. This is the principle behind section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 61 of the 1963 Act specifically provides that all arrears of tax and other amounts due at the commencement of this Act may be recovered as if they had accrued under this Act. Therefore, if there is a liability against the firm under the new Act, each of the partners of the firm shall be jointly and severally liable for such payment as per section 21 of the Act. 14. To pay the tax is a duty and what is levied becomes the liability. Consequently after the tax becomes due the relationship between the assessee and the department is really that of debtor and creditor. Section 9(2) of the Central Act deals with the collection of tax and enforcement of payment of tax. The Supreme Court in Khazan Chand v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [1984] 56 STC 214 upheld the penal interest levied under section 8(2) of the J & K General Sales Tax Act holding : "Providing for payment of interest in case of delayed payment of tax is a method usually adopted in fiscal legislation to ensure that the amount of tax which is due is paid by the prescribed time and provisions in that behalf form part of the recovery machinery provided in a taxing statue..... Neither does it lie in the defaulter's mouth to protest against the rate of interest charged to him nor is it open to him to dictate to the State the methods which it should adopt for recovering the amount of tax due by him." In this context it would be useful to refer to the observations of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1926] AC 37 (HL) which have been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the reference cited supra, as follows : "Now, there are three stages in the imposition of a tax. There is the declaration of liability, that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are liable. Next, there is the assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment. That, ex hypothesi, has already been fixed. But assessment particularises the exact sum which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay." We are concerned with the recovery of tax. Recovery of tax due from the firm through the partners is a method that can be adopted in fiscal legislations to ensure that the amount of tax which is due is paid and provisions in that behalf form part of the recovery machinery provided in the taxing statute. Section 9(2A) of the Central Act provides that all the provisions relating to all offences and penalties of the general sales tax law of each State shall with necessary modifications apply in relation to the collection or enforcement of payment as if the tax under this Act were a tax under such sales tax law. Earlier the Supreme Court in Khemka & Co. (Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [1975] 35 STC 571 held that levy of penalty under the local General Sales Tax Act for delay or default was not permissible. Consequently in 1976 the Parliament by an Amending Act amended section 9 of the Central Act by introducing sub-section (2A). The Supreme Court while upholding the validity of sub-section (2A) in Shiv Dutt Rai Fateh Chand v. Union of India [1983] 53 STC 289 held that the object of legislation was assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment of Central sales tax. This is legislation by incorporation. The Supreme Court while upholding the validity of sub-section (2A) in Shiv Dutt Rai Fateh Chand v. Union of India [1983] 53 STC 289 held that the object of legislation was assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment of Central sales tax. This is legislation by incorporation. The Parliament with the knowledge of various provisions of State laws had adopted them for the purposes of collection and enforcement. 15. The Central Act has adopted the State procedural law inclusive of all subsequent amendments that have been made or might be made for the purposes of assessment, collection and enforcement of payment of any tax including penalties under the Central Act. In Auto Pins (India) v. State of Haryana [1970] 26 STC 466 (P&H) the High Court held that Parliament was fully competent to adopt by a reference to the existing legislations on sales tax along with any subsequent modifications that may be made therein by the respective State Legislatures for the purpose of assessment, collection and enforcement of payment of any tax. Similar view was taken in Mysore Electrical Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1971] 27 STC 559 (Mys). The liability of the firm under section 9(2) of the Central Act would have to be read along with the then existing State law and also all subsequent amendments that would be made and that would come in existence in future from time to time. 16. The machinery provisions for collection of tax including charge of interest on delayed payment have been made so that the dealers may not evade or delay payment of due tax. The interpretation in reference to these provisions has to be made to preserve the workability of the same. In State of Tamil Nadu v. M. K. Kandaswami [1975] 36 STC 191 the Supreme Court held that if more than one construction of such a provision is possible, then that construction which preserves its workability and efficacy is to be preferred to one which would render it otiose or sterile. The said decision was followed in Kingsway & Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1990] 76 STC 119 (WBTT). The said decision was followed in Kingsway & Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1990] 76 STC 119 (WBTT). In McDowell & Company Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer [1985] 59 STC 277 the Supreme Court had taken the view that the proper way to construe a taxing statute, while considering a device to avoid tax, is not to ask whether the provisions should be construed literally or liberally, nor whether the transaction is not unreal and not prohibited by the statute, but whether the transaction is a device to avoid tax and whether the transaction is such that the judicial process may accord its approval to it. We find that specific provisions have been made under section 61 and section 21 of the State Act, 1963 providing that all arrears of tax at the commencement of the Act may be recovered as if they have accrued under the Act, and where a firm is liable to pay, each of the partners is jointly and severally liable. In the light of the clear and express terms of these provisions the appellants are liable. In all the decisions relied on by the learned counsel there were no specific provisions making the partners liable. We are of the considered view that combined reading of section 9(2) and 9(2A) of the Central Act read with section 61 proviso and section 21 of the State Act would show that this is only enforcement provision incorporated and authorised by the Central Act. 17. Taking all these into account we are of the view that the appellants who are the partners of the firm are liable for payment of tax by virtue of section 21 read with section 61 of the State Act. The authorities are well within the jurisdiction to invoke the provisions for enforcement of the liability of the firm on the partners. The view of the learned single Judge is, therefore, correct and hereby confirmed. Accordingly the writ appeals are dismissed. 18. Before parting with this case we cannot refrain from expressing our dissatisfaction about the lack of effective defence in this case. We have to recall the distressing words of Sukumaran, J., in the very same matter as found in his expression in paras 46, 47, 48 and 49 of his judgment ([1991] 83 STC 377 (State of Kerala v. A. Pareed Pillai). We have to recall the distressing words of Sukumaran, J., in the very same matter as found in his expression in paras 46, 47, 48 and 49 of his judgment ([1991] 83 STC 377 (State of Kerala v. A. Pareed Pillai). The matter had been adjourned thrice to enable the Revenue to prepare the case for an effective defence. But it is unfortunate that the department has not chosen to provide useful help to the court. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the 5th respondent in W.A. No. 1575 of 1995, namely, the Special Secretary to Government, Taxes (C) Department, Thiruvananthapuram, forthwith. Writ appeals dismissed.