(1) THIS appeal arises from the judgment of the division bench of the High court of Kerala in WA No. 299 of 1977 dated 6/2/1979. The admitted facts are that the appellant was running a primary school at Kanmanam by name A.M.L.P. School. As per the procedure prescribed in Rule 2 of Ch. V of the Kerala Education Rules, objections have been called on the need to establish new schools or upgradation of existing schools. The notification was issued on 4/7/1975 inviting applications for establishing new schools or upgradation of m the existing schools. Pursuant thereto, the appellant made an application for upgradation of his primary school into upper primary school. The government had sanctioned on 18/10/1975 but in the Schedule the name of the appellant for upgradation of his school did not find place. The government in GOMs. No. 116 of 1976, dated 21/6/1976 issued orders in which the appellants name as Item 5 finds place for upgradation of his school as upper primary school. The respondent had challenged the order of the government giving sanction for upgradation by filing the OP under Article 226 contending inter alia that since the applications have already been dismissed by issuing the notification on 18/10/1975, the government have no jurisdiction or power to grant sanction under the impugned GO. That found favour with the learned Single Judge and accordingly it was quashed. On appeal, it was confirmed. Thus this appeal by special leave. (2) IT would be seen that the judgment of the High court was suspended by this court. In consequence the appellant has been continuing to run the upgraded school ever since the sanction was given by the government on 21/6/1976. The question is whether the sanction for upgradation of the school was properly given by the government. It would be seen from the recital of the GO that certain applications have been deferred for detailed consideration: at a later stage the Director of Public Instructions had considered such application in detail and had recommended to sanction the schools in those places taking into consideration the educational need existing in that locality. In consequence the sanction for the upgradation of the appellants school was granted. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High court, it was specifically stated that the distance between the respondent school and that of the appellant is about 2 ½ kms. In consequence the sanction for the upgradation of the appellants school was granted. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High court, it was specifically stated that the distance between the respondent school and that of the appellant is about 2 ½ kms. The GO further shows that: "THE government felt that the area Kanmanam is in need of a UP School. As no particular school was notified for opening of the new school or upgrading of existing school the question of hearing petition regarding his objections against the upgrading of A.M.L.P.S., Kanmanam did not arise. However, the Assistant Education Officer, Tanur made a spot enquiry when the objections from the Manager, A.M.LI.P.S., Kanhirakole was received. THE Managers statement that the very survival of this UP School primarily depends upon the feeder schools cannot be believed. At present the pupils coming from Kanmanam area to Kanhirakole have to cross a flooded field which is very inconvenient for the little children of lender age. Due to this inconvenience many of the pupils who have completed L.P. School studies in the feeder schools discontinue their studies. The fact that there will be fall in the number of strength in Kanhirakole school cannot be a reason to ignore the inconvenience of the children of Kanmanam area." (3) IN that order. government have granted permission in the public interest upgrading the school to avoid dropping out of school-going children. It is known that Kerala has the highest literacy percentage. Even then Malappuram District was found to be a backward district in education and the government felt that the district needs encouragement for educational incentives. As a consequence, the educational need was found to be genuine. It is also to be noted that in the counter-affidavit filed in this court and the High court, it was stated that due to 2 ½ kms distance young children are dropping out since there is no direct route except crossing the fields which the children found it difficult to travel from the village to the school run by the respondent. Therefore, when the government had found that there exists need for upgradation of the existing school into upper primary school, we think that the government must be allowed to exercise its statutory power unless it is mala fide or colourable exercise of power and is justified on extraneous facts in granting upgradation. Therefore, when the government had found that there exists need for upgradation of the existing school into upper primary school, we think that the government must be allowed to exercise its statutory power unless it is mala fide or colourable exercise of power and is justified on extraneous facts in granting upgradation. (4) SHRI Vishwanatha lyer, learned Senior Counsel has contended that the appellant died in 1983 and an application was made in 1994 to bring the legal representatives on record, and there is no proper explanation for the inordinate delay. Therefore, there is no pending appeal in the eye of law since the appeal stands abated. Technically the contention is correct. But the question is whether the respondent has any personal interest in the matter. Since there exists public need for catering to the educational interest of the young children, the technicalities should not stand in the way for consideration of the matter in issue. Moreover, the government itself has come forward to transpose itself as an appellant. No doubt they did not file any appeal against the order of the Single Judge before the division bench, nor filed any appeal in this court. The fact that the government is coming forward to transpose itself as an appellant would clearly indicate that there is an acute educational need for upgrading primary school in the locality as upper primary school. Moreover, children have fundamental right to education. Therefore, larger interest of young children should be taken into consideration in meeting the procedural cobweb and the technicalities should not subsume substance. Considered in that perspective, we reject the contention of the respondent that the appeal stands abated on account of the fact that the legal representatives of the appellant have not been brought on record within limitation. The appeal is accordingly allowed and they are transposed as legal representatives. (5) IT may be mentioned that GO dated 18/10/1975 recites that incomplete or defective applications stood rejected as noted by the High court. The recitals in the impugned GO clearly mention that some applications including that of the appellant were kept back for further examination. The government also found that there was need for establishing new schools or upgrading the existing schools. The educational need was thereby sought to be served by granting upgradation to the appellants school. The recitals in the impugned GO clearly mention that some applications including that of the appellant were kept back for further examination. The government also found that there was need for establishing new schools or upgrading the existing schools. The educational need was thereby sought to be served by granting upgradation to the appellants school. The High court also did not record any finding that the impugned GO is vitiated by any mala fide exercise of the power. After the Director of Public Instructions examined the mailer and made recommendation, the government had issued the revised GO. Since the procedural steps required under S. 2 and 2-A of the Rules have been adhered to, we do not find any violation of the statutory sleps required in this behalf. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. The orders of the. High court are set aside. Consequently the writ petition stands dismissed. In the circumstances, the parlies are directed to bear their own costs throughout. (6) ALL the applications shall be treated to have been disposed of in the light of this judgment.