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1995 DIGILAW 444 (GUJ)

Parmar Bhimji Govind v. Heirs of Patel Velji Ramji

1995-10-07

Y.B.BHATT

body1995
Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision is one under section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents; Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the said act) wherein the petitioner is the original plaintiff-landlord and respondents are original defendants-tenants. ( 2 ) THE pertinent facts, in brief, leading to the present Revision are as under:2. 1 The petitioner-landlord had filed civil Suit No. 36/77 against the tenant for recovery of arrears of rent and for a decree of eviction against the tenant-on various grounds available to the said landlord under the said Act. 2. 2 This suit, viz. Regular Civil Suit No. 36/77 was filed on 21st February 1977. However, prior to the filing of the suit the tenant had already filed, on 6th April 1976, misc. Application No, 10/76 for determination of the standard rent of the leased premises under Section 11 of the said act. 2. 3 The trial court heard and decided both the suit as well as the application by a common judgment and order, whereby the suit was allowed and a decree for eviction was passed against the tenant, on the basis that the standard rent in respect of the leased premises was Rs. 9/- per month, and on a computation derived from this figure as the standard rent, it was found that the tenant was in arrears of such standard rent for more than six months. 2. 4 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decisions, the tenant preferred separate proceedings before the District Court, viz. Regular Civil Appeal No. 128/79 arising from the eviction decree passed against him by the trial court, the said appeal being under Section 29 (1) of the said Act. The tenant also preferred Civil Revision application No. 1/80 under Section 29 (3) of the said Act, arising from the decision in misc. Application No. 10/76. The District court heard both the proceedings together and decided the same by common judgment and order, whereby the appeal was allowed and the trial court decree for eviction was set aside. This was done on the basis that the Revision Application No. 1/80 was also allowed whereby the District Court determined the standard rent of the leased premises at Rs. 4/- per month, by quashing and setting aside the order passed by the trial court in Misc. This was done on the basis that the Revision Application No. 1/80 was also allowed whereby the District Court determined the standard rent of the leased premises at Rs. 4/- per month, by quashing and setting aside the order passed by the trial court in Misc. Application No. 10/76 where the standard rent had been fixed at rs. 9/- per month. 2. 5 At this stage it may. be noted that the landlord had earlier preferred Civil revision Application No. 307/82 in this court challenging the decision of the district Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 128/79 whereby the suit vas dismissed. This revision came to be summarily dismissed by this court (Coram: P. D. Desai. J.) by order dated 26th February 1982. Thus that question is no longer open to the landlord, and the dismissal of the suit for eviction stands confirmed. 2. 6 The present revision under Section 29 (2) of the said Act seeks to challenge the decision of the District Court in Revision application No. 1/80, which is merely on the questioji of determination of standard rent. ( 3 ) AT the outset I may note thai Section 29 of the said Act provides for remedies available to the parties under the rent Act in respect of various orders that may be passed by a court exercising jurisdiction under Section 28 of the said Act, viz. a rent Court. Section 29 (1) provides for an appeal, to the courts specified in the said sub-section, and in respect of the orders not specifically excluded by the proviso to sub- section (1 ). Obviously, under Clause (iii) of the said Proviso, no appeal would the from a decision of the rent court fixing the standard rent under Section 11 of the said act. It is precisely for this reason that the landlord had preferred a revision to the district Court under Section 29 (3) of the said Act. It is this revisional order of the district Court which is sought to be challenged by way of the present revision filed under Section 29 (2) of the said Act ( 4 ) OBVIOUSLY, a second revision; purportedly filed under Section 29 (2) of the said Act, is not competent; Section 29 (2) provides only for a revision to the High court in matters where an order which is appealable, has already been: decided in appeal. In cases where orders are not appealable, the only remedy available is by way of a revision to the District Court or the specified court, under Section 29 (3) of the said Act, but certainly not by way of a revision to this court under Section 29 (2) of the said Act. In this case, the revisional remedy under Section 29 (3)- has been exhausted, and Section 29of the said Act, (and/or any other provision) does not contemplate any further revision. ( 5 ) IT may perhaps be urged that the present revision may be treated as one under Section 115 of CPC. Even this contention is not open to the petitioner in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Visheshkumar v. Shantiprasad ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ). However, I do not propose to be hypertechnical and to reject the present revision merely on the ground of incompetency. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner- landlord has taken me through the judgment and order of the District Court in the revision Application No. 1/80 where the standard rent has been re-determined by the said court. ( 7 ) THE District Court was perfectly justified in reaching a different conclusion on the basis of reappreciation of the relevant evidence on record. The District court found that Mohanlal Valjibhai (son of the original defendant) during the course of his oral deposition at Exh. 72, had tendered in evidence two rent receipts which were given Mark 4/13 and 4/14. The trial court at the relevant time (in the course of the deposition) had merely noted that the question of giving exhibit numbers to the rent receipts would be considered at the time of arguments. However, after the hearing of arguments was concluded, no further and/or consequential orders were passed as regards giving exhibit numbers to the said rent receipts. The trial court at the relevant time (in the course of the deposition) had merely noted that the question of giving exhibit numbers to the rent receipts would be considered at the time of arguments. However, after the hearing of arguments was concluded, no further and/or consequential orders were passed as regards giving exhibit numbers to the said rent receipts. In this context, the district Court was correct in coming to the conclusion that the said receipts were required to be exhibited, firstly because they were coming from proper custody, and since they were documents more than 30 years old, the same would be admissible in evidence by virtue of Section 90 of the evidence Act Once these rent receipts are read as evidence, it becomes obvious that the rent paid at the relevant point of time (on the date of the receipts) in respect of the very same premises was Rs. 4/- per month, and not Rs. 9/- per month as contended by the landlord. Even during the cross- examination of the plaintiff (Exh. 51) it has been established that the receipts have been issued by one Godavariben, who is the stepsister of the plaintiff, and who was formerly managing the affairs of the plaintiff. On the basis of such evidence no exception can be found to the factual finding recorded by the district Court in the revision, that the original rent of the very same leased premises was Rs. 4/- per month and therefore that is the standard rent of the premises. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner is unable to make out a case that this appreciation of evidence on the part of the district Court is such as would amount to perversity in law or represents a view which could not be taken by any other normal or prudent court. Under the circumstances there is no justification for interference with the finding recorded by the District Court as regards determination of the standard rent. ( 9 ) THIS revision, therefore, requires to be dismissed. Hence rule is discharged with no order as to costs. .