Judgment :- RAJU, J. 1. A subtle as well as an important and interesting question of law arises for our consideration in the above Appeal. The question is as to whether a divorced woman can be said to be a deserted woman so as to entitle her to stake a claim for a seat in the Special Categories reserved for “Deserted Women” in category (ix) of Annexure-I to the prospectus issued for the Tamil Nadu Professional Courses- Medical/Paramedical for 1994-1995. 2. (a). The State Government and the Selection Committee for the course in question who were the respondents in the writ petition are the appellants before us. The respondent herein has filed W.P. No. 13987 of 1994 (since reported in 1995-1-L.W. 330 = 1995 Writ L.R. 180) praying for a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents in the writ petition to publish the merit list of selected candidates for the seats reserved for the category of deserted women and allot one seat to her for the M.B.B.S. Course for the academic year 1994-1995. The claim of the respondent before the learned single Judge in the writ petition was that she belonged to a Backward Community, that she was married to one C.P. Easwaramoorty, that on account of his misbehaviour and acts of cruelty she could not continue to live with him and was forced to live away from her husband having been driven out of the family of her husband even within six months from the date of her marriage, that at the time of her marriage she had completed 10th standard only and after she was driven out by her husband she was residing with her parents and continued her studies and successfully passed her Higher Secondary Course (Academic) in the Public Examination held in the year 1994. It was also stated for the respondent that in the meantime, she came to know that her husband got married to one baby and the said lady on her marriage also gave birth through the respondents husband a female child on 25-10-1993 and since efforts made by the well wishes and parents failed, she was constrained to file H.M.O.P. No. 2 of 1994 on the file of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sankagiri for divorce and the marriage itself was dissolved by the said Court by granting a Judgment and Decree for divorce on 15-4-1994. (b). (b). It may be stated at this stage that as could be seen from the order of the Sub-Court, dated 15-4-1994 in H.M.O.P. No. 2 of 1994 that the divorce was sought for under Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, that both parties were present before Court, that the respondent to the said petition (the husband of the respondent before us) made an endorsement on the Petition stating that he had no objection is allow the petition filed by his wife and that, therefore, the petition filed by the wife was allowed as prayed for. This aspect has to be specifically referred to on account of the conflicting claims made by the parties appearing on either side regarding the ground of claim or the basis for the grant of a decree for divorce. No doubt, a perusal of the copy of the Petition doubt, a perusal of the copy of the Petition filed before the Sub-Court in H.M.O.P. No. 2 of 1994, made available in the typed set of papers filed on behalf of the respondent before us, would also show that Petition was filed under Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 though it is found stated at the end of paragraph VIII of the Petition that the petitioner therein (respondent herein) has come forward with the said Petition for divorce on the ground of desertion and second marriage. Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads ‘has after the soleminisation of the marriages had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse,”. During the course of hearing of the appeal before us, we have informed the counsel to first make their submissions on the assumption and footing, without need for adjudicating specifically on the issue, that the decree for divorce was sought both on the grounds of desertion and adultery and obtained as prayed for, for the purpose of testing the legality and propriety of her claim as deserted women, even after the dissolution of the marriage by the grant of a decree for divorce on 15-4-1994, to enable her to be considered as against the special category of seats reserved for ‘deserted women’. (c). (c). Clause 3.5 (vii) of the prospectus reads as hereunder: “Seats reserved for the category of deserted women : No. of seats reserved in M.B.B.S4 The candidate claiming admission against the Category of Deserted Women should produce a Certificate from the Tahsildar of the area that she is a married woman deserted by her husband.” As a matter of fact, the respondent produced a Certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Tiruchengode, dated 21-7-1994, which as per the true translated copy furnished on behalf of the respondent reads as hereunder:— CERTIFICATE “Mrs. Santhanalakshmi, daughter of K.P. Nachimuthu, residing at 23-A, Erumaikattuthurai, Komarapalayam Village, Tiruchengode Taluk was married to Thiru. P. Easwaramoorthy, son of Perumal Gounder, residing at Chinniampalayampudur, Bhavani Taluml Periyar District. On enquiry, it was found that Mrs. Santhanalakshmi after obtaining a divorce decree in H.M.O.P. No. 2/94 dated 15-4-1994 on the file of Sub-Court, Sankagiri from P. Easwaramoorthy is now living separately and it is certified that Mrs. Santhanalakshmi is a woman deserted by her husband.” The question is as to whether even on the facts stated in the very certificate, the Tahsildar could have certified the respondent to be or the respondent could claim that she is a ‘deserted Woman’ for the purpose of claiming a seat reserved in the special category for ‘deserted women’. (d). The counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 2nd appellant (2nd respondent in the writ petition) discloses that the respondent before us has secured 241.10 marks out of 300 marks (Academic reduced as per formula and Entrance Exam), that the merit list for Special Categories was published on 24-10-1994, that when the respondent submitted her application for admission she did not enclose the Tahsildars Certificate, that, therefore, her claim could not be considered as against the Special Category an d the only decree copy which was enclosed revealed that she herself sought divorce from her husband and obtained the same and, therefore, she could not be considered against the category of ‘deserted women’. It was also contended for the appellants (respondents in W.P.) among other things, that the four seats earmarked for the special category in question were distributed already to other category in the absence of eligible candidates qualified and were filled up and there was no vacancy available for seats under the category of ‘deserted women’. 3. It was also contended for the appellants (respondents in W.P.) among other things, that the four seats earmarked for the special category in question were distributed already to other category in the absence of eligible candidates qualified and were filled up and there was no vacancy available for seats under the category of ‘deserted women’. 3. The learned single Judge, after considering the claims of parties on either side, held (since reported in 1995-1-L.W. 330 = 1995 Writ L.R. 180) that in view of the decree passed by the civil Court on the petition filed for divorce on the ground of desertion, it stood established that the respondent was deserted by her husband, that it cannot be stated that the decree passed was either collusive or without the ground of desertion, that the mere fact that the petition for divorce was filed under Section 13(1)(i) mentioning wrong provision does not prejudice the case because one has to go by the substance and not by nomenclature, that it was also not material as to who filed the petition before the Court below and the fact of desertion was the consequence, relevant and material. It was also held by the learned Judge that merely because a decree for divorce was passed on the ground of desertion the position of a deserted woman does not improve or the desertion disappears, that on the other hand, the decree for divorce passed confirms it, that in view of the decree, it is neither necessary nor proper to go into the question any further and that, therefore, the respondent does not cease to be a deserted women in the context for the purpose of admission merely because a decree for divorce was obtained in the competent civil Court. Consequently, the learned Judge also held that the appellants were not right in not considering the application of the respondent against the reserved category when she satisfied all other requirements and that the mere fact that the Tahsildar Certificate was not initially enclosed with the application (though subsequently sent) being mere a technical objection cannot be put as an objection to deny relief to the respondent. Further, in the matter of granting relief, the learned single Judge was of the view that since all the seats were filled up, the relief sought for could be moulded suitably and, therefore, while allowing the writ petition, directed the appellants to allot one seat for the M.B.B.S. Course for the academic year 1995-1996 to the respondent in a College which is convenient to her. 4. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed the above Appeal. As noticed supra, the learned counsel appearing on either side, proceeded at the first instance to make submissions even on the assumption that the decree for divorce be treated as one also on the ground of desertion. Mr. N. Jothi, learned Special Government Pleader for the appellants contended that once the marriage was dissolved by a decree for divorce, even it be on the ground of desertion, on and after the date of dissolution of the marriage, t he respondent cannot be considered to be a ‘deserted woman’ in law or on facts so as to entitle her claim to be considered as against the special category of seats reserved for ‘deserted women’ and that the learned Judge was not right in sustaining the claim of the respondent in this regard. It was also contended for the appellants that at any rate, there was no justification to issue a direction to the appellants to grant a seat to the respondent during the next academic year 1995-1996 since such a dir ection is either likely to prejudice the genuine claim of a candidate for Special Category during the next academic year for no fault of her or that there may not be any reservation also during next academic year since the reservation for special categories are considered every year and allocation made depending upon exigencies of situation as per dictates of policy for that year. Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, while adopting the reasoning of the learned single Judge in order to sustain the claim on behalf of the respondent, contended that the view taken by the learned single Judge is quite in accordance with law and in as much as justice has been rendered to a deserving candidate no interference is called for in the appeal. The decision reported in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1972 (Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt was relied upon in this regard. 5. The decision reported in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1972 (Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt was relied upon in this regard. 5. On behalf of the appellants, apart from referring to the relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, particularly Section 15 of the Act, our attention has also been drawn with reference to the scope and purport of the word ‘deserted’ women in the light of the exposition of law by Courts on the subject and particularly placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 176 ( Bipinchandra v. Prabhavathi ) It would be useful to advert to the exposition of the law relating to desertion - both statutory and case law in the context of marital status and law governing Hindu marriages. The explanation to Section 13(1) of the Act defines the expression ‘desertion’ to mean the desertion of the applicant before a Court by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the wilful neglect of the applicant before the Court by the other party to the marriage. This explanation was found earlier incorporated as explanation to Section 10(1)(a) prior to 1976 of the Act. The essence of desertion as judicially understood and declared is intentional and total as well as permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without the others consent and without reasonable cause. In effect, it is a total repudiation of the obligation of marriage or an abandonment of the deserted spouse with an intention to bring the cohabitation permanently to an end (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 176: Bipinchandra v. Prabhavathi; A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 40: Lachhman Uttam Chand Kirpalani v. Meena, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 459: Rohinikumari v. Narendra Singh). It is really the conduct as a whole consisting of total disregard of the fundamental obligations of matrimony that was held to constitute an intention to desert and an act of desertion. It is really the conduct as a whole consisting of total disregard of the fundamental obligations of matrimony that was held to constitute an intention to desert and an act of desertion. Though, once it is found that one of the spouses has been in desertion, the presumption is that the desertion continued and it is not necessary for the deserted spouse actually take steps to bring the deserting spouse back to the matrimonial home, with the coming to an end of the matrimonial status by the grant of a decree for divorce and dissolution of marriage by the competent Court of law, the whole basis for claiming any rights by one spouse against the other spouse collapse and the permanent snapping of the marital ties between the spouses also puts an end irretrievably the marital obligations between such parties and the very claim or concept of desertion thereupon becomes a misnomer and rendered wholly inapplicable and inappropriate between such parties. As a matter of fact ‘widows’ is also a special category with 10 seats reserved therefor. Can a deserted woman after the death of her husband claim to be a deserted woman only and not a widow. Reservation or no reservation a widow, after the death of her husband, cannot avail of her earlier position as a deserted woman even though she has no living husband. Similarly divorced woman, can be in no better a position to claim the status of a deserted woman after the dissolution of the marriage by a competent Court of law. Thus, the subsistence of marital relationship is a sine qua non for sustaining the plea of desertion. 6. Considered in the context and position of law, as above, the case on hand presents no difficulty to arrive at the only and inevitable conclusion that on and after 15-4-1994 when the marriage of the respondent with her husband C.P. Easwaramoorthy was dissolved by the grant of a decree for divorce at the instance of the respondent and with the tacit consent expressed before the civil Court by her husband, the respondent cannot any longer after the Courts decree be claimed to be a deserted woman, there was no question her being entitled to any marital obligations from her erstwhile husband and vice-versa after the decree divorce was granted. Consequently, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the plea on behalf of the respondent. Consequently, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the plea on behalf of the respondent. For the same reason, we are unable to share the view expressed by the learned single Judge in the judgment under appeal. 7. Since the direction to allot one seat for M.B.B.S. for the academic year 1995-1996 to the respondent came to be issued only on the ground that the respondent was entitled to be considered as against the seats reserved under the special categories for ‘deserted women’ but wrongly omitted to be so considered, the question of granting any relief or sustaining the direction issued by the learned single Judge does not arise at all. But at the same time, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent by relying upon the decision reported in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1972 ( Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt ) contended that the relief granted may not be interfered with. That was a case wherein the respondent before the Apex Court, a highly qualified Engineer was found unreasonaly left without opportunity for promotion for about twenty years and made to suffer and stagnated also in the same scale from inception for twenty years due to defective promotion policy and the learned Judges thought fit not to interfere with the relief, granted by the Administrative Tribunal concerned, and that too while dealing with an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This is made clear by the observations of the Apex Court in paragraphs 12 to 14 of the reported decision wherein it is found stated that the Supreme Court exercises power under Article 136 only when there is supreme need and even if legal flaws might be electronically detected in the order of the Tribunal or Court the Apex Court will not interfere unless there is manifest injustice or substantial question of public imp ortance. On the merits of the matter before their Lordships also it has been stated as hereunder:— “14. In the instant case, as already noticed that respondent-1 has suffered and stagnated for about twenty years in the same scale from inception due to defective promotional policy. Therefore, we decline to interfere with the relief granted by the Tribunal although we do not agree with the views expressed on the scope of bye-law 71 (b)(ii)”. In the instant case, as already noticed that respondent-1 has suffered and stagnated for about twenty years in the same scale from inception due to defective promotional policy. Therefore, we decline to interfere with the relief granted by the Tribunal although we do not agree with the views expressed on the scope of bye-law 71 (b)(ii)”. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no comparison whatsoever of the case before the Supreme Court with the one before us either on the merits of the claims or the absolutely discretionary nature of the appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The case before us involves a substantial question of law on which there could be very little room for any doubt and public interest is also very much concerned. It is not that the respondent has been admitted as such and has undergone or is undergoing the course also. The jurisdiction exercised by us is that of the first and regular Appellate Court and, therefore, there is no scope for allowing the direction issued by the learned single Judge directing the giving of one seat in the next academic year being allowed to stand without interference on any consideration of mere sympathies or abstract, and technical concepts of justice ignoring real and substantial justice. Moreover, it will not be keeping within the bounds of law and it is also not permissible to issue such a direction ignoring the fact as to what would be the rules of admission for the academic year 1995-1996. A direction to admit to a course can be issued only when the petitioner is not only qualified and is also eligible as per the rules governing the admission and such eligibility has been ignored and the admission is denied unjustly and illegally. 8. For all the reasons stated supra, the writ appeal is allowed. The order of the learned single Judge is hereby set aside. The writ petition is dismissed. But, in the circumstances off the case, there shall be no order as to costs.