JUDGMENT - S.S. DANI, J. :---The petitioner is the wife of convict - Bibhishan Magar, who was tried for an offence of murder under section 302 in 1981 before the Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, and by an order dated 19-8-1981, was held guilty for the alleged offence. The Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, by the said order of conviction and sentence, awarded the extreme penalty of death to the husband of the petitioner. The matter was then taken to this Court in Confirmatin Case No. 1-A/1982 with Criminal Appeal No. 37-A/1982. By an order dated 13-8-1982, this Court confirmed the order of conviction under sections 302 and 394 of Indian Penal Code, but set aside the extreme sentence of death, and instead the husband of the petitioner was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court by the present writ petition for the release of her husband on the ground that he has already undergone sentence of life imprisonment as provided under the rules. 3. On behalf of the respondents, an affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the Jailor Group-I of Central Prison, Aurangabad, and it is alleged that inasmuch as the husband of the petitioner was awarded the death sentence, his case comes under Guideline No. 7-a of the guidelines for premature release of the prisoners dated 18-12-1978. It is, therefore, alleged on behalf of the respondents that the husband of the petitioner is required to undergo the 30 years period of imprisonment and as such his case cannot be considered for premature release. It is the case of the petitioner that inasmuch as the sentence of death has been set aside and substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment, the case is covered by Guideline No. 1-a and the husband of the petitioner is, therefore, required to undergo 22 years period of imprisonment. 4. As stated above, it is not in dispute that in the Sessions Case No. 40 of 1981, before the Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, the husband of the petitioner was awarded the extreme penalty i.e. death sentence. On this basis, it is alleged on behalf of the respondents that the case of the convict for premature release falls under guideline No. 7-a of the said guidelines and as the convict has not undergone the 30 years period of imprisonment, he is not entitled to be released premature. On this basis, it is alleged on behalf of the respondents that the case of the convict for premature release falls under guideline No. 7-a of the said guidelines and as the convict has not undergone the 30 years period of imprisonment, he is not entitled to be released premature. The question is that whether the authorities are right and justified in considering the case of the convict under Guideline No. 7-a of the said guidelines for premature release. 5. The said guidelines dated 18-12-1978 are issued by the Government for premature release of the prisoners and guideline No. 7-a of the said guidelines runs, thus - "Death Sentence Commutted to Life Imprisonment - (a) prisoners in whose cases, death sentence has been commutted to life imprisonment -- 30 years". On this basis, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that as the death sentence of the husband of the petitioner has been commutted to life imprisonment, his case is covered by Guideline No. 7-a and as such he is required to undergo imprisonment for a period of 30 years. 6. Section 54 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, provides for the commutation of sentence of death. The said section 54 reads that in every case in which sentence of death shall have been passed, the appropriate Government may, without the consent of the offender, commute the punishment for any other punishment provided by this Code. We also find similar provisions in section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Under the said section, the appropriate Government has power, without the consent of the person sentenced, to commute a sentence of death for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code or sentence of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or for fine etc. 7. It is, therefore, clear from these two provisions that the power to commute the sentence of death is with the appropriate Government. The appropriate Government in exercise of the power under these provisions can, therefore, commute the punishment of death to any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code. It is in such a contingency alone that the case can be considered within the ambit of Guideline No. 7(a) of the guidelines for premature release. The appropriate Government in exercise of the power under these provisions can, therefore, commute the punishment of death to any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code. It is in such a contingency alone that the case can be considered within the ambit of Guideline No. 7(a) of the guidelines for premature release. As per the said guidelines, the prisoner is required to undergo 30 years period of imprisonment when he was awarded the death sentence, but commutted to life imprisonment. The question involved in the case at hand is whether it can be said that the sentence of death awarded to the husband of the petitioner is commutted to life imprisonment. 8. As stated above, the husband of the petitioner was tried for an offence of murder under section 302 of Indian Penal Code in Sessions Case No. 40 of 1981 before the Sessions Judge at Osmanabad, and the extreme penalty of death was awarded which came to be not only disturbed, but set aside by this Court in Confirmation Case No. 1-A of 1982. The said confirmation case was heard alongwith Criminal Appeal No. 37-A of 1982 filed by the accused - Bibhishan challenging the said order of conviction and sentence of the Sessions Judge, Osmanabad. As observed above, by an order dated 13-8-1982, this Court set aside the sentence of death awarded by the learned Sessions Judge and instead the accused was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. As per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the Indian Penal Code, the trial of an accused who has been sentenced to death does not get concluded with the termination of the sessions trial as it is subject to the confirmation. The extreme-penalty of death is required to be confirmed by the High Court even in the absence of an appeal by the accused. In the case of (State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi @ Raman)1, A.I.R. 1975 Supreme Court 1665 the Supreme Court held that the trial does not conclude with the termination of the proceedings in the Court of Sessions. The reason is that the death sentence passed by Court of Sessions is subject to confirmation by the High Court. The trial cannot be deemed to have concluded till an executable sentence is passed by the competent Court. The reason is that the death sentence passed by Court of Sessions is subject to confirmation by the High Court. The trial cannot be deemed to have concluded till an executable sentence is passed by the competent Court. It is then observed that the appeal against an order of conviction is a continuation of the proceedings and unless the appeal is finally disposed of and unless an executable sentence is passed by the competent Court, the trial of an accused does not get concluded. 9. This Court, by an order dated 13-8-1982, in the Confirmation Case set aside the extreme penalty of death and awarded the life imprisonment for the proved offence under section 302 of Indian Penal Code against the husband of the petitioner. Thus, the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, on 30-4-1982 in Sessions Case No. 40 of 1981 against the husband of the petitioner is, therefore, substituted by the order dated 13-8-1992 by this Court in the said Confirmation Case No. 1-A of 1982. It is, therefore, to be held that the trial of the husband of the petitioner has been concluded not with the termination of the proceedings in the Sessions Case No. 40 of 1981 before the Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, but with the termination of his appeal as well as the Confirmation Case before this Court. 10. It may be noted that while considering the question of sentence, this Court in the said confirmation case has clearly ruled that the extreme sentence of death awarded by the learned Sessions Judge is set aside. It is, therefore, clear that the death sentence awarded by the Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, got substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment by this Court in the said confirmation case. It, therefore, cannot be by any stretch of imagination that there is a commutation of death sentence to that of life imprisonment in the case at hand. As stated above, it is the appropriate State Government which has power to commute the death penalty and to award any other sentence provided by the rules. It is, therefore, clear that the question of commutation of death penalty either under section 54 of Indian Penal Code or under section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, arises only after the death penalty is confirmed by the competent Court. It is, therefore, clear that the question of commutation of death penalty either under section 54 of Indian Penal Code or under section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, arises only after the death penalty is confirmed by the competent Court. It is only thereafter that the question of commutation arises and as per the said provisions, the appropriate Government can commute such death penalty to any other sentence. In the case at hand, therefore, the death penalty is not commutted to that of life imprisonment, but on the other hand, the extreme sentence of death provided by the Sessions Court has been set aside and it stood substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. In view of this, the concerned authorities were, therefore, wrong and unjustified in treating the case of the husband of the petitioner for premature release under Guideline No. 7(a) of the said guidelines. 11. While deciding the said confirmation case, by an order dated 13-8-1982, this Court observed in paragraph No. 29 of the judgment, thus - "At the material time, the accused was hardly 20 or 21 years old. There is no evidence disclosing that the murder was pre-meditated or pre-planned. It appears to be a simple murder for monetary gains. The youth and young age of the accused receive importance in the matter of awarding extreme sentence of death. The affidavit sworn in by the accused discloses that his parents and the family members are depending on him. He owns some 40 or 45 Acres of land ... ... ... ... That life at least cannot be disputed to depend upon the accused. As stated above, we do not find any special reasons to carve out the case to award the extreme penalty of death ... ... ... ... In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to set aside the sentence of death and instead we sentence the accused to suffer imprisonment for life". 12. It is, therefore, clear that this Court held that it is a case of simple murder for monetary gains without any pre-meditation or plan. It is, therefore, on this basis that the case of the husband of the petitioner has to be considered for premature release. 12. It is, therefore, clear that this Court held that it is a case of simple murder for monetary gains without any pre-meditation or plan. It is, therefore, on this basis that the case of the husband of the petitioner has to be considered for premature release. The Guideline No. 1-a provides that when the convict is the aggrieved person and has no previous criminal history and committed the murder in an individual capacity in a moment of anger and without pre-meditation, he is required to undergo the period of 22 years imprisonment subject to a minimum of 14 years actual imprisonment including the set off period. This Court, while deciding the confirmation case, has found an evidence that the murder committed by the husband of the petitioner was without any pre-meditation and it was a simple case of murder for monetary gains. This being so, the case of the husband of the petitioner squarely falls within the purview of Guideline No. 1-a and his case is to be considered from that angle. Therefore, if the husband of the petitioner has undergone the period of 22 years of imprisonment subject to minimum of 14 years of actual imprisonment including the set off period, he is to be released prematurely. 13. The authorities in the present case have admittedly not considered the case of the husband of the petitioner under Guideline No. 1-a and as per the sworn affidavit have decided the case under Guideline No. 7-a on the footing that the death penalty stood commutted to life imprisonment. It will, therefore, be in the interest of justice to direct the concerned authorities to consider the case of the husband of the petitioner under Guideline No. 1-a of the said guidelines and to take decision on merits. If the authorities, after considering the case of the husband of the petitioner under said Guideline No. 1-a, come to the conclusion that the convict has undergone the period of 22 years of imprisonment subject to minimum of 14 years, including the period of set off, shall pass the order of premature release of the said convict. 14. In the result, Criminal Writ Petition No. 259 of 1995 stands allowed. 14. In the result, Criminal Writ Petition No. 259 of 1995 stands allowed. The authorities are directed to consider the case of the husband of the petitioner under Guideline No. 1-a of the guidelines dated 18-12-1978 and to pass appropriate order for premature release of convict if he is found entitled to it on consideration of the said period of imprisonment required to be undergone by the convict under such head. 15. Rule stands absolute in the above terms. Petition allowed. ***