Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE State has filed the present revision under Sec. 115 of c. P. C. , and the memo indicates that the subject-matter of challenge is the order dated 21st July, 1992 passed in Court Fee Reference No. 77 of 1991 in Regular suit No. 1473 of 1990 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Baroda. ( 2 ) HOWEVER, it appears that there is no such specific order of that date passed in the aforesaid Court Fee Reference. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the subject-matter of challenge in the present revision is the disposal of the Court Fee Reference in question by order passed below Exh. 8 (which is apparently undated ). ( 4 ) THE facts so far as are relevant and pertinent for the purpose of the present revision are as under : 4. 1. The first respondent as plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 1473 of 1990 contending that he was a holder of certain shares of the defendant company, that he had lost the relevant share certificates together with valid transfer forms and/or that they were stolen from him, that the said defendant company had intimated to him that they proposed to transfer the said shares to the name of some other person who had applied for such transfer (together with valid transfer deed) and that therefore, the plaintiff was obliged to file the suit for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from transferring the shares in question. It appears that the plaintiff had filed the suit as a suit of injunction simplicitor and had paid Court fees thereon accordingly, viz. , Court fees were paid on the suit claim of Rs. 300. 00. 4. 2. It appears that the plaint was scrutinised by the Inspecting Officer (Court fees), that he filed a report before the Court and on the basis of the report (together with application Exh. 8) the trial Court recorded a provisional finding that the suit is susceptible of monetary evaluation, that proper Court fees have not been paid on the suit plaint and that notice be issued to the parties to show-cause why an inquiry should not be made for the purpose of revising the valuation and to determine the correct valuation of the suit for purposes of the Court fees. 4. 3. 4. 3. It appears that when the parties were served with the notice in this regard, which resulted in the matter being numbered as Court Fee Reference No. 77 of 1991, the plaintiff filed Exh. 10, stating that he is unable to pay Court fees on the suit plaint, and that, therefore, he does not desire to proceed further with the suit and the same should be disposed of accordingly. This application was considered by the trial Court as an application for withdrawal of the suit, and the trial Court by its order dated 21st July, 1992 passed below Exh. 10, disposed of the suit by permitting the withdrawal thereof. As a consequence of the order passed below exh. 10, the trial Court then passed an order (apparently undated) below Exh. 8, observing that since the plaintiff has withdrawn the suit it is not necessary to pass any orders on the reference, and hence it is disposed of with no order as to costs. ( 5 ) IT is the disposal of this Court Reference by the aforesaid order which is the subject-matter of the present revision. ( 6 ) IT must be appreciated that the trial Court has not disposed of the Court Fee Reference on merits. All that the impugned order states is that it is not necessary to pass any order on the Reference since the suit has been withdrawn. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the interest of the revenue cannot be abandoned in this casual manner and the scheme of the Bombay Court Fees Act also indicates that the proper valuation of the suit and payment of the appropriate Court fees is not a question which can be treated as a closed chapter merely because the suit has been disposed of. ( 8 ) IN this context a reference to Sec. 8 of the said Act makes it very clear that if an application is made to the Court for the revision of the valuation of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court revises the valuation and for this purpose it may hold such inquiry as it thinks fit. On the facts of the case the Inspecting Officer (Court Fees) had in fact made such an application, and it was on the basis of such an application that the Court Fee Reference in question came into existence. On the facts of the case the Inspecting Officer (Court Fees) had in fact made such an application, and it was on the basis of such an application that the Court Fee Reference in question came into existence. ( 9 ) IN this context reference to Sec. 12 of the said Act also makes clear the intention of the legislature. Sec. 12 lays down a clear procedural scheme whereby the Inspecting Officers may be appointed by the State Government, who may examine the records of any case, whether the case is pending or has been disposed of, with a view to finding out whether proper fees have been paid. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 12 specifically empowers the Inspecting Officer to examine any record whatsoever, whether the case is pending or has been disposed of. Thus, merely because the suit has been disposed of does not shut out or obviate the necessity of making a proper valuation of the suit claim and the consequential determination of appropriate Court fees payable thereon. Sub-sec. (3) contemplates the action to be taken by the Investigating Officer in case he is of the opinion that proper fees have not been paid. Sub-sec. (4) provides for the recording of a provisional finding on the basis of the report, and sub-sec. (5) consequently provides for issuance of notice to the person who is prima facie liable to make up the deficit, and thereafter making an order requiring such person to pay the proper fee. Sub-sec. (6) contemplates the recovery of such deficit fee in case the person liable to pay fails to make payment. Thus, on the facts of the case, once the question of proper valuation of the suit and the appropriate Court fee payable on the plaint is open before the Court, such inquiry does not ipso facto become unnecessary, nor can the same be closed without recording any findings on merits, merely because the suit has been withdrawn. ( 10 ) IN this context it is also pertinent to note that the charging section under the said Act is Sec. 5. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 5 of the Act specifically contemplates that unless the proper fee is paid on the document in question, the same cannot be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of justice, nor can it be received or furnished by any public officer. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 5 of the Act specifically contemplates that unless the proper fee is paid on the document in question, the same cannot be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of justice, nor can it be received or furnished by any public officer. It is, therefore, obvious that the point of time at which the obligation to pay the proper Court fee arises, and the liability in that regard accrues, is when the document is presented to the Court. In the instant case, when the plaint is presented to the Court and when the Court has applied its mind by directing notice to issue to the defendants, the plaintiff becomes liable to pay the appropriate Court fee depending on the facts of the case. Merely because the suit has been permitted to be withdrawm does not and cannot cut short the inquiry pertaining to the proper court fees. Thus, the Court Fee Reference does not become a nullity, neither does it become redundant merely because the very same Court has permitted the suit to be withdrawn. ( 11 ) FROM a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions it becomes clear that the obligation of the plaintiff to pay the proper Court fee on a correct valuation of the suit claim in accordance with the relevant provisions of the said Act, is not extinguished. This is particularly so where the Court Fee Reference in the very same suit was in fact pending when the suit was permitted to be withdrawn. It is immaterial that the suit permitted to be withdrawn on the statement of the plaintiff that he does not wish to proceed with the suit since he is unable to pay the Court fee. It must also be noted that the plaintiff has not specifically sought permission for withdrawal of the suit. All that has been stated by the plaintiff in Exh. 10 is that he does not wish to proceed further with the suit since he is unable to pay the Court fee and that the same may be disposed of. Thus, although the Court treated this an application to withdraw the suit, fact remains that the plaintiff has merely abandoned the suit. The proper course for the trial Court would have been to dismiss the same for want of prosecution. Thus, although the Court treated this an application to withdraw the suit, fact remains that the plaintiff has merely abandoned the suit. The proper course for the trial Court would have been to dismiss the same for want of prosecution. However, whether the same was disposed of as withdrawn or whether the same was dismissed for want of prosecution, does not release the plaintiff from his obligation to pay the appropriate Court fees on the plaint, after the proper determination of the valuation of the suit in accordance with the relevant provisions of the relevant statute. ( 12 ) THE impugned order of the trial Court in treating the reference as disposed of is, therefore, clearly erroneous and deserves to be quashed and set aside. ( 13 ) IN the result, the petition is allowed. The trial Court is accordingly directed to restore to file the Court Fee Reference No. 77 of 1991 in Regular Civil Suit No. 1473 of 1990 and to decide the same on merits in accordance with law. It shall be open to the plaintiff to ask for a set off or rebate that may be due to him on the withdrawal of the suit, from the Court fee found to be payable by him on the plaint. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .