H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under Section 151 of CPC, read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well as Rule 1 (3) of chapter X of Karnataka High Court Rules, 1959, with the prayer for review and for recall of my order dated 10-1-1995, whereby I have dismissed the petitioner's writ petition (W. P. No. 526 of 1995 ). In my order dated 10-1-1995 I have clearly mentioned that, after passing of ex parte interim order dated 24-9-1994 by the Tribunal granting interim injunction in favour of the respondent, the petitioner had made an application for vacation or revocation or modification of ex parte order dated 24-9-1994. According to the petitioner's case, as have been pointed out at the time of hearing, the Tribunal had not passed any order on the application made by the petitioner for modification or revocation of the interim ex parte injunction order, though request had been made to the Tribunal so this court had taken the view that, when the application was pending, the writ petition was misconceived and except for the direction to be issued to the first respondent to expeditious disposal of the petitioner's application for modification of the interim order dated 24-9-1994 writ petition was liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition has been disposed of by this Court with a direction to the Tribunal to dispose of the application of the petitioner for vacation or modification of order dated 24-9-1994 within a period of four weeks after having heard the parties' counsels on both the sides, from the date of service of the copy of this order by this Court on the Tribunal. ( 2 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner on his application for review. There is no doubt that, with reference to review jurisdiction of this Court in matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India there is no specific article or provision like Article 137 of the Constitution, which is with reference to the power of review specifically conferred on the Supreme Court. There is no doubt that, with reference to review jurisdiction of this Court in matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India there is no specific article or provision like Article 137 of the Constitution, which is with reference to the power of review specifically conferred on the Supreme Court. It is not in doubt that, High court and Supreme Court being Courts of record and of plenary jurisdiction, inherent power or jurisdiction to pass suitable orders in the interest of justice and to avoid or rectify palpable errors of law, does vest in such Courts such as High Court and supreme Court. Anyway, various High Courts have framed specific rules in this regard. I must observe with appreciation that Sri P. R. Ramesh rendered assistance to Court and to counsel arguing review application and he brought to the notice of the Court Rule 39 of the High Court Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 (for short 'the rules' ). Rule 39 of said rules reads as follows:"39. Application of High Court Rules, etc. The provisions of High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, the rules made by High Court of Karnataka under karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, and the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure shall apply, as far as may be to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 and writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made in this rules". ( 3 ) AS per reading of these rules, provisions of Code of Civil Procedure can be made applicable to the extent there is no rule on the subject to the contrary. Article 226 by itself does not bar the power of review as has been observed by the Lords of supreme Court in the case of Shivdeo Singh and Others v State of Punjab and Others. In paragraph 8 of that judgment their lordships have observed as under:"it is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it". In paragraph 8 of that judgment their lordships have observed as under:"it is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it". ( 4 ) ORDER XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for, review in certain circumstances and it would be proper on my part to make a reference to the provisions of Rule 1 in particular, of Order XLVII. Order XLVII, Rule 1 reads as under: "rule 1. Application for review of Judgment. 1. Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. 2. A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. ( 5 ) A bare reading of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure will per se shows that, a review petition can be moved on discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due deligence was not within the knowledge of the party of which inspite of due deligence could not be produced by the party moving the review application at the time when the decree was passed or order was made. It can also be made on the ground of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason. As such, there is no doubt has been contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that, power to review its order vested in this Court even in respect of matters where orders are passed by it under article 226. Power no doubt vests in this Court, but, there are certain limitations thereto and as such, power of review is not akin to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. When I so observe i find support from the decision of their Lordship of Supreme court in Thungabhadra Industries Limited v Government of andhra Pradesh and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v Aribam pishak Sharma and similar view has been taken in the Division bench decision of this Court in C. N. Byrappa (dead) by L. Rs. v state of Karnataka. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant urged that, there is an error of law apparent on the face of record in the order passed by this Court. When this Court dismissed the writ petition taking the view that petitioner has got remedy and further taking the view to the effect that, petitioner's application before the tribunal for modification or vacation of interim order of injunction dated 24-9-1994 is pending and it has got to be disposed of by the Tribunal itself and directing the Tribunal to dispose of the same within the prescribed time. Learned counsel for the applicant contended before me that, there is no power vested in the Tribunal to review any of its order and it is not open to the Tribunal to vacate ex parte interim order of injunction dated 24-9-1994. Learned counsel for the applicant contended before me that, there is no power vested in the Tribunal to review any of its order and it is not open to the Tribunal to vacate ex parte interim order of injunction dated 24-9-1994. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant invited my attention to a Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of shingappa Gowda H. B. v Land Reforms Tribunal, Sringeri and others. In my opinion that case is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, as the facts will indicate that the tribunal has passed a final order 29-4-1975, rejecting the application which had been moved by the second respondent, as second respondent in that case has disclaimed his claim of tenancy over the land in question. Lateron, on 30-5-1975 the second respondent submitted second application with the prayer to the effect that, as the appellant and his sons had promised to give him half the lands to cultivate, so he had moved application disclaiming Tenancy but they failed to keep their promise. Therefore, he moved the second application for tenancy right being granted in his favour and for setting aside the order dated 29-5-1975. The Land Tribunal by its order dated 30-5-1975 considered the second application and reviewed its order dated 29-4-1975 and set aside the order dated 29-4-1975 and fixed the case for adducing further evidence in June 1975. It is this order of 30-5- 1975 passed by the Land Tribunal that had been challenged in Writ Petition No. 8722 of 1976 and that writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that he was satisfied that justice has been done to the parties in that case. Matter had gone before the Division Bench in writ appeal. Division Bench took the view that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review and to recall its order as the Act did not specifically confer a power of review on the Tribunal. The tribunal ordered reopening of the proceedings, which has become final, by an order made in favour of the appellant in that case substantially affected the property right of the land holder and therefore, injustice had resulted by reopening the proceedings in the writ appeal. The tribunal ordered reopening of the proceedings, which has become final, by an order made in favour of the appellant in that case substantially affected the property right of the land holder and therefore, injustice had resulted by reopening the proceedings in the writ appeal. A complete reading of the judgment clearly reveals that the Lordships of the Division bench proceeded to allow the appeal on the ground that there is no power to review unless it is specifically conferred by the provisions of the Act. There can be no dispute as regards the basic principle of law in this regard. It is well-settled that, there exists no power in authorities or Tribunals to review its order unless law specifically confers such a power. But, it may be clarified that these observations may not be read with reference to the Civil Courts. As regards power of Civil Court, Section 151 clearly indicates the inherent powers in the subordinate Courts to pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court and Section 151 declares that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Civil Courts. There may be similar provisions also in other Acts such as Section 25 of the karnataka Land Revenue Act which is also the declaratory of the inherent powers vesting in the Revenue Courts. The present case relates to an interim ex parte order passed by the Tribunal whereby interim injunction order had been granted. ( 8 ) THE Karnataka Land Reforms Act makes provisions with relation to interim orders. Section 48-C of the Karnataka Land reforms Act reads as under: 48-C. Interim orders. 1. The Tribunal may, when it considers it just and proper and subject to such terms and conditions as it may impose, issue interlocutory orders in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver concerning (the dwelling house in respect of which an application is made under Section 38 or) the land in respect of which an application is made under Section 48-A. 2. The Tribunal may at any time revoke or modify the order issued by it under sub-section (1 ). 3. Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the order of the Tribunal shall be final. The Tribunal may at any time revoke or modify the order issued by it under sub-section (1 ). 3. Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the order of the Tribunal shall be final. ( 9 ) SUB-SECTION (2) of Section 48-C very clearly provides that, Tribunal has got the power of revoke or modify the interim order issued by it under sub-section (2) of Section 48-C. Sub-section (3) provides that, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) the interim order of the Tribunal shall be final. A bare reading of the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) per se reveals that, it is open to the Tribunal to revoke or modify or to vacate the interim order granted by it under sub-section (1 ). ( 10 ) IN this view of the matter in my opinion, there is no force in this review application. My order dated 10-1-1995 did not suffer from any error of law or jurisdiction or error apparent on the face of record, when I had observed that the application for revocation or modification of interim order of injunction dated 24-9-1994 is pending before the Tribunal as such, the writ petition is premature and a simple direction needs to be issued to the Tribunal to expeditiously dispose of the application and with this direction the writ petition had been dismissed by me. ( 11 ) THUS considered in my opinion, this application for review is misconceived. One thing I may mention that while referring to the provisions, the learned counsel should have made a reference to Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 along with that, the provisions of Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code in the matter of review. Thus considered, the review application is without force and is hereby rejected. --- *** --- .