Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) is filed by the original defendant Nos. 1, 4, 5 and 6 respectively, whereas the first respondent herein is the original plaintiff and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 respectively. ( 2 ) BEFORE proceeding with the contentions raised in the present revision, it must be kept in mind that the present revision is one under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In the context of the powers of the High court exercisable in such revisions, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Helper Girdharbhai, AIR 1987 SC 1782 is most relevant. In the said decision the supreme Court has observed in substnace that in exercising revisional power under Sec. 29 (2) the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind by the lower court. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. In order to warrant interference, the decision must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. But, in the guise of revision, substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of small Causes has taken a particular view, is not permissible. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding Us jurisdiction if it substitutes its own view in place of that of the courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. 2. 1 It must also be noted that in the case before the Supreme Court, the findings of the Trial Court were reversed in appeal, and it was the appellate decision which was before the High Court. The High Court in the revision under Sec. 29 (2) reversed the finding. Thus, in the revision before the High Court, it was not a case of concurrent findings of fact. The High Court in the revision under Sec. 29 (2) reversed the finding. Thus, in the revision before the High Court, it was not a case of concurrent findings of fact. ( 3 ) IT may also be noted that the present revision along with few other similar revisions were referred to a Division Bench of this Court for deciding between two conflicting views taken by different Judges of this Court viz. , whether the amendment to Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the said Act, by Gujarat Act 7 of 1985, was retrospective in operation or not. This question was considered by a Division Bench consisting of B. N. Kirpal C. J. and s. D. Dave J. and by their decision rendered in the case of Sakarbai Devraj vs. Ibrahim, reported at 35 (2) GLR page 1091, the conflict of decisions now no longer survives. In the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench, this Court held that the amendment to sec. 12 (3) (b) of the said Act, whereby the word "regularly" is deleted or omitted is not retrospective in nature, but merely prospective. The said decision of the Division Bench has taken into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court, including the decisions relied upon by me in my decision in CRA No. 1707/79, decided on 29th october, 1991, wherein the view expressed by me has been upheld by the Division bench. It is, therefore, not necessary for me to reiterate the various Supreme Court decisions afresh herein. Suffice it to say that the omission of the word "regularly" 5 brought about by the amendment referred to hereinabove is merely prospective and not retrospective. ( 4 ) ON the facts of the present case, in view of the aforesaid principle of law now settled, the decree of the Trial Court, as also of the lower appellate court, being long prior to the amendment in question would remain unaffected, so far as this question of law is concerned. Under the circumstances there cannot be any dispute that the unamended section viz. , Sec. 12 (3) (b) as it stood prior to the amendment of 1985 would apply. ( 5 ) IN this context it is relevant to note that Sec. 12 (3) (b) as it stood at the relevant point of time reads as under :sec. Under the circumstances there cannot be any dispute that the unamended section viz. , Sec. 12 (3) (b) as it stood prior to the amendment of 1985 would apply. ( 5 ) IN this context it is relevant to note that Sec. 12 (3) (b) as it stood at the relevant point of time reads as under :sec. 12 (3) (b) In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit, if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suits as directed by the Court. " ( 6 ) IT is in the context of the aforesaid law that the pertinent and relevant facts now need to be examined. The landlord had filed a suit for eviction of his tenants of the ground of arrears of rent, after serving the appropriate statutory notice. The said suit was ultimately numbered as Rent Suit No. 2394/75, wherein a prayer was made for eviction of the tenants from the suit premises, and a further prayer for decree of Rs. 552/- by way of mesne profits, costs, etc. , ( 7 ) THE substance of the tenants contention as seen from the written statement Exh. 10 were to the effect that the contractual rent of Rs. 30/- per month is not the standard rent, that the defendants are not liable to pay the taxes, that the defendants are ready and willing to pay the standard rent which may be determined by the court. They further disputed that they were is arrears of rent as claimed by the plaintiff. ( 8 ) IT is relevant to note at this stage that the defendants had, within the statutory period of 30 days of service of the suit notice, filed an application under Sec. 11 of the said Act, for determination of the standard rent. This application was filed on 13th september, 1974, which was numbered as Misc. Application No. 633 of 1975. This application was filed on 13th september, 1974, which was numbered as Misc. Application No. 633 of 1975. It is also pertinent to note that the Trial Court passed an interim order on 13th September, 1974, which has been reproduced in paragraph 9 of the lower appellate courts judgment, to the effect that the interim rent of the premises is fixed at Rs. 18/- per month, to clear up the arrears at the specified rate by 5th October, 1974, and thereafter to continue to deposit at that rate by the 5th of every month. Thus, until the standard rent ultimately came to be determined by the Trial Court, this interim order would hold the field and would govern the rights and obligations of the tenants, and it would be the tenants compliance with this interim order that would furnish a basis for determining whether they are "ready and willing to pay" the standard rent and permitted increases within the meaning of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the said Act. ( 9 ) BOTH the landlords suit and the tenants standard rent application were consolidated, heard together and disposed of by a common judgment. ( 10 ) THE Trial Court, by way of its judgment and final order fixed the standard rent of the suit premises at Rs. 8/ per month plus taxes and light charges, and held that the defendant was a tenant in arrears for a period of more than six months, but since he was 6 ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases, the plaintiff-landlord was not entitled to a decree for possession. ( 11 ) BEING aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit the landlord preferred Regular Civil appeal No. 331/78 under Sec. 29 (1) of the said Act, which was allowed by the lower appellate court, by passing a decree for eviction against the defendants tenants. ( 12 ) IT is under such circumstnaces that the defendants tenants (in particular defendant Nos. 1, 4, 5 and 6) have preferred the present revision, challenging the decree of eviction passed against them and the other defendants-tenants by the lower appellats court. ( 12 ) IT is under such circumstnaces that the defendants tenants (in particular defendant Nos. 1, 4, 5 and 6) have preferred the present revision, challenging the decree of eviction passed against them and the other defendants-tenants by the lower appellats court. In view of the legal position discussed by me hereinabove, it is by now well settled that the tenants are required to pay or to deposit in court the standard rent and permitted increases "regularly" in order to avail themselves of the benefit and protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the said Act. It is in the context of this legal position that the judgment of the lower appellate court is required to be examined. ( 13 ) AT this stage it may be noted that while the Trial Court had fixed the standard rent ultimately (by its final judgment and order) at Rs. 8/- per month plus municipal taxes, plus electricity charges, the lower appellate court, in appeal, had raised the same to Rs. 30/- per month, on the basis or reappreciation of the relevant evidence on record. Obviously, this is a question of fact and appreciation of evidence and therefore this issue is, in my opinion, no longer open for discussion or reevaluation in the present revision. ( 14 ) IT may also be noted that so far as the specific finding of the defendants-tenants being in arrears of more than six months is concerned, even the Trial Court had rendered a finding against the defendants-tenants, and the only reason for refusing to pass a decree for eviction was by conferring upon the tenants the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the said act, on the basis that they were "more or less regular" in depositing the amount in the trial Court. ( 15 ) THE lower appellate court has rightly appreciated the order passed below Exh. 5 of the standard rent application, dated 13th September, 1974, wherein the defendants were directed to deposit the rent in court at the rate of Rs. 18/- per month and thereafter to continue to deposit at that rate by the 5th of every month. ( 15 ) THE lower appellate court has rightly appreciated the order passed below Exh. 5 of the standard rent application, dated 13th September, 1974, wherein the defendants were directed to deposit the rent in court at the rate of Rs. 18/- per month and thereafter to continue to deposit at that rate by the 5th of every month. It is, therefore, obvious that the lower appellate court has adopted the correct approach in law in testing the readiness and willingness of the tenants by the examination the various dates on which the deposits were made in court, both with a view to ascertain whether such deposits have been made "regularly", and whether such deposits were in compliance with the interim order referred to above. ( 16 ) THE lower appellate court has in para 8 of the judgment referred to Exh. 37, which is a pursis filed by the advocate for the tenants, setting out the various dates and the amounts of the deposits made in the Trial Court. The lower appellate court has rightly drawn the conclusion that the various dates of making the various deposits clearly indicates that the tenants were not regular in making the deposit, that they were regularly irregular in making such deposits, and also that the deposits were not made on or before he due date as specified in the interim order viz. , by the 5th of each month. The lower appellate court has rightly appreciated that at least on fvie occasions the deposits were made at an interval of two month, that two other deposits made on 11th December, 1975 and on 9th February, 1976 were also at an interval of two months, and a further deposit on 8th July, 1976 was also at an interval of three months, that between 9th February, 1976 and 8th July, 1976 there was no deposit whatsoever. Lastly, there were 23 (sic) occasions 7 when the payment was not made before the 5th of the month, as stipulated in the interim order. Lastly, there were 23 (sic) occasions 7 when the payment was not made before the 5th of the month, as stipulated in the interim order. ( 17 ) WHILE dealing with these facts and dates the lower appellate court has rightly observed that though there may not be lapse on the part of the tenants, so far the period of the pendency of appeal is concerned, it is equally clear that the aforesaid interim order has not been complied with during the pendency of the proceedings before the Trial Court. ( 18 ) IN view of this detailed factual discussion and appreciation of incontrovertible evidence on record, I cannot possibly entertain any other view canvassed by the present petitioners. The lower appellate court was justified in concluding that at least during the stage of the proceedings before the Trial Court, the interim order of the Trial Court has not been complied with so far as making regular deposit of the interim rent is concerned and so far as making such deposits by the specified date is concerned. ( 19 ) IN view of this finding, the lower appellate court has rightly appreciate the law applicable to such facts and findings, and has rightly come to the conclusion that the tenants have lost the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) (as it then stood), and therefore cannot be protected against the plaintiffs claim for a decree for eviction. ( 20 ) THE lower appellate court has correctly appreciated the various decisions of the supreme Court in particular the ratio laid down in the case of Harbanslal Jagmondas vs. Prabhudas, 18 GLR 157, Premjibhai Vithaldas vs. Ganeshbhai, AIR 1977 SC 1707 , mrunalini B. , 19 GLR 1090 and Ganpat Ladha vs. Sashikant Vishnu, 19 GLR 502. . ( 21 ) THE tenants sought to contend before the lower appellate court that their readiness and willingness to pay or deposit in court is to be tested in terms of the standard rent ultimately fixed by the court, and not with reference to the interim rent fixed by interim order. This contention has rightly been rejected by the lower appellate court. This contention has rightly been rejected by the lower appellate court. It must be noted that at the stage of the Trial Court proceedings, i. e. , during the pendency of the suit, the standard rent was not in fact determined, and this came to be determined only by the final judgment in the suit. Therefore, during the pendency of the suit, the tenants had no other basis for showing their readiness and willingness to deposit the amount in court, except on the basis of the amount fixed by way of the interim order referred to hereinabove. The tenants have lost the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b), because it is this order which has not complied with. To contend in appeal, knowing in retrospect, that the standard rent ultimately determined by the Trial Court is rs. 8/- per month, is a mere device to take advantage of the fact situation. To say that they have paid up the standard rent as determined by final judgment of the Trial Court, and to accept such a submission, would clearly negative and/or nullify the interim rent determined by the interim order passed upon the tenants own standard rent application. The very purpose of the statutory provision for determination of interim standard rent is to provide or furnish a basis to the tenant to show and establish before the Trial Court his readiness and willingness to pay, until the standard rent application is finally decided. Obviously, no tenant can be permitted to plead that he may not have complied with the directions as to deposit of interim standard rent, and further that such non-compliance would be of no consequence, since ultimately by final judgment, the standard rent determined is lower than the interim standard rent. To accept such a contention would clearly amunt to putting a premium upon either the tenants negligence or to confer upon the tenants a protection not contemplated by law. ( 22 ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter. Even if such a contention (as referred to above) could possibly be entertained, the net result would not be in favour of the tenants, 8 inasmuch as the lower appellate court has modified the factual finding of the trial Court, and as against such standard rent of Rs. 8/- per month finally fixed by the Trial Court, has raised the same to Rs. 30/- per month in appeal. 8/- per month finally fixed by the Trial Court, has raised the same to Rs. 30/- per month in appeal. Thus, if the tenants readiness and willingness to pay is tested with reference to the figure of standard rent ultimately decided in appeal, (Rs. 30/- per month), the tenants would not be able to claim the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the said Act in view of the necessary short-fall of the deposit actually made, whether on the basis of Rs. 8/- per month, or Rs. 18/- per month. It may then be futile for the tenant to submit that he could not deposit at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month during the Trial court proceedings because that figure came to be determined later on in appeal, since in law the decision of the appellate court relates back to, and modifies or substitutes the original decision of the Trial Court. 22. 1 The aforesaid discussion is only with a view to demonstrate the fallacy and/or futility of the view canvassed by the tenants. If the law is correctly applied, it would be obvious that the tenant would be protected under Sec. 12 (3) (b), even against a short-fall of deposits made (when computed on the basis of the higher figure of standard rent determined in appeal), so long as the deposits actually made are in compliance with the interim rent determined and directed to be deposited by the Trial Court. The fact that there is a short-fall, on account of the appellate court having raised the figure of standard rent in appeal, would not then come in the way of the tenants so as to deprive them of the protection of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the said Act. ( 23 ) THUS in the ultimate analysis, the lower appellate court was correct in concluding that the tenants suggestion of ignoring the interim order directing deposit at the rate of Rs. 18/- per month, and testing their readiness and willigness to make the deposit on the basis of Rs. 8/-, per month cannot be accepted. ( 24 ) THE lower appellate court was, therefore, eminently justified in reversing the decree of the Trial Court, and in directing the decree of eviction against the defendants-tenants. ( 25 ) THE present revision is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. .