B. PADMARAJ, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these appeals arise out of the same judgment and award passed in M. V. C. No. 266 of 1991, on the file of M. A. C. T. No. IX, Bangalore, and, therefore, they are dealt with together. ( 2 ) ON 19. 9. 1990 at about 8. 15 p. m. , one Nalina was crossing the road near the Ulsoor Lake from south to north, when a. car bearing registration No. CAG 5287 came from east to west on that road and hit her. As a result of this accident, she sustained serious injuries. On the ground that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the car by its driver, the injured lady, nalina, claimed a compensation of Rs. 12,00,000/- only, for the injuries sustained by her in the accident before the Claims Tribunal against the respondents, who were the owner and the insurer of the car. ( 3 ) THE respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to the claim petition contested the claim by filing their separate written statements. ( 4 ) IN the course of the trial before the Tribunal, PWs 1 to 6 were examined and Exhs. P-1 to P-23 were got marked on the side of the claimant. On the side of the respondents, the driver of the car was examined as RW 1 and Exhs. R-1 to R-3 were marked. ( 5 ) ON an appreciation of the evidence on record, the Tribunal held that the accident was the result of the actionable negligence on the part of the driver of the car. On the question of compensation, the Tribunal held that the claimant is entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 8,00,800/-together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the respondent nos. 1 and 2. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by this judgment and award of the Tribunal, the claimant has preferred M. F. A. No. 441 of 1994 for the enhancement of compensation while the respondents therein have preferred m. F. A. No. 910 of 1994 for setting aside the said judgment and award of the Tribunal. ( 7 ) WE have heard the arguments of the learned Counsel on both sides in both the appeals at some length and we have been taken through the relevant evidence on record as well as the reasonings of the Tribunal. ( 7 ) WE have heard the arguments of the learned Counsel on both sides in both the appeals at some length and we have been taken through the relevant evidence on record as well as the reasonings of the Tribunal. ( 8 ) WE shall now proceed to consider the challenges made in both these appeals. Negligence ( 9 ) EXH. P-3 is the true copy of the sketch of the scene of accident prepared by the police during the course of investigation of the case in respect of this very accident and it is helpful to appreciate the issue of negligence. The correctness of the sketch, Exh. P-3, has not been disputed by either side. It would show that the injured lady was crossing the road from south to north. The car was proceeding on the road from east to west. The place of impact was 31 ft. from the southern margin of the road and 29 ft. from the northern margin of the road. The total width of the road at the accident spot was 60 ft. That means the injured lady had crossed more than half the width of the road, when she was hit by the car. The sketch, Exh. P-3, would clearly indicate that the car had deflected from its course towards its right beyond the central or median line and hit the lady on the other half of the road. The lady was crossing the road from south to north and the car had virtually chased her by deflecting towards right side, while proceeding from east to west and hit the lady. There was a space of about 31 ft. on the left side of the car. On either side of the road at the accident spot there were shops and houses and also lake junction. The road was a straight one and was sufficiently wide at the accident spot. The accident took place at about 8. 15 p. m. , in the night. The driver of the car has stated in his testimony before the court that he saw the lady crossing the road from a distance of about 20 feet and he says that he was driving the car at the speed of 30 to 35 km. per hour. He would admit that a car moving at a speed of 30 km. per hour could be stopped instantaneously. per hour. He would admit that a car moving at a speed of 30 km. per hour could be stopped instantaneously. But on seeing the lady crossing the road, he says that he did not stop the car and he had only slowed down the speed of the car. According to him, when he sounded the horn and took the vehicle on its right side, after seeing the lady crossing the road, the said lady suddenly retreated and again moved forward and fell on the left front portion of the car. Now, turning to the sketch, Exh. P-3, it would show that the blood had fallen on the road at a distance of about 6 feet towards the west of the place of impact. If the impact had occurred in the manner as sought to be made out by RW 1, the blood would not have fallen at a distance of 6 ft. away from the place of the accident. This would clearly indicate that the car had given a violent impact to the lady and it must have hit her with sufficient force. This would clearly indicate that the car must have been driven with the excessive speed at the time of this accident. If really the driver of the car had been slow, he could have immediately stopped the car when he saw the lady crossing the road and in that event there would not have been any such accident. The very fact that he took the car towards its right side and he was not able to stop the car, though he had seen the lady crossing the road from south to north from a distance of about 20 feet, the negligence of the driver of the car is writ large. The car driver, RW 1, had virtually chased the lady, who was crossing the road from south to north by taking the car to its right side instead of either stopping or taking it to its left side. Therefore, what emerges from the material evidence on record is that when the lady had almost crossed more than half the width of the road from south to north, the car which came driven by RW 1 from east to west deflected towards its right and hit the lady with sufficient force. Therefore, what emerges from the material evidence on record is that when the lady had almost crossed more than half the width of the road from south to north, the car which came driven by RW 1 from east to west deflected towards its right and hit the lady with sufficient force. Though RW 1 had seen the lady crossing the road from a distance of about 20 feet, he did not stop the vehicle and on the other hand, he virtually chased the lady, by taking the car to its right side. Therefore, we are of the opinion that it was on account of the rash and negligent driving of the car by its driver that the accident had occulted, as a result of which the claimant sustained serious injuries. The defence as set up by the respondents, more particularly the second respondent, is not at all satisfactory and in tune with the evidence which has been produced by the claimant. In view of the aforesaid background, this question should not detain us any further and we hold, therefore, that the respondents are responsible for the accident which had taken place on account of the rash and negligent driving by the driver of the car. The appreciation of the evidence on the issue of negligence by the tribunal does not, in our opinion, suffer from any infirmities as to call for interference in appeal. The evidence on record does support the conclusion reached by the Tribunal. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants in M. F. A. No. 910 of 1994 that there was no negligence on the part of the car driver or at least that there was a contributory negligence on the part of the injured lady. In our view, it was the driver of the car, who was solely responsible for this accident. In this view of the matter, we confirm the finding recorded by the Tribunal on the question of actionable negligence. Quantum of Compensation ( 10 ) THE next and the main question that arises for consideration is with regard to the amount payable to the claimant as compensation for the injuries suffered by her. ( 11 ) THE injured claimant was aged about 41 years at the time of this accident. Her date of birth as per the service register is 19. 12. ( 11 ) THE injured claimant was aged about 41 years at the time of this accident. Her date of birth as per the service register is 19. 12. 1949 vide the evidence of PW 4. The claimant was working as a special Assistant in the Viveknagar branch of the Canara Bank, Bangalore, at the time of this accident. The accident occurred on 19. 9. 1990 and for the month of January, 1991, the claimant had drawn the gross salary of Rs. 5,587. 32 as per the evidence of PW 4. PW 1 is the husband of the injured claimant and he has been working as a Head Clerk in the State Bank of India. At the time of this accident, the injured claimant had completed service of 19 years, while her husband, pw 1, had completed service of 28 years. They have a son by name Aswin Sabhapathy, who was aged about 19 years and was studying in II Year B. E. (Architecture) and a daughter by name shilpa, who was aged about 14 years and was studying in 10th standard at the time of this accident. The claimant remained absent from duty from 20. 9. 1990 and on account of long absence from duty, she was referred to the Medical Board by her employer bank and the Medical board by its letter dated 4. 2. 1993 had opined that the claimant is medically unfit and she cannot discharge her duties in the Canara Bank for the present or in future. After the receipt of such a report from the Medical Board, the employer bank of the claimant had issued a notice to her on 18. 5. 1993, terminating her services with effect from 20. 8. 1993. In the normal course, the claimant would have retired from her service of the bank on 31. 12. 2009. According to PW 4, the manager of the bank, the injured was entitled to gratuity amounting to Rs. 51,705 on the date of the termination of her service on 20. 8. 93. The claimant had been given the salary for a period of 42 days after the accident as she had 42 days of leave to her credit. Provident Fund accumulations of the injured claimant vide letter dated 5. 8. 1993 of the Manager of the bank were as detailed below: employee's contribution Rs. 47,415. 53 bank's contribution Rs. 47,415. 8. 93. The claimant had been given the salary for a period of 42 days after the accident as she had 42 days of leave to her credit. Provident Fund accumulations of the injured claimant vide letter dated 5. 8. 1993 of the Manager of the bank were as detailed below: employee's contribution Rs. 47,415. 53 bank's contribution Rs. 47,415. 53 voluntary contribution Rs. 19,488. 00 a. D. A. D. Rs. 1,316. 20 withdrawal liability (Principal) Rs. 17,260. 00 ( 12 ) THE letter dated 18. 5. 1993 of the Disciplinary Action Cell, Bangalore, sent to the claimant as per Exh. P-22 would read as under: you had admitted in your letter dated 8. 5. 1993 that you are not attending office since 20. 9. 1990 and that you are bedridden. Regarding the medical report submitted by the panel of doctors deputed by the bank, you have not made any specific submission. In the circumstances, since the panel of doctors have certified that you are medically unfit and that you cannot discharge your duties either now or in future, we wish to terminate your services w. e. f. 20. 8. 1993 a. o. h. as contemplated under Chapter XII, regulation 3 (i) of Canara Bank Service Code. This shall be taken as 3 months' advance notice as envisaged under the above regulation. ( 13 ) DR. Satish, PW 3, was a Resident Doctor in Neuro Surgery at the Nimhans Hospital, bangalore. He has stated that on 19. 9. 1990, the claimant was brought to the Nimhans Hospital for treatment and he examined her and found the following: (i) The blood pressure was very low. (ii) Lacerated wound with the exposure of bones on right frontal and parietal regions. (iii) Swelling on right leg. (iv) The petitioner was not able to speak, the movements of her eyes were sluggish, she was groaning with pain. ( 14 ) BLOOD was given to the claimant and her blood pressure was brought to normal. On angiogram, they found that the claimant had haematoma on right fronto-parietal region and depressed fracture in the same region. The claimant was operated and clot in the brain was removed. She did not show any signs of improvement. On the next day C. T. scanning was done. It showed right frontal contusion, right posterior parietal extra haematoma, left frontal contusion and left frontal extra dural haematoma. The claimant was operated and clot in the brain was removed. She did not show any signs of improvement. On the next day C. T. scanning was done. It showed right frontal contusion, right posterior parietal extra haematoma, left frontal contusion and left frontal extra dural haematoma. The claimant was operated again for the second time. Right frontal extra dural haematoma and right frontal contusion were removed. The claimant was put on artificial ventilation. After the operation, the claimant developed infection in the chest and also the infection in the brain injuries-operated part. The brain tissue started coming out through the operated wound. Claimant also developed hydrocephalus. To reduce this, the claimant was operated for the third time by inserting a tube through the spinal space into the abdomen. With this process, the brain swelling was reduced. The skin covering over the brain did not heal and the exposed brain was clearly visible through the operated wound. To prevent the chest infection tracheostomy was done. The water content in the brain increased with infection and, therefore, she was operated for the fourth time on the left side with ventrioculo peritoneal shunting. The claimant was operated for the fifth time for removal of the blocked tube and once again new tube was inserted. The claimant was discharged on 13. 1. 1991. On 3. 8. 1991, the claimant was admitted to the Nimhans Hospital and it was found that the left side tube was blocked. The claimant was operated and the tube was revised. Ultimately, the claimant was discharged on 10. 8. 1991. ( 15 ) THE claimant was examined by Dr. Satish, PW 3, again on 6. 8. 1991 and he found the following conditions: (i) The petitioner can speak few words and she has slurred speech. (ii) The petitioner's immediate and recent memory is impaired. (iii) The petitioner cannot sit or stand on her own. The petitioner has weakness on the right side of her body throughout. (iv) The petitioner does not have control over urinary bladder. ( 16 ) PW 3 would further say that the right side weakness, which the claimant was then suffering, may improve to some extent. But he cannot say with certainty whether the other disabilities suffered by the claimant may disappear. As on the date of her examination by Dr. Satish, PW 3, on 6. 8. ( 16 ) PW 3 would further say that the right side weakness, which the claimant was then suffering, may improve to some extent. But he cannot say with certainty whether the other disabilities suffered by the claimant may disappear. As on the date of her examination by Dr. Satish, PW 3, on 6. 8. 1991, the claimant had not been able to attend to even her basic needs and she requires the assistance of someone. According to Dr. Satish, PW 3, by undergoing physiotherapy, the general weakness of the right side of the claimant may improve to a certain extent in course of time. But the achievement of complete improvement by any type of treatment is difficult, according to Dr. Satish, PW 3. In his cross-examination, Dr. Satish, PW 3, has stated that as on the date of the discharge of the claimant on 14. 11. 1990, she was found to be conscious, opening eyes, alert and speaking few words with low voice. Pupils equal and reactive. External ocular movements were full and she was moving all the limbs minimally, bilateral primitive reflexes present. Right sided craniotomy sight there was a depression. Claimant was on Foley's catheters. She was accepting oral feeds. He would admit that at the time of her discharge on 14. 11. 1990, no mention has been made in the discharge summary about the weakness of the right side of the body of the claimant. The doctor, PW 3, cannot, however, say about the further progress in the condition of the claimant. ( 17 ) IT is well settled that a person injured by another's wrong is entitled to general damages for non-pecuniary loss, such as, her pain and suffering, past and future and her loss of amenity and enjoyment of life. Such damages constitute a conventional sum. By the very nature of things, there can be no precise yardstick by which compensation payable under such heads can be assessed and determined. This is a head of claim, which is impossible to quantify in monetary terms. The only thing that can be said is that it is some solace to the injured, when he or she is aware of the loss. But when he or she is not aware of it, money is no solace at all. It does her no good. It is a benefit to those who succeed his/her estate. The only thing that can be said is that it is some solace to the injured, when he or she is aware of the loss. But when he or she is not aware of it, money is no solace at all. It does her no good. It is a benefit to those who succeed his/her estate. As we have already stated, it is assessed by the courts on conventional basis. There can, by its very nature, be no precise measurement in monetary terms of what an injured claimant suffers on account of the injuries sustained by him or her and the disabilities that he/she is left with on account thereof. It would, however, be pertinent to bear in mind the observations made in the case of R. D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. , 1995 ACJ36 , AIR1995 Bom 55 , 1995 (1 )Bomcr67 , (1994 )96 BOMLR83 , [1995 (70 )FLR360 ], (1995 )I LLJ833 Bom , 1994 (2 )Mhlj1656 , where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated thus: when compensation is to be awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life, the special circumstances of the claimant have to be taken into account including his age, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereof on his future life. The amount of compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but the award must reflect that different circumstances have been taken into consideration. ( 18 ) IN that case, the claimant was an advocate having good practice in different courts and as, because of the accident, he had been crippled and could move on wheelchair, the Hon'ble supreme Court directed payment of Rs. 3,00,000/- only as compensation against the claim of Rs. 6,00,000/- under the heads 'pain and suffering" and 'loss of amenities'. ( 19 ) THEREFORE, in the light of the above decision and having regard to the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the claimant in the instant case and the totality of the circumstances as have arisen as a consequence thereof, it would be just and reasonably to hold her entitled to a sum of rs. 3,00,000/- only as compensation under the heads 'pain and suffering' and 'loss of amenities of life'. 3,00,000/- only as compensation under the heads 'pain and suffering' and 'loss of amenities of life'. ( 20 ) SO far as the expenses incurred towards the medical treatment and other miscellaneous expenses are concerned, PW 1, the husband of the claimant, has stated that the entire amount covered under the bills which were produced before the bank had been reimbursed. According to him, a sum of Rs. 69,294. 20 had been reimbursed. The Tribunal has also observed in the course of its judgment that it is seen from the contents of Exh. P-15 that a sum of Rs. 69,000/- has been reimbursed by the State Bank of India, the employer of PW 1 and a sum of Rs. 36,000 has been reimbursed by the Canara Bank, the employer of the claimant. Thus, the Tribunal found that the amount spent for treatment had been reimbursed under Exhs. P-11 and P-15. The learned counsel for the injured claimant did not dispute the said finding recorded by the Tribunal. The doctor, PW 3, has stated that the claimant had been charged by the hospital authorities on the basis of the income furnished by the claimant at the time of the accident. It has to be concluded, therefore, that whatever expenses that were incurred by the claimant and her husband towards the treatment of the claimant have been fully reimbursed by either employer bank and hence the claimant will not be entitled for any compensation towards the expenses incurred for medical treatment. ( 21 ) THE claimant had a prolonged period of hospitalisation and thereafter she was required to undergo physiotherapy. From these established facts, it would be legitimate to infer that expenses must have been incurred both on transportation and medicines, besides other items such as nutritional food, etc. The Tribunal had disallowed the claim regarding the actual medical expenses and the hospitalisation charges incurred by the claimant and her husband, which had been reimbursed by their employer bank. True, the actual expenses incurred by the claimant towards her treatment, medicinal and hospital charges, etc. The Tribunal had disallowed the claim regarding the actual medical expenses and the hospitalisation charges incurred by the claimant and her husband, which had been reimbursed by their employer bank. True, the actual expenses incurred by the claimant towards her treatment, medicinal and hospital charges, etc. , have been reimbursed, but then the other expenses incurred towards nourishment, conveyance, attendance and nursing charges could not have been reimbursed by the employer of the claimant and her husband and there is no manner of doubt that the claimant is entitled to be compensated for attendance and nursing charges besides the expenses incurred towards transportation, nourishment and other miscellaneous expenses. ( 22 ) PW 1, the husband of the claimant, has stated that he had appointed a nurse to attend on the claimant and he had also appointed a cook for preparing food and had paid a salary of Rs. 3,000/- per month to the nurse and a salary of Rs. 2,500/- per month to the cook. In the claim petition filed by the claimant, it is stated in this behalf as under: it is stated that the petitioner has engaged the services of a nurse right from 12. 1. 1991 up to the date of filing of this petition on a monthly salary of Rs. 3,000/- added to that one peon also employed for attending the petitioner, apart from that a cook is also employed for cooking and for cook and peon, a salary of Rs. 2,500/- per month is paid. ( 23 ) IT is to be seen, therefore, from the claim petition for a peon and cook a consolidated salary of Rs. 2,500/- was said to have been paid but in his evidence before the court, PW 1 would contend that he had paid Rs. 2,500/- to cook only. Such a variation could not have been there if really the claimant had employed a cook and a peon as claimed. ( 24 ) PW 5, who claims herself to be a nurse, has stated in her testimony as under: the petitioner can speak, but her speech is slurred. She takes food. I help the petitioner in doing physiotherapy. I am working as a full-time nurse and looking after the petitioner. I have been paid a salary of Rs. 2,000/- per month. I work from morning 7. 00 to evening 7. 00. She takes food. I help the petitioner in doing physiotherapy. I am working as a full-time nurse and looking after the petitioner. I have been paid a salary of Rs. 2,000/- per month. I work from morning 7. 00 to evening 7. 00. ( 25 ) AS against the evidence of PW 1 that he had engaged a nurse by paying a salary of Rs. 3,000/-, PW 5 would say that she had been paid a salary of Rs. 2,000/-p. m. Further, in her cross-examination, PW 5 has stated that the husband of the claimant has not obtained any receipt from her for having paid the salary to her. She further says that she has undergone training as a nurse and she was being paid Rs. 1,000/- during the training. But no certificate was given to her for having undergone training as a nurse. She has no documents to show that she has been paid a salary of Rs. 2,000/- per month by PW 1. As we have already stated, it is pertinent to note that while PW 1 would say that he had paid a salary of Rs. 3,000/- per month to the nurse, PW 5 would say that she has been paid a salary of Rs. 2,000/- per month and for that also there are no records. Such discrepancy would not have been there if really PW 1 had appointed a nurse to look after the claimant by paying the nurse a salary of Rs. 3,000/- per month as claimed by the claimant. ( 26 ) PW 6 has been examined to show that she had been working as a cook. She would go to the extent of saying that she looks after the entire domestic work including cooking and also takes the children of the claimant to their schools and she says that she has been paid a salary of Rs. 1,500/- per month. It is to be recalled that the claimant has a son aged about 19 years, who is studying in II Year B. E. , and a daughter aged about 14 years, who is studying in 10th standard. That being so, the say of the witness, PW 6, that she takes the children of the petitioner-claimant to the school cannot be believed. That being so, the say of the witness, PW 6, that she takes the children of the petitioner-claimant to the school cannot be believed. Further, in the cross-examination, she has stated that before coming to the house of the petitioner-claimant she was working as a maidservant in other houses and was working in three different houses simultaneously and she was being paid Rs. 500/- in one house and Rs. 400/- each in the other 2 houses. According to PW 6, no other person is working in the house of the claimant. But in the claim petition, as extracted above, the claimant has stated that a cook and a peon were employed on a salary of Rs. 2,500/- per month. Therefore, it is very difficult to swallow the evidence on the side of the claimant that PW 1 could have appointed a nurse and a cook by paying them a salary of Rs. 3,000/- and Rs. 2,500/- per month especially having regard to the economic and social status of the claimant. Apart from this, the evidence adduced in this behalf on the side of the claimant, besides being highly exaggerated, is not capable of being believed, on the face of it, as it does not stand the test of probability. ( 27 ) HAVING regard to the circumstances in which the claimant has been put after the accident, there can be no getting away from the fact that the claimant needed the services of some person to look after her. It is also quite likely that the claimant must have also incurred some expenses towards her nourishment, conveyance, etc. , which could not have been reimbursed by the employer of the claimant or her husband. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that in the circumstances in which the claimant was, some special diet must indeed have been administered to her during the period of her treatment and also because of her physical needs attributable to the accident, she needed the services of some person. In this view of the matter, the claimant is entitled to be compensated under the heads of nourishment and nursing attendance charges. In this view of the matter, the claimant is entitled to be compensated under the heads of nourishment and nursing attendance charges. Even if the services needed by the claimant rendered gratuitously either by the husband or by the children of the disabled claimant, the claimant can recover damages for the services and must hold such damages in trust for the person, who rendered the services to her. Even for future attendance and nursing, if need for the same is proved and the person providing voluntary services agrees to render the same as long as he can continue to do so, the claimant can recover compensation for all the extra attendance on her, on the basis of proper and reasonable cost of supplying of those needs. The compensation in such a case would be payable for attendance and nursing charges both for past and future. ( 28 ) KEEPING in view the circumstances in which the claimant had been put after the accident, it would be just and reasonable to award a sum of Rs. 25,000/- to cover her expenses on the above heads, viz. , nourishment, conveyance, nursing and attendance charges, etc. ( 29 ) THE Tribunal has also awarded a sum of Rs. 60,000/- under the head future medical expenditure and attendant's charges. This part of the award does not require any interference because a sum of Rs. 60,000/- can be held to be reasonable amount to be awarded taking into consideration all the facts and peculiar circumstances of this case. ( 30 ) COMING to the compensation awardable under the head, pecuniary loss, it has to be stated that the claimant in this case is entitled for the loss of past and future earnings. So far as the damages for pecuniary loss are concerned, they are awardable under two heads. Special damages for the loss of past earnings and general damages for loss of prospective earnings. So far as special damages for the loss of past earnings are concerned, they must be awarded in respect of the actual earnings which have been lost as a result of the injuries till the date of trial. In the instant case, the special damages are to be awarded up to the date of termination of the services of the claimant by her employer on medical grounds. Salary certificate, Exh. In the instant case, the special damages are to be awarded up to the date of termination of the services of the claimant by her employer on medical grounds. Salary certificate, Exh. P-10, produced on behalf of the claimant would show that as on the date of the accident, the net take-home salary of the claimant was Rs. 1,906. 02. She had drawn salary till January, 1991 and she has also been paid salary for 42 days of leave which was to her credit. Accordingly, special damages in this case towards the loss of past earnings will have to be awarded at the rate of Rs. 1,906. 02 p. m. for the period from January, 1991, to the date of termination of her service by her employer with effect from 20. 8. 1993 minus the salary paid for 42 days of leave to her credit by the employer. Thus, in the instant case though the claimant had met with an accident on 19. 9. 1990, the evidence of PW 4 would show that the claimant had drawn the salary for the month of January, 1991. It has come in his evidence that she had been paid salary for 42 days after the accident as she had 42 days leave to her credit. That means, the claimant had been paid salary up to the end of January, 1991 and in addition to this, she had been paid salary for 42 days of leave, which were to her credit. Therefore, as per the salary certificate, Exh. P-10, the take-home salary of the claimant for the month of October, 1990 was Rs. 1,906. 02. As we have stated above, the claimant had been paid the salary till the end of January, 1991 and also for a period of 42 days in addition towards the leave to her credit. The claimant was terminated from service with effect from 20. 8. 1993 on medical grounds. Therefore, for about 20 months, she would be entitled for the loss of salary, which would come to Rs. 38,120. 40. This may be rounded off to Rs. 39,000/ -. ( 31 ) THE claimant was 41 years of age at the time of the accident. As a result of the injuries sustained by her in the accident, she had been crippled throughout her life. She had also been terminated from service with effect from 20. 8. 38,120. 40. This may be rounded off to Rs. 39,000/ -. ( 31 ) THE claimant was 41 years of age at the time of the accident. As a result of the injuries sustained by her in the accident, she had been crippled throughout her life. She had also been terminated from service with effect from 20. 8. 1993 by the employer bank. Both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses resulting from the injury are to be compensated. Assessment of damages is subject to rules of remoteness and mitigation. Such difficulties as arise in the task of quantification in terms of money of non-pecuniary losses are largely the result of ignoring the basic rule that while the awards should be reasonable, they should also be assessed with moderation having regard to the awards in comparable cases. In the matter of assessment of damages in the personal injury actions, the approach of the court, as indicated in R. D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. 1995 ACJ36 , AIR1995 Bom 55 , 1995 (1 ) Bomcr67 , (1994 )96 BOMLR83 , [1995 (70 )FLR360 ], (1995 )I LLJ833 Bom , 1994 (2 ) Mhlj1656 , should be as under: in its very nature whenever a Tribunal or a court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards. ( 32 ) IN United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brijesh Kumar Jain 1995 ACJ 399 (Allahabad), where the injured aged about 42, earning Rs. 4,000/- per month from agriculture and printing press and was supporting a family consisting of mother, wife and son aged 28, who is useless for rendering any assistance to his father and two grown-up daughters, suffered paralysis and half of the body of the injured was paralysed, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 8,00,000/- which was reduced in appeal to Rs. 6,00,000/ -. 8,00,000/- which was reduced in appeal to Rs. 6,00,000/ -. ( 33 ) IN R. D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. 1995 ACJ36 , air1995 Bom 55 , 1995 (1 )Bomcr67 , (1994 )96 BOMLR83 , [1995 (70 )FLR360 ], (1995 )I llj833 Bom , 1994 (2 )Mhlj1656 , where an advocate who became paraplegic on account of the injury sustained by him used to appear in various courts including the High Court and the supreme Court of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the award of Rs. 1,62,000/made by the High Court in respect of loss of future earnings does not require any interference as it can be held to be a reasonable amount to be awarded taking all the facts and circumstances of the case in respect of the future earnings of an advocate of such practice. ( 34 ) SO far as the loss of future earnings is concerned, it must be recalled that the service of the claimant with the Canara Bank came to be terminated with effect from 20. 8. 1993 as contemplated under Chapter XII, regulation 3 (1) of Canara Bank Service Code, vide Exh. P-23. Therefore, she ceased to be an employee of the bank with effect from 20. 8. 1993. The evidence of the Manager of the bank, PW 4, would show that the claimant was also entitled to a gratuity amounting to Rs. 51,705/ -. According to him, the bank is not liable to pay any compensation to its employee, who is rendered medically unfit. The claimant was aged about 41 years at the time when she was terminated from her service with the bank on medical ground. The Manager of the bank, PW 4, would say further in his cross-examination that he cannot give the net salary of the claimant after the authorised deductions. The claimant has produced another salary certificate, exh. P-22 (a), which only shows the particulars of the gross salary but it does not contain the particulars of the authorised deductions of the claimant. Whereas the salary certificate, Exh. P-10, would show that the take-home salary of the claimant for the month of October, 1990, was only Rs. 1,906. 02. The claimant has produced another salary certificate, exh. P-22 (a), which only shows the particulars of the gross salary but it does not contain the particulars of the authorised deductions of the claimant. Whereas the salary certificate, Exh. P-10, would show that the take-home salary of the claimant for the month of October, 1990, was only Rs. 1,906. 02. Even the oral evidence on the side of the claimant does not disclose as to what were the authorised deductions from the gross salary of the claimant as on the date of termination of her service. Under this head, the Tribunal has awarded the sum of Rs. 6,40,800/ -. It arrived at this figure by assuming that the claimant had suffered loss of income to the extent of rs. 4,447/- per month relying upon the salary certificate, Exh. P-22 (a) and deducting the income tax payable by her on the basis of the Form-16 produced on the side of the claimant and further deducting the professional tax payable by the claimant and then applied the multiplier of 12' years' purchase. The learned Counsel for the owner and the insurer of the vehicle had attacked this figure as too high. It cannot be disputed that because of this accident, the claimant who was a bank employee has been crippled throughout her life. What then is the present value of the probable financial damage? The starting point for the assessment of the probable loss under this head should be the amount, which she was earning at the time of the trial. The post she was occupying in the bank carried total consolidated emoluments of Rs. 5,587. 32 as per Exh. P-22 (a ). No doubt, this document would show that the gross salary of the claimant was Rs. 5,587. 32, but the Bank Manager, PW 4, is not in a position to give the authorised deductions from the total salary of the claimant. On the other hand, as we have already stated the salary certificate, Exh. P-10, issued by the same bank for the month of October, 1990, would give the total take-home salary of claimant after deductions at Rs. 1,906. 02. On the other hand, as we have already stated the salary certificate, Exh. P-10, issued by the same bank for the month of October, 1990, would give the total take-home salary of claimant after deductions at Rs. 1,906. 02. Form No. 16 certificate under Section 203 of the Income Tax Act for tax deducted at source from the income chargeable under the head 'salaries' in respect of the claimant would show the total income of the claimant for the year 1991-92 to be Rs. 41,158/- and the total tax payable thereon by the claimant has been shown to be Rs. 4,948. Further, it would be quite natural to expect that when the services of the claimant had been terminated with effect from 20. 8. 1993 as per Exh. P-23, she would have derived certain benefits in advance but the same does not appear to have been disclosed. Even assuming that there would have been improvement in her emoluments in the present post or that she would have earned promotion to a higher post, there is no manner of doubt that any substantial raise in her emoluments would have come to her only over a period of years. Besides the probability that she might not be continued in service or that she might not earn any substantial improvements in emoluments cannot altogether be eliminated or ruled out. Therefore, the Tribunal, in our view, was not justified in taking the figure of Rs. 4,450/- per month as the future probable earnings of the claimant. However, bearing in mind all imponderables, it appears to us to be just and proper to quantify the probable average earnings at Rs. 4,087. 32 (Rs. 1,860/- basic pay + Rs. 6547special allowance + Rs. 1,573. 32 D. A.) spread over the entire period of her earning life. Earning at this stage is, however, no longer possible in view of the fact that the services of the claimant have been terminated. Thus, the actual loss comes to Rs. 4,087. 32 rounding up it can be estimated to Rs. 4,000/ -. The whole of this amount, however, cannot be taken to be the present value of the financial damage, which the claimant might suffer in future on account of her injuries because all sorts of uncertainties and imponderables will have to be kept in mind, besides the amount which the claimant would have spent on herself. 4,000/ -. The whole of this amount, however, cannot be taken to be the present value of the financial damage, which the claimant might suffer in future on account of her injuries because all sorts of uncertainties and imponderables will have to be kept in mind, besides the amount which the claimant would have spent on herself. Allowance must be made for all such contingencies or vicissitudes of life. Taking into consideration all the relevant factors, we would estimate one-half of the amount, that is to say Rs. 2,000/- per month as reflection of present value of the loss of claimant's earning capacity. Having regard to the present condition of the claimant, a multiplier of 11 can be appropriately taken. Therefore, taking into consideration the gravity of the injury sustained by her, ends of justice would be met if the loss of her monthly income is assessed at Rs. 2,000/- and by applying the multiplier of 11, the total amount of compensation comes to Rs. 2,64,000/ -. Accordingly, the general damages for loss of earning capacity can be worked out at Rs. 2,64,000/ -. ( 35 ) THEREFORE, in the light of the above decisions and having regard to the facts and peculiar circumstances of this case, we award general damages for the loss of earning capacity to the claimant at Rs. 2,64,000/- in place of Rs. 6,40,800/-awarded by the Tribunal. ( 36 ) AS a result of foregoing discussion, we are of the view that in the instant case, the compensation is awarded under different heads as follows: compensation under Rs. the Heads: (1) 'pain and suffering' and 'loss of amenities' 3,00,000/ ( 2) Expenses incurred towards nourishment, conveyance and nursing charges, etc. 25,000/ ( 3) Future medical expenditure and attendant's charges 60,000/ ( 4) Loss of actual income up to the date of termination of the services of the claimant by her employer 39,000/ ( 5) Loss of future earnings of the claimant 2,64,000/ _____________ total Rs. 6,88,000/ _____________ ( 37 ) THE only item now remaining is in relation to interest. The Tribunal has allowed interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of petition till realisation. 6,88,000/ _____________ ( 37 ) THE only item now remaining is in relation to interest. The Tribunal has allowed interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of petition till realisation. In R. D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. 1995 ACJ 36 (1)SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in this behalf at para 18 of the judgment as under: so far the direction of the High Court regarding payment of interest at the rate of 6 per cent over the total amount held to be payable to the appellant is concerned, it has to be modified. The High court should have clarified that the interest shall not be payable over the amount directed to be paid to the appellant in respect of future expenditures under different heads. It need not be pointed out that interest is to be paid over the amount which has become payable on the date of award and not which is to be paid for expenditures to be incurred in future. As such we direct that appellant shall not be entitled to interest over such amount. ( 38 ) IN the light of the above decision, we would say that the interest shall not be payable over the amount directed to be paid to the appellant in respect of future expenditure and the interest shall be paid over the amount which has become payable on the date of the award. ( 39 ) IN the result, therefore, the claimant's appeal, M. F. A. No. 441 of 1994, for enhancement of the compensation amount awarded by the Tribunal fails and accordingly it is hereby dismissed while the appeal filed by the owner and the insurer of the car, M. F. A. No. 910 of 1994, succeeds in part and it is accordingly allowed to the extent as indicated above. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. ( 40 ) THE owner and the insurer of the car are directed to deposit the compensation amount awarded to the claimant together with costs and interest, of course after adjustment of the amount paid, if any, already to the claimant. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. ( 40 ) THE owner and the insurer of the car are directed to deposit the compensation amount awarded to the claimant together with costs and interest, of course after adjustment of the amount paid, if any, already to the claimant. Out of the amount payable to the claimant 50 per cent of the amount should be deposited in the personal name of the claimant in any nationalised or scheduled bank of the choice of the claimant in the F. D. account for a period of 5 years from the date of the deposit of the amount into court. The claimant shall, however, be at liberty to withdraw the interest accrued thereon from time to time for being spent towards her living expenses. In case if any amount is needed by the claimant to meet any contingency or exigencies in life, the claimant will be at liberty to make an application for withdrawal of any such amount that may be needed by her to meet the said contingency in life or for any future treatment and if any such application is filed, the Tribunal will consider the same in the light of the guidelines given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in General Manager, Kerala State Road Trans. Corporation v. Susamma Thomas 1994 ACJ 1 (SC ). The balance amount shall be permitted to be withdrawn by the claimant.