M. Jagannadha Rao ( 1 ) THIS Appeal by the defendant Sales Tax Officer, Ward No. 47, Vikas Bhawan, New Delhi is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 24th August,1993 in IAs 5606 and 6554/93 in Suit No. 1297/93. By virtue of the said order the learned Single Judge granted ad interim injunction in favour of plaintiff (respondent) against the recovery of sale-tax dues from the appellants for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92. The total amount of sales-tax involved in this case was said to come to Rs. 1,21,15,315. The operation of the impugned order was stayed by the learned Single Judge subject to the condition that the petitioner deposits a sum of Rs. 5 lacs in cash and furnishes security of immoveable properties in a sum of Rs. 20 lacs to the satisfaction of the appellate authority. The learned Single Judge also stated that the plaintiff would be at liberty to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Local Act against the impugned assessment order during the pendency of this case. ( 2 ) THE reliefs in the two las mentioned above were as follows: IA 5606/93 was filed by the plaintiff praying that the defendants 1 to 3 (namely Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, New Delhi and Lt. Governor, National Capital Union Territory of Delhi) be restrained from making any assessment on the basis of letters Annexures A and C or any other assessment in respect of sales which, according to the plaintiff-Com-pany, took place outside Delhi. In IA 6554/93 the plaintiff prayed for stay of recovery of any amount under the two demand notices both dated 10th June, 1993 for the years 1990-91 as well as 1991-92 respectively. The suit itself was filed on 27th May,1993 praying for a declaration that the transactions of sales set out in Schedule for the financial years 1990-91 and 1991-92 were valid sales effected in the respective towns of Sates/union Territories of Haryana, Chandigarh and Daman and the said sales were effected outside the National Capital Territory of Delhi and were not liable to sales tax under Delhi Sales Tax Act, for a mandatory injunction to cancel the letters of the department dated 20. 7. 1992 and 24. 9. 7. 1992 and 24. 9. 1992 Annexure a and c and for directing defendants 1 to 3 not to act upon the same and not to make any assessment order in respect of transactions sought to be covered by the said letters and set out in the Schedule. It was alternatively prayed that this Court should come to the conclusion that the aforesaid sales were effected within the National Capital Territory of Delhi and not in the territories of State of Haryana, Chandigarh and Daman, and the Court be pleased to direct defendants 4 to 12 (the officials of the above said three States) by mandatory injunction to refund the amounts received by them and direct defendants 1 to 3 (Delhi Sales-tax authorities and the Delhi Administration) to recover the balance amount from purchasers of the said vehicles on the basis of assessment which might be made by them. ( 3 ) SUBSEQUENT to the filing of this suit, a demand notice filed as Annexure "e _ in the IA 6556/93 was issued on 10th June,1993 for 47,67,242 and another demand notice filed as Annexure h was issued for Rs. 26,78,013 on the same date. In view of the said demand notices, the petitioner moved for amendment of the plaint by filing IA 6556/94. Thereafter anapplication was filed for setting aside the assement orders and consequential reliefs. After that, the defendant/appellant filed a reply in IA 6554/93 stating that the suit was not maintainable and was barred by Section 67 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act,1975. The said IA was disposed of on 24th August, 1993 as stated earlier granting injunction subject to the conditions REFERRED TO to above. The learned Single Judge dealing with the question whether the suit could be filed to set aside the assessment order, came to the conclusion that the suit lay where fundamental principles of judicial procedure have not been complied with. Of course what fundamental principles were violated was not stated. The learned Single Judge REFERRED TO to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1942 . Reference was also made to State of Kerala v. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons, 1966 (3) SCR 582 . Of course what fundamental principles were violated was not stated. The learned Single Judge REFERRED TO to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1942 . Reference was also made to State of Kerala v. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons, 1966 (3) SCR 582 . The learned Single Judge observed: "the question whether the provisions of the statute have been complied with or not in the present case will depend on the facts of the case and this point cannot be decided while disposing of these applications. In case it is held that the impugned assessment order passed by the Assessing Authority was within jurisdiction, the suit will not be maintainable and the remedy of the plaintiff will be only to challenge those orders before the Appellate Authority under the Local Act. "the learned Single Judge held that the suit was maintainable. He then passed the conditional order dated 24th August, 1993 granting injunction in respect of stay of collection of the amount covered by the demand notices subject to the condition that the petitioner should deposit Rs. 5 lacs in cash and furnishes security of the immovable properties in the sum of Rs. 20 lacs to the satisfaction of the defendant No. 1. ( 4 ) THE FAO was filed by the appellant on 21st September, 1993. Stay of the proceedings in the suit was granted on 7th March,1994 in CM 830/94. Thereafter plaintiff also filed IA 6594/94 and IA 6759/94 praying that pending the hearing of the IA 6594/94 for extension of time, ex parte order may be passed restraining the assessing authorities from taking coercive steps for recovery of the sales tax for the assessment years 1990-91 and 1991-92. The application would show that even after one year of passing of the conditional order dated 24th August, 1993, the plaintiff had still not complied with the directions regarding the deposit etc. At that stage IA 6759/94 was filed on 7th July, 1994 to restrain the defendants 1 to 3 from recovering any amount pending disposal of IA 6594/94 contending that the amount of Rs. 5 lacs had been paid and furnished security of Rs. 20 lakhs. IA 7698 / 94 was also filed by the plaintiff under Order 8 Rule 10. At that stage IA 6759/94 was filed on 7th July, 1994 to restrain the defendants 1 to 3 from recovering any amount pending disposal of IA 6594/94 contending that the amount of Rs. 5 lacs had been paid and furnished security of Rs. 20 lakhs. IA 7698 / 94 was also filed by the plaintiff under Order 8 Rule 10. The amendment applications raised the questions, one was about validity of Section 67 which barred a suit to set aside an assessment and the other to permit the plea to set aside the assessments made after the suit. ( 5 ) THE Counsel for appellant (Department) argued that the suit was not maintainable for the reliefs prayed initially and also in respect of the relief for setting aside the assessment and refund. Counsel for plaintiff also argued elaborately on these questions. We have gone into the question of maintainability of the suit as stated above. ( 6 ) IT is, therefore, clear that the question of maintainability of the suit was argued before the learned Single Judge in the injunction application. The question was fully argued before us on 27. 1. 95,3. 2. 95,10. 2. 95, 15. 2. 95 and 27. 3. 95. We are mentioning these facts to make it clear that the respondents/plaintiff cannot again be permitted to raise contentions about the maintainability of the suit in case the amendment applications questioning Section 67 and questioning the assessments, since filed by the plaintiff I. A 466/94, I. A. 6556/94 etc. are allowed. It will be taken that the question of maintainability of the suit has been fully argued in the injunction applications before us. ( 7 ) BEFORE we proceed with the discussion, we have to refer to certain orders passed by this Court in earlier writ petitions filed by various other dealers raising the same questions as raised by the present plaintiff in this suit. The Division Bench of this Court passed orders on 26th May, 1994 in Writ Petition 1947/94. The question there was whether the Sales Tax Officer could include the gross turn-over of the petitioner therein in respect of the sales made outside Delhi and transactions entered between the seller and the purchaser of the vehicle during the said years. The appeals were filed before the Appellate Authority. The question there was whether the Sales Tax Officer could include the gross turn-over of the petitioner therein in respect of the sales made outside Delhi and transactions entered between the seller and the purchaser of the vehicle during the said years. The appeals were filed before the Appellate Authority. The Additional Commissioner of Sales-tax (Appeals) directed the petitioner company there to pay a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs each for the assessment years 1990-91 and 1991-92 against the demands created on account of sales by branch offices and Rs. 20 lakhs and Rs. 5 lakhs for assessment years 1990-91 and 1991-92 respectively against the demands created by taxing sales allegedly made to third parties. The Appellate Tribunal modified the said order of the Additional Commissioner of Sales-tax on 15th April, 1994. The petitioner there was directed to deposit Rs. 17 lakhs for the assessment year 1990-91 and Rs. 6 lakhs for the assessment year 1991-92. When the said order was questioned in the writ petition. Counsel on both sides were heard and on suggestion of the Counsel for the department, stay was granted directing the petitioner therein to deposit Rs. 4 lakhs in respect each of the two transactions involved in the case for each of the years and on payment thereof, the appeal before the Appellate Authority could be entertained. This suggestion was accepted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in that writ petition represented by the same Counsel Mr. P. C. Khanna, Senior Advocate, who is also appearing in this case before us. We are only mentioning this fact as a matter of history and in fact in respect of a large number of other dealers who were similarly situate, they have been allowed to make a deposit of Rs. 4 lacs for each assessment year. On that basis departmental appeals were to be entertained. In the case before us arising out of the suit, the learned Single Judge has permitted the appellant to pay Rs. 5 lacs and give security for Rs. 20 lakhs for both years put together. ( 8 ) DURING the course of the hearing before us it was submitted by learned Counsel for the department that if the plaintiff is prepared to comply with the same directions which the other dealers have complied within the writ petitions, the plaintiff s appeal could be heard by the Appellate Authority. 20 lakhs for both years put together. ( 8 ) DURING the course of the hearing before us it was submitted by learned Counsel for the department that if the plaintiff is prepared to comply with the same directions which the other dealers have complied within the writ petitions, the plaintiff s appeal could be heard by the Appellate Authority. That would mean plaintiff has to pay Rs. 8 lakhs for the two assessment years put together. While the Counsel for the appellant-department was also willing for such a course in this F. A. O, the respondent/plaintiff s Counsel stated before us that the plaintiff in this suit is not willing to follow the same course adopted by the other dealers and wants a decision on the question of maintainability of the suit in this FAO. Obviously this is because the plaintiff has to pay Rs. 8 lakhs (Rs. 4 lakhs for each year) rather than a lumpsum of Rs. 5 lakhs and security of Rs. 20 lakhs as now directed by the learned Single Judge. ( 9 ) WITH these preliminary remarks, we shall take up the main issue argued before us, namely, the question whether the suit is maintainable in the face of Section 6 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975. ( 10 ) THE Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 defines a dealer in Section 2 (e) as a person who carries on business in Delhi, Section 2 (1) defines sale . Section 2 (m) defines "sales-price , and Section 2 (0) defines turnover . Section 3 deals with incidence of tax . Section 4 deals with rates of tax . Section 8 deals with certain sales and purchases not liable to tax. It reads as under:- "section 8. Section 2 (m) defines "sales-price , and Section 2 (0) defines turnover . Section 3 deals with incidence of tax . Section 4 deals with rates of tax . Section 8 deals with certain sales and purchases not liable to tax. It reads as under:- "section 8. Certain sales and purchases not liable to tax: Nothing in this Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be deemed to impose, or authorise the imposition of a tax on any sale or purchase of any goods when such sale or purchase takes place (i) in the course of inter-state trade or commerce; or (ii) outside Delhi; or (iii) in the course of import of goods into, or export of goods out of, the territory of India Explanation: Sections 3,4 and 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 shall apply for determining whether or not a particular sale or purchase takes place in the manner indicated in clause (i), clause (ii) or clause (iii) of this Section". Therefore, the question whether the sale or purchase in question took place outside Delhi falling under Section 8 (ii) is a question that arises in the assessment proceedings and it has been decided by the assessing authority at Delhi, that the sale/purchase took place not outside Delhi but within Delhi. ( 11 ) SECTION 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act deals with the question as to when a sale or purchase of goods can be said to have taken place outside a State. It states: "section 4: When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place outside a State: (1) Subject to the provisions in Section 3, when a sale or purchase of goods is determined in accordance with Sub-section (2) to take place inside a State, such a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place outside all other States. (2) A sale or purchase shall be deemed to take place inside a State if the goods are Within the State:- (a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale is made; and (b) in the case of unascertained goods or future goods, at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior to subsequent to such appropriation. Explanation: When there is a single contract of sale or purchase of goods situated at more places than one, the provisions of this sub-section shall apply as if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods at each of such places. Now, the Assessing Authority at Delhi applied Sections 4 and 8 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act,1975 and Section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act and held that the sales/purchases have taken place inside Delhi. The plaintiff has filed an I. A. under Order 6 Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code in suit to question the assessment. The plaintiff has filed another I. A. under Order 6, Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code questioning the validity of Section 67 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act. The question of maintainability of the suit challenge Section 67 and the assessment orders are argued in the injunction application itself. ( 12 ) SECTION 67 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 reads: SECTION 67: Bar of suits in Civil Courts: No suit shall be brought in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any assessment made or any order passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder and no prosecution, suit or other proceeding shall lie against the Government or any officer of the Government for anything done in good faith or intended to be done under this Act or the rules made thereunder. "learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submits that in regard to these transactions, one or other of the States/union Territories of Haryana or Chandigarh or Daman has already imposed sales tax and tax has been paid and, therefore, the said States/union Territories have been impleaded in this suit and an adjudication is to take place in their presence. No such adjudication in the presence of the Haryana or Chandigarh or Daman Sales Tax Authorities has been undertaken by the Delhi Sales Tax Authorities and there is, therefore, violation of fundamental principles i. e. natural justice. As fundamental principles have not been followed as stated in Secretary of State v. Mark and Co. (AIR 1940 P. C. 105), the suit lies in the Civil Court to challenge the validity of Section 67 of the Act and the assessments. ( 13 ) THAT brings us to the issue of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. As fundamental principles have not been followed as stated in Secretary of State v. Mark and Co. (AIR 1940 P. C. 105), the suit lies in the Civil Court to challenge the validity of Section 67 of the Act and the assessments. ( 13 ) THAT brings us to the issue of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Now in so far as the plaintiff proposes to challenge the validity of Section 67 of the Act, which debars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, we are of the view, it is open to a litigant, - having regard to Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure - to challenge the validity of Section 67 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 in a Civil Court. Suffice it to say, at this stage, that the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has not been able to make out any prima facie case as to why Section 67 is liable to bestruck down. In Kamla Mill s case ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ) it was held towards the end of the judgment that a civil suit lies to declare any provision in a statute - including the one barring jurisdiction of the Civil Court as ultra vires. ( 14 ) IT is common legislative practice in this country to create an appropriate authority for adjudication of disputes - particularly in regard to to taxes (e. g. Sales-tax, Income-tax, Central Excise etc.) and when such authority is constituted and Appellate Authorities arid ajudicial Tribuanal to hear further appeals are constituted, the said procedure does not prima facie violate Article 14 of the Constitution nor the basic principles of rule of law. It is true that the authorities or Tribunals cannot decide the questions relating to the validity of any provisions of the statute and it is only a Civil Court or a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 (or the Supreme Court under Article 32) that can decide about the validity of the statutory provisions. But, merely because the Civil Court can decide about the validity of Section 67 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it does not mean the Civil Court can straightaway proceed on the basis that Section 67 is ultra vires. But, merely because the Civil Court can decide about the validity of Section 67 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it does not mean the Civil Court can straightaway proceed on the basis that Section 67 is ultra vires. A primafade case has to be made out to say that the provision is ultra vires of legislative powers of the Legislature or is ultra vires of any constitutional provision or is violative of any Fundamental Rights. Firstly, we do not think there is primafade any want of power in Parliament while enacting Section 67 of Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975. Secondly no other provision of the Constitution is REFERRED TO to before us to say that Section 67 is otherwise ultra vires of such a provision. Nor has any provision in Part III of the Constitution brought to our notice to say that the bar to approach the Civil Court created by Section 67 prima facie offends any fundamental right. We do not therefore think that merely because the plaintiff is proposing to attack Section 67, the Civil Court should straightaway ignore the said bar created by Section 67 and proceed with the suit and the interlocutory application. A very strong case has to be made to enable a Civil Court, where jurisdiction is ousted by a statutory provision, to ignore the same or to suspend the same, pending suit and proceed to decide issues barred by the statute. We, therefore, hold that the proposed attack on Section 67 cannot by itself, without a strong case, enable the Civil Court (here, the Delhi High Court, in its original jurisdiction) to entertain and proceed with the suitor with the injunction applications filed therein. ( 15 ) THE next question is with regard to the power of the Civil Court to set aside the assessments made under the Act. ( 16 ) THE law in this behalf is too well settled to admit of any doubt. Though large number of rulings have been cited before us by both sides, we shall refer to those which are relevant. At the outset, we would like to refer to the well settled legal principles. ( 16 ) THE law in this behalf is too well settled to admit of any doubt. Though large number of rulings have been cited before us by both sides, we shall refer to those which are relevant. At the outset, we would like to refer to the well settled legal principles. These principles have been summarised in Principles of Statutory Interpretations by Justice G. P. Singh (5th Ed, 1993) (P. 433 at P. 436 to 439): "in Income-tax and Sales Tax Acts, it is common to find provisions to the effect that no suit shall lie to challenge an assessment made under the Act shall be called into question in any Court except as otherwise provided in the Act . In Raleigh Investment Co. v. G. G. in Council, AIR 1947 PC 78, p. 81; See further, Commr. of Income tax v. Tribune Trust, AIR 1948 PC 102, pp. 106,107. The Privy Council construing a provision of this nature (Section 67 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (held that an assessment could not be challenged in Civil Court on the ground that it was based on a provision of law which was ultra vires. It was pointed out that the correct meaning of the phrase assessment made under the Act is an assessment finding its origin in any activity of the assessing officer acting as such, and that an assessment under the machinery of the Act relying on a provision which is later found ultra vires is not a nullity but only erroneous in law. This Privy Council decision has not been accepted by the Supreme Court. In K. S. Venkatraman and Co. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 it was held by the Supreme Court that an assessment which is based on a charging section which is ultra vires is not an assessment under the Act, and a suit to challenge such an assessment is not barred. It was also held that assessing authorities cannot entertain a question relating to validity of the Act, and hence, it is open to a Civil Court to entertain and decide such a question not with standing that assessment has already been made. This case was followed in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 . It was also held that assessing authorities cannot entertain a question relating to validity of the Act, and hence, it is open to a Civil Court to entertain and decide such a question not with standing that assessment has already been made. This case was followed in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 . See further, CIT v. Straw Products, AIR 1966 SC 1113 ; Even the High Court in a reference and the Supreme Court in appeal against the order passed in reference cannot decide the question of the validity of the Taxing Act and a statutory order issued under it. See also State of Tripura v. Province of East Bengal, AIR 1951 SC 23 , p. 28; and State of Bombay v. Jagmohandas, AIR 1966 SC 1412 ; a suit to restrain an assessment on the ground that the Taxing Act is ultra vires is not barred. Where assessment was based not under the Act , and could be challenged by a suit in Civil Court, Income Tax and Sales Tax Acts, however, contain an elaborate machinery for assessment and for termination of questions of fact and law arising in assessment proceedings and an assessment cannot be questioned except in the manner provided under the Act on the ground that it is erroneous in fact or in law. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 , p. 607: (1983) 3 SCC 433. Thus, if purchases only and not sales can be taxed, a suit challenging an assessment is not maintainable on the ground that the transactions taxed were sales and they were wrongly held to be purchases by the assessing authorities Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1942 . In Provincial Govt. of Madras v. J. S. Basappa, AIR 1964 SC 1873 where there was only a finality clause but no express bar to challenge an assessment a similar suit was held to be maintainable. Basappa s case supra was disapproved in State ofkerala v. Ramaswami, AIR 1966 SC 1738 , but the correctness of the disapproval was doubted in Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. , AIR 1969 SC 78 . Basappa s case supra was disapproved in State ofkerala v. Ramaswami, AIR 1966 SC 1738 , but the correctness of the disapproval was doubted in Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. , AIR 1969 SC 78 . Similarlyif sales taking place inside a State are alone taxable, a suit to challenge theassessment is not maintainable on the ground that the sales were in factourside sales and were wrongly held to be inside sales State of U. P. v. Yodavendra, AIR 1966, p. 731. In this connection it must be kept in mind thatspeaking generally the taxing authorities have authority to decide finally evencollateral questions of fact and law touching their jurisdiction. The factorsthat liability to pay income-tax or sales tax is a creatu re of the taxing Act whichnormally provides an elaborate machinery for assessment; that the taxingauthorities have in general authority to decide finally questions of fact andlaw pertaining to their own jurisdiction; and that these Acts usually containan exclusionary provision expressly restraining a suit to challenge an assessment made under the Act, leave little room for a suit to challenge anassessment. In addition to the case where assessment is based on an ultravires provision, assessment may also be open to challenge on the ground thatit was made in violation of fundamental principles of judicial procedure e. g. without any notice to the assessee. A provision encated in terms: no order made in exercise of any powerconferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court ,assumes that the order is made in exercise of the power, which clearly leavesit open to challenge on the ground that it was not made in conformity with thepower conferred. Collector of Kamrup v. Kamakhya Ram, AIR 1965 SC 1301 ,p. 1302; Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji, AIR 1945 PC 156, p. 161; Emperor v. Vimalabai Deshpande, AIR 1946 PC 123, p. 127; but see Bhagwat Bakse v. Secretary of State, AIR 1940 PC 82, p. 85. Similarly a provision using theformula: no order or decision under this Act shall be called in question in anycourt will not stand in the way of a suit challenging an order or decisionwhen the order or decision is really not an order or decision under the Act buta nullity Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) I Aller 208 (HL) (Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra, AIR 1980 SC 1206 ,pp. 1213,1214, Union of India v. Tarachand, AIR 1971 SC 1558 ; Ramsarup v. Shikharchand, AIR 1966 SC 893 , pp. 897,898; Bhupendra Singh v. G. K. Umath,air 1970 M. P. 91, pp. 95-98. Therefore, when there is a non-compliance withfundamental provisions of the Act or fundamental principles of judicialprocedure which makes proceedings before the Tribunal or authority illegaland void, a civil suit to challenge the order or decisions passed in such aproceeding is not barred. Secretary of State v. Mask b Co. , AIR 1940 PC 105,p. 110, as explained in Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty and Sons v. State of A. P. , air 1964 SC 322 , p. 326, which is further REFERRED TO in Provincial Govt. ofmadras v. J. S. Basappa, AIR 1964 SC 1873 , p. 1877; Custodian of E. P. v. Jafranbegum, AIR 1968 SC 169 , p. 174; Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. , AIR 1969 SC 78 ,p. 86; State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramlinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10 , p. 17; Gurbax Singh v. The Financial Commmissioner, AIR 1991 SC 435 , p. 439. The reason is that an order or adecision which is a nullity or void, is not an order or a decision under the Act and jurisdiction of the Civil Court tochallenge such an order is not barred by the exclusionary provision using theabove formula. See cases in note 15 supra. For fuller discussion of nullity casessee under title 20 (b) cases of nullity . For the same reason when an order isrequired to be passed on subjective-satisfaction of an authority is to existenceof certain matters, a satisfaction based on wholly irrelevant grounds isregarded as no satisfaction and the order based on it can be challenged in acourt in spite of the exclusionary clause providing that the satisfaction of theauthority "shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in anycourt of law. State of Rajasthan and Others v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC1361, pp. 1390,1391,1401, 1414, 1415; (1977) 4 SCC 599 . See further text andnote 31 infra and Chapter 5 text and note 26, p. 255. State of Rajasthan and Others v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC1361, pp. 1390,1391,1401, 1414, 1415; (1977) 4 SCC 599 . See further text andnote 31 infra and Chapter 5 text and note 26, p. 255. ( 17 ) FROM the above principles, it is clear that while a Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the validity of an assessment where the taxing provisions of thestatute or a notification made thereunder is challenged as ultra vires, no suit lies onthe ground that the assessment is erroneous in fact or law. If sales taking placeinside a State alone are taxable, a suit to challenge the assessment is not maintainable on the ground that the sales were in fact outside sales and were wrongly heldto be inside sales. This aspect is very clear for Kamla Mills case ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 )rendered by a Bench of Seven Judges where the identical question was so decided. This was followed in State of Kerala v. Ramaswami, ( AIR 1966 SC 1738 ). ( 18 ) LEARNED Counsel for plaintiff-respondent has made elaborate submissionsin regard to Kamla Mills case ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ). But it has to be noticed that inthat case the Supreme Court clearly held that the decision whether a transaction isan inside sale or not as per the Bombay Sales Tax Act, is indeed not a decision ona collateral fact which can be gone into by a Civil Court. The principle that bywrongly deciding a collateral fact, an authority. or Tribunal can not confer jurisdiction on itself, is not applicable. The Court said : ". . . . WE find it impossible to accept Mr. Sastri s argument that the finding ofthe Appropriate Authority that a particular transaction is taxable under theprovisions of the Act, is a finding on a collateral fact which gives theappropriate authority jurisdiction to take a further steps and make the actualorder of assessment". The whole activity of assessment from the filing of the return to the assessment fallswithin the officer s jurisdiction and no part of it can be said constitute a collateralfact or activity. The whole activity of assessment from the filing of the return to the assessment fallswithin the officer s jurisdiction and no part of it can be said constitute a collateralfact or activity. ( 19 ) IF that be the law decided by the Supreme Court, then the fact that theperiod there related to 1950-51, that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bengalimmunity case (1955 (2) SC p. 603) came later, that subsequently, the provisions ofarticle 286 of the Constitution were amended in 1956 and the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 was enacted, in our opinion, make no difference. These aspects have norelevance to the principle whether the issue is a collateral one or not. ( 20 ) THE further contention that Section 20 of the Bombay Act 1946 is differentin language from Section 67 of the Delhi Act has no substance. Section 20 of thebombay Act read: "section 20. Save as otherwise provided in Section 23, no assessment and noorder passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder by the Commissioner or any person appointed under Section 3 to assist him shall be calledinto question in any Civil Court, and save as it provided in Sections 21 and 22,no appeal or application for assistance shall be against any such assessmentor order. "we are unable to find any substantial difference between Section 20 of the Bombayact and Section 67 of the Delhi Act. Though the language is different, the substanceis the same. As long as a decision as to whether a sale is an inside sale or outside saleis not a decision on a collateral fact relating to jurisdiction -as held by the Supremecourt in Kamla Mills case - there is no way that plaintiff can question theassessment contending that the decision on merits by the assessing authority is ona collateral issue and that it is a jurisdictional issue. This is so, notwithstanding theamendment to Article 286 of the Constipation of India in 1956. Merely because ofthe amendment, the decision of the Assessing Authority does not become adecision on a collateral issue relating to jurisdiction. The seven Judges judgment isbinding on us on this aspect. ( 21 ) IT is then argued that Kamla Mill s case lays down exceptions, namely thatwhere the taxing provision is ultra vires or where the fundamental procedure is notfollowed, the Civil Court can entertain the suit to set aside the assessment. The seven Judges judgment isbinding on us on this aspect. ( 21 ) IT is then argued that Kamla Mill s case lays down exceptions, namely thatwhere the taxing provision is ultra vires or where the fundamental procedure is notfollowed, the Civil Court can entertain the suit to set aside the assessment. Here itmust be noted that so far as vires of the charging provision is concerned, there is noattack before us or before the learned Single Judge. Learned Counsel for theplaintiff failed to notice that attack to the validity of Section 67 of the Delhi Sales Taxact is different from attack on the charging provisions of the said Act. If there is noattack upon the charging provisions, no question of vires of the assessment on thatground arises. ( 22 ) SO far as the assessment is concerned, it is true that if the fundamentalprocedure is not followed, the Civil Court can examine the contention that theassessment order is valid. But here the contention is that the order is passedwithout giving notice to the State/union Territories of Haryana or Chandigarh ordaman which have already made assessments and which are said to have collectedsalex-tax from the plaintiff in relation to the same transaction. Learned Counselsubmits that the Assessing Authority ought to have given notice to the above threestates/union Territories and decided the question whether there was a sale insidedelhi or not. It is pointed out that in the 7 Judges case (Kamla Mills), the Supremecourt did not overrule Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. as understood in Dhulabhai s case ( AIR 1969 SC 78 at 89 ). ( 23 ) WE are of the view that there is a serious misconception in the contention. The sales-tax laws of the above three States/union Territories are self-contained asare the sales-tax laws in Delhi. The Assessing Authority in Haryana might decidethat the sales took place within Haryana but that decision cannot bind theassessing Authority in Delhi. Likewise, the Assessing Authority in Delhi mightdecide that the sale is within Delhi. But such a decision is not binding on theassessing Authorities in Haryana. The assessee, who is common to the proceedings, is entitled to contest the case in any of these 3 States. The assessee has hisremedies of appeal under each of the State laws. Likewise, the Assessing Authority in Delhi mightdecide that the sale is within Delhi. But such a decision is not binding on theassessing Authorities in Haryana. The assessee, who is common to the proceedings, is entitled to contest the case in any of these 3 States. The assessee has hisremedies of appeal under each of the State laws. The law does not contemplate anassessing Authority to give notice to Assessing Authorities in various States whichmight be more than one, and which might consider that the same transaction wasliable to sales-tax entitling them to make assessments in their respective States. Thevery scheme of levying sales tax by various States will come to a standstill if aprocedure is to be adopted by the Assessing Authorities of any State of givingnotice to other States. Each State is here exercising its own sovereign power oflevying tax and it is not bound to exercise that power by issuing notices to variousother States in connection with transactions which concern more than one State. Infact, in such a situation, the aggrieved party has a remedy of ultimately carrying thematter to the highest Court of the land, namely the Supreme Court of India, andhave the conflict resolved. Therefore, the absence of a notice by the Assessingauthorities at Delhi to the State of Haryana or to other States does not bring the casewithin the principles laid down in Mask s case. There is no violation of anyfundamental principle by the Delhi Assessing Authorities merely because they didnot issue any notice to the Haryana Authorities or other States. Admittedly, so faras the assessee is concerned, the Delhi Authorities followed the principles ofnatural justice and there is, in fact, no submission that the assessment orders werepassed without notice to the plaintiff. It is therefore clear that the case on hand doesnot come within the limited exceptions mentioned in Kamla Mills case or asaccepted in Dhulabhai s case ( AIR 1969 SC 78 at 89 ). ( 24 ) AS per Kamla Mills case and Dhulabhai s case, there could also be achallenge that there is no provision in the Statute for a proper adjudication of theissues. But there is no such case pleaded or argued before us. We need not thereforerefer to cases cited in regard to this aspect. ( 24 ) AS per Kamla Mills case and Dhulabhai s case, there could also be achallenge that there is no provision in the Statute for a proper adjudication of theissues. But there is no such case pleaded or argued before us. We need not thereforerefer to cases cited in regard to this aspect. In the latest decision of the Supremecourt in Srikant K. Jituri v. Corporation of City of Bulgaria, (1994) (6) SCC 572 ithas been held that the fact that the tax has to be paid for availing a remedy underthe Act, is not a ground for contending that the remedy under the Act is notefficacious. If conditions are onerous, the party could move under Article 226 of theconstitution of India. ( 24 ) YET another principle decided in Kamla Mill s case and accepted indhulabhai s case goes against the plaintiff. Sales-tax liability is a liability created bystatute and is not a liability arising at common law. Matters relating to such specialrights or liabilities created by special statutes can be agitated only by availingremedies provided in the said statutes. This principle has been explained in greaterdetail in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1993 (3) SCC 162=50 (1993) DLT 492 (SC ). Theentire case-law, English and Indian, was reviewed and it was held that regulationof demolition of structures by Delhi Municipality was only a modification of acommon law right and hence in spite of the bar in Sub-clause (4) and (5) of Section347-E of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, a Civil suit would be maintainablein certain situations and injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code could be granted. But if the right or liability is created for the first time by Statute, the bar of suit wouldapply. ( 26 ) WE have dealt with the relevant rulings quoted by the Counsel on bothsides. Though some other decisions were cited, we do not think it necessary to referto them because either they are not relevant or they refer to the same principlesmentioned above. ( 27 ) WE, therefore, reject the submissions of the plaintiff and held that thoughthe suit is maintainable for questioning the validity or Section 67 of the Act, thereis no challenge to the charging provisions of the Delhi Act. ( 27 ) WE, therefore, reject the submissions of the plaintiff and held that thoughthe suit is maintainable for questioning the validity or Section 67 of the Act, thereis no challenge to the charging provisions of the Delhi Act. Further no prima faciecase is made out to say that Section 67 which ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courtis bad. Though the plaintiff could contend that in the assessment proceedings,fundamental principles were not followed, no such violation was prima faciepointed out. The fact that the States of Haryana or Union Territories of Chandigarhand Daman were not given notice by the Delhi assessing authorities is not a groundfor saying that fundamental principles were not followed by the Assessing Authoritiesof Delhi. The law is settled that a decision as to whether a sale isan outsidesale or inside sale is not a collateral fact relating to jurisdiction. The Act providesadequate remedies and there is no compelling reason to resort to Civil Court onground of want of adequate remedy. The Act creates a special liability not knownto common law and the remedy is the one provided by the statute. ( 28 ) THE result is that primafacie there is no ground for granting injunctionrestraining the authorities from recovering the sales-tax assessed. ( 29 ) THE Learned Single Judge thought that a suit was maintainable if fundamental principles were not followed but did not say what principles were no. tfollowed so far as the plaintiff was concerned. In fact, he observed (see extract givenearlier) that at this stage it is not necessary to set out what fundamental principlewere violated in the present case. This, in our opinion, is a wrong approach. At thestage of injunction application, plaintiff has to specify and point out a prima faciecase of violation of fundamental principles. This has not been done. We havealready held that it is not contemplated by law that the Delhi Assessing Authoritiesshould give notice to the State of Haryana or Union Territories of Chandigarh anddaman. There is primafacie no violation of any fundamental principle of law orprocedure. ( 30 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the temporary injunction granted by the learnedsingle Judge is liable to be vacated and is accordingly vacated. As the plaintiff hasnot chosen to pay Rs. There is primafacie no violation of any fundamental principle of law orprocedure. ( 30 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the temporary injunction granted by the learnedsingle Judge is liable to be vacated and is accordingly vacated. As the plaintiff hasnot chosen to pay Rs. 8 lakhs (4 lakhs per year) as per the arrangement arrived atbetween similar dealers and the Delhi State in connected cases, - inspite of anoption given before us by the learned Counsel for the State - we are unable to passany other order in favour of the plaintiff. ( 31 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed and the injunction order passed by thelearned Single Judge is vacated.