MOHMED SHAFI NOORMOHMED v. RATILAL RAMBHAI PATEL — 1995 DIGILAW 471 (GUJ)

S. D. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THESE orders shall govern the disposal of these six Civil revision Applications, arising under Sec. 28 of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. The civil Revision Application Nos. 693 of 1979, 694 of 1979 and 695 of 1979 have been filed by the tenants, who suffered a decree of eviction under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, at the hands of the Appellate Court. The remaining three Civil Revision Applications have been presented by the landlords, because they feel that, their case for the decree of eviction on certain other grounds like, the non-payment of the rent for a period of more than six months and bona fide personal requirement etc. should have been recognised by the Courts below. It would be appropriate, if the three Civil Revision Applications falling under the first group are taken for decision. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs are the owners and the landlords of Final Plot bearing F. P. No. 581, within the T. P. Scheme No. 3, Ellisbridge, Ahmedabad, having the area of about 2,625 sq. yds. Originally, the landlords had filed 11 Suits to recover the possession from all the tenants existing in different structures on the said land. Except for the four Suits, the rest of the Suits came to be compromised. According to the plaintiffs, upon the said final plot, there is one chawl touching the southern boundary and there are certain rooms on the ground floor. Some rooms are also having the upper storey construction. The case of the plaintiffs before the trial Court was that, the defendants were the tenants in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months and that they were not ready and willing to pay the rent. In fact, according to the plaintiffs, they had failed and neglected to pay the rent for a pretty long time. It was also the case of the plaintiffs, in these Suits that, they wanted to demolish the whole chawl and wanted to construct a new chawl with residential blocks for the technicians working in their factory. They also wanted to construct two residential bugalows on the northern back of the plot. It was also the case of the plaintiffs, in these Suits that, they wanted to demolish the whole chawl and wanted to construct a new chawl with residential blocks for the technicians working in their factory. They also wanted to construct two residential bugalows on the northern back of the plot. Their case further was that, the said structures under which the defendants-tenants used to reside, were in violation of the bye-laws of the Municipal Corporation, and that the previous owners and the landlords had executed an agreement, popularly known as, "kabulat" in favour of the erstwhile Municipality of Ahmedabad saying that, they would demolish the construction, at any time, if the Municipality so orders. The Municipality, now, has been converted into the Corporation and according to the plaintiffs, now, there is an order from the Corporation, calling upon them to demolish the above said construction and, therefore, also, they were entitled to a decree of eviction under sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. Their case further also was that, some of the tenants have sub-let the premises to different persons, unlawfully, and that, therefore, also, they were liable to be evicted from the Suit premises. The defendants had resisted the Suits, by filing separate written statement, in the Suits, inter alia, contending that there was no personal or bona fide requirement on the part of the plaintiffs-landlords and that the sole idea on their part was to see that the tenants vacate the premises, at any rate. They have also contended that, one shri Thakker who was holding the position of Deputy Municipal Commissioner in the Corporation, happened to be a relative of the plaintiff No. 2, since deceased, and therefore, the plaintiffs had tried to obtain the necessary notice from the Municipal corporation, so that, ultimately, the defendants could be evicted on that basis. ( 3 ) UPON the appreciation of the evidence on record, the trial Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the decree of eviction, on any of the above said grounds. The finding recorded by the trial Court is that, the plaintiffs could not establish that, any of the defendants had, unlawfully, sub-let the premises in question. The finding recorded by the trial Court is that, the plaintiffs could not establish that, any of the defendants had, unlawfully, sub-let the premises in question. The trial Court had also taken the view that the plaintiffs could not establish that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required for their personal use and occupation. It was also the view of the trial Court that, the plaintiffs-landlords could not establish that, the premises were required by the plaintiffs for the immediate purpose of demolition, under the orders of the corporation, as understood within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay rents Act, 1947. Coming to this conclusion, the trial Court was pleased to dismiss all the Suits of the plaintiffs. Anyhow, the standard rent of the Suit premises came to be fixed. The plaintiffs were granted the decree qua the rent dues, against the respective tenant. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgments and the decrees of the trial Court, the plaintiffs-landlords had preferred appeals before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, at Ahmedabad. These appeals which came to be registered as Appeal Nos. 29, 30, 31 and 32 of 1976 came to be allowed by the judgment dated 6th March 1979. Under this judgment, the Appellate Court has reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs-landlords were able to establish the ground as understood within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. Anyhow, they have failed to establish any other ground on which the decree of eviction could be based. The said judgment and orders dated 6th March 1979 are under challenge in the present group of Civil Revision Applications. ( 5 ) FIRSTLY, the group consisting of Civil Revision Application Nos. 693 of 1979, 694 of 1979 and 695 of 1979 requires to be taken on hand, for consideration. As indicated above, the Appellate Court has taken the view that, the plaintiffs-landlords are entitled to a decree of eviction under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. This finding rendered by the Appellate Court is being assailed by learned counsels Mr. Prakash M. Thakker and Mr. S. M. Shah appearing on behalf of the petitioners. As indicated above, the Appellate Court has taken the view that, the plaintiffs-landlords are entitled to a decree of eviction under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. This finding rendered by the Appellate Court is being assailed by learned counsels Mr. Prakash M. Thakker and Mr. S. M. Shah appearing on behalf of the petitioners. ( 6 ) THE Appellate Court has granted the decree of eviction under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, upon the interpretation of the very same provisions and on taking into consideration the evidence on record, i. e. , the agreement and/or "kabulat" which was registered in favour of the erstwhile Municipality of Ahmedabad on March 4, 1935, and the notice issued by the Corporation on October 28, 1968, available at Exh. 497. ( 7 ) WHEN the reference is made to the provisions contained under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, it is apparent that, for obtaining a decree of eviction on this ground, the plaintiffs-landlords shall have to satisfy the Court that, the premises are required for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by any local authority or other competent authority. The question as to whether the said ground has been made out by the landlords requires to be examined in view of the interpretation of the provisions and the correct reading of the two documents at exhs. 245 and 497. ( 8 ) IT is not in dispute that the property originally belonged to three brothers, namely, Chinubhai Lalbhai, Jasubhai Lalbhai and Ramchandra Lalbhai. There were certain disputes between them, regarding the partition of the joint family property and, therefore, an Arbitrator was appointed under the writing dated March 7, 1945. The said Arbitrator had given his award and under the award dated March 14, 1945, the property which forms the subject-matter of the present Civil Revision Applications had fallen to the share of the third and youngest brother, Ramchandra Lalbhai. He had sold the property to Shankarbhai Kasibhai Patel and others, by registered sale deed dated December 27, 1955. The purchasers had again sold the property to Pranlal thakore and Ratilal Patel, by the sale deed dated February 8, 1960. Pranlal Thakore has, later on, expired and his share in the property has gone to his heirs and legal representatives. He had sold the property to Shankarbhai Kasibhai Patel and others, by registered sale deed dated December 27, 1955. The purchasers had again sold the property to Pranlal thakore and Ratilal Patel, by the sale deed dated February 8, 1960. Pranlal Thakore has, later on, expired and his share in the property has gone to his heirs and legal representatives. Therefore, the property in question belonged to two sets of landlords, one, the heirs and the legal representatives of deceased Pranlal Thakore and the other, of Ratilal Patel. One more fact which requires to be, pertinently, appreciated is that, the three brothers, namely, Chinubhai, Jasubhai and Ramchandra, the sons of Lalbhai, had made certain construction over the land in the margin area, in violation of the existing bye-laws of the erstwhile Ahmedabad Municipality. The necessary proceedings were initiated by the erstwhile Municipality in year 1927-28. Anyhow, during these proceedings, the said three brothers had executed an agreement, to unconditionally remove the above said unauthorised construction as and when called upon, by the erstwhile Borough Municipality. Later on, the Board of the Municipality had adopted a resolution on November 28, 1927 at Sr. No. 43 and the above said prayer of the said three brothers was accepted. Anyhow, they were called upon to execute the necessary agreement and/or "kabulat" which was executed on October 5, 1934, which came to be registered, later on, on March 4, 1935, which is at Exh. 245. Later on, the Borough Municipality has been converted into the Corporation. Exh. 497 is the notice dated October 28, 1968, calling upon the plaintiffs to demolish the above said construction, within a stipulated time. It is also stated that, if the necessary action, in this respect, is not taken within a period of 10 days, the corporation shall be constrained to initiate the proceeding against the plaintiffslandlords for the specific performance of the "kabulat", at Exh. 245. Making this as a ground, it is the case of the plaintiffs-landlords that, there has been an order of demolition, as understood, within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay rents Act, 1947 and, therefore, a decree required to be granted in each of the Suits in their favour. 245. Making this as a ground, it is the case of the plaintiffs-landlords that, there has been an order of demolition, as understood, within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay rents Act, 1947 and, therefore, a decree required to be granted in each of the Suits in their favour. ( 9 ) THE question, therefore, which requires to be decided, in this group of three civil Revision Applications is, as to whether the Appellate Court was justified in awarding a decree of eviction under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. The Appellate Court, upon the reading of the above said "kabulat" at Exh. 245 and the notice at Exh. 497, has come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs-landlords have been able to establish the said ground. ( 10 ) SECTION 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947 reads thus :"13. When landlord may recover possession :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Sec. 15 and 15a, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied - (hhh) that the premises are required for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by any local authority or other competent authority; or (i) that where the premises are land, such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building; or (ii) that where the premises are land in nature of garden or grounds appurtenant to a building or part of a building, such land is required by the landlord for the erection of a new residential building which a local authority has approved or permitted him to build thereon;"a bare reading of the above said provisions would go to show that, the Court is required to be satisfied that, the premises are required for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by any local authority or other competent authority. The question as to whether the ground has been established or not, requires to be examined, in view of the interpretation of the above said provisions and the said documents at Exh. 245 - the "kabulat" and the notice at Exh. 497. ( 11 ) IT shall have to be noticed, pertinently that, the "kabulat" at Exh. 245 came to be registered before the Sub-Registrar, Ahmedabad, on March 4, 1935. 245 - the "kabulat" and the notice at Exh. 497. ( 11 ) IT shall have to be noticed, pertinently that, the "kabulat" at Exh. 245 came to be registered before the Sub-Registrar, Ahmedabad, on March 4, 1935. It has been executed by the three brothers, namely, Chinubhai, Jasubhai and Ramchandra, the sons of Lalbhai. They have stated, unequivocally, in this "kabulat" that, the constructions made on the land are, admittedly, in violation of the bye-laws and that, certain proceedings were instituted, in the year 1927-28. Ultimately, the opinion of the Senior Assistant to the Consulting Surveyor was obtained on November 21, 1927, under the resolution No. 681. The Board, under the resolution No. 43, dated november 28, 1927, had agreed that, the said unauthorised construction shall not be demolished, provided the said three brothers execute an agreement to remove the construction, unconditionally, at their cost, whenever called upon to do so, by the Borough Municipality. It is agreed by the executants that, if they fail to remove the construction, the Municipality can do so, at their cost. This writing dated October 5, 1934 came to be registered on March 4, 1935. It is, therefore, apparently, clear that, the erstwhile owners had agreed before the Borough Municipality that, the construction was violative of the bye-laws of the Borough Municipality and that, they were allowed not to remove the construction, immediately, on their entering into an unconditional agreement or a "kabulat", saying that, they agree to the proposition that, they would demolish it whenever called upon to do so, by the borough Municipality. ( 12 ) WHEN the reference is made to the notice at Exh. 497, it appears that, all this old history has been narrated in the notice and, ultimately, it has been said that, now, the Borough Municipality has been converted into the Corporation and that, the Corporation is entitled to call upon the present owners and landlords to demolish the above said construction. They are also called upon to remove or demolish the said construction, within a period of 10 days from the receipt of the notice. It is also said that, if the plaintiffs-landlords fail to do so, the Corporation shall be constrained to file the necessary proceedings against them, for the specific performance of the "kabulat", which is at Exh. 245. ( 13 ) IT has been the contention, on behalf of learned Counsels Mr. It is also said that, if the plaintiffs-landlords fail to do so, the Corporation shall be constrained to file the necessary proceedings against them, for the specific performance of the "kabulat", which is at Exh. 245. ( 13 ) IT has been the contention, on behalf of learned Counsels Mr. Suresh M. Shah and Mr. Prakash M. Thakker, appearing on behalf of the petitioners-tenants that, the above said communication at Exh. 497 cannot be said to be an order of demolition, within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. With a view to examine this contention, the reference requires to be made to the bombay High Court decision, in the case of Narayanlal Bansilal v. B. N. Meattle, 75 BLR 233. In that case, a notice under Sec. 346 of the Bombay Municipal corporation Act, came to be served upon the owners and the landlords of the premises situated at Bombay. The landlord had filed a Suit, on the basis of the above said notice, treating the same as an order of demolition, within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. The Suit came to be resisted by the respondent No. 1, on the ground that, the notice given by the Municipal Corporation was, at the instance of the petitioner No. 2 and that, it was nothing more than an intimation of disapproval under Sec. 346 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation act, 1888 and that, therefore, it did not amount to an order for immediate demolition of the premises as contemplated under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. The Small Causes Court at Bombay did try the Suit and upheld the contention of the respondent No. 1 and had dismissed the Suit of the plaintiff. The Appellate bench had dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners. The view taken by the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court, anyhow, was that, a notice under Sec. 346 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 constitutes an order of demolition under Sec. 298 (J) of the said Act and, therefore, an order of demolition contemplated within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. The other decision to which a reference requires to be made is, also, a Bench decision of the bombay High Court on the Appellate side, in the case of Diwanchand Gupta v. N. M. Shah, 74 BLR 259. This decision, slightly on different facts, considers the question as to whether the Court can interfere with the subjective satisfaction of the authorised officer of the Municipal Corporation regarding his satisfaction qua Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. In that case, the notice came to be issued by the Bombay Municipal Corporation, under the signature of the Assistant engineer, dated June 11, 1965. The building was found to be in a ruinous condition and was found to be likely to fall and injure the person occupying or passing by the same. The landlord, Parasram was required under Sec. 354 of the Bombay municipal Corporation Act, 1888, to pull down the whole building upto the ground level. The time-limit granted was of 30 days. This notice came to be accepted as an order, under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, by the Bombay High court, in this decision. ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court pronouncement, in the case of M/s. Veli Lakshmi and co. v. M/s. Benett Coleman and Co. , AIR 1977 SC 1844, makes the position entirely clear. In that case, the Municipal Commissioner had granted the permission to raise some temporary structure under the City of Bombay (Building Works Restriction) act (18) of 1944, subject to a condition that, the same would be pulled down, whenever required, to give effect to an improved scheme. Later on, the notice of demolition was issued, after the expiry of the Act of 1944. In this background of facts, the Supreme Court had held that, the notice was an order, within the meaning of Clause (hhh) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. ( 15 ) WHEN the notice dated October 28, 1968, at Exh. 497 is examined, in light of the view expressed by the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court, it is clear that, the same would amount to an order, as understood within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. The notice makes a detailed reference regarding the previous owners, the unauthorised construction made by them, the "kabulat", at Exh. The notice makes a detailed reference regarding the previous owners, the unauthorised construction made by them, the "kabulat", at Exh. 245 and the right on the part of the Municipal Corporation to call upon the plaintiffs-landlords to remove the above said construction. Learned counsels Mr. Shah and Thakker had urged, with emphasis that, this is a notice simpliciter, given under the signature of an Advocate of the Corporation, in which, the notice fees are also claimed and in case of failure of the necessary action on the part of the plaintiffs-landlords, it has been stated that, the Corporation shall be constrained to initiate proceedings for the specific performance of the "kabulat" at exh. 245. Factually, the learned Counsels are correct. But, it requires to be appreciated that, the notice happens to be on the Letter Head of the Municipal corporation, Ahmedabad. It is signed by the Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad municipal Corporation, on 23-9-1968. It has been sent through and by the learned counsel for the Corporation, under his signature, on 28-10-1968. It is true that, it has been said in the notice that, the plaintiffs-landlords would be liable for the expenses of the notice which has been quantified at Rs. 55. 00. It is also true that, it has been said in this notice that, if the landlords failed to act upon the notice, within a period of 10 days, the Municipal Corporation shall be constrained to approach the appropriate Court, by way of initiating appropriate proceedings for obtaining the decree of specific performance of the "kabulat" at Exh. 245. Despite these features, it is, apparently, clear that, the notice at Exh. 497 is, nothing more and nothing less than an order of demolition of a construction which was, admittedly, made years back, in violation of the relevant bye-laws of the erstwhile Borough municipality. It should not escape the notice of a judicial mind that, right from year 1927-28, the objections were being raised by the erstwhile Borough Municipality, regarding the constructions made on the land which were unauthorised and in violation of the bye-laws. The proceedings had started right from year 1927-28 and, ultimately, were referred to the Senior Assistant to the Consulting Surveyor, who has opined under his resolution No. 681 dated November 21, 1927 that, the constructions were unauthorised and can be continued only if there is Kabulat from the landlords. The proceedings had started right from year 1927-28 and, ultimately, were referred to the Senior Assistant to the Consulting Surveyor, who has opined under his resolution No. 681 dated November 21, 1927 that, the constructions were unauthorised and can be continued only if there is Kabulat from the landlords. Later on, the Board of the Municipality had adopted the necessary resolution, in this respect, and the landlords were required to enter into a "kabulat", agreeing unconditionally, to remove the construction as and when called upon, by the Municipality. It is, therefore, apparently, clear that, by the notice at Exh. 497, what the Corporation was doing was, nothing less, but ordering immediate demolition of the said construction, within a period of 10 days. Merely because the said writing came to be sent by the Advocate concerned and came to be sent through him, under his signature and further merely because there has been an averment that, in case of failure on the part of the landlords to act upon the notice within a period of 10 days, the Corporation shall be constrained to file the Suit for the specific performance of the "kabulat" at Exh. 245, it cannot be accepted that, the said communication looses the character and significance of an order of demolition, as understood within the meaning of Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. ( 16 ) THUS, it is clear that, the Appellate Bench was, perfectly, justified in coming to the conclusion that, the plaintiffs-landlords were entitled to obtain a decree of eviction against the tenants, under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. These three Revision Applications, filed by the tenants, challenging the above said appellate judgment and the decree, require to be dismissed and they are hereby accordingly dismissed. The Appellate judgment granting a decree of eviction, in each of the matter, against the respective defendant-tenant or tenants under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947 is hereby upheld and confirmed. Rule shall stand discharged in all these three matters. There shall be no order as to costs. ( 17 ) AS indicated above, the other group comprising three Civil Revision applications, relates to the claim of the landlords, for a decree of eviction, on other grounds. Rule shall stand discharged in all these three matters. There shall be no order as to costs. ( 17 ) AS indicated above, the other group comprising three Civil Revision applications, relates to the claim of the landlords, for a decree of eviction, on other grounds. Both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that, the plaintiffslandlords are not entitled to a decree of eviction, either on the ground of arrears of rent, bona fide personal requirement or sub-letting. Regard being had to the evidence on record, learned Counsel Mr. Sanjanwala, who appears on behalf of the petitioners in these three matters, was not in a position to place the case of the petitioners on a higher pedestal. The Courts below have concurred in their opinion that, the Suits of the plaintiffs-landlords against respective tenants, on these counts, require to be dismissed. For deciding the case of the plaintiffs that, the Suit premises were reasonably and bona fide required by them, for their own use and occupation, it requires to be appreciated that, the defendants had taken out a clear contention in the Suits that, the plaintiffs were having sufficient accommodation and they never required the suit premises, reasonably and bona fide. The Courts below, while appreciating the evidence, have noticed that, there was nothing on the record to show anything, regarding the area occupied by the plaintiffs, at the relevant time. It was also noticed that, the plaintiffs had failed to produce, even a plan or a sketch, in respect of the residential areas which they were occupying. There was no sufficient evidence, in this respect, during the sworn testimony also. The evidence had shown, beyond any manner of doubt that, the plaintiffs used to run about four "factories" and there were about 700 workers under their employment in these factories. The courts below have also noticed that the plaintiffs were having their own accommodation apart from the premises in dispute and they had taken a house property also, on lease. The plaintiffs wanted to say that, there has been a decree of eviction against them, qua the leased house property. Anyhow, as noticed by the courts below, there was no documentary evidence, in this respect. No copy of any decree could be produced before the trial Court. The plaintiffs wanted to say that, there has been a decree of eviction against them, qua the leased house property. Anyhow, as noticed by the courts below, there was no documentary evidence, in this respect. No copy of any decree could be produced before the trial Court. In the same way, there was, absolutely, no evidence regarding any execution proceedings, taken out by the landlady of the said premises. The evidence also showed, beyond any manner of doubt that, the members of the family, for whom also, the premises were required, were found to be living in other premises. It is, thus, clear that the plaintiffs were not able to establish their case that, the Suit premises were reasonably and bona fide required for their own use and occupation. ( 18 ) THE second limb of this ground urged before the Courts below and negatived by them is that, the plaintiffs wanted to construct certain residential quarters, with a view to accommodate their technical staff, in the same. It was sought to be urged that, under some agreement or arrangement, the plaintiffs were required to accommodate their technical staff. But, as rightly, pointed out by the courts below, there was no documentary evidence, worth its name. No such agreement could be produced before the trial Court and, there was, absolutely, no evidence regarding the strength of such staff, which according to the plaintiffs was, required to be accommodated in the premises. It was also sought to be contended that, the plaintiffs wanted to construct office premises on the leased part of their property. But, here also, the Courts have noticed, with the assistance of the evidence on record that, in certain other Suits, there has been a compromise between the plaintiffs on one hand, and the other tenants, on the other hand, under which, the residential accommodations are to be provided to such tenants. It was sought to be urged that, the plaintiffs family is maintaining about seven Cars and only two garages were available to them. Though there is the evidence regarding the maintenance of seven Cars, the evidence regarding there being only two garages was found not to be convincing. Thus, it appears that, the evidence would not disclose that, the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiffslandlords for the above said purposes. Though there is the evidence regarding the maintenance of seven Cars, the evidence regarding there being only two garages was found not to be convincing. Thus, it appears that, the evidence would not disclose that, the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiffslandlords for the above said purposes. ( 19 ) THE Courts below have examined the question regarding the comparative hardship, also. The evidence on record goes to support the findings of the Courts below that, even if the decrees were to be passed against the defendants-tenants, on the ground that, the suit premises were required bona fide and reasonably, then also, greater hardship would be on the part of the tenants. On the appreciation of the entire evidence, it appears that, no fault can be found with the findings of the Courts below, in this respect. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, in this group of petitions, was not able to show as to where and how the Courts below have erred in coming to this conclusion. ( 20 ) THE Courts below have come to the conclusion that the Suits of the plaintiffs-landlords could have not been decreed, on the ground of the arrears of rent for a period of more than six months. In H. R. P. Suit No. 8140 of 1966, it was said that the defendant was in arrears of rent, for a period of more than six months and that the arrears were not paid or deposited within a period of one month of the receipt of the notice, in this respect. The Courts below have come to the conclusion that the defendant had sent the amount due, within a period of one month, from the service of the notice, but there was a refusal on the part of the landlords to accept the above said amount tendered by way of Money Order. In H. R. P. Suit no. 3143 of 1966, previously, there was an institution of the application for the fixation of the standard rent, but it was, later on, withdrawn. Deceased tenant- maganlal had sent the Money Orders, as evidenced by Exhs. 823 to 826. The remaining amount of rent was, later on, tendered. As per Exh. 985, the tenants had deposited not only the rent which was due, but they had deposited a further amount of Rs. 50. 00 also, later on. Deceased tenant- maganlal had sent the Money Orders, as evidenced by Exhs. 823 to 826. The remaining amount of rent was, later on, tendered. As per Exh. 985, the tenants had deposited not only the rent which was due, but they had deposited a further amount of Rs. 50. 00 also, later on. The whole amount was paid or deposited and that, therefore, the Courts below have recorded a finding that the landlords, in that case, would not be entitled to a decree of eviction, on the ground of the non-payment of rent. In H. R. P. Suits Nos. 3144 of 1966 and 3150 of 1966, the Courts below have come to the conclusion that, the total deposit exceeded the amount which was found to be due. In these two cases, also, therefore, there has been a concurrent finding of fact that, the plaintiff-landlords are not entitled to a decree of eviction on the ground of the non-payment of rent. Moreover, the issue regarding the Standard Rent came to be resolved along with the suits under the very same Judgment/orders/ decrees and the dues were paid and or deposited. The learned Counsel for the petitioners was not able to convince me, as to how, under such circumstances, the plaintiffs-landlords would be entitled to a decree of eviction, on the ground of the arrears of rent, for a period of more than six months. . ( 21 ) THE plaintiffs-landlords also wanted to have a decree, on the ground that, the defendants-tenants have erected permanent construction on the open plot of land. In this respect also, the Courts below have concurred in their opinion that, the alleged shed etc. , were constructed years back and that, this fact was borne out from the municipal record also. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, in this respect also, was not able to establish any flaw on the part of the Courts below. The same is the position in respect of the sub-letting of the premises. No convincing evidence was brought before the trial Court to warrant a conclusion that, any of the defendants is guilty of ever sub-letting the suit premises or assigning or transferring his interest in the same, in favour of anybody. On this count also, the learned Counsel for the petitioners was not able to satisfy me. No convincing evidence was brought before the trial Court to warrant a conclusion that, any of the defendants is guilty of ever sub-letting the suit premises or assigning or transferring his interest in the same, in favour of anybody. On this count also, the learned Counsel for the petitioners was not able to satisfy me. ( 22 ) IT is, therefore, apparently clear that, the Courts below were perfectly justified, in coming to the conclusion that, the plaintiffs-landlords were not entitled to a decree of eviction, on any of the above said grounds. These three Revision applications also, therefore, fail and they require to be dismissed. They are hereby accordingly dismissed. Rule shall stand discharged in these three matters, but with no order as to costs. ( 23 ) THE resultant effect would be that, the Decrees of Eviction granted by the appellate Court in favour of the Landlords and against the Tenants, under Sec. 13 (1) (hhh) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947 stand confirmed, as the three Revision petitions of the first group are dismissed and Rules are discharged. Interim Relief staying the execution of the Decree shall stand vacated. ( 24 ) THE above said orders were pronounced yesterday, that is on November 13, 1995, in the Court. Just thereafter, learned Counsel Mr. Prakash M. Thakker wanted to plead that the appropriate time should be granted to the petitioners-tenants for approaching the appropriate forum and to obtain suitable orders. The passing of the orders on such a plea was deferred at the instance of learned Counsel Mr. Sanjanwala for the otherside. ( 25 ) WHEN the matter is being called out today on November 14, 1995, learned counsel Mr. Thakker urges that, the appropriate time should be given to the petitioners-tenants, so that, they can approach the appropriate forum and can obtain suitable orders. This say of the learned Counsel Mr. Thakker is being objected to strenuously by the learned Counsel Mr. S. H. Sanjanwala on the ground that, the municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad has ordered the demolition of the 9th floor portion of a structure known as "shalin Hotel Building", and that, more F. S. I. would be available to his clients if they get the possession of the premises in question. Learned Counsel Mr. S. H. Sanjanwala on the ground that, the municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad has ordered the demolition of the 9th floor portion of a structure known as "shalin Hotel Building", and that, more F. S. I. would be available to his clients if they get the possession of the premises in question. Learned Counsel Mr. Sanjanwala urges that, in view of this position, no time should be granted as urged by learned Counsel Mr. Thakker. ( 26 ) IN reply, learned Counsel Mr. Thakker urges that the tenants are keeping the premises in question since last about fourty-six years. The learned Counsel further urges that, the objection raised by Mr. Sanjanwala would go to demonstrate that in fact the suits were filed not for honouring the orders of the Municipal Corporation for the demolition of the structures but for getting more F. S. I. ( 27 ) IT appears that, the above said questions are not relevant to the question with which I am presently concerned, namely, as to whether the time should be granted to the petitioners or not. It appears very clearly that not granting any time to petitioners-tenants would foreclose their right to approach the appropriate forum and to seek suitable orders. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and looking to the usual practice of granting of time in such matters, it is hereby ordered and directed that the decrees granted by the Appellate Court, as confirmed by my above said orders shall not be executed and/or implemented for a period of three months hereof. Learned Counsel Mr. Prakash Thakker makes a statement that, during this time the tenants would not in any way transfer or assign the premises or their interest therein. The statement is being recorded. The authenticated copy of my orders be furnished to the respective Counsels as early as possible. .