C. K. THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition, the petitioner wants this Court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by quashing and setting aside the communication, Annexure "i" by which the request of the petitioner to withdraw prosecution against him was turned down by the District government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, Baroda and by directing him to reconsider the representation of the petitioner, Annexure "h" de novo. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was holding a licence under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and was doing business of running a fair price shop at Anandnagar, Kareli Baug, Baroda. It appears that on 20/08/1987, the shop was inspected by the officers of the Civil Supply Department and certain defects and irregularities were found. In connection with those irregularities, a show cause notice was issued on 17/10/1987 wherein it was inter alia, alleged that at the time of inspection, there was considerable shortage in three essential articles, namely, levy sugar - 100 kgs. , other sugar 100 kgs. , and Palmolin oil - 418 kgs. It was also averred that no satisfactory explanation was put forward regarding the shortage. It was, therefore, alleged that the said stock must have been disposed of by the petitioner without issuing necessary bills thereby committing serious irregularities. It was further alleged that bills of daily sale of Palmolin oil were not entered in Sale Register, nor licence number was mentioned in the bill book. Monthly registers were also not sent every month regularly. By committing those irregularities the petitioner had violated condition No. 4 read with condition No. 7 of the licence and Clauses 17 and 20 of the Gujarat Essential Articles Declaration order, 1981 as also Sec. 3 of the Act. The petitioner was, therefore, called upon to show cause as to why appropriate action should not be taken against him and without prejudice to other actions to be taken under other laws as to why seized goods should not be ordered to be confiscated to the State under Sec. 6-A of the act. The petitioner was asked to submit his written reply on or before 30/10/1987. Hearing of the case was fixed on 3/11/1987. The petitioner was asked to submit his written reply on or before 30/10/1987. Hearing of the case was fixed on 3/11/1987. It was mentioned that if the petitioner would not submit any explanation or would not remain present at the time fixed, proceedings will be conducted ex parte against him and appropriate decision will be taken presuming that the petitioner had nothing to say in his defence. ( 3 ) IT appears that the petitioner submitted his reply on 30/10/1987. The copy of the reply is not produced in the present proceedings. The Collector, Vadodara (respondent No. 3 herein) by his order, dated 19/01/1988 held the allegations levelled against the petitioner proved and accordingly ordered confiscation of certain commodities. That order is also not placed by the petitioner on the record of this petition. It, however, appears that earlier the petitioner had approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 6984 of 1988 for certain reliefs and in that petition, he had produced a copy of that order. ( 4 ) IN the present petition, the petitioner has made the following prayers in para 8 :"8. In view of the above premises, Your Lordships may be pleased to exercise powers of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and - a. issue a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the letter Annexure I; b. issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent No. 1 to re-consider representation Annexure H de novo; c. issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents, especially respondent-Collector to cancel the authorisation for running a fair price shop granted to Smt. Jayshriben Vindorai Shah; d. grant such other and further relief that may be deemed fit and just by Your lordships in the facts and circumstances of the case; and e. costs of this petition be provided for. "mr. S. V. Parmar, learned Counsel for the petitioner raised various contentions. He submitted that there is total non-application of mind on the part of the Public prosecutor in ignoring relevant and material facts and in taking into account irrelevant and extraneous matters. "mr. S. V. Parmar, learned Counsel for the petitioner raised various contentions. He submitted that there is total non-application of mind on the part of the Public prosecutor in ignoring relevant and material facts and in taking into account irrelevant and extraneous matters. It was contended that in case of similarly situated person, namely, Vinodrai Mulchand Dharaiya (respondent No. 4), no prosecution is launched though in substance and in reality, he is the person who has committed all illegalities and irregularities. Hence, he alone ought to have been prosecuted but when he is not prosecuted, action of prosecuting the petitioner is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Arts. 14, 15 (1), 19 and 46 of the Constitution of India. It is argued that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in passing the impugned order (Annexure I) inasmuch as Public Prosecutor -respondent No. 1- while rejecting the application has considered a decision of the single Judge, dt. 22/04/1992 in Special Civil Application No. 6984 of 1988 (Coram : B. C. Patel, j.) but did not even refer to an order passed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent appeal No. 223 of 1992. According to Mr. Parmar, in the light of the order passed by the Division Bench, the order passed by the single Judge had lost all its efficacy and could not have been read nor any observation could have been taken into consideration by the first respondent. Mr. Parmar also attacked the order passed by a Co-ordinate Court (Coram : B. C. Patel, J.) in Spl. C. A. No. 6984 of 1988 contending that the learned single Judge has proceeded on certain factual basis which were non-existent. He contended that all the points raised by him were not dealt with the Court. According to Mr. Parmar, this is a case of "reversal discrimination" ignoring Preamble of the Constitution, Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy. The first respondent by the impugned order permitted injustice to be perpetrated and perpetuated by rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for withdrawal of prosecution. It was argued that there is change of circumstances inasmuch as the order passed by respondent No. 3, was set aside by the State government in appeal on 31/03/1994. A copy of the order of the State government has been placed on record by Mr. Parmar. It was argued that there is change of circumstances inasmuch as the order passed by respondent No. 3, was set aside by the State government in appeal on 31/03/1994. A copy of the order of the State government has been placed on record by Mr. Parmar. It was submitted that though notice was issued as early as in October 1993, no counter-affidavit is filed by any of the respondents. According to Mr. Parmar, power conferred on this Court under art. 226 of the Constitution is very wide and extensive. All the same, the said power is "coupled with duty" and if necessary conditions are fulfilled, the Court has to exercise it. Finally, it was submitted that while rejecting application, no reasons and/or grounds have been recorded. The first respondent has committed error of fact in placing reliance on certain matters which were not true. Similarly, he has committed an error of law in not properly construing and applying Sec. 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. My attention was invited to a number of decisions of the Honble Supreme Court. ( 5 ) HAVING given anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, no case has been made out to interfere with the order passed by the first respondent rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for withdrawal of prosecution against him. Earlier, the petitioner had filed Spl. C. A. No. 6984 of 1988. In that petition, following reliefs were prayed :"8. Earlier, the petitioner had filed Spl. C. A. No. 6984 of 1988. In that petition, following reliefs were prayed :"8. In view of above premises, Your Lordships may be pleased to exercise the powers of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and - (A) issue writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction and order quashing and setting aside the order, Annexure V; (B) issue writ of Mandamus and/or Certiorari, Mandamus quashing and setting aside notice issued by the respondent-Collector on 27-10-1987 intimating the petitioner that authorisation issued to him shall cease to operate on expiry of 30th day from 27-10-1987 and directing the respondent-Collector and concerned officers of the respondent-State that the authorisation issued to the petitioner remains in force; (C) issue writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the respondent-Commissioner of Police, Vadodara City to take appropriate action against the respondent-Vinodrai Dharaiya instead of the petitioner; (CC) direct respondent-State to take action against respondent-Dharaiya or drop proceedings initiated against the petitioner in the Criminal Court, Baroda; (CCC) direct respondent-State to take decision in respect of petitioners application Annexure IV dt. 1-9-1988; (D) grant such other and further relief in the facts and circumstances of the case; (E) pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition the respondent- state and respondent-Collector be restrained from allotting authorisation for running fair price shop in respect of the area for which authorisation was issued to the petitioner. This has become necessary since the respondent-Collector has issued letters to various persons who made application for granting authorisation in respect of the area for which authorisation was granted to the petitioner, for selecting some of them for the purpose of running fair price shop and issuing authorisation therefor; (E-1) and prohibit criminal Court, Vadodara from proceeding further in the matter of criminal Case that is being tried because of F. I. R. No. 252 of 1988 of Kareli Baug police Station in Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Vadodara. "while rejecting that application, learned single Judge of this Court, inter alia, observed :"so far as the prosecution is concerned, reading the complaint, it clearly indicates that an offence is committed. It is open for the petitioner to place his defence before the trial Court and it is for the trial Court to consider the same and not by this Court at this stage. It is open for the petitioner to place his defence before the trial Court and it is for the trial Court to consider the same and not by this Court at this stage. Complaint is investigated, charge-sheet is filed and prima facie the court has come to the conclusion that an offence has been committed. Therefore, cognizance is taken and summons is issued. Therefore, it cannot be said that no offence is committed. Looking to the averments made in the complaint, the defence put forward by the petitioner before the Court cannot be considered at this stage. It is open for the petitioner to take the defence which he has tried to make out here by introducing the new story about he being cheated by one Mr. Dharaiya. "being aggrieved by the order of the single Judge, the petitioner preferred Letters patent Appeal No. 223 of 1992. The said Appeal came to be disposed of by the division Bench on 20/07/1992. The said order reads as under :"mr. Parmar, learned Advocate for the appellant states that appellant has already applied to the concerned Public Prosecutor for withdrawing the prosecution launched against him, and therefore, the appellant desires to withdraw the appeal. He, however, submitted that till his representation is disposed of, this Court should stay further proceedings of that criminal case. In our opinion, the request made on behalf of the appellant is reasonable and, therefore, we direct that the criminal proceedings, which are subject-matter of this appeal, should be stayed for a period of two months. The concerned Public Prosecutor is also directed to dispose of the representation of the appellant within two months from the date of receiving the same. It is clarified that if the appellants representation is rejected, it will be open to him to file a fresh petition. This appeal is accordingly disposed as withdrawn. "from the above order of the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal, it is clear that the appellant withdrew the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the order passed by the learned single Judge. He (petitioner), however, submitted that he had filed an application for withdrawing the prosecution launched against him and till that application is disposed of, the Court may grant stay of further proceedings in criminal case. The Court considered the request as reasonable and stay was granted. He (petitioner), however, submitted that he had filed an application for withdrawing the prosecution launched against him and till that application is disposed of, the Court may grant stay of further proceedings in criminal case. The Court considered the request as reasonable and stay was granted. Meanwhile, the Public Prosecutor was directed to dispose of the representation of the appellant. In my opinion, from the direction issued by the Division Bench, it cannot be said that the order passed by the learned single Judge was quashed or set aside or that it lost its efficacy. On the contrary, it can be said that since the appellant could not satisfy the Division Bench that the order passed by the single judge was contrary to law and required interference, a request was made to withdraw appeal which was granted by the Bench. ( 6 ) AGAIN, in my opinion, the inquiry before the Public Prosecutor in case of withdrawal from prosecution under Sec. 321 of the Code is limited. As a general rule, once prosecution is launched, its relentless course cannot be halted except on sound considerations. Justice ordinarily demands that every case must reach its destination and not interrupted en route. As a Custodian of administration of justice, it is the duty of the State to prosecute those who commit crimes (Vide Subhash Chander v. State, AIR 1980 SC 423 , Balwant Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 2265 , Rajendra Kumar v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1510 ). It is also well settled that the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case is competent authority to take appropriate decision regarding withdrawal from prosecution. It is his power which is not restricted or curtailed even by the State Government and even if direction is issued by the State Government to withdraw prosecution, the public Prosecutor is not bound by it. In the instant case, the petitioner was holding a licence. The fair price shop was being run in his name. Inspection was carried out and certain irregularities were found. If in the light of those facts, an action is taken to prosecute him, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the order of prosecution is unlawful, unreasonable or arbitrary which requires interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Inspection was carried out and certain irregularities were found. If in the light of those facts, an action is taken to prosecute him, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the order of prosecution is unlawful, unreasonable or arbitrary which requires interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. No case has been cited before me in which the prosecution was not withdrawn and the Court interfered with such discretion by directing the Public prosecutor to drop the proceedings. On the contrary, when the Public Prosecutor had decided to withdraw prosecution against accused in certain cases, the action was challenged and the Supreme Court held that it was the Public Prosecutor alone who has to apply mind and to come to a positive conclusion as to whether an action for withdrawal from prosecution should be granted. ( 7 ) I am also of the opinion that in dealing with an application for withdrawal from prosecution, the Public Prosecutor does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Withdrawal from prosecution is an executive function - pure and simple. The Public Prosecutor is, therefore, not required to record reasons. No speaking order is necessary. No doubt, he has to apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and take a decision one way or the other. The Division Bench of this court directed the first respondent to dispose of the representation of the petitioner. The first respondent thought it fit to disclose grounds as to why he did not think proper to accede to the request of the petitioner. In para 2 of the communication, it was stated :"looking to the papers and documents, following facts are admitted facts- (i) You had applied for authorisation to run fair price shop. (ii) Authorisation to run fair price shop was issued in your name within your knowledge. (iii) You were staying with your brother-in-law Dharaiya Vinodrai and as per your say he and his wife were managing the business of a fair price shop. (iv) The authorisation holder was imposed fine of Rs. 1,815. 00 by the Collector, and it was paid. (v) On 17-10-1987, show cause notice was issued to you by the Collector for irregularities committed, and you had filed reply with your signature. (vi) The Collector, Baroda, ordered to confiscate quantity of foodgrains and also ordered to prosecute you. (iv) The authorisation holder was imposed fine of Rs. 1,815. 00 by the Collector, and it was paid. (v) On 17-10-1987, show cause notice was issued to you by the Collector for irregularities committed, and you had filed reply with your signature. (vi) The Collector, Baroda, ordered to confiscate quantity of foodgrains and also ordered to prosecute you. (vii) You had challenged the order of the Collector upto the Honourable High court and in Special Civil Application No. 6984 of 1988, the Honourable High court Judge has observed that "it is open for the petitioner to place his defence before the trial Court. "in para (2) (iii) it was stated-" (III) You were staying with your brother-in-law Dharaiya Vinodrai and as per your say he and his wife were managing the business of a fair price shop. " the learned single Judge observed in his order dt. 22/04/1992 in Spl. C. A. No. 6984 of 1988 :""so far as the order passed by the Government is concerned, there is no merit in the substance. At the earlier stage, petitioner came out with the version that in his absence his relative was in charge of the shop who was unaware of the procedure; hence he did not issue bills but made relevant entries only in the ration card and accounted the shortage in the essential commodities to it. It is only after the Collector passed the order that the petitioner came out with another version that he has been cheated by Vinodrai Mulchand Dharaiya, who was entrusted the business and the said offence is committed by Vinodrai Dharaiya. Petitioner was a student of Engineering college in M. S. University, Baroda. His afterthought defence cannot be accepted because he is not an uneducated person but was taking education in an Engineering college. Therefore, it is not possible to accept what he says. It is further to be noted that the Collector as well as the State Govenment, the appellate authority, have not found any substance in the submissions made by the petitioner herein. There are concurrent findings. On facts, authorities have decided against the applicant and no defect in procedure is noticed. Therefore, no interference is called for. "mr. Parmar strongly objected to the above facts and findings as according to him, they were factually incorrect. I am afraid, I cannot enter into all these questions at this stage. There are concurrent findings. On facts, authorities have decided against the applicant and no defect in procedure is noticed. Therefore, no interference is called for. "mr. Parmar strongly objected to the above facts and findings as according to him, they were factually incorrect. I am afraid, I cannot enter into all these questions at this stage. In my opinion, all the defences which are available to the petitioner can be taken at the time when the case will be tried by a competent Court of law. ( 8 ) SO far as the contention regarding discrimination and unreasonableness is concerned, I do not find any substance therein. If the Public Prosecutor thought it fit to proceed with a criminal case against the petitioner in the light of the facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that by not prosecuting Vinod Dharaiya, provisions of Art. 14, 15 (1) or 46 of the Constitution of India can be said to be violated. It is clear from the facts of the case that the licence was in the name of the petitioner and hence, it was incumbent on his part to run fair price shop. By allowing someone else to run the shop (whether related or otherwise), he has committed breach of law and prosecution can be launched against him. It is not open to the petitioner to contend that the impugned communication/order requires re-consideration on the ground that other person is not prosecuted. Case of Vinod Dharaiya cannot be said to be a similar one. Moreover, it is settled law that Art. 14 cannot be pressed in service in such cases. That is not the sweep of Art. 14. In Lakshman Kumajibhai Barot v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad and Anr. , [1979 (2)] XX (2) GLR 563, the petitioner, Police Sub-Inspector was suspended pending criminal prosecution. He challenged that action inter alia on the ground that the action was discriminatory inasmuch as several Police Officers who were involved in serious criminal offences, were not suspended. The action was thus violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Repelling the contention, P. D. Desai, J. (as he then was) stated :"it is difficult to comprehend, under such circumstances, how the order of suspension can be challenged on the ground of violation of Art. 14 by reference to some other distinct cases of different Police Officers. One more thing. Repelling the contention, P. D. Desai, J. (as he then was) stated :"it is difficult to comprehend, under such circumstances, how the order of suspension can be challenged on the ground of violation of Art. 14 by reference to some other distinct cases of different Police Officers. One more thing. Merely because the authority has failed to suspend a person who ought to have been suspended in the facts and circumstances of one case, it cannot be precluded from exercising the power of suspension in another like case, although suspension might be justified on the facts of that case, by invoking Art. 14. One or two or even series of cases where power of suspension ought to have been exercised but has erroneously not been exercised cannot be relied upon in order to claim the protection of Art. 14 in a subsequent case where the power might have been reasonably and bona fide exercised on legitimate grounds. That truly is not the sweep of Art. 14. " (emphasis supplied) in Ramkrishna Bus Transport v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [1994 (2)] XXXV (2) glr 1371, a similar argument was advanced before me by contending that the regional Transport Authority had taken action against some Bus Operators but similar actions were not taken against other Operators though they had also violated the provisions of law. Negativing the said contention, I observed :"if one Operator is plying his vehicle in violation of statutory provisions, other operators relying upon Art. 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be allowed to commit breach of law. The Court cannot countenance such plea and permit other operators also to violate law by invoking equality clause enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. That is not the sweep of Art. 14. " (emphasis supplied ). ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Honble supreme Court in the case of T. V. Choudhary v. Chief Secretary, Government of a. P. and Anr. , 1987 (3) SCC 258 in support of the submission that if an action is taken against some officers and not against similarly situated co-delinquents, the action would be arbitrary and vitiated. In my opinion, the ratio laid down in t. V. Choudharys case (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. , 1987 (3) SCC 258 in support of the submission that if an action is taken against some officers and not against similarly situated co-delinquents, the action would be arbitrary and vitiated. In my opinion, the ratio laid down in t. V. Choudharys case (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. As stated hereinabove, the licence was in the name of the petitioner who committed breach of law. In violating the law, he allowed someone else to run the shop. The case of the petitioner, therefore, cannot be said to be similar to the case of Vinodrai dharaiya. My attention was also invited to a case of Ram Chander v. Union of India and Ors. , 1986 (3) SCC 103 for the proposition that "to consider" means "to apply mind, to consider relevant materials objectively and to record reasons. " As already stated, in a well considered order, the first respondent dealt with all the points succinctly and formed an opinion that this is not a fit case in which permission for withdrawal from prosecution should be granted. Hence, it cannot be said that the Public Prosecutor failed "to consider" the relevant materials of the case. ( 10 ) ATTENTION of the Court was also drawn by Mr. Parmar to a decision in rajendra Kumar v. State, referred to earlier, wherein certain principles relating to withdrawal from prosecution were laid down by the Supreme Court. Heavy reliance was placed on principles 5 and 8 which read as under :"5. The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant grounds as well in order to further the broad ends of public justice, public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will certainly include appropriate social, economic and, we add, political purposes sans Tammary Hall enterprises. 8. The Courts duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the Public prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution. "the Counsel contended that broad ends of justice require withdrawal of prosecution of the petitioner. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution. "the Counsel contended that broad ends of justice require withdrawal of prosecution of the petitioner. The contention is not well-founded and cannot be accepted. If the allegation is that the petitioner has committed breach of law and violated conditions of licence and after considering relevant material on record, permission to withdraw prosecution is not granted, the action cannot be held to be arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) IT was submitted by Mr. Parmar that the order passed by the Collector, baroda on 19/01/1988 was set aside by the State Government on 31/03/1994, copy of which was produced at Annexure D/1. By the said order, certain commodities ordered to be confiscated by the Collector were released in favour of the petitioner though the finding recorded by the Collector that the petitioner permitted someone else to run business even though the licence was in the name of the petitioner was not disturbed. I am not called upon to express opinion on the legality or otherwise of that order. I am, however, constrained to observe that without considering the reasons recorded by the Collector in the impugned order, and without setting aside findings of fact, the State Government quashed the order passed by the Collector observing that the petitioner appeared to have been duped by Vinodrai dharaiya. It further appears that when the State Government decided the appeal, its attention was not invited to the order dt. 22/04/1992 passed by the learned single Judge in Spl. C. A. No. 6984 of 1988 or to the order dt. 20/07/1992 passed by the Division Bench in L. P. A. As observed earlier, the learned single Judge observed that the petitioner is not illiterate. He had obtained licence and hence it was obligatory for him to run the shop. Instead, he gave it to someone else and thereby he violated provisions of law. Hence, even the order passed by the State government cannot carry the matter further. ( 12 ) MR. Parmar submitted that the petitioner was minor at the relevant time and respecting the suggestion of the Division Bench, he withdrew the Letters Patent appeal. Instead, he gave it to someone else and thereby he violated provisions of law. Hence, even the order passed by the State government cannot carry the matter further. ( 12 ) MR. Parmar submitted that the petitioner was minor at the relevant time and respecting the suggestion of the Division Bench, he withdrew the Letters Patent appeal. In my opinion, I can neither go behind the order passed by the single Judge, nor by the Division Bench. The fact remains that the petitioner withdrew L. P. A. Now, if after the order of the Division Bench the first respondent has considered the facts and circumstances and rejected the prayer to withdraw from prosecution and no error either of fact or of law is committed by him in rejecting the application, the petition requires to be dismissed. ( 13 ) FOR all these reasons, I do not find any substance in any of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the petition requires to be dismissed. Notice discharged. Ad-interim relief vacated. No order as to costs. .