Judgment : The above Letters Patent Appeal was directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court, dated 27. 1993 in C.M.A. No.458 of 1992, wherein it has been held rejecting the appeal in A.A.O. No.458 of 1992, that there was no scope for condoning the delay of eighteen months in filing a claim petition under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. The first appellant is the mother of appellants 2 to 4, and wife of late Chinnapomma Naicken and appellants 2 to 4 who are the minors are the sons and daughter of late Chinnapomma Naicken and the first appellant and Chinnapomma Naicken. He was stated to have been aged about 38 years, at the time of his death and was stated to have been travelling at about 5.30 a.m. on 12. 1989 by a bicycle towards Namakkal. At that time, the bus/bearing Registration No. TMN.5972 belonging to the respondent-Transport Corporation, which is a public undertaking was said to have knocked down the deceased from his Cycle and he was stated to have died on the spot on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle, belonging to the respondent-Corporation. The accident was stated to have occurred at a place in Namakkal-Salem main Road near P.S.K. House at Salem Road. The deceased was stated to have been earning a sum of Rs.2,000 per month and was also paid to be the only bread winner of the family and the death left the family in lurch. The appellants were stated to have filed a petition under Sec.110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act read with Rule 3 of the Motor Accident Claims Rules before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (District Judge, Salem) claiming a compensation of Rs.1,50,000 from the respondent Corporation. Before the court below, it was submitted that the deceased would have lived for another thirty-two years and that the driver of the vehicle was facing trial before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Namakkal for an offence under Sec.304-A of Indian Penal Code. 3. The claim petition in question was indisputable presented before the tribunal on 111. Before the court below, it was submitted that the deceased would have lived for another thirty-two years and that the driver of the vehicle was facing trial before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Namakkal for an offence under Sec.304-A of Indian Penal Code. 3. The claim petition in question was indisputable presented before the tribunal on 111. 1990 and therefore has moved the court by filing I.A. No. 1495 of 1990 seeking for condonation of delay of 458 days in filing the claim petition invoking the powers of the court under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act and read with Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By way of explaining the reason for the delay. It has been stated in the court below that the appellants were stunned by the serious calamity in the family and being an uneducated lad with no knowledge of the intricacies of law and the difficulties encountered even for the bare livelihood, the claim petition could not be filed within time and that if the delay in filing the claim petition is not condoned, irreparable loss and damage would be caused to the appellants and that they will be seriously prejudiced. The respondent- Corporation appears to have filed a counter affidavit opposing the claim for compensation contending that the reasons assigned are not sufficient in law to justify the condonation and that the appellants deliberately failed to present the claim petition in time and that therefore there is no scope or justification for condoning the delay. The learned District Judge, Salem, after considering the submissions of learned counsel appearing on either side has chosen to reject the application on the ground that under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 particularly under Sec. 166(3) of the said Act, there is no scope for condoning the delay in filing a claim petition for a period beyond six months, in addition to the initial period of limitation of six months prescribed and therefore the powers under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked. It is seen from the order of the learned District Judge that as against the plea of the learned counsel for the claimants before the trial Court that the powers under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked for condonation of the period of delay of more than one year from the date of the accident. It is seen from the order of the learned District Judge that as against the plea of the learned counsel for the claimants before the trial Court that the powers under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked for condonation of the period of delay of more than one year from the date of the accident. Learned counsel for the claimant appears to have contended that though the Motor Vehicles Act in a special enactment inasmuch as the applicability of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act has not been excluded the court below was entitled to condone the delay even for an unlimited period, provided sufficient cause was shown. The said submission of the learned counsel for the claimants did not find favour of acceptance by the trial court. Hence, the claim petition came to be rejected with the rejection of LA. No.1495 of 1990 on 14. 1991 declining the condonation of delay, as prayed for. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed an Appeal before this Court under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The said appeal also come to be rejected by a learned single Judge of this Court by applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Company Limited, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2158. Hence the above appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 4. Mr.P.Mani, learned counsel for the appellants, while disputing the applicability of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to the case on hand which came into force on 7. 1989 in respect of the accident in question which occurred on 12. 1989 contended that the learned single Judge as also the learned trial Judge were in error in holding that the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act is not a applicable to the case on hand and that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by learned single Judge will not apply to the case on hand, wherein the claim relates also to minors. It was contended that the minor claimants are entitled to avail of the benefit conferred under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act and the claim petition could be filed through their lawful guardian even after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and before the minors attain the age of majority without being impleaded by the bar of limitation. It was contended that the minor claimants are entitled to avail of the benefit conferred under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act and the claim petition could be filed through their lawful guardian even after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and before the minors attain the age of majority without being impleaded by the bar of limitation. The plea that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 do not have the effect of excluding the applicability of the provisions contained in Sec.5 of the Limitation Act has been reiterated by placing reliance upon also the provisions of Sec.217(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with Sec.6(8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent Corporation adopted the reasoning of the learned trial Judge and of the learned single Judge reliance has been placed on several judicial pronouncements before us in support of the claim made on either side and it would be useful as also necessary to advert to the same hereinafter before taking up for actual consideration the points raised before us. .6. In Krishna Raju v. Ayyappa Chettiar, (1995)2 M.L.J. 456: 1955 M. W.N. 491, a learned single Judge of this Court had considered the scope of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) in a case, wherein the Advocate Guardian appointed by the District Court for two minors obtained a pronote from the two debtors of the minors’ estate and later filed a suit to recover the money due under the same after the expiry of three years. The trial court appears to have dismissed the suit as time barred, holding that the pronote was in favour of the guardian solely, though described in it as guardian of the minors and that therefore the benefit of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act could not be claimed by the minors. It was held, in that context that although the Advocate Guardian was entitled in law to file a suit at any time before the minors attain majority. It was held, in that context that although the Advocate Guardian was entitled in law to file a suit at any time before the minors attain majority. It would be most anomalous to hold that it would be open to a minor to sue after attaining majority, availing of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act, but at the same time deny the guardian’s right to sue on behalf of the minor before he attains majority and move than three years from the date of the promote. 7. In Bishan Dass v. Ramesh, 1971 A.C.J. 203, a learned single Judge of Delhi High Court, while dealing with a case, where the deceased left, a widow and two minor children and the children filed an application for compensation after limitation prescribed claiming extension of time on the ground of minority, invoking Sec.6 of the Limitation Act, it was held that each of the minors had separate cause of action and each one of them was entitled to separate compensation by virtue of Sec.110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and that the claim being distinct and separate and the mother being not competent to give a valid discharge in respect of the compensation payable to the minor children, the provisions of Sec.7 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied and in view of Sec.6 of the Act, the limitation would not run and therefore the claim cannot be considered to be barred by limitation. 8. In Amalgamated Coal Fields Limited v. Mst.Chhotibai, 1973 A.C.J. 365, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had an occasion to consider and deal with the claim of a widow and her five minor daughters under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The accident involved in the said case was on 6. 1962 and the suit came to be instituted on 28. 1963 after a year of his death. The accident involved in the said case was on 6. 1962 and the suit came to be instituted on 28. 1963 after a year of his death. While considering the issue in the context of Art.21 and Sec..7 of the Limitation Act, it was held that the heirs of the deceased are in the position of co-heirs, or tenants in common, having distinct shares and the widow could not under the Hindu Law gave discharge in her own right in respect of the right of her minor daughters and consequently by virtue of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act, the limitation gets extended in favour of the entire body of the claimants who had joint right and sue. .9. In Pritpal Singh v. H. S. Transport Company, A.l.R. 1974 P. & H. 39, a learned single Judge of the said High Court was concerned with a claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by the sons and daughters of the deceased, of whom claimants 1 to 4 were majors and 5 to 7 were the minor children of the deceased. When an objection was taken to the claim on the plea of limitation, the tribunal held that the claim was barred by limitation. On an appeal before the High Court, a learned single of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act would be in the nature of a suit and that having regard to Sec.6 of the Limitation Act and in view of the minority, the benefit of the extended period of limitation would be available to the minor claimants to claim compensation. 10. In Electricity Board, U.P. v. Shea Nath. A.l.R. 1976 All. 118, the claim arose under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and a suit was filed by and on behalf of a minor claiming benefit under Sec.6 of the Limitation Act. The trial Court rejected the claim, as barred by limitation on appeal, it was held that the right of the wife, husband, parent and child to recover compensation is not joint but distinct and several one and that therefore one of them cannot give a discharge without the concurrence of the person under disability, on that view, Sec.7 of the Limitation Act was held to be not attracted and the provisions of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act were held to save the period of limitation. 11. 11. In Punjabhai Prabhudas and Company v. Sakinaben Mohanabhai, 1977 A.C.J. 44, a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat had an occasion to deal with the claim under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In one of the appeals, the claim was contested on the basis of the bar of limitation. The claim was by and on behalf of the minors and therefore on the view that Sec.7 of the Limitation Act would have no application to the case before them the benefit of extended period of limitation was held to enure to the entire body of the plaintiffs who had a joint right to sue. 12. In Usha Rani v. Premier Insurance Company Limited, A.l.R. 1983 All. 27. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court was dealing with a claim from the legal heirs of a victim under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and the claim was presented beyond the period stipulated therefor by the wife of the deceased and two minor children. It was held that the mother could not give a valid and legal discharge of the rights and claims of the minor children and that therefore, time could not run against the minors till they attain majority. In coming to such conclusions, reliance was placed on Secs.6 and 7 of the Limitation Act. .13. In Musthafali v. Subair, 1992 A.C.J. 225, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has dealt with a claim presented by a minor, represented by the guardian claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which came to be rejected by the tribunal on the ground that the application was filed beyond the statutory period prescribed for filing such a claim. On an appeal therefor before the High Court, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court applying the provisions of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act held that the claim of a minor, when presented through the guardian cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. On an appeal therefor before the High Court, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court applying the provisions of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act held that the claim of a minor, when presented through the guardian cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. In coming to such a conclusion, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court not only applied the ratio of some of the decision earlier referred to by us, but also on the view that the provisions contained in Secs.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable to claims made under the Motor Vehicles Act and if the provision contained Sec.6 of the Limitation Act is made applicable, there is no question of limitation running against the minor during his minority learned Judges of the Kerala High Court were also of the view that even if Sec.6 of the Limitation Act is considered to be not applicable the tribunal had a discretionary power to condone the delay under the provisions of Sec.110-A(3) of the Act, that the tribunal can entertain an application, if it is satisfied that the application was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time and that therefore the question of compensation has got to be dealt with taking a very liberal, pragmatic and meaningful attitude. 14. In Bhucha Dhana Danger v. Jiviben Madeva Luknel, 1992 A.C.J. 1093, a learned single Judge of Gujarat High Court, while dealing with -a claim petition presented under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 after a delay of about 14 years that the period of limitation prescribed under Sec. 166(3) would start running against the minor only after the minor attains majority in view of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act and that therefore no exception could be taken to the entertainment of the claim notwithstanding the delay noticed above. .15. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Company Limited, A.I.R. 1991 S. C. 2158, has finally settled the issue relating to the applicability of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, even to accidents which occurred prior to the coming into force of the 1988 Act, as long as the claim petition was filed only after the commencement of the 1988 Act. It was also held therein that in view of the stipulation contained in Sec.166(3) of the 1988 Act, there is no scope for any condonation of delay of the period beyond one year of the date the accident by having recourse to Sec.5 of the Act. Therefore, the claim petition in the case before us, filed indisputably after such period of limit is necessarily time barred. But, to get over the hurdle of limitation, for the first time in the appeal before us a plea based upon Sec.6 of the Limitation Act, as enabling the minors to claim an extended period of limitation has been made. In substance, the claim on behalf of the appellants is that during the subsistence of the minority of appellants 2 to 4 the period of limitation prescribed does not commence to run against them and the said position would help the first appellant also to maintain the claim taking advantage of the minority of the appellants 2 to 4. This plea based upon the applicability of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act is made relying upon Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 16. A reference to some of the statutory provisions relevant for our consideration will necessary to properly appreciate the issue raised in this case. "166. This plea based upon the applicability of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act is made relying upon Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 16. A reference to some of the statutory provisions relevant for our consideration will necessary to properly appreciate the issue raised in this case. "166. Application for compensation: (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-sec.(l) of Sec.165 may be made — .(a) by the person who has sustained the injury: or .(b) by the owner of the property: or .(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be; .(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application: .(2) Every application under Sub-sec.(l) shall be made to the claims having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed; provided that where any claim for compensation .under Sec. 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant: .(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. .Provided that the claim tribunal may entertain the application after expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. .(4) Where a police officer has filed a copy of the report regarding an accident in a claims tribunal under the Act, the claims tribunal may, it it thinks necessary so to do, treat the report as if it was an application for compensation under this Act. (Newly substituted Sub-sec.(4) with effect from 111. 1994). .(5) The claims tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-sec. (Newly substituted Sub-sec.(4) with effect from 111. 1994). .(5) The claims tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-sec. .(6) of Sec.158 as an application for compensation under this Act. Sec.158(6) of the Act, as amended reads thus: As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is completed by a police officer, the Offi-cer-in-charge of the Police Station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or as the case may be, uncompletion of such report to the claim tribunal having jurisdiction and copy thereof to the concerned insurer and where a copy is made available to owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report forward the same to such claims tribunal and insurer. Sec.2(b) and (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as hereinunder: .(b) “application” includes a petition: .(1) “suit” does not include an appeal or an application: Sec.6 in so far as it is relevant for our purpose is as hereunder: 6. Legal Disability: (1) where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or in sane or an idiot, he may, institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disabilitv has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule. Sec.8 provides that nothing in Sec.6 or Sec.7 applies to suits to enforce rights of presumption or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cession of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application. Sec.8 provides that nothing in Sec.6 or Sec.7 applies to suits to enforce rights of presumption or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cession of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application. Sec.29(2) reads as follows: Where any special or local law prescribe for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation from the period prescribed by the Schedule the provisions of Sec.3 shall apply as if such period where the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in Secs.4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 17. The fact that in respect of even an accident which took place prior to the coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which came into force on 7. 1989 the claim petition has to be filed under the provisions of the 1988 Act on and after such commencement of the 1988 Act is by now well settled by the decision of the Apex Court reported in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Company Limited, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2156. The only question is as to whether in so filing the claim petition there is room or scope for availing of the benefit of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in respect of the filing of such a claim petition. Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.166 of the 1988 Act in our view will have the effect of excluding the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, in view of the specific and definite intention expressed that the claim petition cannot at any rate be permitted to be filed later than twelve months from the date of the accident. The several decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable and will have no application to the case on hand for more than one reason, in addition to the one referred to above. The several decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable and will have no application to the case on hand for more than one reason, in addition to the one referred to above. The decisions of the various division as well as single Benches of the other courts had no occasion to consider the impact or consequences of the special provisions contained in Sec. 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which not only have the effect of excluding the application of the Limitation Act, 1963, but also do not appear to take into account or advert to the impact of the proviso to Sec.166(1), which obliges a claimant, if all the legal representatives of the deceased had not joined as claimants in the application for compensation, to make the application on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and also obliges all the legal representatives, who have not joined as claimants to be made as respondents to the application. The provisions made in the force of proviso to Sub-sec.(l) of Sec.166 of the Act only go to show that, at any rate in cases, where all claimants or legal representatives are not minors, there is no impediment or disability for any one or more of the minor claimants moving the claims tribunal along with one or more major members. Even while making such a claim in view of the proviso it should be considered to have been made not only for him them but also for and on behalf of all the body of legal representatives of the deceased and the adjudication of the compensation payable has to be for and on behalf of all the legal representatives. Consequently, in our view, atleast in a case like the one before us where the first appellant/ claimant was a major and her claim could have been and has to be legitimately treated as having been made for all the body of legal representatives of the deceased, irrespective of the individual disability of any one of the other claimants/ legal representatives, there is no scope or justification for invoking or applying Sec.6 of the Limitation Act. The individual disability of any one of the claimants is no impediment under the peculiar scheme of things adumbrated in Sec.166 of the Act to make the claim. The individual disability of any one of the claimants is no impediment under the peculiar scheme of things adumbrated in Sec.166 of the Act to make the claim. As a matter of fact with the coming into force of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act 54 of 1994) with effect from 111. 1994 by virtue of anew Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.166, there is a mandate or compulsion to the claims tribunal itself to treat a report of the accidents necessarily to be sent to the tribunal under Sec. 158(6) of the Act at an application for compensation, unlike the provisions contained earlier which only gave an option to the tribunal to do so, if so desired. Therefore, we are of the view that the appellants at any rate in this case cannot try to invoke to take advantage of or shelter under Sec.6 of the Limitation Act for the simple reason that the first appellant is major and her claim which ought to be on behalf of all the legal representatives also could have been and ought to be filed within the stipulation contained in Sec.166(3) and also subject to the proviso thereto, not later than twelve months of the occurrence of the accident. 18. Even that apart the legal position in case pertain- ing to the computation of a period of limitation prescribed by a special Law vis-a-vis the general law of limitation appear to be as hereunder: In Ramana Reddi v. Babu Reddi, I.L.R. 37 Mad. 186, a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the question of limitation in the context of Sec.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the case of an execution application filed after twelve years after decree and the applicability of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act, 1908 that limitation being the result of the statute law no exemption from it can be recognised except what the statute itself provides. It was also held therein that it would be unnecessary to consider whether the other general provisions of the Limitation Act contained in Secs.4 to 25 would be applicable or not, where the period of limitation is prescribed by some Special Act and not by the general law of limitation. Sec.6 has been held to be expressly limited to cases where the limitation is provided for in the Limitation Act itself. Sec.6 has been held to be expressly limited to cases where the limitation is provided for in the Limitation Act itself. In elaborately considering the above issue it was also observed that ‘we cannot therefore upholding the argument that there is any Fundamental Rules of law or justice entitling the appellant to claim that the limitation should run only from the date of his attaining majority. In Sri Ramamurthi v. Soramma, A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 492, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in a similar cases as the one considered in I.L.R. 37 Mad. 186 subscribed to the same view. In Kartic Chandra v. Rata Krishna Roy, A.I.R. 1938 Cat. 25, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that Sec.6 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was expressly limited to cases where limitation is prescribed by the schedule I to the Act and where limitation is provided for by some Act outside the provisions of the Limitation Act, such limitation is not affected by Sec.6 or Sec.7 of the Limitation Act. 19. The construction placed by us as above in a case of the nature under our consideration becomes necessary also to avoid serious anomalies involved in taking a contra view. Even as the matter stands courts can take judicial notice of the fact that in the last majority of cases even filed within time, it is found difficult to get a true and proper picture of the accident or the details thereof for effectively adjudicating the claims made before the tribunals and if claims are permitted to be filed availing of provisions like Sec.6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 claims may be forthcoming after several years and at times after a decade or two and in such cases there will hardly any trac, of even document, evidence available in the shape of records maintained by the police authorities or criminal court or authorities of the Motor Vehicles Department, leave alone the question of creditworthiness of oral evidence that may be forthcoming after such long time. It may also pave way for frivolous, vexatious and astronomical claims too apart from encouraging those who could avail of Sec.6 of the Limitation Act to merely and mercilessly challenge the adjudication properly and effectively made on an application filed by the guardian of such persons suffering disability or made by the major members themselves for and on behalf of them and those who were under some disability or others as visualised under Sec. of the Limitation Act, 1963. It will also be difficult for those who have to defend themselves or answer such postponed or delayed claims and place them at great disadvantage. A construction which would lead to such startling consequences of grave and serious nature which may inevitably lead to uncertainty and friction undermining the very system of providing for an expeditious and effective remedy presumably never intended also, dissuade us from subscribing to the two wide propositions laid down in some of the decisions of the other learned Judge of various other High Courts. We make it clear and confine, at any rate our decision, to the category of cases before us, wherein the claim petition has been presented indisputably beyond the period of twelve months from the occurrence of the accident by a claimant who is also a major joining together with one or more minor claimants. Though the question raised before us in the form in which it has been argued, does not appear to have been presented for consideration before the learned single judge, we have considered the same having regard to the importance of the issue and the fact that it is a pure question of law. We make it clear that this decision will have no application to a case where all the claimants are minors. 20. For all the reasons stated supra we do not see any justification to interfere with the orders of the learned single Judge confirming the order of the learned District Judge, rejecting the claim petition as barred by limitation. Consequently, the appeal fails and shall stand dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.