K. L. ISSRANI, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision has been filed against the order dated 23. 12. 1994 passed by the Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Revision No. 136/94 arising out of an order dated 13. 9. 1994 passed by the Executive Magistrate, Salipur in Criminal Misc. Case No. 24/94 holding that the proceeding between the parties under section 145 Cr. P. C. at the instance of the first party, that is, the petitioner herein is not maintainable. ( 2 ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is not correct. Even if there is a decree passed by/the Civil Court, ft cannot be said that the proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. are not maintainable as held in (Prakash Chand Sachdeva v. The State and anothers ). ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the opposite parties submits that the facts in A. I. R. 1994 S. C. 1436 (supra) are not applicable to the facts of the present case as in the present case the petitioner has already approached the Civil Court in a title suit claiming partition of the joint family property in T. S. No. 55/1993 which is pending for trial in the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Second court, Cuttack. Their further submission is that as per the principles laid down in (Ram Rumer Pun Mahant v. State of V. P. and others) and also by this Court in (Kela Khatua v. Baidhar Khatua and others, the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is not valid and proper and needs no interference in this revision petition. The petitioner claims to be the adopted son of late Sitanath Misra whose widow is opposite party no. 4 in this revision petition. Learned counsel appearing for her even denies the fact of adoption. But the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that they have already admitted his adoption and cannot do so now. ( 4 ) WITHOUT entering into their dispute, from the xerox copy of the plaint in the Title suit which is shown by the petitioner today, he has claimed that there was no partition by metes and bounds of the ancestral joint family properties and for all intents and purposes the family is joint vis-a-vis their properties which are in suit. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, he has stated that he and his adoptive mother continues to live in the joint family of which Achutananda was the karta but since they are denying his adoption, he has no other alternative but to file the suit for declaration of his status as the adopted son of Sitanath and Saradamani (opp. party no. 4 ). In the prayer he has claimed the relief of preliminary decree for partition determining his share as one-sixth in the suit property and for permanent injunction against the defendants. ( 5 ) NO doubt, the principles laid down by the apex court in A. I. R. 1985 S. C. 475 (supra) are that the parallel proceeding should not be permitted to continue in the event of the decree of the civil court. But the apex Court further holds that the criminal courts should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court as the parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during the pendency of the dispute. This position is not denied by the petitioner that he can approach the civil court for issue of an injunction or for appointment of a receiver which is the adequate remedy for the protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. The apex court further hold that multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigations. ( 6 ) I have already dealt with the principles laid down In A. I. R. 1994 S. C. 1436 (supra) on the point that according to the apex Court proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. need not necessarily be dropped on the ground that the proceeding under section 107 are dropped nor on the point that the pendency of the civil suit for injunction which suit is not based on title but raised question to dispossess a co-owner by another co-owner. P. C. need not necessarily be dropped on the ground that the proceeding under section 107 are dropped nor on the point that the pendency of the civil suit for injunction which suit is not based on title but raised question to dispossess a co-owner by another co-owner. As discussed above, the plaintiffs aforesaid suit is based on title he derives, title being an adopted son and since his adoption is also under challenge, according to him he is forced to file that suit which goes to show that the suit is not based on mere possession but on the title. Even this case is not the dropping of the proceeding but what the lower revisional court found that in view of the fact that the parties have approached the civil court for seeking the relief, the pendency of parallel proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. at the instance of first party is not maintainable. So the facts of the present petition are squarely covered by the decision of the apex Court in A. I. R. 1985 S. C. 472 (supra ). Accordingly no interference in this revision is called for and it is dismissed. ( 7 ) IN this revision petition in Misc. Case No. 894/94, status quo in respect of the land was directed to be maintained. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that under section 146 Cr. P. C. , the receiver has already been appointed and he should continue to be in possession. The decision of such continuance is left to the discretion of the civil court. The petitioner is free to approach the civil court for the same and appraise of this fact also in his application for temporary injunction. Revision dismissed. .