TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS Writ petition has been filed in public interest and calls in question two Government Orders one dated the 4th of Aug. 1984 and the other 25th May, 1987, whereby the Government have in the purported exercise of its powers under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation, Act 1976) exempted land measuring 9. 19 Acres underlying Sy. Nos. 105 and 108 of Allalsandra village, G. K. V. K. Post, Yelabanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk from the provisions of the Act and permitted the sale thereof by its owner Sri. M. Narayanappa to the 5th Respondent Society. Sale-deed executed in pursuance of the impugned exemption order has also been called in question by the petitioners. The facts are few and may be stated immediately. ( 2 ) AN application was made by the 5th respondent-Society to the Government seeking exemption of the excess land held by Sri. M. Narayanappa from the operation of the Act aforesaid and for permission to sell the same to the said respondent. The Government appears to have considered the request and by an order dated 4th August, 1984 granted the exemption prayed for as also the permission to sell the same, to Respondent No. 5 Society subject to certain conditions. One of the Conditions was that the sale-deed in favour of the 5th Respondent shall be executed within a period of six months from the date of issue of order. A sale-deed it appears was not executed in favour of the Society within the time allowed by the Government, with the result that an application for extension of time up to the end of Dec. 1987 for finalising the sale transactions was made by the owner Sri. M. Narayanappa which request was granted by the Government in terms of its letter dated 26th May, 1987. Consequently, by a sale-deed executed and registered on the 16th of Jan. 1987 the owner, transferred in favour of the 5th Respondent-Society, the land in question measuring 7 Acres and 14 guntas underlying Sy. No. 105, and 2 Acres and 5 guntas underlying Sy. No. 108, of village Allalsandra, Bangalore North Taluk. It is not in dispute that the Society was put in actual physica1 possession of the lands in question in the year 1984 itself since it has been in actual possession of the same. No. 105, and 2 Acres and 5 guntas underlying Sy. No. 108, of village Allalsandra, Bangalore North Taluk. It is not in dispute that the Society was put in actual physica1 possession of the lands in question in the year 1984 itself since it has been in actual possession of the same. ( 3 ) NEARLY 10 years after the issue of the order granting exemption in favour of the land owner and nearly 7 years after the 5th Respondent-Society had in consequence of the sale in its favour secured the possession of the land in question, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the order passed by the Government as also the sale-deed executed in favour of the 5th Respondent in pursuance of the said orders. The petitioners claim that they are citizens of India and resident of Bangalore but due to exorbitant prices of the real estate and due to their humble station in life have not been able to acquire any house or other property of their own. The claim that the present writ petition has been filed by them in public interest in furtherance of the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 1454-56/1993 reported in AIR 1994 SC 923 . They argue that the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case declares the law in regard to the scope and ambit of Section 20 of the Act and in unmistakable terms hold that the Government has no power to grant exemption under Section 20 of the Act so as to permit the sale of vacant lands in excess of ceiling areas. It is urged that the action taken by the Government besides being ultra vires, unreasonable and arbitrary is opposed to public policy, hence deserve to be struck down and the sale- deed executed in furtherance of the permission granted by the Government held to be legally bad and inoperative. ( 4 ) THE Government has filed no reply to the writ petition nor have the other respondent except Respondent 5 contraverted the assertions made therein. ( 4 ) THE Government has filed no reply to the writ petition nor have the other respondent except Respondent 5 contraverted the assertions made therein. Respondent 5 Society has however filed a detailed reply to the writ petition in which it points out that the petition has not been filed in public interest but is meant to serve the interest of Respondents 4a to 4c who are the legal heirs of the deceased owner and who have failed to secure an interim order against the 5th Respondent in O. S. 423/1992, OS. 409/1993 and in M. F. A. 115/ 1993 filed by them. It is pointed out that after this Court had dismissed the M. F. A. filed by the Respondents 4a to 4c by its order dated 4th Feb. 1994 the petitioners who are residing close to Respondents 4a to 4c have been set up to file the present petition in so called public interest. It is also alleged that the first petitioner is a tenant of the Respondent Nos. 4a to 4c while the second petitioner is a purchaser of a house site from the said respondent which is a portion of land underlying Sy. Nos. 105 and 108. It is averred that the petitioners are close associates and henchmen of Respondents 4a to 4c and filing of the present petition is totally mala fide. ( 5 ) ON the merits of the case the 5th Respondent states that it is a House Building Co-operative Society registered under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act and comprising the employees of the University of Agricultural Science. The Society it is stated has been formed for the purpose of acquisition of lands for residential layouts, allotment of house sites to its members and for various other purposes. The Society further states that the lands in question have been purchased by it for the purpose of formation of a lay-out and allotment of sites to its members numbering about 1458 employees of the University aforesaid. The Society claims to have earlier formed layouts and allotted sites to its members and that Government of Karnataka had initiated acquisition proceedings for acquisition of land measuring 64 Acres for that purpose. The Society claims to have earlier formed layouts and allotted sites to its members and that Government of Karnataka had initiated acquisition proceedings for acquisition of land measuring 64 Acres for that purpose. It further states that out of the land in question the society has formed 155 sites for the purpose of allotment to its members and that a proper layout plan had been submitted to the Bangalore Development Authority for its approval. On the basis of the layout plan which has been prepared strictly in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the B. D. A. the Society claims to have prepared a provisional list for allotment to its members. The purchase price of the land in question it is asserted was paid out of the advance received by the Society from its members since the year 1982. It is urged that the permission in question was granted by the Government, in public interest and that even though the deceased, owner Sri. Narayanappa had obtained an order of conversion of the land to non-agricultural use it was the 5th Respondent Society who had actually paid the conversion fine of Rs. 2,6425. 50. This payment it is stated has been made in addition to the sale consideration fixed for the land in question. Besides the aforesaid amounts the Respondent Society also claims to have paid a sum of Rs. 7 lakhs towards the conversion charges for the formation of layout by means of two cheques drawn in favour of the B. D. A. In the process it is stated that the respondent- Society has spent a sum of Rs. 44,46,452/ - towards the sale consideration conversion fine, conversion charges etc. , and for formation of the layout for distribution among its members. It is urged that the members of the Society belong to either middle class or lower middle class sections of the society, and a large number of them are either attenders, Peons, Drivers and Lab Assistants, or Teachers working in the University who have invested huge money in the Society by raising the loans ever since the year 1982 in the fond hope that they would be able to get a site allotted in their favour. In the circumstances, in case the relief prayed for by the petitioners is granted to them, irreparable injury, and harm would be caused to all those who have waited all these years to build a shelter for themselves. The Respondent Society has therefore prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition which according to it is a wholly mala fide exercise and an abuse of the process of this Court. ( 6 ) THE following questions fall for determination:-1) Are the impugned orders issued by the Government legally valid and competent? 2) Is the writ petition a bona fide proceeding instituted in public interest? 3) Should any relief be granted to the petitioners at this distant point of time looking to the fact that the layout has already been formed after incurring a huge expenditure, out of the collections made from the members of the respondent Society. Reg. Question No. 1:-Mr. Datar, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners argued that the impugned orders were ex facie ultra vires of the provisions of Section 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling Regulations Act. He urged that the provisions of Section 20 did not empower the State Government to permit the transfer of land exempted under the said provision. He placed heavy reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1994 SC 923 and submitted that the impugned orders could not be sustained in view of the clear dicta of the Supreme Court in the said judgment holding that the Government could not in exercise of its power under Section 20 exempt the land and simultaneously permit its transfer by the owner concerned. I find considerable merit in the submission made by Mr. Datar. In Vasudeva's case the facts were almost identical. The owner of the excess land in that case was a firm who had applied for grant of exemption in respect of a certain area which permission was granted by the Government by its order dated. 9th of June, 1983. Subsequently, the owner appears to have made an application to the Government for permission to sell the land to the extent of 5 acres and 24 guntas to a certain builder. 9th of June, 1983. Subsequently, the owner appears to have made an application to the Government for permission to sell the land to the extent of 5 acres and 24 guntas to a certain builder. The grounds made out in the application were that due to stiff competition and nationalisation of black and pink granite by Southern States the owner firm was running in losses and also that the families of the partners constituting the firm had no other source of income besides one of the partner being seriously ill in a hospital at Bangalore. The State Government accordingly permitted the firm to sell the lands to the extent of 16. 194 Sq. mtrs. to the builders subject to certain conditions. This was followed by another application by the firm seeking permission to transfer the remaining land also which request too was granted by the Government, by a separate order. Sale-deeds thereafter were executed in favour of the builders in respect of the land in question. It was in the above backdrop that writ petitions came to be filed by way of public interest litigation in this High Court challenging the exemption order issued by the Government as also the sale-deed executed in pursuance thereof. ( 7 ) A single Judge of this Court allowed the petitions and declared as null and void the orders granting exemption and the permission to sell. Sale-deeds executed in pursuance of the said orders in favour of the Builder were also declared to be null and void. In appeal however, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and dismissed the writ petitions. In a further Appeal the Supreme Court formulated the following three points for consideration namely:- (1) Were the permissions granted by the State Government to sell land admeasuring 16. 194 Sq. mtrs and 3444 Sq. mtrs by its orders dated 6th March, 1987 and 18th April, 1987 valid under the Act? (2) Were the said orders motivated by mala fides? (3) Is the sale-deed executed by the firm in favour of the Builder on 30th Sept. 1987 is void and inoperative? ( 8 ) UPON a close examination of the provisions of the Act, the Apex Court observed that the Act showed a clear intention of the legislature and disclosed a definite scheme. (3) Is the sale-deed executed by the firm in favour of the Builder on 30th Sept. 1987 is void and inoperative? ( 8 ) UPON a close examination of the provisions of the Act, the Apex Court observed that the Act showed a clear intention of the legislature and disclosed a definite scheme. The intention of the legislature it was held was to acquire all the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed by the Act with the purpose of preventing contradiction of Urban land in the hands of a few persons, and speculation or profiteering therein besides distribution of such land equitably and to regulate, the construction of the buildings thereon. The Court found that the Act provides for the acquisition of all urban vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and prohibits its transfer in any form absolutely. It was further held that all that Act permitted in the case of such excess land was either express exemption from the operation of Sections 3 to 19 of Chapter III of the Act or non declaration of such land as an excess vacant land by the competent authority under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act. The Court in specific terms negatived the existence of any power with the Government under Section 20 of the Act to permit the sale by the owner of the excess land held by him. In support it gave as many as eight distinct reasons. The following passages from the judgment clearly bring out the line of reasoning behind the view taken by the Court:"the first question that arises is whether the provisions of Section 20 (1) (b) permit the State Government to permit the sale of the excess vacant land to a third party. According to us, the answer has to be in the negative for reasons more than one. In the first instance, the central object of the Act, as is evident both from the preamble as well as the statement of objects and reasons, is to acquire vacant land in excess of the ceiling area and to prevent speculation and profiteering in the same and also to distribute the land equitably to subserve the common good. It is, therefore, per se against the said object to permit the sale of the excess vacant land for whatever reasons, including the undue hardship of the landholder. It is, therefore, per se against the said object to permit the sale of the excess vacant land for whatever reasons, including the undue hardship of the landholder. To construe the provisions of Section 20 (1) (b) so as to read in them the conferment of such power on the State Government for whatever reasons is to distort and defeat the whole purpose of the legislation. ""thirdly, the provisions of Cls. (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 20 make it clear that what the legislature has in mind is an exemption for the purposes of the use of the land and not for the purposes of selling it. Sub-section (I) (a) speaks of exemption of such land having regard to its location, the purposes for whjch the land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require. The said provisions further require that even after taking into consideration the said circumstances, the State Government has to examine, before giving exemption, whether it is necessary or expedient in the public interest to do so. ""it is not, therefore, possible to agree with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Thakorbhai Daji bhai Desai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 Guj 189 that the indebtedness of the land-holder on the date of the commencement of the Act can be a ground for exemption under Section 20 (1) (b ). Muchless can such a ground vest the State Government with the power to permit the sale of the land. As has been explained earlier, under the Act no transfer of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit is permitted whether with or without condition, if it is not encumbered with a building or a portion of a building. It can either be acquired by the State Government under Section 10 (3) of the Act or exempted from being acquired or permitted to be retained under Sections 20, 21 and 23 respectively It can in no case be transferred. It can either be acquired by the State Government under Section 10 (3) of the Act or exempted from being acquired or permitted to be retained under Sections 20, 21 and 23 respectively It can in no case be transferred. ""fifthly, the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 20, directly negative either exemption on account of financial hardship or for the purpose of the transfer of the land, since that sub-section empowers the State Government to withdraw the exemption already granted if the State Government is satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which the exemption is granted either under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of sub-section (1) is not complied with. It is inconceivable that the legislature had in mind the cancellation of the transfer including sale, which cannot be done when it has already taken place. "respectfully following the view taken by their Lordships I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned orders passed by the Government were legally bad and in excess of its powers under Section 20 of the Act aforesaid. My answer to the first question accordingly is in the negative. Reg. Question No. 2:-Three significant circumstances have been pointed out by the respondents in support of their submission that the writ petition is not bona fide, legal proceeding instituted to vindicate a genuine public interest. These are: (i) delay in the institution of the proceedings; (ii) absence of any public activity background of the petitioners and; (iii) the connections between the petitioners and the land owners who are said to have set them up to get the present proceedings launched. ( 9 ) MR. Vishwanath Shetty learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents strenuously argued that, the above circumstances when seen collectively show that the writ petition was not a bona fide exercise meant to serve any genuine public interest but only an attempt by the owners to secure indirectly what they had failed to achieve directly. He urged that the belated grievance of the petitioners, and its timing was much too transparent to hide the real purpose behind the filing of the petitions. He urged that the belated grievance of the petitioners, and its timing was much too transparent to hide the real purpose behind the filing of the petitions. He contended that the writ petition had been filed only after the owners had eventually failed in securing an injunction against the Society in the suits and the M. F. A. filed by them, and therefore the claim of the petitioners that they were acting in public interest could be accepted only with a pinch of salt. ( 10 ) MR. Datar learned Senior Counsel on the other hand submitted that the petitioners had no connection whatsoever with the erstwhile land owners, and that the occasion to file the writ petition had arisen only after the Supreme Court had authoritatively laid down the true legal position in so far as Section 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act was concerned. He argued that the action instituted by the petitioners could not be shut out only on the basis of the circumstances pointed out by the respondents. ( 11 ) PUBLIC Interest Litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon in the judicial system of this Country. It marks a departure from the adverserial system of adjudication known to us till recently. It is one of most profound judicial innovations symbolising an activity and non-conventional approach to issue of general public importance or relevance. The doctrine being one of recent origin, is as at present not subjected to any constraints as to the subjects or issues qua which the jurisdiction can be exercised, nor have the courts attempted to lay down clear guidelines or outlined the parameters for entertaining such litigation. What however is certain is that the concept has come to stay and blossom into one of the most useful and effective instruments for the courts to make use of in resolving issues of general application unhindered by the procedural or other considerations like locus standi of the person setting the legal process in motion. ( 12 ) A review of the case law on Public Interest Litigation is in my view, unnecessary, and a reference to few only of the judgments should suffice. ( 12 ) A review of the case law on Public Interest Litigation is in my view, unnecessary, and a reference to few only of the judgments should suffice. The landmark out of all these judgments is S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 in which Bhagwati, J. , (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court observed thus:"today a vast revolution in taking place id the judicial process; the theatre of law is fast changing and the problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The Court has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies for the purpose of providing access, to justice to large masses of people who are denied their basic human rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The only way in which this can be done is by entertaining writ petitions and even letters from public-spirited individuals seeking judicial redress for the benefit of persons who have suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose constitutional or legal rights have been violated but who by reason of their poverty or socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach the Court for relief. "the above case was followed by Babu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 308 , Miss Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 339 , People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473 , in which simple letters addressed to the Supreme Court were treated as writ petitions and proceedings initiated by the Court. In the later cases like D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 , Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Thera v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 74 , Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra Dehradun v. Stare of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 652 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College Shimla, AIR 1985 SC 910 the Apex Court enlarged and fashioned an all pervasive embarrassing role for the doctrine, to play in our judicial system. ( 13 ) IN the chain of judicial pronouncement on the new found doctrine of PIL, there is one common thread that runs through all these judgments namely the necessity of circumspection on the part of the Courts in the matter of entertaining litigation in the name of 'public interest'. ( 13 ) IN the chain of judicial pronouncement on the new found doctrine of PIL, there is one common thread that runs through all these judgments namely the necessity of circumspection on the part of the Courts in the matter of entertaining litigation in the name of 'public interest'. The key word in all such cases is the bona fides of the person setting the legal process in motion who should have sufficient interest in the matter in order that he may be entitled to maintain such proceedings. The judgments delivered by the Apex Court have cautioned the Courts against opening their doors wide at the instance of busy bodies, officious interveners, or those who have political or personal axes to grind. The process of the Courts cannot in the name of public interest litigation be allowed to be abused for vindication of private rights or for wreaking vengeance. What is important is that the person who moves the Court does so as a bona fide act aimed at serving public interest or the interest of the socially or economically disadvantaged class of the society. An effort has therefore to be made at the very threshold to see whether bona fides of the person at whose instance the legal process is being set in motion does or does not inspire confidence, and whether he has a reasonable interest in the matter. It is only in case the bona fides of the individual moving the Court in the name of public interest is beyond suspicion and the person concerned demonstrates the existence of a reasonable nexus with the subject chosen by him that the Courts intervention would be warranted. In S. P. Gupta's case, AIR 1982 SC 149 the Supreme Court cautioned that the relaxation of the Rule of locus standi in public interest litigation did not give any right to the meddlesome interlopers or officious interveners to approach the Court in the guise of 'public interest' litigation. The Court observed thus:"but we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the Court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. " ( 14 ) IN Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1987 SC 1109 , Khalid, J. , with whom Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. , as his Lordship then was agreed in a later judgment in the case of Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 549 , made the following significant observations:-"today public spirited litigants rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public. They must be above suspicion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But once is led to think that it poses a threat to Courts and public alike. Such cases are now filed without any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines and to outline the correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If Courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the Courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest litigations. " ( 15 ) IN Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976sc 578. Sarkaria J. , observed that busy bodies and meddlesome interlopers interfere even in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice and pretend to act in the name of Pro- Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. They masquerade as crusaders for justice and pretend to act in the name of Pro- Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration and that the High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold. ( 16 ) IN Fertilizer Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 , Krishna Iyer, J. , used the following expression on the subject:-"if a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to anyone of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the Court will not be ajar for him. " ( 17 ) IN Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420 the Court held that the person invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 must approach for vindication of the fundamental rights of the affected persons and not for the purpose of vindication of his personal grudge or enmity and that it was the duty of the Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous, litigants for personal ends in the garb of the public interest litigation. ( 18 ) IN Jantadal v. H. S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 392 the Court observed that it is only a person acting bona fide having sufficient interest in the proceedings of PIL who can have a locus standi to approach the Court in order to wipe-out the tears of the poor and the needy suffering from the violation of their fundamental rights and not a person who acts for personal gain or private or political motive. The Court held that while genuine litigations with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters or criminal cases in which person sentenced to death facing gallows undergo untold agony remain pending for long years and standing in a long serpentine queue for years in the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers. wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation, and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves which piquent situation creates a frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly making them lose faith in the administration of our judicial system. ( 19 ) THE question then is whether the petitioners in these writ petitions have satisfactorily established their locus standi to maintain these petitions. The answer to this would in turn depend upon whether the petitioners are acting bona fide and have sufficient interest in the litigation that they have initiated in the name of PIL. An answer to these questions, cannot be provided by the application of any cut or dried formulae nor has any such formula been devised by any judgments of the Supreme Court or the High Courts in the country. As to whether an action brought in the name of PIL is a bona fide action in public interest will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and would require an appreciation of the background in which such action has been brought. 'bona fide' is more a state of mind than a tangible state of affairs. The existence or otherwise of 'bona fide', therefore has to be gathered on the basis of the circumstances attendant upon a given case, for it is only by reference to the circumstances peculiar to each case that the question as to whether the action is bona fide can be satisfactorily answered. The existence or otherwise of 'bona fide', therefore has to be gathered on the basis of the circumstances attendant upon a given case, for it is only by reference to the circumstances peculiar to each case that the question as to whether the action is bona fide can be satisfactorily answered. ( 20 ) IN the instant case, the first and the foremost circumstance which the Respondents rely upon to show that the action brought by the petitioners is not bona fide is the delay in bringing the same on the part of the petitioners. ( 21 ) DELAY it is well settled defeats equity, and the writ jurisdiction of this Court being discretionary and equitable it can decline to exercise the same should there be unreasonable delay in the filing of the proceedings before it. Inordinate and unexplained delay would even give rise to the inference that the proceedings are not bona fide, for anything which is not done with due care and caution cannot be said to be bona fide. Lethargy, indolence, neglect or contumacious inaction on the part of the petitioner would make any belated attempt at setting the legal proceedings in motion, suspect and therefore any thing but bona fide. ( 22 ) IN the present case there is a delay of over ten years between the issue of the impugned orders and the filing of the writ petition. There is no explanation in the petition as to why the petitioners slept over what they consider to be an improper act of allowing the landowner to transfer the excess land held by him, which would but for such exemption and transfer have gone to the landless, needy among the poorer sections of the Society. Silence of the petitioners for over a decade or so, makes their belated and self professed righteous indignation look like a pretence more than a genuine grievance which this Court could make a basis for any public interest proceedings. The argument that the legal position as to the true scope and purpose of Sec. 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act was not known till the Supreme Court settled the matter does not commend itself to me. What the Supreme Court has done is only declare the legal position which would be deemed to be the true position as it always existed. What the Supreme Court has done is only declare the legal position which would be deemed to be the true position as it always existed. The absence of the Apex Court judgment did not prevent the petitioners from filing a writ petition if they were truly concerned over the illegal order passed by the Government nor was it a case where the legal position stood settled by some earlier judgment of the Supreme Court, in the face whereof any attempt at agitating the question of legality of the orders may have looked futile. The delay in the filing of the writ petition thus remains unexplained, casting a cloud over the bona fides of the petitioners belated attempt to invoke the process of this Court in the name of public interest. The Supreme Court has in K. R. Srinivas v. R. M. Premchand, (1994) 6 SCC 620 , held that a person who moves the Court in public interest belatedly has no locus standi to do so. The following passage from the judgment is instructive :"a writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands, like any other writ petitioner, must further come with a clean heart, clean mind and a clean objective. It cannot be assumed that the respondent who at the relevant time was a Research Scholar and part and parcel of the University, did not know the regulations where under the answer books were destroyed within six months from the examination under formal orders of the functionaries. It cannot also be assumed that he did not know about the destruction of the answer books of the appellant at the time when he moved the High Court in public interest. Therefore, he had no locus standi to move the High Court in public interest at the belated point of time. Accordingly, the order of the Division Bench is set aside and the operative part of the single Judge of the High Court is restored. As a sequel, all the remarks against the appellant's father in the judgment of the division Bench of the High Court not only get expunged but the whole basis on which they rest stands affected. Accordingly, the order of the Division Bench is set aside and the operative part of the single Judge of the High Court is restored. As a sequel, all the remarks against the appellant's father in the judgment of the division Bench of the High Court not only get expunged but the whole basis on which they rest stands affected. "that brings me to the other two circumstances relied upon by the respondents namely that the petitioners have no credentials to offer for espousing a cause in public interest and that their association with the landowners shows that they have been inspired to do so. There is some merit even in this submission. It is true that it is not, necessary for a citizen to demonstrate that he has an established tract record of being a public activist, before he can institute proceedings in public interest, yet, while disclosing his or her locus standi to do so, the least that the petitioner would be required to do so is to divulge the background in which he suddenly becomes a crusader against injustice which he wants the Court to remove. This is because the petitioner should not be a mere name lender, in a litigation aimed at fighting some one elses battle in the grab of Public Interest Litigation. It is for the petitioners to show that they are not pawns in the invisible lands of some private interest, and for doing so, they must disclose all such facts as would prove their bona fides. After all bona fides behind an action can be judge only by reference to such attendant circumstances, which ought to be disclosed by petitioner to inspire confidence in the Court. ( 23 ) SEEN thus the petitioners have revealed nothing that could show their bona fides. All that the writ petition contains is an assertion that the petitioners are Tax paying Citizens of India interested in the Rule of law; and because of exorbitant prices of the real estate have been unable to acquire a house of their own in Bangalore. These assertions of a general character are hardly enough and leave a hog of questions unanswered. For instance, the petition does not disclose the social background of the petitioners, one of whom appears to be a house wife, nor does it indicate whether they have been active in any social or reformatory activity over the past. These assertions of a general character are hardly enough and leave a hog of questions unanswered. For instance, the petition does not disclose the social background of the petitioners, one of whom appears to be a house wife, nor does it indicate whether they have been active in any social or reformatory activity over the past. Their silence, for a long period of one decade since the impugned order was passed too remains unexplained particularly in the context of the admitted position that they reside in the very same village where the land in question is located. Suffice it to say that in the absence of clear and faithful disclosure of facts relevant for determining the bona fides of the petitioner the circumstances pointed out by the respondents to show that the action is mala fide and inspired by the erstwhile owners cannot be said to be farfetched no matter the allegation of the respondents that one of the petitioners has purchased a site from the owners, while the other is a tenant under one of them has been denied. There is also no explanation as to why have the petitioners produced only that order of exemption which pertains to the land in dispute and impleaded only the fifth respondent-society, who is the beneficiary under the same even when the relief prayed for in the writ petition purports to challenge all such orders issued by the Government over the past years. It appears as if the petitioners are actually interested in having only one of those orders struck down even when they have generally asked for quashing other similar orders without so much as producing copies of the said orders or impleading all those concerned with the same as party respondents. The inference is obvious. The petition is not an attempt to vindicate any uniform principle applicable to all such orders similarly but is aimed at challenging only one single order in which they are interested. ( 24 ) SUPER added to the above is the fact that the present writ petition was filed only after the owners who have filed O. S. No. 423/92 and O. S. No. 4903/93 failed in securing an injunction order against the respondent-society and their M. F. A. filed in this Court against the refusal order was also dismissed by this Court on 4-2-1994. The totality of the above circumstances therefore lead me to the conclusion that the present writ petition is not a bona fide proceeding instituted in public interest. My answer to question No. 2 also is therefore in the negative. Re: Question No. 3: The Respondent-Society's case is that it has spent an amount of over Rupees forty four lakhs, on the purchase of the land in question, its conversion to non-agriculture use and formation of the layout. Since the petitioners did not accept the fact that the layout was already formed, it was considered proper to appoint a Commission to get a clear picture about the actual position obtaining on the spot. Consequently Shri G. Patri Baswan Gowda, Registrar Vigilance of this Court was appointed as Commissioner by my order dated 15-2-1995 with the direction to visit the spot and report. The report submitted by him after spot inspection records the following:" (A) A layout has been formed. (b) The general plan executed is in accordance with the one approved by the B. D. A. in its resolution No. 2120 dated 31-7-1991 as per the copy made available to me. (c) Roads have been formed and they are metalled roads. (d) Cross drains (Storm water drains with stone slabs) are formed. (e) Culverts are also laid, except at one point marked with a cross in red pencil in the copy of the plan submitted herewith. (f) Big masonry drain is also constructed for carrying water from the upstream. (g) There is a valley like halla all along Northern boundary of the area. (h) The areas set apart for park and civic aminities are in their original forms. (i) Demarcation of sites and fixing of boundary stones for each individual site is not yet done, though the area left for sites tallies with the one mentioned in the approved plan. (j) Water supply, underground drainage, and electricity lines are not yet provided. " ( 25 ) DESPITE an opportunity given to the parties to file objections if any, no objections have been filed. The observations made in the report have therefore to be treated to be admitted. It follows, that the respondent- society has taken substantial steps and invested a collosal amount on the entire project in the bona fide belief that the sale made in their favour was legally sound and binding. The observations made in the report have therefore to be treated to be admitted. It follows, that the respondent- society has taken substantial steps and invested a collosal amount on the entire project in the bona fide belief that the sale made in their favour was legally sound and binding. The amount spent has been collected from the members of the society who are employees of the University of Agriculture Sciences and belong to the middle or the lower rung of the hierarchy, for whom owning a shelter for the family in the form of a house of their own is a distant dream. Small savings made out of the salaries by sacrificing other comforts and necessities for a long period stretching in most cases over a life time, have nourished the fond hope of getting a site. When amounts saved thus are spent, and a layout emerges, the hopes and aspirations of those who have waited endlessly seem to be coming true. It is a realisation of a dream for the employee for ought we know the hardship, inconvenience and, suffering which a middle class white collared job holder or those of less fortunate than that have to undergo in the ever growing cities of this country where human life is cheap but a dignified shelter for the family expensive. ( 26 ) THE question then is whether this court should at this stage, interfere in the name of Public Interest at the instance of two individuals whose bona fides are suspect and who have allowed the innocent third party to change its position to its detriment all these years. My answer is in the negative. In a Public Interest initiative, the ultimate test is whether Courts intervention is necessary to secure justice for the disadvantaged or the deprived sections of the society, whether the system has in any way failed to serve the purpose underlying the guarantee of the fundamental rights or the promise that the directive principles hold for the teeming millions of this Country, whether private gain or avarice has in any manner, deprived any section of its legitimate due? And in the process of determining all these, the benefit that would accrue to the public at large or a given section of the same has to be kept in view, while at the same time keeping the hardship to those who may suffer on account of the Courts intervention in mind. Suffice it to say that the mere illegality of an action, would not by itself be enough for the Court to interfere if it is found that any such intervention would cause inconvenience or hardship to a sizeable section of the public who have acted bona fide or were in no way responsible for the illegality pointed out by the public activist. ( 27 ) APPLYING the above tests, to the instant case, I am of the view that notwithstanding the invalidity of the order impugned this Court need not interfere with either the order or the sale-deed executed in pursuance thereof. I say so firstly because, the writ petition is not a bona fide proceeding initiated in Public Interest. Secondly because, the present proceedings have been launched belatedly without there being any explanation for the same. Thirdly, because, the third party namely the respondent society and its members have changed their position to their detriment by spending a considerable amount on the development of the land in a layout, fourthly because, any interference with the impugned order would adversely affect a large section of the people who have in no way been responsible for the invalidity attached to the order or the sale transactions in pursuance thereto, and lastly because even according to the petitioners the land in question ought to have been distributed among the landless, instead of allowing the owner to sell the same for a price. This object is substantially if not entirely achieved by the distribution of the sites among the deserving members of the respondent Society against whose membership or management, there is no allegation of misuse or mismanagement. To strike down at this stage the sale transaction in favour of the Society would in these circumstances amount to robing Peter to pay Paul which appears to me to be neither just nor otherwise warranted. ( 28 ) MY answer to question No. 3 is also in the circumstances in the negative. To strike down at this stage the sale transaction in favour of the Society would in these circumstances amount to robing Peter to pay Paul which appears to me to be neither just nor otherwise warranted. ( 28 ) MY answer to question No. 3 is also in the circumstances in the negative. ( 29 ) IN the result, this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but without any orders as to costs. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .