S. N. SAHAY, J. This is an appeal by the State against the order of sri J. V. N Jaiswal, Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur dated 27. 6. 80 acquitting Padam Singh respondent under Section 376 I. P. C. in Session Trial No. 87/80. 2. The prosecution case is that Premwati (PW1) is the daughter of Ratnoo resident of village Nayagaon Police Station Rampur District Saharanpur. On February 4, 1980 at about noon the respondent came to the house of Premwati and asked Premwati and her cousin Rajendra to come to his field for cutting Barseem. Premwati was aged about 11 years at that time. Both Premwati and Rajendra went with the respondent to his field and cut Barseem for about 1 1/2 hour. Rajendra at the instance of the respondent took a bundle of Barseem and went away for keeping the same at the house of the respondent. After Rajendra had left, Premwati was taken to the adjoining sugar cane field of Niranjan by the respondent. In that field, the respondent caused Premwati to lie down on the ground, took off his Paijama, pulled down the salwar of Premwati and committed rape on her. The salwar of Premwati got stained with blood. Lotan (PW 2) Pirthi (PW 3) and others arrived at the spot on hearing cries of Premwati. The respondent took his paijama and ran away on seeing them. 3. After the incident, a report was written by Pirthi (PW 3), on which Premwati affixed her thumb impression. Pirthi is uncle of Premwati. The report was lodged by Premwati at police station Rampur on February 4,1980 at 8. 15 P. M. The distance between the police station and village Nayagaon is 9 miles. The Police registered a case against the respondent under Section 376 I. P. C. The case was investigated by Sub-Inspector Rukan Singh (PW 4 ). He inspected the place of occurrence, prepared site-plan and interrogated the witnesses. He did not find the respondent who later on surrendered in court on February 7, 1980. After completing investigation he submitted charge-sheet against the respondent on February 8,1980. Dr. (Smt.) Nirmala Sharma examined Premwati on February 5, 1980 at 11. 30 A. M. Premwati was produced before her by constable Bhag Singh. The medical report prepared by Dr. (Smt.) Sharma is as follows: "secondary Sex Characters - Breasts not developed. No hair present in the axilla. After completing investigation he submitted charge-sheet against the respondent on February 8,1980. Dr. (Smt.) Nirmala Sharma examined Premwati on February 5, 1980 at 11. 30 A. M. Premwati was produced before her by constable Bhag Singh. The medical report prepared by Dr. (Smt.) Sharma is as follows: "secondary Sex Characters - Breasts not developed. No hair present in the axilla. No marks of injury seen on the body. Per vaginam Exam : Vagina admits one finger with difficulty p/v. Very painful. Hymen torn at various places. Inflamed bleeding on touch, red. Second degree vaginal tear at 6 Oclock position about 1 cm long present towards anus. Clots seen in vagina. " 4. Premwati was referred by Dr. (Smt.) Sharma for X-ray examination for determina tion of her age. The X-ray report, dated February 5,1980, indicated that in the Right wrist Pisoform bone was present and in Right elbow epiphysis of medial epicondyle was not fused and epiphysis of bones of right knee was also not fused. According to X-ray report, the age of Premwati was about 11 years. 5. The report of Dr. (Smt.) Sharma dated February 5,1980 shows that vaginal smear was taken and sent for microscopic examination. Blood stains were present on the Salwar of Premwati was wearing and it was directed that it should be sealed by police. Pathological report dated 5. 2. 80 was that no spermatozoa was seen (dead or alive ). In her report dated 6. 2. 80 Dr. (Smt.) Sharma, after referring to the pathological report, stated that no definite opinion can be formed about rape. 6. The Salwar of Premwati was sent with a covering letter of Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 11. 2. 80 to the Chemical Examiner for examination and report. The Chemical Examiner gave a report dated 10. 6. 80 stating that blood stains and spermatozoa were found on the Salwar. The largest blood stain was 15 cm. long. The respondent was charged under Section 376 I. P. C. at the trial. The prosecution examined four witnesses namely Premwati (PW 1), Lotan (PW 2), Pirthi (PW 3) and Sub-Inspector Rukan Singh (PW 4 ). Premwati is the victim and two other witnesses are eye-witnesses of the occurrence. Sub-inspector Rukan Singh is Investigating Officer. Dr. (Smt.) Sharma was examined as C. W. 1. The respondent denied the prosecution case. He has stated that he has been falsely implicated due to enmity. Premwati is the victim and two other witnesses are eye-witnesses of the occurrence. Sub-inspector Rukan Singh is Investigating Officer. Dr. (Smt.) Sharma was examined as C. W. 1. The respondent denied the prosecution case. He has stated that he has been falsely implicated due to enmity. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge found that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond doubt and the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. Therefore the respondent was acquitted. 7. Learned counsel for the State has urged that it is proved from the evidence on record that on 4. 2. 80 at about 5. 00 p. m. the respondent committed rape on Km. Premwati, a minor girl aged about 11 years, in the sugarcane field of Niranjan in village Nayagaon. Premwati (PW 1) has testified to the prosecution case stated above. Her testimony shows that at the time of occurrence she and her cousin Rajendra had gone to the field of respondent, at his instance, for cutting Barseem. Rajendra left under the directions of the respondent for carrying a bundle of Barseem to his house. After this, Premwati was lifted by the respondent in his lap and was taken to the sugarcane field of Niranjan where the respondent committed rape on her. Premwati has stated that her salwar was stained with blood and on the arrival of the witnesses on her cries the respondent ran away taking his Paijama with him. Premwati has been subjected to lengthy cross-examination, but she has not been shaken. She has repudiated the suggestion made on behalf of the respondent that she was not subjected the sexual intercourse by the respondent and since she got injured the respondent was implicated due to enmity. 8. It is true that Premwati has deposed that the respondent came to her house at about 2. 00 or 3. 00 P. M. and took her and Rajendra to his field for cutting Barseem. This fact is not specifically mentioned in the F. I. R. It is only mentioned that Padam came to the house of Premwati at noon (Aaj dopahar mein) and took her to his field. In our opinion the omission on the part of Premwati to mention the precise time (2. 00 or 3. 00 P. M.) in the F. I. R. is not significant. In our opinion the omission on the part of Premwati to mention the precise time (2. 00 or 3. 00 P. M.) in the F. I. R. is not significant. The fact that rape was committed by the respondent in the field of Niranjan is also not mentioned in the F. I. R. It is stated that the respondent lifted Premwati by force, took her to the adjoining sugarcane field (wahin pas mem ikh ke khet mein) fell her down and forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. The site-plan shows that the sugarcane field of Niranjan is an adjoining field, situate on the southern side of the field of the respondent. The omission to mention the name of Niranjan in the F. I. R. cannot be considered to be material. The testimony of Premwati cannot be brushed aside on these minor contradictions, as has been held by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, either with regard to the place of occurrence or the factum of rape. 9. According to Dr. (Smt.) Nirmala Sharma C. W. 1 who examined Premwati on 5. 2. 80 at 11. 30 A. M. it was found that vagina admitted one finger with difficulty and P/v was very painful and hymen was torn at various places, inflammed and bleeding on touch and red. Second degree vaginal tear about 1 cm long was present towards anus and clots were seen in vagina. Dr. Sharma has admitted in her evidence that the vaginal tear would be caused by rape and even after sexual intercourse, the orifice will admit only one finger. She has also stated that the tear was fresh as bleeding was present on touch. The injuries found on the person of Premwati at the time of medical examination are sufficient to corroborate her testimony with regard to commission of rape. 10. Dr. (Smt.) Shrama has, however, not given any positive opinion regarding rape in the injury report prepared by her. She referred to the pathological report which indicated that no spermatozoa was seen (dead or alive ). She has explained in her evidence that no definite opinion could be given because no injury was found on the labia mejora or labia minora or mucous membrane and it is possible that vaginal tear may be caused by injury also. She referred to the pathological report which indicated that no spermatozoa was seen (dead or alive ). She has explained in her evidence that no definite opinion could be given because no injury was found on the labia mejora or labia minora or mucous membrane and it is possible that vaginal tear may be caused by injury also. In this connection it may be pointed out that Premwati (PW 1) has stated in cross-examination that at the time of incident, she tried to get herself released from the clutches of the respondent and marks of resistance were visible on her breast, hands and feet. She has gone to the extent of saying that abrasions were caused from which blood also came out. According to her, the injuries were shown by her to the Doctor as also to the police. No injuries were found on her person at the time of her medical examination. It may be that Premwati has indulged in exaggaration in making statement regarding injuries and so it may not be accepted as correct. But that cannot be a ground for rejecting the whole of her testimony. 11. The absence of injuries on the body of the prosecutrix, generally, gives rise to an inference that she was a consenting party to coitus. But the absence of injuries, either on the accused or on the prosecutrix, is not, by itself, sufficient to hold that the prosecutrix was consenting party; it only shows that the prosecutrix did not resist, may be on account of being frightened or being unnerved. As held in Sheikh Zakir v. State of Bihar 1983 Criminal Law Journal 1285 the absence of any injuries on the person of the complainant may not by itself discredit the statement of the complainant. Merely because the complainant was a helpless victim who was by force prevented from offering serious physical resistance, she cannot be disbelieved. Similar view has been taken with regard to absence of injuries on the body of the accused or the victim or the absence of spermatozoa in vaginal smear in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, J. T. 1993 (2) S. C. 152 and Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka, 1994 (5) S. C. C. 728. Similar view has been taken with regard to absence of injuries on the body of the accused or the victim or the absence of spermatozoa in vaginal smear in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, J. T. 1993 (2) S. C. 152 and Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka, 1994 (5) S. C. C. 728. In the first mentioned case, the victim was a girl of 7 or 8 years and the medical evidence was that the hymen was ruptured and slight bleeding coming out of the vaginal edges. Blood clots were also present and the external genitals were found to be tender and red. The vagina admitted one finger with difficulty, which got smeared with blood. In the second case, the girl was about 14 years old. According to the medical evidence, hymen was ruptured, admitted two fingers, bled on touch, was reddish in colour and was painful and tender. It was held in both cases that medical evidence offered sufficient corroboration to the evidence of the prosecutrix and no inference can be drawn from the absence of injuries or spermatozoa. 12. It is remarkable that Premwati was about 11 years old at the time of occurrence. Her age was not disputed in the trial court or in this Court. It stands proved from the evidence on record. It may be that on account of her tender age she could not offer much resistance. The question of consent being immaterial. She was over-powered by the respondent and hence no visible injuries were caused on her body. However, she has no motive to implicate the respondent falsely and to make a false accusation of rape against him. It may be that the father of the respondent had moved an application against the father and uncle of the prosecutrix in the canal department some time before the occur rence. But that can hardly be taken into account as furnishing sufficient motive to falsely implicate the respondent. No spermatozoa was seen in the vaginal smear, but the salwar of the prosecutrix was found stained with blood and spermatozoa. The Salwar was no doubt seized about 48 hours after the occurrence at the instance of Dr. (Smt.) Sharma. But there is no evidence that any tempering was done with the Salwar in the meantime. The report of the Chemical examiner was not before Dr. (Smt.) Sharma when she gave her report. The Salwar was no doubt seized about 48 hours after the occurrence at the instance of Dr. (Smt.) Sharma. But there is no evidence that any tempering was done with the Salwar in the meantime. The report of the Chemical examiner was not before Dr. (Smt.) Sharma when she gave her report. The absence of injuries and spermatozoa by themselves are not conclusive evidence and Dr. (Smt.) Sharma has not given a negative opinion in clear terms. The ellegeable facts found at the time of medical examination support the evidence of Premwati in full measure. The respondent took advantage of the loneliness of the prosecutrix in his field and forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. His subsequent conduct in running away with his paijama on the arrival of the witnesses is also indicative of his guilt. Therefore, we are satisfied that the evidence of Premwati (PW1) deserves to be accepted in toto. 13. Lotan (PW 2) has stated that at the time of occurrence he was going towards his field. Pirthi (P W 3) has stated that he was cutting grass in the south of the field of Niranjan. Both of them went there on hearing the cries of the girl and saw the occurrence. They have not been shaken in cross-examination on material points. We see no reason to discard their evidence. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge has however held that Lotan is a Khandani and Pirthi is the uncle of the prosecutrix and both are interested witnesses. If the evidence of these two witnesses, is excluded on the ground that they are interested witnesses, even then we consider that Premwati is a wholly reliable witness and her evidence is sufficient to prove establish the charge against the respondent. 14. After carefully considering the evidence on record we have come to the con clusion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the fact that the respondent com mitted rape on Premwati at the stated time and place and he has thereby committed an offence under Section 376 I. P. C. He has been wrongly acquitted by the trial court and the acquittal is laible to be set aside. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the respondent has a right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution and this right is available to the respondent at all stages of the proceedings including appeal. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the respondent has a right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution and this right is available to the respondent at all stages of the proceedings including appeal. He has submitted that the alleged occurrence took place on 4. 2. 80, the appeal against acquittal was filed on 24th September 1980 and the appeal was admitted on 13. 1. 81. The appeal has come up for hearing after the lapse of about 15 years for no fault of the respondent. He has further submitted that an appeal is a continuation of the trial and the hearing of the appeal after undue delay of 15 years for which the respondent is not responsible would infringe the right of the respondent to speedy trial. It is accordingly prayed that the appeal may be dismissed and the prosecution and trial may be quashed. The respondent has also moved a formal application dated 29. 3. 95 for the same purpose. 16. Learned counsel has further contended that this appeal should have been decided within two years. He has tried to support this argument by reference to Article 224 (1) of the Constitution which provides that the President may appoint duly qualified persons to be Additional Judges of the High Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify. This power may be exercised by the President if, as held in S. P. Gupta v. President of India, A. I. R. 1982 S. C. 149, if one or other or both of the pre-conditions for the exercise of power are satisfied, namely (1) by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Court, or (2) by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of Judges of that Court should be for the time being increased. In other words, Additional Judges can be appointed only where temporary increase in the business of the High Court or the arrears of work can be expected to be disposed of within a period of two years and not very much more. This called for a review of the number of permanent judges in the light of the accumulated arrears of the Court. This called for a review of the number of permanent judges in the light of the accumulated arrears of the Court. The expediency of taking necessary measuras for the purpose of appointing requisite number of Judges was emphasised in Shecla Barse and another v. Union of India and others A. I. R. 1986 Supreme Court 1773 and in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1994 S. C. 268 which was decided by a Nine-Judge Bench, the majority has taken the view that fixation of Judge strength in High Court is justiciable and if it is shown that the existing strength is inadequate to provide - speedy justice to the people-speedy trial being a requirement of Article 21-inspite of the efficiency of the existing strength, a direction can be issued to assess the felt need and fixed the strength of Judges with the need to fulfill the said obligation of providing speedy disposal. Learned counsel has submitted that he has filed writ petition No. 4502/82 Indian Society of Lawyers Vs. Union of India in this Court for appointment of more Judges to clear arrears. The matter was referred to a larger Bench by order dated 3. 5. 82 but the Bench has not been constituted and an application to expedite the hearing of writ petition has been rejected. 17. There is no doubt that the right of speedy trial is considered to be a fundamental right implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. If the case is not tried speedily and remains pending for an unreasonable length of time, the said right would be violated. It has been held in Husain Ara v. State of Behar, A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1360, that the consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed. In Sheela case cited above a direction was issued to complete the investigation and trial in respect of juvenile offenders within a fixed period, in Abdul Rahman Antuley v. R. S. Nayak, 1992 (1) S. C. C. 225 it has been laid down that right to speedy trial is the right of the accused and it is part of fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 and reflected in Section 309 Cr. P. C. Social interest lies in punishing the guilty and exoneration of the innocent, but this determination (of guilt or innocence) must be arrived at with reasonable dispatch - reasonable in all the circumstan ces of the case. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. It was further held that right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. This view has been taken again in Kanar Singh v. State of Punjab, J. T 1994 (2) S. C. 423, vide para 92. Learned counsel for the respondent has specially referred to the observations made in para 12 of The State v. Maksudan Singh and others, A. I. R. 1986 Patna 38, the relevant portion may be extracted as below: "it is plain that the right of speedy and public trial does not arise or depend on the conviction and sentence of the accused. Barring exceptions (where it may be invoked even after conviction), such right indeed arises normally before any conviction or sentence is recorded. An accused person on the ground of inordinate delay should claim the right long before the conclusion of the trial and before the stage of holding him guilty or otherwise arises. The assumption that he must be first convicted before he can invoke such a right, and only thereafter, he can claim some leniency in the quantum of sentence at the stage of its imposition or later in the appellate forum has, therefore, to be categorically rejected. In the case of gross and inordinate delay in trial Court itself, it is open to the accused to invoke the claim that the trial should be halted in its tracks because his constitutional right stands plainly infracted. It is not open to the prosecution to suggest that despite the violation of the constitutional guarantee, the belated trial must continue and on the out lying chance of a conviction being recorded, some benefit in the imposition of sentence be given for violating the right which has been declared as both a human right and a constitutional one. It is not open to the prosecution to suggest that despite the violation of the constitutional guarantee, the belated trial must continue and on the out lying chance of a conviction being recorded, some benefit in the imposition of sentence be given for violating the right which has been declared as both a human right and a constitutional one. " Thus it will appear that while it is the right of the accused to claim speedy trial, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case whether the right of speedy trial has been infringed or not. As laid down by the constitution Bench in the case of Abdual Rahman Antuley, cited above, it will have to be determined whether the trial has been held with reasonable despatch in all the circumstances of the case, therefore, it will not be reasonable to hold merely on the basis of the number of years or the amount of time taken in completing the trial that Article 21 has been violated, unless, of course, the law requires the trial to be completed or the appeal to be decided within a specified period or some such condition is prescribed. The time taken in holding the trial or hearing the appeal or revision may prima fade suggest the inference that undue delay has taken place and Article 21 has been violated. But in order to come to a definite finding, one will have to consider all the relevant circumstances: Delay is a relative term and is to be determined on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances of a particular case. This is not intended to constitute as a charter for protracting the trial or proceedings of a case on account of lethargy or lame excuses and the like. The substance of the matter is that when it is claimed by the accused that the prosecution or trial may be quashed on account of delay in completing the proceedings, it will be necessary to consider all the attending circumstances which are relevant for the purpose of the case and to arrive at a clear finding that unreasonable delay has taken place by reason of which the procedure contemplated by Article 21 would cease to be just, fair and reasonable and would become oppressive, arbitrary and fanciful. In recent time also the prosecution has not been quashed merely on the ground of passage of time. In Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan, J. T. 1990 (1) S. C. 74, the accused applied under Section 482 Cr. P. C. for quashing the criminal proceedings in eight cases pending against him for the offence under Section 408 I. P. C. during the period from 1961 to 1963. The proceedings were pending for over 25 years and yet the plea of the accused that the prolongation of the trial without any fault on the part of the accused amounts to persecu tion and the proceedings should be quashed was rejected. Dealing with this submission, it was observed that it is no doubt regrettable feature but having regard to the nature of the allegations made and the availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings at this stage, on account of lapse of time alone and the circumstances of the case only called for appropriate directions for expeditious dis posal of the pending proceedings. In the case of Raghubir Singh, also, cited above, the occurrence had taken place in 1982, the accused was acquitted by the High Court in 1983-84 and the appeal against acquittal was allowed by the Supreme Court on 18. 2. 93 and the accused was convicted under Section 376 I. P. C. and sentenced to severe rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. 18. In the present case the trial was completed in 1980 itself within a reasonable time after the occurrence had taken place. No fresh trial is to be held and the rehearing in the appellate court is to take place on the basis of evidence on record. The precise reason for the appeal coming up now for hearing is not known, if the respondent is not responsible for it, it is equally true that the same cannot be attributed solely to the Judge strength of the High Court. There are no materials on record to justify a nexus between the two. When it is said that appeal is continuation of the trial it is not the same thing as to say that appeal is trial itself. Trial commences with the framing of the charge and terminates with the verdict of conviction or acquittal by the trial court. There are no materials on record to justify a nexus between the two. When it is said that appeal is continuation of the trial it is not the same thing as to say that appeal is trial itself. Trial commences with the framing of the charge and terminates with the verdict of conviction or acquittal by the trial court. Appeal is continuation of the trial in the sense that the verdict of the trial court is not the ultimate, it is subject to the decision of the appellate court and that the appellate court is competent to exercise all the powers of the trial court in dealing with the matter under appeal. In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded and come to its own finding, bearing in mind that it does not have the advantage of the trial court in observing the demeanour of the witnesses and also that the presump tion of innocence of the accused is reinforced by the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court. The respondent has been found to be guilty of committing rape on a minor girl of 11 years in a most callous manner. The offence was committed by him forgetting that he is a grown-up man leading a marital life having a young wife 28 years old and small children. This is evident from the application for parole (Criminal Misc. 323/80) dated 28. 3. 80 moved on his behalf in the court of Session at Saharanpur. The effect of quashing the prosecution and the trial would be to let off the respondent unpunished inspite of the fact that it has been proved at a trial held in accordance with law that the offence was committed by him. As a matter of fact it has not been seriously questioned on behalf of the respondent that the charge of rape is established against him from the evidence on record. The act of the respondent does not deserve to be condoned and it will be in the interest of justice, that suitable punishment is imposed on respondent. This will also give effect to the constitutional goal of social justice as also to the fundamental duty of a citizen under Article 51-A to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. The act of the respondent does not deserve to be condoned and it will be in the interest of justice, that suitable punishment is imposed on respondent. This will also give effect to the constitutional goal of social justice as also to the fundamental duty of a citizen under Article 51-A to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. The passage of time cannot be a ground by itself in the circumstances of the case, for quashing the prosecution or the trial, although it may be a mitigating circumstance for taking a some what lenient view in awarding the sentence. 19. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order under appeal are hereby set aside. The respondent Padam Singh is held to be guilty under Section 376 I. P. C. and is sentenced to regorous imprisonment for five (5) years. The respondent shall be taken into custody for serving out the sentence. Appeal allowed. .