JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. - Heard the learned Counsel for the parties 2. One of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant in support of the present application under Section 397 read with Sections 401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pulgaon on 11.5.94 was an interlocutory order and not amenable to revision under Section 397 Cr. P.C. and, therefore, the 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, Wardha committed serious error of jurisdiction in allowing the revision application filed by the non-applicant No.1 herein and setting aside the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pulgaon on 11. 5.94. 3. Opposing the aforesaid submission made by Mr. Gandhi, Mr. A Shelat, the learned Counsel for the non-applicant No.1 strenuously urged that the non-applicant No.1 herein was not a party in the proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pulgaon in which the order dated 11.5.94 was passed and, therefore, according to him, the order dated 11.5.94 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, F.C., Pulgaon in Misc. Criminal Application No. 32 of 1994, so far as non-applicant No.1 was concerned, was final order and, therefore, the criminal revision filed by the non-applicant No.1 hereinbefore the 3rd Add I. Sessions Judge, Wardha was competent. Mr. A Shelat also submitted that as a matter of fact, the order passed by the judicial Magistrate. First Class was an order under Section 457 Cr. P.C. since the vehicle in question was not produced before the Court and it was not an order under Section 451 Cr. P. C. 4. Since the primary question raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant is about the maintainability of the revision application filed by the non-applicant No.1 hereinbefore the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha, the facts in details are not required to be gone into. Suffice it to observe that the dispute between the applicant herein on the one hand and the non-applicants 1 and 2 herein on the other hand relates to the vehicle, viz. Truck bearing No. MP-23-B/6577 (old), MH-31/9763 (new). The said vehicle was seized by the Police Station Officer, Aurangabad in Crime No. 57/94 registered at Police Station, Pulgaon. Suffice it to observe that the dispute between the applicant herein on the one hand and the non-applicants 1 and 2 herein on the other hand relates to the vehicle, viz. Truck bearing No. MP-23-B/6577 (old), MH-31/9763 (new). The said vehicle was seized by the Police Station Officer, Aurangabad in Crime No. 57/94 registered at Police Station, Pulgaon. On seizure of the said vehicle, the application came to be filed by the present applicant for getting the custody of the aforesaid truck on Supratnama It appears from the order passed by tl1e ,Judicial Magistrate, Pulgaon that the non-Applicant No.1 also filed an application (Ex. 5) before the said Court for releasing the truck in his favour. 5. There is no dispute that the truck was originally registered in the name of the present applicant. However, the case of the non-applicant No.1 herein before the Trial Court was that he had purchased the said truck from the present applicant Liyakat. Be that as it may, it is apparent from the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pulgaon that the said Court heard the Counsel for the applicant, the Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the Counsel for non-applicant No.1 herein and after perusal of the available material on record held that the present applicant Liyakat was entitled to get possession of the truck and the Police Station Officer, Pulgaon was directed to hand over possession of the said truck and original documents to the applicant on Supratnama of Rs. 5,00,000/- and the applicant Liyakat was directed to produce the said truck before the Court as and when directed and not to tamper or alienate the truck in any manner until further orders. The order passed by the learned Magistrate was definitely an order of interim nature subject to final order. Though there is dispute between the parties as to whether the present order has been passed under Section 451 Cr. P.C or under Section 457 Cr. P.C in my view, so) far as the nature of the order to) find out whether it is interlocutory or not, it does not make much difference whether it is covered under Section 451 or Section 457 Cr. P.C According to Mr. A. Shelat since the vehicle was not produced before the Court, Section 451 Cr. P.C. was not applicable while according to Mr. P.C According to Mr. A. Shelat since the vehicle was not produced before the Court, Section 451 Cr. P.C. was not applicable while according to Mr. Gandhi, the documents of the seized vehicle were submitted before the Court and, therefore, the order was passed under Section 451 Cr. P.C. Be that as it may from the very nature of the order, it is very much clear that it is an interlocutory order and did not decide the rights of the parties in any manner. The order passed by the learned Magistrate was not an order falling in the category or intermediate order and it is an interlocutory order pure and simple. In Virendrakumar J. Handa v. Dilawarkhan Ajia Ors1, this Court considered the nature of the such order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class for interim custody of the vehicle on supratnama, viz-a-viz maintainability of the revision under Section 397 Cr. P.C. and this Court held as under: "12. In my view, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has merit and has to be accepted. As pointed out by Gadgil, J. in Ghafoor Bhai's case - (supra), an order may be passed under Section 457 of the Code purely at the stage of investigation or even after that charge- sheet had been filed, but before the property was actually produced before the Court during the trial. In the latter case, any order passed by the Magistrate must necessarily be an interlocutory order subject to the final orders to be passed after the trial has concluded. " 16. Mr. Sam ant argued that the order in question was not an interlocutory order at all. He referred to tl1ejudgment of tl1e Supreme Court in Amar Nath and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1977 SC 2185 and in Madhu Urnaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 (Cri. L.J 165) SC 47, and pointed that after noticing the historical background against which Section 397(2) was brought on to the Statute book, the Supreme Court in these two cases accepted the proposition that every order which is not final, need not be an interlocutory order. He also pointed out that in these judgments the Supreme Court has laid down that there could be an intermediate category of orders which were not final and yet could not be considered as merely interlocutory as they decide. He also pointed out that in these judgments the Supreme Court has laid down that there could be an intermediate category of orders which were not final and yet could not be considered as merely interlocutory as they decide. issues of moment and determined or seriously affected the rights of a party. Relying on these judgments, Mr. Samant contended vehemently that the order passed by the learned Magistrate who not an interlocutory order at all. 17. While the proposition of law canvassed by Mr. Samant, on the basis of the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court, is unexceptionable, I am not in a position to accept his contention that the order passed by the learned Magistrate was an order of the nature falling within the intermediate category as contemplated by the said Supreme Court judgments. In my view, the learned Magistrate's order does not determine any issue of moment, nor does it determine the rights of either party, nor can it be said to prejudice the right of either party. Mr. Samant's contention that by the said order, the right of possession of the accused is disturbed or affected, does not cut ice. All interim orders, in their impact, must necessary affect some party or the other, as they are obviously in favour of one and operate against another. By this criterion, every interim order must necessarily fall into the intermediate category as contemplated by the Supreme Court. In my view, the present order does not fall in the intermediate category and it is an interlocutory order pure and simple. Mr. Sanlant then cited the judgment of the Supreme court in Ram Prakash Sharma v. State of Haryana, AIR 1978 SC 1282 , in his attempt to persuade me that the order of the learned Magistrate is an interlocutory order. I am afraid, there is nothing of this nature decided by the Supreme Court in Ram Prakash Sharma's case (supra). All tl1at the Supreme Court has held in this case that the Court has to be circumspect before releasing the property which comes in its custody and has to exercise its jurisdiction judiciously and wisely. In my judgment, the order of the learned Magistrate dated 17th March, 1986 is clearly an interlocutory order. All tl1at the Supreme Court has held in this case that the Court has to be circumspect before releasing the property which comes in its custody and has to exercise its jurisdiction judiciously and wisely. In my judgment, the order of the learned Magistrate dated 17th March, 1986 is clearly an interlocutory order. It was not appeal able under any express provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, being an interlocutory order, it was also no revisable under Section 397 of the Code, on account of the bar under Sub-section (2) of that section. 6. In my view also, the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 11.5.94 does not fall in category of intermediate order and is covered in the category of interlocutory order and, therefore, not amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr. P.C. The maintainability of the revision filed by the non-applicant No.1 before the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge was raised by the present applicant and the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge overruled the objection raised by the applicant and held that the revision application filed by the non-applicant No.1 herein before the Court of the 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge was maintainable The said finding recorded by the 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge holding the revision application maintainable, is wholly misconceived. The Revisional Court seriously erred in finding substance in the argument advanced by the Counsel for non-applicant No.1 hereinbefore the said Court that the order was passed by the learned Magistrate in the proceedings in which the non-applicant No.1 herein was not the party and, therefore, the said order could not be treated as an interim order. A bare perusal of the order passed by tl1e learned Magistrate would show that the non-applicant No 1 herein who was the revisionist in the revision application filed before the 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, was fully heard and not only that he also had moved an application before the Trial Court claiming custody of the vehicle. By no stretch of imagination, therefore, can it be said that the present non-applicant No.1 herein was not party in the order dated 11.5.94 passed by the learned Magistrate or that the said order was not an interlocutory order. By no stretch of imagination, therefore, can it be said that the present non-applicant No.1 herein was not party in the order dated 11.5.94 passed by the learned Magistrate or that the said order was not an interlocutory order. The Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha committed serious error of law in holding the revision application maintainable which was filed against the interlocutory order dated 11.5.94 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class and, thus, committed serious error of jurisdiction in interfering with the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class on 11.5.1994 when the said order was not amenable to revision under-Section 397 Cr. P.C. 7. Consequently, this criminal revision application deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The order passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha on 2.12.94 is quashed and set aside. Order accordingly. Revision allowed. 1. 1991 Mrl. L.J. 1371.