Judgment B. L. Yadav, J. 1. By the present Second Appeal under Sec.100 of the code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) the defendant-appellant has sought the relief for setting aside the decree dated 10-12-1991 of the learned 9th Additional District Judge, Patna, dismissing the appeal of the defendant and decree dated 30-3-1988 passed by the Subordinate Judge-I, Patna decreeing the suit for evicting directing the defendant-appellant to give vacant possession of the suit land within two months from the date of decree after removal all structures constructed by the defendant over the same and directing the aefendant-appellant to pay arrears of rent claimed in Schedule-II. 2. The plaintiff-respondent has filed the suit with the averments that the plaintiff was the owner land lady of land measuring 65-6" on North, 6310" on Sough.85 on East and 88 on West bearing Municipal Survey No.789 Plot No.1, Holding No.249/181/c, Circle No 9, ward No.2 situate at moballa Exhibition Road, P. S. Kotwali (Gandhi Maidan) Patna. The defendant-appellant which is a firm, through Sri Subodh Kumar Jhunjhunwala (a partner of the firm) took the said piece of land on lease for a fixed period of five years commencing from 1st February, 1972 and ending on 31st" january, 1977 on a monthly rental of Rs.4,00/- through unregistered deed dated 16-2-1972 The rent was payable on the 7th day of the succeeding month. The defendant the firm occupied the suit premises on 1-1-1972 and constructed a temporary godown. As per the terms of agreement, in case of failure of payment of rent by the date fixed, the defendant was to pay interest at the rate of 1% per month The plaintiff would have also right to terminate the tenancy and take direct possession of the suit premises. The defendant was to pay municipal tax and on termination of tenancy the defendant would give vacant possession to the plaintiff, after removing all materials and fixtures, in case of default the defendant shall be liable for damages Rs.30/- per day till the possession was delivered to the plaintiff. The term of lease expired but the defendant continued in possession. Thereafter the plaintiff sent a registered letter dated 12-1-1977 to the defendant to give vacant possessi on to the plaintiff. The defendant requested the plaintiff for fresh lease on fresh rate of rent and the rent was enhanced to rs.550/- per month. The term of lease expired but the defendant continued in possession. Thereafter the plaintiff sent a registered letter dated 12-1-1977 to the defendant to give vacant possessi on to the plaintiff. The defendant requested the plaintiff for fresh lease on fresh rate of rent and the rent was enhanced to rs.550/- per month. But thereafter the defendant defaulted in payment of rent. Then the defendant by letter dated 7-2-79 was directed to pay arrears of rent. The defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff narrating the circumstances under which he could not pay the rent. Another letter dated 31-1-79, however, was served on the defendant. Thereafter the defendant issued a cheque on 16th April, 1979 for Rs.4,150/- and the other cheque dated 17th april, 1979 for Rs.3,000/-. Since January, 1980 the defendant failed to payrent The plaintiff served a registered notice dated 7th August, 1982 through an Advocate terminating the tenancy of the defendant calling upon to give possession to the plaintiff on 1st September.1982 after removing the constructions That notice was, however, served on the defendant on 14-8-1982 hut he neither paid rent nor vacated the premises. Another notice dated 2nd March.1963 was sent to the defendant on expiry of 31st day of march.1983 and the defendant was called upon to vacate the said premises and give the vacant possession to the plaintiff afer removing the structures. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant appellant denving the plaint allegation and alleging that the suit was barred by limitation and also barred by the provisions of Specific Relief Act. After expiry of agreement dated 16-2-1972 the defendant continued on the land on the request of the plaintiff. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant appellant denving the plaint allegation and alleging that the suit was barred by limitation and also barred by the provisions of Specific Relief Act. After expiry of agreement dated 16-2-1972 the defendant continued on the land on the request of the plaintiff. The mode of payment was not on every tucceding month by 7th Normally lump sum amount was raid to the plaintiff on 30-6-1982 defendant paid rs.10,000/- to the plaintiff bv bank draft and again on 30-1-1984 Rs 15,000/-by bank draft to the plaintiff A sum of Rs 12,000/- was already lying as advance to the account of the plaintiff Apart from that the plaintiff had taken one refrigerator from the defendant at a cost of Rs 5500/- which amount was also not paid A sum of Rs 42,600/- (in total) was paid to the plaintiff towaads rent adjustment from 1st Jund, 1982 onwards The said notice terminating the tenancy was not legally served on the defendant-appellant, the firm, but on servant of the firm who has no authority to receive it. 4. The trial court framed number of issues. The material issues are as to whether the suit was barred by limitation, whether a sum of Rs.42.600 as advance paid by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiff was correct, whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for arrears of rent, whether the nature of the tenancy of the defendant-appellant was permanent and the last issue framed was whether notice under Sec.106 of the Ttansfer of prdperty Act, 1882 (for short the Act) determining the tenancy of the defendant-appellant was duly served and if so, was it legal and valid ? 5. Learned Senior Counsel. Shri Shree Nath Singh, appearing for the appellant, sbarplv focused the points that the suit has illegally been decreed and as the defendant appellant raised structure construction in view of the agreement between the parties hence tenancy of the appellant was permanent in nature and the permanent tenancy cannot be terminated. It was further contended that the notice under Section ! It was further contended that the notice under Section ! 06 read with Sec.111 (h) of the act was not legally served on the defendant-appellant, the firm or oh a partner i. e. Subodh Kumar Jhunjhunwala, with to terminate tenancy and for payment of arrears of rent, rather it was served on one Pramod Kumar, servant of the appellant who has no authority to receive a notice on behalf of the firm or to represent the firm. Consequently, without terminating the tenancy by serving the notice legally in view of Sec.106 read with Section 111 (h) of the Act the suit cannot be filed nor the same would be maintainable. Some other points were also focussed but not necessary to refer to them. 6. Shri Krishna Prakash Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, refuted the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant and urged that the notice was properly served and the tenancy was legally terminated and the suit has been correctly filed and the same was maintainable The courts below have correctly decreed the suit. There was no substantial question of law involved as required under section 100 of the Code. 7. Having evaluated the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the principal question for consideration is whether the notice under section 106 read with Sec.111 (h) of the Act was properly and legally served on the defendant-appellant ? 8. How the service of notice has to be effected, has been provided under Sec.106 of the Act. Ex Abundanti Cautela, the statutory provision of Sec.106 of the Act is set out: "106 Duration of certain leaser in absence of written coptract or local usage. In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immoveable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months notice expring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immoveable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month. terminable on the part of either lessor or leasee, by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. terminable on the part of either lessor or leasee, by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Every notice under section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of bis family or servants at bis residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable)affixed ty a conspicuous part of the property. " Part-II of the aforesaid Sec.106 is material for the purpose. It postulates how the notice has to be sent and served. It indicates that notices are to be served on the party, which obviously excludes the service of notice either on the agent or to the servant unless they were specially authorised for the purpose. Mode of service of notice as contemplated under Part II of Section 106 of the Act is mandatory. The word "must" has been used which indicates the provision to be mandatory. See Laxmi Narain V/s. Union [air 1976 S. C.7l4j. Normally the word "shall" is employed by Legislature to make it mandatory, but here the Legislature wanted the provision to be more amphatic and mandatory than the word "shall", hence the word must has been used. In fact the word "must" means a thing that should not be missed or neglected, a necessity. What is noticeable is that or" expression has been used at six places which is very rare. In ordinary usage of word "and",is conjunctive and "or" disjunctive. But to carry out the intention of the legislature, it may be necessary to read "and" in place of "or" and vice versa [see R. V. J W. Dwyer, Ltd. V/s. Met Pol, Receiver (1967) 2 QB 970 : r. V Surrey Quarter Session [1963 1 QB 990 ). Some times the word "or" is used for the word "an4", it depends upon the context whether legislature has employed it as conjunctive or disjunctive First "or" is to indicate that either notice has to be sent, or it has to be tendered to the party who is to be bound by it. The second "or" indicates that it is disjunctive and indicates the intention of legislature that the "notice has to be delivered personally. The second "or" indicates that it is disjunctive and indicates the intention of legislature that the "notice has to be delivered personally. Thereafter there is a comma, which is very significant. The punctuation is after all a main element in the construction of a statute, but very little attention is paid to it by the English Courts where a statute is carefully punctuated, as in the present case and there is some doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to it See Md. Shabbtr V/s. State of Maharashtra, [ air 1979 SC 564 ]. It may be indicated that the comma (,) marks the smallest division of a sentence, smallest interval or break The presence of comma after or be tendered or delivered to such party means there is a pause and this is the mode of service which stands at priority No.1 and legislature intended it, the other modes of service are of not so much important meaningful as this one. In the instant case we are concerned with this mode of service of notice. Thereafter by third or it is alternative mode of service to one of his family and thereafter last alternative is to the servant. But in the case of a firm or company, as the appellant is, servant has no authority, rather only partner of the firm can receive it. But in the instant case it was served on servant. In this connection the first appellate court must take into consideration the material evidence including statement of P. W.2 and record a fresh findings. As he failed to consider entire evidence or material evidence hence his findings can not be sustained and it raises a substantial question of law. 9. The plaintiff has given registered notice dated 6-8-1982 through her Advocate terminating the tenancy of the defendant and calling upon him to deliver the vacant possession of the suit premises on l-9-1982 after removing the structure and also pay arrears of rent. Another notice dated 2-3-1983 determining the tenancy was served. A similar direction including terminating the tenancy and delivering the vacant possession was given. Another notice dated 2-3-1983 determining the tenancy was served. A similar direction including terminating the tenancy and delivering the vacant possession was given. The notices are, however, Ext.2 and 2/a. The acknowledgment due has been filed as Exts.6 and 6/a The postal receipts are Ext.7 and 7/a. Statements of P. W 1 and P. W.3 are of general nature, whereas the statement of P. W.2 Syed Ataur Rahman appears to be specific on the point of service of notice under Sec.114 (h) of the Act. The close scrutiny of the statement under para 8 indicates that it was stated in specific term that notice was served on Pramod Kumar (Ext 6/a) but under para-15 of the satement it has been stated (presumably in the cross examination) that on Ext.6/1 there is small signature of the recipient which is not very clear. To be precise the words are "karta KA LAGHU HASTAKSHAR PRAPT hai WOH ASHPASHTNAHIN HAL" 10. It was emphasised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that in case the signature of Pramod Kumar, who was not the partner of the Firm. rather was a servant (Ext.6/a ). was not clear, in that event how can the notice itself be said to have been served. 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, however, contended that even though notice could be deemed to have served on Pramod Kumar, whose signature may not be clear but the notice would be deemed to have been served. What is significant is that on Ext.6/a, the receipt of the notice, there is no signature of Subodh Kumar Jbunjhunwala, who was the partner of the Firm is proved. Even the present appeal has been filed through the partner of the Firm named Subodh Kumar Jhunjhunwala It is evident that the suit was also filed against M/s S. K. Trading Co. through its partner Subodh Kumar Jhunjhunwala. Admittedly there were other partners of the Firm and in that event whether notices are required to be served on all or any of the partners, is a question which also assumes significance Admittedly no notice was served even on one of the partner namely Subodh Kumar jbunjhunwala through him the firm or the company was represented and he was made a party by the plaintiff-respondent. 12. 12. The contours of Sec.100 of the Code have been made more restricted after C. P. C. Amendment 1976 and in Second Appeal interference it possible only when substantial question of law is invloved. In Jagdish singh V/s. Nathu Singh, [ air 1992 SC 1604 ] their Lordships of the Apex Court have held under para-8 that High Court is not precluded from interference if relevant evidence not considered. Better to quote exact words as follows : "in our opinion, the High Court was right in its view. The notices must be presumed to have been served as contemplated by Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. As to the jurisdiction of the high Court to reappreciate evidence in a second appeal it is to be observed that where the findings by the Court of facts is vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings. " 13. In Dilbagrai Punjab V/s. Sharad Chandra. [air 1988 SC 1958], Hon ble l. M. Sharma, J (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Apex court observed under para-5 at page 1859 as follows ; "unfortunately neither the Civil Judge why tried the suit nor the additional District Judge confirming the decision of the trial court adverted to important items of relevant evidence which were considered and relied upon by the High Court. The plaintiff, before filing the suit, sent a notice through his counsel, to the appellant on which it was stated that the shop in question belongs to him. In his reply sent through an advocate the appellant, while denying the other statements in the notice, accepted the plaintiffs title in the following word". "that it is admitted that my client is occupying the shop situated at dal Bazar belonging to your client. " Their Lordships further observed as follows :. "the plaintiff also produced counterfoil receipts signed by the tenant-appellant in which the plaintiff was described as "the owner of property". It was not a case of an isolated single receipt-quite a number of such documents were produced in the trial court. The High Court was right in pointing out that the courts below had seriously erred in not considering the entire evidence on the record including the aforesaid documents. It was not a case of an isolated single receipt-quite a number of such documents were produced in the trial court. The High Court was right in pointing out that the courts below had seriously erred in not considering the entire evidence on the record including the aforesaid documents. It is true that the high Court while hearing the appeal under Sec.100 of the code of Civil Procedure has no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the first appellate court, but at the same time its power to interfere with the finding cannot be denied when the lower appellate court decides an issue of fact a substantial question of law arises. The court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error arises is of a magnitude than it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the high Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case. We, therefore, do not discover any defect in the judgment of the High Court, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. " 14. What requires emphasis is that the aforesaid dictum of the Apex court in Dilbagrai Punjabi case was in connection with the mode of service. It is to the effect where conclusion has been reached by the First Appellate court even on an issue of fact without considering relevant and material evidence, in such matters the court below is under duty while deciding validity of the notice to examine entire relevant evidence on record and in case it refuses to consider the important evidence (as statement of P. W.2 in the present case and similar other evidence) which has got direct bearing on the material issue in that event the error would be magnitude and would be treated to be substantial question of law involved in the appeal. 15. In view of the premises aforesaid and after applying the Aristetolian and Beconian reasonings the decree of the lower appellate court cannot be sustained. As an inescapable corollary the present appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. 15. In view of the premises aforesaid and after applying the Aristetolian and Beconian reasonings the decree of the lower appellate court cannot be sustained. As an inescapable corollary the present appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and it is directed to readmit the appeal to its original number and to decide it afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. As the matter has dragged on far too long, hence what is required is expedition. The cost shall, however, abide the result. Appeal allowed.