B. N. KIRPAL, J. ( 1 ) THESE are appeals against the judgment of the learned single Judge, who upheld the order dated 15th of November, 1994, whereby the appellant and other former members of the Viramgam Municipality were held to be guilty of misconduct and were disqualified for a period of four years for being re-elected as members of the Viramgam Nagarpalika. ( 2 ) THIS judgment will dispose of Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 663, 664, 666, 667, 671 and 672 of 1994. Briefly stated, the facts are that the appellants in all these Appeals were elected as councillors of the Viramgam Municipality on 4th of june, 1989. In the year 1992, the appellant in Letters Patent Appeal No. 663 of 1994 was elected as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the said Municipality. He was Chairman for two terms, viz. , 1992-93 and 1993-94. The other appellants continued to be councillors as well as members of the Executive Committee. ( 3 ) IT is not in dispute that on 4th of June, 1994, the term of the councillors came to an end and, pursuant thereto, an Administrator was appointed. ( 4 ) THE appellants thereafter received a show cause notice dated 7th of October, 1994, in which it was alleged that the appellants had been guilty of misconduct, in as much as by a Resolution of the Executive Committee dated 19th of December, 1992, RS. 250. 00 per year had been taken from the occupants of some huts and their occupation was regularised. It was alleged that this Resolution was against the provisions of law and, therefore, the appellants should show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken and they should not be debarred from being elected. ( 5 ) THE appellants filed a reply, but on 15th of November, 1994, order was passed by the Director of Municipalities, State of Gujarat, whereby the appellants, who were held to be guilty of misconduct and on that account, they were disqualified for a period of 4 years for being re-elected as members of the Viramgam Nagarpalika. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid order dated 15th November, 1994 was challenged before this court by filing Special Civil Applications. The said Special Civil Application, being Special Civil Application Nos. 12743 to 12746 of 1994 and Special Civil application Nos. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid order dated 15th November, 1994 was challenged before this court by filing Special Civil Applications. The said Special Civil Application, being Special Civil Application Nos. 12743 to 12746 of 1994 and Special Civil application Nos. 12749 and 12750 of 1994, were dismissed by the learned single judge on 21st November, 1994. It was observed that the Court could not sit in appeal over the orders of respondent No. 1, who had come to the conclusion that the members of the Executive Committee had regularised encroachment in contravention of the provisions of S. 65 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. It was further observed that the order has been made after giving proper opportunity of being heard and it could not be said to have been made without jurisdiction. ( 7 ) IN appeal, the contention which has been raised is only one. It has been submitted that on a correct interpretation of the relevant provisions of the said Act, the powers for disqualifying ex-councillors from standing for an election in future did not exist. In other words, the submission was that the respondents had no jurisdiction to exercise powers under S. 37 or S. 37a of the said Act. ( 8 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to relevant provisions of the Act. S. 11 contains a provision regarding the general disqualifications for becoming a councillor. S. 11 (1) (a) (ii), which is relevant in the instant case, reads as under :-"11. (1) No person may be a councillor - (a) who - xxx xxx xxx (ii) has been removed from office under S. 37 and four years have not elapsed from the date of such removal, unless he has, by an order which the State Government is hereby empowered to make, if it shall think fit, in this behalf, been relieved from the disqualification arising on account of such removal from office; or. . . . . "the said provision shows that any person who was removed from office under s. 37 will not be qualified to stand for election unless four years have elapsed since his removal. This necessitates reference to S. 37 and S. 37a, which read as under :-"37. . . . . "the said provision shows that any person who was removed from office under s. 37 will not be qualified to stand for election unless four years have elapsed since his removal. This necessitates reference to S. 37 and S. 37a, which read as under :-"37. (1) The State Government may remove from office - (a) any councillor of a Municipality, on its own motion or on receipt of a recommendation of the Municipality in that behalf supported by a majority of the total number of the then councillors of the Municipality, or (b) any President or Vice-President of a Municipality, if, after giving the councillor, President or as the case may be, Vice-President an opportunity of being heard and giving due notice in that behalf to the Municipality and after making such inquiry as it deems necessary, the State Government is of the opinion that the councillor, President or as the case may be, Vice-President has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct or has become incapable of performing his duties under this Act. (2) A President or Vice-President removed under sub-S. (1) shall not be eligible for re-election as a President or Vice-President during the remainder of the term of the Municipality. ""37a. Notwithstanding that a councillor has resigned his office under S. 35, if it appears to the State Government that the councillor during the period he held office as a councillor has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct, the State Government may disqualify him from becoming a councillor or a councillor or member of any other local authority for a period of five years from the date of its order : provided that no action against the councillor so resigned shall be taken under this section after the expiry of one year from the date of his resignation and without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. " ( 9 ) A mere reading of S. 37 makes it clear that the State Government may, on account of a councillor being held guilty of misconduct, remove the councillor, or the President or the Vice-President from the office. " ( 9 ) A mere reading of S. 37 makes it clear that the State Government may, on account of a councillor being held guilty of misconduct, remove the councillor, or the President or the Vice-President from the office. The reference to the word office in S. 37 clearly indicates that at the time when the order is passed, the person, against whom the order is proposed, should be in office. In the present case, the tenure of the members had come to end on 4th of June, 1994 when they had ceased to be councillors as well as members of the Executive Committee. This being so, neither on the date when the impugned order was passed nor on 7th of october, 1994, when the show cause notice was issued, were any of the appellants holding any office in the Municipality. S. 37 of the said Act, therefore, could not be invoked because, for the simple reason, the appellants were not holding any office from which they could be removed. They had, in fact, already ceased to hold office as far back as on 4th of June, 1994. ( 10 ) S. 37a makes reference to the resignation of a councillor which may have been submitted under S. 35 of the Act. Under S. 35, the President, Vice- president or the councillor can tender his resignation which takes effect either on the date when it is accepted by the Collector or on the expiry of 30 days from the date of tendering of the resignation, whichever event occurs earlier. In order that a delinquent councillor should not escape the disqualification under S. 37 read with S. 11, the provisions of S. 37a was enacted so that a mere resignation would not, automatically, absolve the delinquent councillor from any action being taken against him. It will, however, be seen that the proviso to S. 37a lays down a time-limit of one year, within which such an action can be taken. We cannot read s. 37a to apply to even those circumstances where a person has ceased to be councillor merely by efflux of time and at the expiry of the tenure. S. 37a is applicable only in those cases where resignation under S. 35 has been filed. We cannot read s. 37a to apply to even those circumstances where a person has ceased to be councillor merely by efflux of time and at the expiry of the tenure. S. 37a is applicable only in those cases where resignation under S. 35 has been filed. It is for that reason that the limitation for taking action is provided in the proviso and that refers to one year from the date of the resignation. To put it differently, the proviso to S. 37a clearly indicates that the said section refers only to a case where action has to be taken against a delinquent ex-councillor, who has resigned from office. S. 37a will not apply in a case where a person has ceased to be a councillor by efflux of time or when his tenure has come to an end. Therefore, no order could have been passed in the case under S. 37a because none of the appellants had tendered their resignation. ( 11 ) IT appears that this argument was not seriously advanced before the learned single Judge because in the impugned order we do not find any mention thereof. ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the respondents had no jurisdiction, in the present cases of passing the impugned orders because neither the provisions of S. 37 nor S. 37a were applicable. We accordingly allow these Appeals and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and quash the decision dated 15th November, 1994 of the Director of Municipalities, respondent No. 1 herein. ( 13 ) SINCE the election of the councillors of the concerned Municipality is over and the results are also out, no useful purpose will be served by granting the prayer contained in the concerned petitions for quashing the action of rejection of the nomination paper on the basis of the impugned order. That prayer would stand rejected. ( 14 ) PARTIES will bear their own costs. .