S. RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner along with one rangaswamy, son of range gowda, of koniganahalli village, somwarpet taluk, kodagu district, filed a complaint before the lokayukta respondent No. 1 complaining that respondents 2 to 5 had committed certain acts or omitted to discharge their duties being public servants. The 1st respondent passed an order on 17-6-1986 dismissing the complaint filed by them. Thereafter, they filed an application seeking revival of the complaint which was also dismissed by the 1st respondent. While doing so, the 1st respondent made certain comments which, the petitioner submits, are not called for. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order made by the 1st respondent on 17-6-1986 and the order made on the subsequent application on 8-7-1986, while challenging the legality thereof seeks for quashing of the said two orders and for a mandamus to consider the material placed before him and to conduct an investigation into the allegations levelled against respondents 2 to 5 under Section 9 (3) of the Karnataka lokayukta Act, 1984 (hereinafter, for short, referred to as the 'act' ). Petitioner also seeks for a direction to expunge the remarks set out in the schedule to the petition. ( 2 ) THE complaint made to the 1st respondent by the petitioner along with rangaswamy briefly stated is as follows: in the year 1981 applications to fill up the posts of sub- inspector of police were notified. The said rangaswamy, one of the complainants before respondent No. 1, applied for the same. One nagarathnamma stated to be the sister of respondents 3 and 4 is said to have assured the said rangaswamy of securing him the post with the help of respondent No. 3 and shakuntala hegde, wife of respondent No. 2, on the understanding that he would pay a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to nagarathnamma and thereafter another sum of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid after selection is made. Accordingly, the said rangaswamy is stated to have paid a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to the said nagarathnamma. However, he found, he was not selected in the results announced on 7-7-1985. His efforts to recover the money from the said nagarathnamma went in vain. Similarly, his representations to respondent 2 and his meeting with shakuntala hegde wife of respondent 2 also proved futile. Subsequently rangaswamy made a complaint to respondent 5, but the latter did not take action. However, he found, he was not selected in the results announced on 7-7-1985. His efforts to recover the money from the said nagarathnamma went in vain. Similarly, his representations to respondent 2 and his meeting with shakuntala hegde wife of respondent 2 also proved futile. Subsequently rangaswamy made a complaint to respondent 5, but the latter did not take action. Respondent 4 on the other hand, induced the said rangaswamy to withdraw the complaint promising him repayment of the money paid by him. The said nagarathnamma got three cheques issued for a total sum of Rs. 12,500/- by her husband in favour of the brother-in-law of the said rangaswamy. The balance of Rs. 17,500/- was also promised to be repaid after collecting it from shakuntala hegde, wife of respondent 2, and respondent No. 3. ( 3 ) ON this complaint, the lokayukta conducted a preliminary enquiry as contemplated under Section 9 of the act. The 1st respondent found it not necessary to examine the petitioner. But, rangaswamy who is stated to have personal knowledge of the matter and who was directly involved in it was examined. In the course of his statement, it is stated that he made it clear that the petitioner did not have any knowledge of the facts of the case. On that basis proceeded to examine only the said rangaswamy. The lokayukta considered the complaint, statement on oath made by the said rangaswamy and the documents produced along with the complaint and held there are no sufficient grounds for investigating or continuing the investigation in the matter. ( 4 ) A reading of the Provisions of Section 9 would make it clear that the scope of enquiry under this Section is extremely limited limited only to ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint - (i) on the materials placed by the complainant for the purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for investigation has been made out and, (ii) such a question would be decided purely from the point of view of the complaint without at all adverting to any defence that respondents may have in the case. The lokayukta has considered the material before him in regard to each of the four respondents who are public servants. The lokayukta has considered the material before him in regard to each of the four respondents who are public servants. The object of Section 9 being that a public servant should not be exposed to unnecessary harassment by complaints of frivolous or vexatious nature or prima facie cannot be substantiated even after an investigation is held i. e. , if the lokayukta finds that there is no intrinsic truth in the allegations made calling for further investigation, can refuse to do so. The conclusion drawn by the lokayukta in regard to the allegation that respondent 2 was involved in the matter of securing a job to said rangaswamy is that there is not even iota of material to show that he was aware of the payment made to nagarathnamma or the possibility of whole or part of that amount having been paid to his wife shakuntala hegde, much less to show that he was personally concerned in any manner with the alleged collection of Rs. 30,000/- by nagarathnamma from the said rangaswamy. The lokayukta also noticed that respondent No. 2 had not influenced in any manner in the matter of appointment of sub-inspectors in respect of which the said rangaswamy was interested. This conclusion is drawn, as stated earlier, on the examination of the complainant, the statement on oath of rangaswamy and the documents produced. ( 5 ) AS regards involvement of respondent No. 3 in the matter, the inference of the 1st respondent is that the said rangaswamy himself had met respondent 3 on two occasions - on the first occasion he informed respondent 3 about nagarathnamma having taken Rs. 30,000/- in connection with his selection for the post of police sub-inspector and he told him to meet nagarathnamma in her village and to ask her to make arrangement for the return of the amount. On the second occasion when he met respondent No. 3 he asked him to give a complaint against nagarathnamma with an assurance that the investigation would be entrusted to cod and thus the respondent No. 3 was neither aware of what nagarathnamma had done nor was he influenced by his sister. There was also an allegation that one srinivas, private secretary of respondent 3 had received the amount. There was also an allegation that one srinivas, private secretary of respondent 3 had received the amount. The lokayukta found there was no link between respondent No. 2 and the taking of money by the private secretary in this connection and that allegation was also not borne out on the material on record and therefore it was concluded that there was no prima facie case against respondent No. 3. ( 6 ) AS regards the complaint made against respondent No. 4, the 1st respondent found the same to be highly improbable considering the serious contradictions in the complaint itself while at one stage it was stated that the amount was promised to be returned after it was collected from Smt. Shakuntala hegde and respondent No. 2, at another stage it is stated that no settlement about the balance of Rs. 17,500/- was arrived at nor was there any talk about it. The further allegation that in lieu of repayment of Rs. 17,500/- an alternative appointment would be secured for him, was also found to be not substantiated. In the statement on oath, the said rangaswamy gave a go-by to that aspect altogether. Therefore, the 1st respondent found that the material averments made against respondent 4 are not reliable to be proceeded further. ( 7 ) SIMILARLY, the complaint against respondent No. 5 also was found to be such as not calling for further investigation. The lokayukta found that in the first place the said rangaswamy is stated to have made a oral complaint to respondent 5 and when respondent 5 informed him that nagarathnamma had already made a complaint against him and his friend one venkatesh, he handed over the written complaint to respondent No. 4. On analysis of the material on record, the 1st respondent found that the allegation of filing a written complaint was an afterthought. In arriving at this conclusion, the 1st respondent referred to the two representations made to the 2nd respondent which did not mention a written complaint having been made and there was no reason assigned as to why such mention could not be made. ( 8 ) THE scope of interference under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is far too limited against the orders made by the quasi-judicial authorities. ( 8 ) THE scope of interference under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is far too limited against the orders made by the quasi-judicial authorities. When the relevant material has been taken into consideration and irrelevant material eschewed from consideration or no irrelevant material or extraneous consideration had entered into in recording a finding, this court would not interfere with such an order for this court would not sit in appeal against the decisions arrived at by such authorities. The lokayukta on the material on record has drawn inferences one way or the other and there is no material available to show that it has not considered any material placed before it in the shape of complaint, statement on oath and the documents along with the complaint or was any fresh material placed before it which was not considered. Hence, bearing in mind the scope of investigation at the preliminary stage, when the respondent 1 has to make up its mind as to whether any further investigation is required in the case, all that was to be seen is only establishment of a prima facie case, if unrehutted, would prove the charge. On the basis, i find no ground is made out by the petitioner for interference with the order of the 1st respondent. ( 9 ) SO far as the ground raised by the petitioner that the 1st respondent has not taken note of the fact that the complaint raised was one in the nature of public servants having failed to take action by setting the law into motion even after receiving a complaint is concerned, the lokayukta has explained this position pursuant to the order made on the application for revival of the original complaint. The lokayukta considered the complaint as a whole. The principal averment made in the complaint is in paragraph 9 of the complaint that respondents 2 and 3 are found to be amassing wealth by unlawful means with the active support and connivance of other public servants. The kith and kin of public servants such as respondents 2 and 3 have been acting in utter disregard to the Rule of law and respondents 2 and 3 have failed to act in accordance with the norms of integrity and conduct which ought to be followed by public servants of the class to which they belong. The kith and kin of public servants such as respondents 2 and 3 have been acting in utter disregard to the Rule of law and respondents 2 and 3 have failed to act in accordance with the norms of integrity and conduct which ought to be followed by public servants of the class to which they belong. Column No. 4 in the complaint reads as follows:"the complainant No. 2 was cheated by the public servants, complained against herein nos. 1, 2 and 3, and the 4 did not take action as per law". therefore, the lokayukta, proceeded on the basis that the charge made in the complaint was that respondents 2, 3 and 4 had been guilty of cheating the said rangaswamy and that respondent No. 5 was accountable for not taking action as per law. The lokayukta understood that was the explicit position taken in the complaint and the overall tenor of the contents of the complaint and therefore the lokayukta reiterated that it correctly understood the scope of the complaint. ( 10 ) NOW, before me, it is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no consideration of the aspect that respondents 2 and 3 had wilfully omitted to take suitable action in the matter which required to be investigated by the lokayukta. It is no doubt true that there is no specific reference to this aspect of the matter in the course of the order made on 17-6-1986 so far as respondents 2, 3 and 4 are concerned. But, considering the nature of the complaint made and the specific allegation in respect of which grievance was made before the lokayukta, no fault could be found with the lokayukta that the complaint against respondents 2, 3 and 4 was one of cheating, while complaint against respondent 4 was one of not taking action as per law. When these were the averments made in the complaint filed before the lokayukta and a passing reference made thereon on the conduct of the public servants that they have wilfully failed to take suitable action in the matter was only in the context of making it clear that they were actuated by personal motives and not so much as a kind of dereliction of duty which is sought to be remedied now. That was not the tenor of the complaint at all. That was not the tenor of the complaint at all. In essence, the complaint was one relating to cheating by respondents 2, 3 and 4 and inaction on the part of respondent 5 and the view taken by respondent 1 cannot be found fault with at all for that is a probable and reasonable view to take on the basis of the complaint. It cannot be said that the first respondent could not have reached any conclusion other than the one contended for the petitioners for that is a plausible and probable view. The finding that the complaint was in essence and content as one relating to cheating by respondents 2, 3 and 4 and not one of dereliction of duty for passing reference to inaction is made to buttress the charge of cheating cannot be ruled out to be as unreasonable or perverse view. If the lokayukta on the material on record, draws such an inference, this court cannot substitute its view to that of lokayukta. ( 11 ) IT is contended that the orders impugned herein are ultra vires of Section 9 (5) of the act. The discussion made above would disclose that the order made by the first respondent is in conformity with Section 9 (5) (b) of the act and therefore cannot be stated to be beyond the scope of powers of the 1st respondent. Hence i do not think there is any merit in the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order is ultra vires of Section 9 (5 ) (b) of the act. It is certainly within the scope of powers of the 1st respondent either to proceed to conduct an investigation or refuse to do so. If there is any lapse on the part of the 1st respondent, the impugned order could be quashed, but that would not mean that it had no jurisdiction to make the order. Therefore, i find no infirmity either in the reasoning adopted by the 1st respondent in the order made on the complaint or in the order made on the subsequent application filed by the petitioner. Hence i find no justification to interfere with the order made by the lokayukta. Therefore, i find no infirmity either in the reasoning adopted by the 1st respondent in the order made on the complaint or in the order made on the subsequent application filed by the petitioner. Hence i find no justification to interfere with the order made by the lokayukta. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the conclusions have been drawn by the lokayukta in the proceedings before it arising out of the complaint made by the petitioner without affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard and the same is in violation of the principles of natural justice. A reading of the order made by the lokayukta would make it clear that it is only under Section 9 (5) (b) of the act it has refused to investigate the complaint made to it. The basis upon which the discretion is exercised is that there are no sufficient grounds for investigation. In doing so, the question that arises is what should be the scope of enquiry. The procedure in regard to complaints filed before the lokayukta and the investigation into the same are dealt with under Section 9 of the act. Section 9 (3) thereof provides that the lokayukta; after making such preliminary inquiry as he deems fit, shall forward a copy of the complaint to the public servant, shall afford to such public servant an opportunity to offer his comments or make such order as to the safe custody of documents relevant to the investigation. There is no provision made thereto to indicate in the matter of preliminary enquiry that any opportunity of being heard be given to the complainant. In fact the very complaint made by the petitioner is being considered by the lokayukta to find out whether the complaint is substantiated or not. It can examine the complainant or other witnesses, if necessary, and other material on record. All that is submitted now that if an opportunity had been given, they would have examined certain witnesses to prove their case. If the lokayukta on examination of complaint itself and the complainant who had personal knowledge of the matter found that there are inherent improbabilities in the case and has no intrinsic thereof, no further investigation would arise in such matter. If the lokayukta on examination of complaint itself and the complainant who had personal knowledge of the matter found that there are inherent improbabilities in the case and has no intrinsic thereof, no further investigation would arise in such matter. So far as the lokayukta is concerned, the object of investigation is to enquire into the conduct of public servants in relation to an allegation or grievance as defined under the act. But before taking up any investigation, a prima facie examination of the material would certainly be necessary to see that the public servants would not be put to unnecessary harassment by reason of a vexatious, vague or a false complaint. In such matters, the question of affording an opportunity to the complainant to establish a case would not arise. The learned counsel for the petitioner however relied upon the decision of this court in n. Gundappa v state of karnataka, and the order made in the appeal against the said decision in state of Karnataka v n. Gundappa. These two decisions relate to a matter where action was proposed to be taken against a public servant and when such a public servant made a complaint that he did not have reasonable opportunity of participating in the enquiry. The principle laid down in that context cannot be made applicable to a case of the present nature wherein the complaint itself is under investigation. Moreover, in the proceedings arising under the Act, there is no lis as such between the complainant and the respondents wherein adjudication is made by the lokayukta. Lokayukta is an investigating agency and tries to find out whether there is any material worth being pursued for purpose of investigation. In the absence of such material, it is open to it to refuse to take such action. Hence, at the preliminary stage of enquiry, the question of violation of principles of natural Justice would not arise at all. The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this regard is rejected. In the absence of such material, it is open to it to refuse to take such action. Hence, at the preliminary stage of enquiry, the question of violation of principles of natural Justice would not arise at all. The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this regard is rejected. ( 13 ) IN the view I have taken, it is unnecessary to consider the contentions urged on behalf of the learned counsel for respondents that this court need not exercise its powers under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India considering the time gap between the incident and now when further action is to be taken nor that no substantial injustice would be caused by refusing to interfere with the orders impugned herein particularly when the complainant before the lokayukta who is really aggrieved by the alleged grievance against respondents 2 to 5, has not made any complaint before this court. ( 14 ) IT is lastly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the remarks made by the 1st respondent in para 8 of Annexure n and para 11 of Annexure n1 as extracted in the schedule to the petition need to be expunged. The law on the matter of expunction has been discussed in detail by the Supreme Court in shivajirao nilangekar patil v Dr. Mahesh madhav gosavi and others. In state of Uttar Pradesh v mohammad naim, it has been stated that in making remarks, the limitations that enter into are as follows: (I) whether a party whose conduct in question was before the court had an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (II) whether there was evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; (III) whether it was necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof to refer to that conduct; and (IV) the observations must be judicial in nature. this position is reiterated in shivajirao nilangekar patil's case, supra. However, a distinction is noticed between an 'adverse comment' and a 'remark'. Applying the tests laid down in mohammad nairn's case, supra, and followed in shivajirao nilangekar patil's case, supra, whether the 1st respondent was justified in making these remarks or not need not be considered by me. this position is reiterated in shivajirao nilangekar patil's case, supra. However, a distinction is noticed between an 'adverse comment' and a 'remark'. Applying the tests laid down in mohammad nairn's case, supra, and followed in shivajirao nilangekar patil's case, supra, whether the 1st respondent was justified in making these remarks or not need not be considered by me. But, i wish to examine on1y the aspect whether it was necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof to refer to that conduct. So far as the observations made in para 8 of Annexure n is concerned, is part of the reasoning of the 1st respondent in dismissing the complaint. In finding out whether there are grounds for reconsideration of the matter and the intention of filing such an application, the matter has necessarily to be discussed. Therefore that part of the order being necessary for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion, they cannot be expunged. This part of the remarks is borne out by the material on record because earlier the basic tenor and the serious allegation made against respondents 2 and 3 was one of cheating while what was sought to be put forth in the forefront in revival application was inaction on their part to set the law into motion. Therefore, the 1st respondent was justified in making an observation that this application was really an attempt to wriggle out of the consequences of the dismissal of the original complaint and such a course cannot be allowed as it would amount to abuse of process of law. Therefore, i do not think this part of the observation can for any reason be expugned. ( 15 ) SO far as the other part of the order is concerned which is at para 11, the remark is on1y a tailpiece added to the order which is in the nature of an advice to the member of a legal profession. But, in doing so, has used very strong language stating that the conduct of the petitioner would amount to prevarication and has twisted the averments made earlier. Whether these remarks are justifiable or not need not be considered by me. But I can certain1y say that the same are not necessary for the purpose of deciding the matter in issue. Therefore, that portion of the order in para 11 at Annexure n1 shall stand expunged. Whether these remarks are justifiable or not need not be considered by me. But I can certain1y say that the same are not necessary for the purpose of deciding the matter in issue. Therefore, that portion of the order in para 11 at Annexure n1 shall stand expunged. ( 16 ) IN the result, petition is dismissed subject to the expunction of the remarks in para 11 of the order dated 8-7-1986 (annexure n1 ). Rule discharged. --- *** --- .