H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition arises out of the judgment and order dated 5-6-1995 passed by II Additional Munsiff, Bangalore, on interim relief application (I. A. I) in Original Suit No. 268 of 1995. The plaintiff-opposite party had filed a suit for decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his agents and servants, G. P. A. holders, henchmen or anybody acting on behalf of the defendant from interfering in any manner with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the plaintiff as well as from putting any construction on the suit property. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff-opposite party moved with an application under Order 39, Rule 1, C. P. C. , read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and prayed for grant of temporary injunction to the above effect as well. The learned Munsiff after hearing the Counsel for the plaintiff on i. A. I, observed that as per the plaintiffs case that the properties in dispute were ancestral property in which the plaintiff claims a share and that the plaintiffs father failed to maintain the plaintiff and neglected the plaintiff. The plaintiff has further alleged in the plaint that the defendant is making arrangement to put up construction on the suit property. Looking to the facts and circumstances narrated in the affidavit, the learned Munsiff thought that the object of the interim relief application might be frustrated if ex parte interim order is not granted and as such, by his order dated 5-6-1995, the learned Munsiff granted ex parte injunction order in the following terms:"until the next hearing date issue temporary injunction against the defendant as prayed in I. A. I. Until the next hearing date plaintiff should also not to put up any construction in the suit schedule property. The plaintiff to comply with Order 39, Rule 3, C. P. C. Issue temporary injunction against the defendant as stated above along with suit summons and notice of I. A. No. I returnable by 1-7-1995". ( 2 ) HAVING felt aggrieved from this order of the learned Additional Second Munsiff, Bangalore, the defendant has filed this revision under Section 115 of C. P. C. Notice having been issued to other side, the plaintiff-respondent appears through his Counsel Sri Y. N. Satyanarayana Rao on behalf of respondents. Today, this case is listed for orders on LA. ( 2 ) HAVING felt aggrieved from this order of the learned Additional Second Munsiff, Bangalore, the defendant has filed this revision under Section 115 of C. P. C. Notice having been issued to other side, the plaintiff-respondent appears through his Counsel Sri Y. N. Satyanarayana Rao on behalf of respondents. Today, this case is listed for orders on LA. No. II for vacating stay, which was granted in this case while admitting the revision petition. ( 3 ) I have heard Sri M. U. Poonacha for the applicant and Sri S. P. Shankar assisted by Sri Y. N. Satyanarayana Rao for the opposite parties. Sri M. U. Poonacha, learned Counsel for the revision petitioner urged that the order impugned suffers from jurisdictional error. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted before me that the land in dispute is agricultural land and that under Section 4 of the Karnataka land Reforms Act, it has been provided that no ex parte injunction shall be granted or in other words no injunction order shall be granted without issuing any prior notice to the opposite parties to injunction application or the defendants in the suit. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner invited my attention to Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Second amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions of Act, 1974 and submitted that in view of Section 4 of the Act 31 of 1974, the temporary injunction could not be granted ex parte because the mandate of law is that it shall not be granted except after service of notice of application on the defendant. He has submitted that as such the order suffers from jurisdictional error. Sri Poonacha has submitted that the case is one which calls for interference under Section 115 of C. P. C. The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decision of this court in Kanna Belchada v Ramappa Poojary and Another and contended that no appeal did lie to the High Court or to the subordinate Court and as Section 4 was mandatory as such the ex parte order passed in violation thereof suffers from violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 4 of the Act. So the Court below has acted illegally. So the Court below has acted illegally. ( 4 ) ON behalf of respondent, it was urged by Sri S. P. Shankar, learned Counsel for respondent that no case is made out and the order does not call for interference. It was further submitted that the order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error and even if it be taken to suffer from jurisdictional error or from some material irregularity, it did not cause any material injury to the petitioner and therefore, really if the operation of the interim order is stayed and is allowed to be stayed, it is really likely to cause injury to the present plaintiff-respondent as under the garb of the stay order, the defendant is likely to raise construction and as such, the Court below, in view of urgency of the matter, as delay would have frustrated the object of injunction order, granted the ex parte injunction order. ( 5 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties. Section 115 of Code of Civil procedure provides for revisional powers of this Court. The High court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to the High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto. If the order passed by the Subordinate Court appears to have been passed in exercise of the jurisdiction not vested in it by law or the Court below appears to have failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or acted illegally or with material irregularity of its jurisdiction, it is provided in such case, the High Court can make such an order as it thinks fit. This has been the position under section and law as originally stood prior to its amendment by Civil Laws Amendment Act (Act no. 104 of 1976 ). After the Amendment by Act No. 104 of 1976, a proviso has been added to original Section 115 which was numbered as sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) was also added to Section 115. This has been the position under section and law as originally stood prior to its amendment by Civil Laws Amendment Act (Act no. 104 of 1976 ). After the Amendment by Act No. 104 of 1976, a proviso has been added to original Section 115 which was numbered as sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) was also added to Section 115. The provision to Section 115 reads"provided that the High Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where, (A) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings; or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Sub-section (2) of Section 115 further provides and reads as under:"the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate to it". ( 6 ) THE explanation which has been added to this section is not relevant for the purpose of the present case. Reading of Section 115 along with the provision of sub-section (1) as well as sub-section (2) of that section, reveals that the powers of this court under Section 115, C. P. C. , are limited and supervisory in nature. In case of Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v Krisknaji dattatraya Bapat, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. ( 7 ) THE nature of the revisional jurisdiction as such has been defined to be the part of general appellate jurisdiction of the high Court as the superior Court. ( 7 ) THE nature of the revisional jurisdiction as such has been defined to be the part of general appellate jurisdiction of the high Court as the superior Court. But the limits of exercise of that jurisdiction have been circumscribed and the High Court could exercise that jurisdiction only when and if requisite conditions are satisfied and the case also does not come within the clutches of the proviso to Section 115 or within the clutches of sub-section (2) thereof. It means firstly in order to exercise the jurisdiction, the applicant has to prove that the order impugned amounts to be case decided. Secondly, he has also to show in view of language of Section 115 (1) and sub-section (2) that the order impugned is not appealable to the High Court or to any court subordinate to High Court because in case the order is appealable to the High Court, then revision will not lie as the required ingredients of sub-section (1) of Section 115 will not stand satisfied if the order impugned is appealable to the Court subordinate to High Court. Then in such a case as well under sub-section (2), the revision will not be maintainable because sub-section (2) provides that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. Once these two ingredients have been satisfied, the party invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code has to show and establish that the case is one where the Subordinate Court has committed a jurisdictional error in the sense either Subordinate Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested or at least it is shown that the Court has exercised the jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. But even in those case, the High Court is not bound to interfere. The basic concept is justice. Even if irregularity has been committed, even then the high Court is not bound to interfere and particularly in view of the proviso, this thing is very much clear. But even in those case, the High Court is not bound to interfere. The basic concept is justice. Even if irregularity has been committed, even then the high Court is not bound to interfere and particularly in view of the proviso, this thing is very much clear. According to the proviso to Section 115, C. P. C. , the High Court shall not vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto except in two conditions as provided in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to section 115. So the applicant will have to satisfy that if either order would have been made against the revision applicant, it would have resulted in final disposal of the suit or the proceeding or he has to show that the order if it is allowed to stand would occasion failure of justice causing irreparable loss. In the present case, the revision applicant has tried to show that the ex parte order has been passed in favour of the opposite party without giving notice to the defendant. The law under Section 4, even for a moment taken to be operative and applicable and even assuming that Section 4 is operative, then it does not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to grant interim order. What is provided is that before granting any temporary injunction order, the notice should be served on the opposite party and ordinarily it should not be granted without serving notice to opposite party and it prescribes the manner applicable to cases which may be said to be covered by the Karnataka Land Reforms act and to which the provision of Section 4 is applicable. That, as urged by the learned Counsel if Section 4 of the Act are applicable then in those cases the temporary injunction may be granted only after serving the notice of application. So, if the order is passed in violation of this provision of Section 4, it may be said to be a case of irregularity or illegality in exercise of the jurisdiction. But, as I have mentioned every illegality or irregularity cannot be the ground for interference with the order. In the present case, the learned Counsel for the applicant has failed to point out how the material injustice has been caused to the party. But, as I have mentioned every illegality or irregularity cannot be the ground for interference with the order. In the present case, the learned Counsel for the applicant has failed to point out how the material injustice has been caused to the party. The order impugned clearly shows that it was passed for a limited period only keeping in view the provision of Order 39, Rule 1. Order 39, Rule 1 provides for grant of temporary injunction where, in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise, that the circumstances mentioned in either of the clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Order 39, Rule 1 exists that Court may grant temporary injunction order. Rule 3 of Order 39 provides that except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay on account of compliance of issuance of notice before the granting of an injunction, it may on being so satisfied and on being of such an opinion may grant ex parte injunction order after having recorded its opinion and reasons therefor and may also direct that the notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party. The provision to Order 39, Rule 3 further provides that where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting of the injunction would be defeated by delay and require the applicant to deliver to the opposite party or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction, copy of the affidavit, copy of the plaint and documents and the Court shall fix a date. That Order 39, Rule 3-A provides that where an injunction has been granted without giving to the opposite party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability. The sub-rule (3) provides that ex parte injunction may be granted in special situation as mentioned therein in exceptional cases. The sub-rule (3) provides that ex parte injunction may be granted in special situation as mentioned therein in exceptional cases. But the power to grant injunction is definitely there and is exercisable under Order 39, Rule 1, no doubt read with proviso to Rule 3 thereof. That Rule 3 and its proviso create an exception, to general principle of law under Rule 3, as to in what cases, circumstances or conditions the power under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 is to be exercised even prior to the issue of notice. The breach if any in the case is and can no doubt be said to be irregularity. No doubt the party aggrieved by the order of ex parte injunction has got the remedy, in the first instance of filing ejections under Order 39, Rule 4. Apart from that the learned counsel for the opposite party very fairly brought to my notice that the revision petitioner has filed objections under Order 33, rule 4. Those objections have been filed earlier to the filing of the present revision. Even for a moment let it be taken that two remedies i. e. , revisional remedy and the remedy under Order 39, rule 4 both are available then option had to be exercised and has been exercised by the revision petitioner by having recourse to the remedy available under Order 39, Rule 4. Once the party opts one of two remedies, then the second remedy is closed and it is to be presumed that the applicant has opted for first remedy and after decision of the Trial Court in the matter of injunction order, the remedies are made available by way of appeal but it is not open to him to avail or opt both remedies simultaneously at one and the same time and therefore, in my opinion as the objections had been filed on 17-1-1995 and the revision applicant had opted to that remedy, he has no right to approach this Court under Section 115 of the Code at this stage and to question whether the ex parte order suffers from illegality. Further, the appellant is not entitled to call upon the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 115 of Code because in my opinion there is no likelihood of irreparable injury or injustice being caused therefrom as the ex parte order has been passed for a limited period. Further, the appellant is not entitled to call upon the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 115 of Code because in my opinion there is no likelihood of irreparable injury or injustice being caused therefrom as the ex parte order has been passed for a limited period. It is the duty of the applicant to get his objection disposed of. When the Court below had issued notice after granting ex parte order, it kept open to the revision applicant to raise, objection and to show that injunction order deserves to be vacated. It is always open to make all submissions before the Sub- ordinate Court itself i. e. , the learned Parliament Munsiff, and as such, the present revision in my opinion, is misconceived and shall be liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, this revision is dismissed in view of proviso to Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. No orders as to costs i. e. , parties are to bear theif own cost. Since the revision is dismissed, the interim order that has been granted by this Court shall also automatically stand vacated. --- *** --- .