Judgment :- A.R.LAKSHMANAN, J. The short facts which are relevant for the purpose of the disposal of these appeals are as follows:- The appellant Veeraswami Naidu instituted O.S. No.28 of 1975 on the file of the Sub-Court, Chengleput, for the relief of cancellation of the sale deed dated 19-7-1971 executed by him in favour of the 1st respondent Pushpammal and for granting a permanent injunction restraining the 1st respondent Pushpammal, her agents, servants etc., from interfering with the possession of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu or in the alternative granting a decree for possession of the suit properties from the 1st repsondent Pushpammal. According to the appellant Veeraswami Naidu, the sale deed had been obtained from him under misrepresentation and that it was only intended to be a mortgage deed and thereby a fraud had been committed on him. The appellant would aver that he is the owner of the properties described in the schedule to the plaint, that he leased out the same to the 2nd respondent P.V. Radhakrishna Naidu on 2-11-1974 and transferred possession to him and that the 2nd respondent is in possession as a lessee. 2. Paragraph 11 of the plaint is relevant for the purpose of disposing of these appeals. It reads as follows:- "The plaintiff owed monies to third parties on pronotes and mortgage. The creditors were pressing him after he left Pidarithangal and took up residence in the 1st defendant's house. The plaintiff owed money to the 1st defendant herself on a mortgage and a promissory note. He suggested to the 1st defendant and her husband that she could take a mortgage of all his properties for the total amount of his liabilities to third parties and to the 1st defendant herself and that she might discharge all of them and relieve him from the pressure of creditors. They agreed to do so. In or about the middle of July, 1971, they brought a document readily prepared representing that it was a mortgage for the total amount of the 1st plaintiff's liabilities and on that representation, which he honestly believed, took his signatures in the document and also got it registered by him in the head office at Madras. In or about the middle of July, 1971, they brought a document readily prepared representing that it was a mortgage for the total amount of the 1st plaintiff's liabilities and on that representation, which he honestly believed, took his signatures in the document and also got it registered by him in the head office at Madras. The contents were not read over to the plaintiff at any time and he had no manner of suspicion not need to entertain such, that the 1st defendant and her people had played a fraud upon him, as he now finds, by taking a sale deed of all the properties for a stated price of Rs. 36,124/- with false recitals." * As stated already, the appellant Veeraswami Naidu averred that possession of the suit lands was with him always and consequently, he prayed for an injunction against the 1st respondent Pushpammal. 3. Pushpammal, the 1st respondent herein, opposed the suit O.S. No.28 of 1975 on the ground that the suit schedule cultivable lands were leaved out to her initially by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu by Muchilika dated 15-10-1970 and she was inducted into possession as a lessee first. Subsequently, the appellant sold the lands with the well, pump and pump shed and also a house site for a total consideration of Rs. 36,124/ -. Out of this, a sum of Rs. 15,400/- was to be retained by the 1st respondent Pushpammal to discharge the mortgage debts of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu and the balance of Rs. 20,724/ is to be paid to him. The arrangement was carried out. The appellant executed the document on 19-7-1971 and registered it at Madras on the next day and handed over possession of the lands to the 1st respondent Pushpammal. The 1st respondent is in possession of the suit lands in her own right and is in enjoyment of the same ever since. There was no misrepresentation as alleged by the appellant. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. It is the case of the 1st respondent Pushpammal that she has been in effective possession in her own right of all the suit properties and paid kist for all the faslis. She has also paid the electricity consumption charges for running the pump set for irrigating the suit lands ever since the date of purchase by her of the lands with the well and pump set. She has also paid the electricity consumption charges for running the pump set for irrigating the suit lands ever since the date of purchase by her of the lands with the well and pump set. In fact, the Taluk Supply Officer has demanded levy paddy from her in respect of the crop raised by her on the suit lands and she delivered five bags of paddy to the Taluk Supply Officer from and out of the yield harvested by her from the suit lands. 5. The 1st respondent Pushpammal originally filed O.S. No.1574 of 1974 on the file of the District Munsif, Poonamallee, for permanent injunction. The same was transferred to the Sub-Court, Chengleput, and numbered as O.S. No.52 of 1977. The suit properties in O.S. No.52 of 1977 were the subject matter of sale dated 19-7-1971 executed by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu in favour of the 1st respondent Pushpammal, for valuable consideration. According to Pushpammal, on the date of sale, possession had been handed over to her and she has been in effective possession and enjoyment of the suit properties from that day as full owner. Since the appellant and the 2nd respondent P.V. Radhakrishna Naidu are trying to interfere with her possession of the suit properties on trumped up allegations, she has filed the suit O.S. No.52 of 1977 for permanent injunction. 6. The 2nd respondent P.V. Radhakrishna Naidu filed a written statement and the same had been adopted by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu as 1st defendant. In the written statement it is inter alia alleged that the appellant never sold the properties to the 1st respondent Pushpammal as alleged and possession had never been handed over to the 1st respondent as alleged. Possession was with the appellant always and hence the suit O.S. No.52 of 1977 is liable to be dismissed. 7. On the pleadings, the following issues were framed for trial in O.S. No.28 of 1975:- 1. Whether the document dated 19-7-1971 was executed by the 1st plaintiff believing the same to be a mortgage deed and not knowing it to be a sale deed? 2. Whether the 1st plaintiff was in possession through his lessee 2nd plaintiff on the date of suit? 3. Whether the document dated 19-7-1971 is liable to be cancelled? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction? 5. To what relief the plaintiff are entitled? 8. 2. Whether the 1st plaintiff was in possession through his lessee 2nd plaintiff on the date of suit? 3. Whether the document dated 19-7-1971 is liable to be cancelled? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction? 5. To what relief the plaintiff are entitled? 8. In O.S. No.52 of 1977, the following issues were framed for trial; 1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit properties? 2. Whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff had been obtained fraudulently? 3. Whether the plaintiff had obtained possession in pursuance of the sale deed in her favour and had been in possession of the date of suit? 4. Whether the 1st defendant had leased out the suit property to the 2nd defendant truly and validly? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction? 6. What are the reliefs the parties are entitled to? 9. Since the 2nd plaintiff P.V. Radhakrishna in O.S. No. 28 of 1975 was transposed as 2nd defendant, the issues were recast as follows:- 1. Whether the document dated 19-7-1971 was executed by the plaintiff believing the same to be a mortgage deed and not knowing it to be sale deed? 2. Whether the plaintiff was in possession through his lessee 2nd defendant on the date of suit? 3. Whether the document dated 19-7-1971 is liable to be cancelled? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to injunction? 5. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled? 6. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 10. On a joint memo filed by both parties, common evidence was rendered in O. S. No.28 of 1975 and the same has been treated as evidence in O.S. No.52 of 1977 also. The appellant, Veeraswami Naidu examined himself as P.W. 1 and three others as P. Ws. 2 to 4. On the side of the appellant, Exs. A1 to A35 were marked. on the side of the 1st respondent Pushpammal, she examined herself as D.W. 4 and three others as D.Ws. 1 to 3. Exs. B1 to B-119 were marked on the side of the 1st respondent Pushpammal. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengleput, on a detailed consideration of the entire materials placed before him, dismissed O.S. No.28 of 1975 filed by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu and decreed the suit O.S. No.52 of 1977 filed by the 1st respondent Pushpammal. 1 to 3. Exs. B1 to B-119 were marked on the side of the 1st respondent Pushpammal. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengleput, on a detailed consideration of the entire materials placed before him, dismissed O.S. No.28 of 1975 filed by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu and decreed the suit O.S. No.52 of 1977 filed by the 1st respondent Pushpammal. The net result is, the prayer asked for by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu to cancel the sale deed dated 19-7-1971 was not countenanced. The trial Court held that the sale deed was in fact executed by Veeraswami Naidu in favour of Pushpammal for valuable consideration. In so far as the suit O.S. No.52 of 1977 filed by Pushpammal for possession is concerned, the trial Court granted a decree in her favour restraining the appellant Veeraswami Naidu and others from interfering with her possession and enjoyment of the same. 11. The sole plaintiff Veeraswami Naidu preferred A.S. No.3 of 1983 against the judgment and decree in O.S. No.28 of 1975, as an indigent person. He preferred A.S. No.11 of 1983 before the District Court, Chengleput, against the judgment and decree O.S. No.52 of 1977. That appeal was numbered as A.S. No.11 of 1983 in the District Court, Chengleput. The same was transferred to this Court and numbered as Tr. A.S. No.515 of 1984 to be tried along with A.S. No.3 of 1983. 12. Pending hearing of these appeals, the sole appellant Veeraswami Naidu died on 4-7- 1983. The two appeals were sought to be prosecuted by the proposed party minor Rukmani alias Sathiabama claiming herself to be the legatee under a registered will dated 10-6-1980, executed by Veeraswami Naidu in her favour bequeating all his properties to her and hence to be the legal representative of him. The applications of the said minor legatee, for impleading herself as the legal representative of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu were opposed by the 1st respondent Pushpammal on the ground that the suit schedule properties barring Item Nos.2, 6 and 14 shown in the date sheet of the additional typed set which belong to a third person contained in the Will are the same properties which had been conveyed to her by the sale deed dated 19-7-1974 by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu and. after such conveyance, the said Veeraswami Naidu did not have any proprietary interest or estate in such properties entitling him to bequeath the same in favour of minor Rukmani, the proposed party, as per Sections 7, 8 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the same cannot be bequeathed by virtue of the definition in Section 2(h) and also under the provisions of Sections 57, 59, 90 and 152 and Restriction 1 to Schedule III of the Indian Succession Act, which prohibit the bequeathing of a property by a person who is not entitled to transfer inter vivos. 13. In both these appeals, we have heard the arguments of Mr. S.V. Jayaraman for the appellants and Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam for the 1st respondent. Before us, the following contentions were raised by Mr. S.V. Jayaraman on behalf of the appellants: i) The document dated 19-7-1971 was executed by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu believing the same to be a mortgage deed and not knowing it to be a sale deed and therefore the said document is liable to be cancelled. (ii) The sale deed in favour of the 1st respondent Pushpammal had been obtained by misrepresentation and fraudulently. (iii) Possession had never been handed over to the 1st respondent Pushpammal and it was always with Veeraswami Naidu. 14. The arguments of Mr. S.V. Jayaraman were met by Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam in minutest details. Since the arguments were confined only with regard to the above three contentions, findings are rendered only on those three contentions. That is why the pleadings in both the suits have not been elaborately extracted herein as we do in other appeals. 15. Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam, learned counsel for contesting 1st respondent Pushpammal, contended that at the time of his death, Veeraswami Naidu did not possess any property other than the suit property in which he had no legal or proprietary interest or right and, therefore, he did not leave any estate for the legatee to inherit and claim herself to be the legal representative of deceased Veeraswami Naidu. According to him, the proposed party Rukmani is not a legal representative of deceased Veeraswami Naidu and she is not entitled to prosecute the appeals since the appeals had abated. He also contended that there is no survival of cause of action on minor Rukmani on the death of Veeraswami Naidu. Mr. According to him, the proposed party Rukmani is not a legal representative of deceased Veeraswami Naidu and she is not entitled to prosecute the appeals since the appeals had abated. He also contended that there is no survival of cause of action on minor Rukmani on the death of Veeraswami Naidu. Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam cited the following decisions in support of his above contention: Custodian of Branches of Banco National Untramarino 1989 AIR(SC) 1589, 1989 (1) Scale 1410, 1989 (S2) SCC 275, 1989 (2) SCR 810 , 1989 (2) UJ 171 , 1976 AIR(Mad) 368; 1973 AIR(HP) 44; 1948 AIR(Mad) 386; Bodi alias Lakshmakka v. Venkataswami Naidu (ILR 38 Mad 369) (sic); Rani Srimati Krishna Kumari Devi v. Phaiya Rajendra Bahadur Sinha Deo 1972 AIR(SC) 806, 1973 (3) SCC 614 , 1972 (2) MLJ 46 , 1929 AIR(PC) 121; Ram Nath Das v. Ram Nagina Choubey 1962 AIR(Pat) 481); and 1986 AIR(All) 220. 16. Mr. S.V. Jayaraman opposed the contentions raised by Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam. Since we were not convinced with the preliminary objection raised by Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam, we directed both parties to argue the main appeals themselves, on merits. Further, in view of the conclusion we are reaching on the merits of these appeals, there is no necessity even to go into the correctness or otherwise of the abovesaid preliminary objection. 17. At this Juncture, we may also point out the earlier order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Tr. Appeal No. 515 of 1984 on 6-8-1991 directing the District Court, Chengleput, to submit a finding under Order 22, Rule 5, C.P.C. regading the said Rukmani's claim on the basis of the registrered Will dated 10-6-1980. Since the 1st respondent Pushpammal disputed the genuineness and validity of the Will, the Bench directed the District Court, Chengleput, to held and enquiry and find out whether the claim of the proposed legal representative Rukmani is sustainable in law; if not, who are the legal representatives of the deceased appellant Veeraswami Naidu. Both parties were permitted to let in evidence, both oral and documentary, before the Court below. The District Judge, Chengleput, conducted an enquiry and submitted his findings on 15-11-1991 holding that Rukmani alias Sathiabama is entitled to inherit the properties of Veeraswami Naidu, as legatee under the said Will as his legal representative, and therefore, she should be made as a party in the appeal. The District Judge, Chengleput, conducted an enquiry and submitted his findings on 15-11-1991 holding that Rukmani alias Sathiabama is entitled to inherit the properties of Veeraswami Naidu, as legatee under the said Will as his legal representative, and therefore, she should be made as a party in the appeal. Objections were filed by the 1st respondent Pusbpammal to the finding rendered by the District Judge, Chengleput. But, it should be reiterated that neither the District Judge nor we give any conclusive finding regarding the genuineness or validity of the Will executed by Veeraswami Naidu. The enquiry under Order 22, Rule 5 of the C.P.C. is only summary enquiry and the question whether a person can be permitted to be brought on record as the legal representative of a deceased party for the purpose of continuing the proceeding already begun is a matter collateral to the said proceeding and the adjudication arrived at in the course of such an enquiry cannot operate as res judicata. Thus, Rukmani alias Sathiabama has been made as a party to the appeals only for the purpose of prosecuting the same. She also appeared through the same counsel Mr. S.V. Jayaraman and contested the appeals. 18. On the merits of the appeals, Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, argued that the trial Court had manifestly erred in considering the matter on individual instances rather than considering the totality of the matter. In support of this contention, Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, referred to the decision reported in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai, v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras 1957 (31) ITR 28, 1957 AIR(SC) 49, 1957 SCJ 1, 1956 (1) SCR 691, 1957 MLJ 1 , 1957 MLJ(SC) 1, 1957 MLJ 1 . The next contention urged by him is that the evidence of Seethapathi Naidu husband, of the 1st respondent Pushpammal, Ramamurthi Naidu, brother of the 1st respondent, and Narayanaswami Naidu, attestor to the sale deed dated 19-7-1971, is vitial to the case and their non-examination by the 1st respondent Pushpammal tantamount to her withholding vital piece of evidence from the scrutiny of Court and therefore the Court should draw an adverse inference against the 1st respondent Pushpammal. In support of this contention Mr. In support of this contention Mr. S.V. Jayaraman relied on the decision reported in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif 1968 AIR(SC) 1413, 1968 (3) SCR 862 , 1948 AIR(Cal) 457, 1973 AIR(Mad) 421. He further argued that the evidence of the 1st respondent Pushpammal as D.W. 4 is not reliable since there is prevarication especially in the matter of the house site and certain amount of doubt has been thrown about as regards the place of payment of sale consideration and the learned trial Judge has failed to take such discrepancies into account while dealing with the matter. He would further contend that the sale deed had been obtained by misrepresentation and also fraudulently and that the Court below has materially erred in law and on facts in finding that the 1st respondent Pushpammal had been in possession and enjoyment of the property from the date of her purchase. 19. Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, in reply contended that since the learned counsel for the appellant Veeraswami Naidu had marshalled his arguments in the trial Court based on the projection of individual instances to support his plea, the learned trial Judge had to discuss the matter the way it had been projected, but, nevertheless, considered the totality of the circumstances of the case to come to the conclusion and therefore it cannot be said that the learned trial Judge had swerved from the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in 1957 (31) ITR 28, 1957 AIR(SC) 49, 1957 SCJ 1, 1956 (1) SCR 691, 1957 MLJ 1 , 1957 MLJ(SC) 1, 1957 MLJ 1 at page 56. 20. Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, learned counsel for the appellant, relied on a few sentences in paragraph 5 of the decision reported in 1957 (31) ITR 28, 1957 AIR(SC) 49, 1957 SCJ 1, 1956 (1) SCR 691, 1957 MLJ 1 , 1957 MLJ(SC) 1, 1957 MLJ 1 at page 56, which read as follows:- "When a conclusion has been reached on an appreciation of a number of facts established by the evidence, whether that is sound or not must be determined not by considering the weight to be attached to each single fact in isolation, but by assessing the cumulative effect of all the facts in their setting in the picture as a whole." * 21. We have perused the judgment of the trial Court. We have perused the judgment of the trial Court. The trial Court has considered each and every bit of the materials, both oral and documentary placed before it and arrived at the conclusion, rightly so in our view, on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances and the instances of the matter. We are satisfied with the approach made by the lower Court in rendering its detailed Judgment on every aspect of the matter. In our view, the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court is only as per the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cited decision. Hence we are of the view, that this plea has no substance. 22. Adverting to the argument of Mr. S.V. Jayaraman of drawing an adverse inference, Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam, learned counsel for the 1st respondent argued that the decisions cited by Mr. S.V. Jayaraman reported in 1968 AIR(SC) 1413, 1968 (3) SCR 862 , 1948 AIR(Cal) 457, 1973 AIR(Mad) 421, are distinguishable on facts and therefore have no application to the facts of the present case. The non-examination of a person in respect of a matter in dispute by ope of the contesting parties, according to Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam, would not amount to withholding of evidence from the purview of Court entitling the Court to draw an adverse inference since there is no evidence at all. As rightly pointed out by Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam, it is always open to the contesting party viz. the appellant to haye summoned and examined the said persons, which he has failed to do. As a matter of fact, the attestor Narayanaswami Naidu, besides the sale deed dated 19-7-1971, had attested sever atother documents viz., Exs. A.14, B.2, B.3, B.5 and B.7 on behaif of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu thereby showing his close proximity to Veeraswami Naidu rather than the 1st respondent Pushpammal and, therefore, as a matter of rightful course when the appellant Veeraswami Naidu has been attacking the sale deed attested by Narayanaswami Naidu, he should have examined him as his witness to speak about the fact of the matter. The matter in our view, assumes greater importance when D.W. 3, the scribe of the sale deed dated 19-7-1971, was categorical in asserting that it was the appellant Veeraswami Naidu who had insisted on Narayanaswami Naidu attesting the sale deed. The matter in our view, assumes greater importance when D.W. 3, the scribe of the sale deed dated 19-7-1971, was categorical in asserting that it was the appellant Veeraswami Naidu who had insisted on Narayanaswami Naidu attesting the sale deed. There is no cross-examination of the witness on his score nor any denial of the said suggestion 23. Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, supported the Judgment of the trial Court on the reasoning founded by it and submitted that Veeraswami Naidu knew well at the time of executing the document dated 19-7-1971 that it was a sale deed as desired by him and not a mortgage deed as is sought to be made now and the appellant Veeraswami Naidu participated in all the procedural matters willingly and completed the document and delivered possession of the property to the 1st respondent that day itself and the 1st respondent had taken effective possession of the property and is in enjoyment of the same in her own right from that day onwards. 24. Let us now consider the argument of Mr. S.V. Jayaraman in regard to the misrepresentation and fraud said to have been played by the 1st respondent Pushpammal on the appellant Veeraswami Naidu in obtaining the sale deed dated 10-7-1971. The case of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu, as already stated, proceeds on the footing of misrepresentation and fraud. Therefore, as contended by Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam, distinction is to be drawn to the date of execution and post execution. Accordingly, on the facts of the case, as alleged by the appellant, the factum of misrepresentation must have happened earlier to the appellant executing the document and has no relevance after the document had been executed. What had happened by way of procedural formalities in completing the sale deed are only collateral proceedings and do not address themselves to the main question of misrepresentation pleaded. It is, therefore, essential for us to find out whether the plea of misrepresentation argued by Mr. S.V. Jayaraman has been established by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu. 25. What had happened by way of procedural formalities in completing the sale deed are only collateral proceedings and do not address themselves to the main question of misrepresentation pleaded. It is, therefore, essential for us to find out whether the plea of misrepresentation argued by Mr. S.V. Jayaraman has been established by the appellant Veeraswami Naidu. 25. Salmond on Law of Torts, 18th Edition, on the "Elements of Deceit" says thus: "The Tort of decoit is the act of making a willfully false statement with intent that the plaintiff shall act in reliance on it, and with the result that he does so act and suffers harm in consequence (Bradford Building Society v. Borders 1941 (2) AllER 205. As we have seen, the origin of the tort can be clearly traced to the decision in (Pasely v. Freeman (1789) 3 TR 51). There are four main elements in this tort (Bradford Building Society v. Boarders 1941 (2) AllER 205; (1) there must be a false representation of fact; (2) the representation must be made with knowledge of its falsity; (3) it must be made with the intention that it should be acted on by the plaintiff, or by a class of persons which includes the plaintiff, in the manner which resulted in damage to him; (4) it must be proved that the plaintiff has acted upon the false statement, and has sustained damage by so doing (Diamond v. Bank of London and Montroal Ltd. (1979) QB 333, 349)." * 26. In order to substantiate this plea of misrepresentation, the appellant Veeraswami Naidu has averred in his plaint and also deposed in Court, that he was residing with the 1st respondent Pushpammal in her house in Ayal Cheri from the year 1970 to 1974 and during such stay, suggested to the 1st respondent do discharge his various debts and to have a mortgage of his properties and that the 1st respondent has agreed to such suggestion. In this context, the evidence of Veeraswami Naidu, which is at page 152 of the typed set, has to be looked into. It is as follows: - There was a general election in 1970, I exercised my vote in Pidari Thangal. There was an election in 1971, I did not vote. After 1971, I went to Sholavaram and resided in my mother-in-law's house. It is as follows: - There was a general election in 1970, I exercised my vote in Pidari Thangal. There was an election in 1971, I did not vote. After 1971, I went to Sholavaram and resided in my mother-in-law's house. Hence, my name has been left out and I could not exercise my vote. 27. This piece of evidence suggests that Veeraswami Naidu was not in Pidari Thangal during the crucial period of 1971 and his plea of the 1st respondent Pushpammal exercising influence over his lacks credence. We have already extracted paragraph 11 of the plaint. It inter alia reads as follows: "In or about the middle of July, 1971, they brought a document readily prepared representing that it was a mortgage for the total amount of the plaintiffs liabilities and on that representation, which he honestly believed, took his signature on the document and also got it registered by him in the hand office at Madras." * 28. The details about the misrepresentation, the nature of the misrepresentation, who made that, where was it made and who else were present at the time of such mis- representation are not given in the plaint. The failure to furnish such particulars of mis- representation is very vital and against the provisions of Order 6, Rule 4, C.P.C. as rightly contended by Mr. R.V.R. Nallasivam. It is the plaintiff who made these allegations has to substantiate them. The appellant Veeraswami Naidu with a view to substantiate these allegations examined two witnesses viz., P.Ws. 2 and 3. We have gone through their evidence. Unfortunately, their evidence, in our view, is of no material use to the appellant Veeraswami Naidu since they were not parties to the document of sale dated 19-7-1971 in any capacity and they have no personal knowledge about the transaction at all. 29. The evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2 examined on the side of the 1st respondent, who are attestors to the document of sale dated 19-7-1971, is superfluous since the appellant/executant himself has admitted the execution of the document. The other witness P.W. 4, a Clerk in the Sub Registrar's Office, had been examined for the purpose of marking the guideline Valuation of the lands. His evidence has no relevance to the plea of misrepresentation. The other witness P.W. 4, a Clerk in the Sub Registrar's Office, had been examined for the purpose of marking the guideline Valuation of the lands. His evidence has no relevance to the plea of misrepresentation. The only other witness, apart from the appellant and the 1st respondent, is the scribe D.W. 3 Kannayiram, Karnam, Parivakkam village, whose evidence is material in deciding the nature of the transaction. He is categoric in his assertion and consistent in deposing that it was the appellant Veeraswami Naidu who had told him to write a sale deed in respect of his property in favour of the 1st respondent Pushpammal. He did in fact write the draft of the sale document, read it over and one being approved to be correct by the appellant, wrote it in the stamp paper. Thereupon, the appellant signed it and attested by Narayanaswami Naidu. The appellant received the cash consideration of Rs. 20,124/- after the balance amount of Rs. 15,400/- was retained by the vendee Pushpammal towards the discharge of the debts of Veeraswami Naidu. The document was registered at Madras as per the desire of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu on 20-7-1971. The Sub Registrar also enquired the executant Veeraswami Naidu wbether he had executed the document of sale and received consideration in full and the executant affirmed that he had executed the sale document, received full consideration from the vendee/1st respondent and delivered possession of the property to the 1st respondent Pushpammal. Narayanaswami Naidu and P.V. Radhakrishnan had identified the executant Veeraswami Naidu to the Sub Registrar. There is also no denial or cross-examination of the witnesses on this aspect, which destabilises the case of the appellant. The appellant, referring to the scribe of Ex. B.11, would aver that he had no enmity with the scribe and that Kannayiram had written some of his documents earlier - Vide page 148 of the typed set. He would further aver that he had confidence in the person who had written the document of sale and since he is the Village Karnam, he is common to all. P.W. 2 in his evidence would depose that the village Karnam Kannayiram is an important person. P.W. 3 would depose that the scribe village Karnam is common to all and would write documents which are true only. P.W. 2 in his evidence would depose that the village Karnam Kannayiram is an important person. P.W. 3 would depose that the scribe village Karnam is common to all and would write documents which are true only. There is no evidence worth the name on the side of the appellant to discredit or impeach the testimony of the scribe D.W. 3, which has wholly destroyed the case of the appellant. In our opinion, the evidence of the village Karnam itself is sufficient to discountenance the pleas raised by the appellant in regard to his case of misrepresentation and fraud in the matter of executing the sale deed dated 19-7-1971. 30. The appellaht Veeraswami Naidu in his pleading would aver that he was residing at Ayalchari with the 1st respondent Pushpammal and her husband during the years 1970 to 1974 and returned to Pidari Thangal in January, 1974, harvested the paddy crop raised by him without any obstruction or objection from the 1st respondent Pushpammal and that the 1st respondent never made any claim of ownership in respect of the suit property at any time and more relevantly during 1970-74. It is to be borne in mind that the house site measuring 200' x 55' Gramanatham, Pidari Thangal village, was also part of the property conveyed under the sale deed dated 19-7-1971. It is a fact that this property was trespassed upon by one Bakthavatsalam, son-in-law of the appellant in the year 1973 resulting in a suit O.S. No. 910 of 1973 filed by the 1st respondent in the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee, on 2-5-1973 to vacate the trespass. It is to be remembered, that during the crucial period the appellant, according to his version, has been residing in the house of the 1st respondent. The Judgment in O.S. No.910 of 1973 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee, dated 25-11-1974 has been marked as Ex. B.113. It refers to the written statement of the said Bakthavatsalam, which inter alia reads as follows :- "The plaintiff in O.S. No.910 of 1973 is the daughter of the defendant's maternal uncle and the plaintiffs' vendor Veeraswami Naidu is another maternal uncle and father-in-law of the defendant who is also not in good terms with the defendant. B.113. It refers to the written statement of the said Bakthavatsalam, which inter alia reads as follows :- "The plaintiff in O.S. No.910 of 1973 is the daughter of the defendant's maternal uncle and the plaintiffs' vendor Veeraswami Naidu is another maternal uncle and father-in-law of the defendant who is also not in good terms with the defendant. The alleged sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by Veeraswami Naidu is a sham transaction not supported by consideration and it has been vitiated by fraud also." * 31. The narration in the written statement of the defendant in O.S. No. 910 of 1973 makes it obvious that specific reference has been made to the sale deed dated 19-7-1971 and Veeraswami Naidu, who has been, according to him, residing with the 1st respondent Pushpammal during 1970-74, must have known about the suit O.S. No. 910 of 1973, nature of the claim, the resistance to the claim, and the reference to the sale deed dated 19-7-1971 in the month of May, 1973, itself. He would deny knowledge about the existence of the sale deed dated 19-7-1971 only in December, 1974, when the 2nd respondent P.V. Radhakrishnan, his lessee, experienced obstruction from the 1st respondent Pushpammal and her people in the matter of cultivation and in January, 1975, when he obtained a registration copy of the sale deed. The records in the proceedings bear out that 2nd respondent Radhakrishnan, whom the appellant claims to be his lessee in respect of the suit properties, on being obstructed by the 1st respondent Pushpammal and her men in the matter of cultivation of the lands, filed O.S. No. 1623 of 1974 on the file of the District Munsif, Poonamallee, and specifically pleaded that he was in possession and obtained an order of ex parte injunction restraining the defendants therein from interfering with his possession. The case of the 2nd respondent Radhakrishnan was that he was in possession of the suit properties from November, 1974, onwards in pursuance of the Muchalika dated 2-11-1974 marked as Ex. A.22. 32. Two things militate against the assertion of possession by Veeraswami Naidu through his lessee during November, 1974, and January, 1975, and thereafter. The first is the appellant Veeraswami Naidu filed I.A. No. 215 of 1975 in O.S. No. 28 of 1975 in the trial Court for appointment of a receiver in respect of the suit properties. A.22. 32. Two things militate against the assertion of possession by Veeraswami Naidu through his lessee during November, 1974, and January, 1975, and thereafter. The first is the appellant Veeraswami Naidu filed I.A. No. 215 of 1975 in O.S. No. 28 of 1975 in the trial Court for appointment of a receiver in respect of the suit properties. The same was dismissed by the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge, Chengleput, by his order dated 6-10-1975 finding as follows:- "In the above circumstances, I am of the opinion that the petitioners have not succeeded in establishing their case that there is really a scramble for possession, which is just and convenient reason for the appointment of a receiver. There is no need for the appointment of a receiver as the defendant is in possession of the properties. Therefore, I find these points against the petitioners." * The appellant Veeraswami Naidu challenged the said order passed by the learned Sub- ordinate Judge, Chengleput, in C.M.A. No. 548 of 1975 and we are told that this Court by order dated 26-8-1976 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the lower Court. 33. From the above facts, it is clear that the claim of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu that he was in possession of the suit properties throughout as owner and thereafter through his lessee is falsified and that it is absolutely clear that the 1st respondent Pushpamhmal was in possession of the properties, which possession could be attributed to her only as purchaser under the sale deed dated 19-7- 1971. It is not either the case of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu that the 1st respondent Pushpammal had trespassed upon the suit properties and continuing to squat on the same. The assertion of the appellant in his evidence that the document was intended to be a simple mortgage deed and he was liable to pay interest on the mortgage amount and that he had neither paid interest nor discharged the principal amount so far only militate against the claim put forward by the appellant in the case. It is significant to note that the appellant deposed that the suit lands were lying fallow during 1972-73 and that the 2nd respondent Radhakrishnan was also not cultivating the lands at that time. But Exs. It is significant to note that the appellant deposed that the suit lands were lying fallow during 1972-73 and that the 2nd respondent Radhakrishnan was also not cultivating the lands at that time. But Exs. 29, to B.103, which are receipts evidencing payment electricity charges for the pump set paid by the 1st respondent Pushpammal for operating the pump set to bailout water for irrigation purposes, show that the 1st respondent had been in active possession and enjoyment of the suit properties right from 1971 and cultivating the same in her own right, and this could clinchingly show that the 1st respondent Pushpammal had been in active possession and enjoyment of the suit properties right from 1971 and that she has been cultivating the same in her own right as owner evidenced by Ex. B.11 sale deed dated 19-7-1971. 34. There is no evidence worth accepting on the side of the appellant to prove his case. The trial Court has considered every aspect of the matter in detail and in totality has come to the conclusion, rightly so in our view, that the appellant Veeraswami Naidu has not proved his case. The propositions that the document was meant to be a mortgage deed and not a sale deed, that the 1st respondent Pushpammal was never in possession of the suit properties and that the appellant came to know of the misrepresentation only in Dec. 1974 are only theories trotted out for finding a cause of action which, in our opinion never existed. The evidence of the appellant Veeraswami Naidu which is at page 155 of the typed set, which is extracted below itself is sufficient to reject his plea; "I do not know, the plaint allegation. Nobody ever read it to me. Hence, I do not know whether what has been stated in the plaint is true or false." * The above evidence of the appellant clinches the matter and it is an answer to the allegation raised by the appellant. 35. On a careful consideration of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, we are of the opinion that the appellant had not substantiated his case by any acceptable evidence and therefore has rightly been non-suited by the trial Court. There are no merits in any of the contentions raised by Mr. S.V. Jayaraman on behalf of the appellant. 35. On a careful consideration of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, we are of the opinion that the appellant had not substantiated his case by any acceptable evidence and therefore has rightly been non-suited by the trial Court. There are no merits in any of the contentions raised by Mr. S.V. Jayaraman on behalf of the appellant. Accordingly, we dismiss both the appeals with costs, costs one set. The memorandum of cross-objection is also dismissed. However there will be no order as to costs. The appellant was permitted to file the appeal in this Court as an indigent person. We direct the appellant to pay the Court fee due to Government. Appeals dismissed.