Judgment :- This writ petition is filed by one of the Directors of the Petitioner-Company to quash the order of the second respondent dated 20-3-1995 whereby it demanded an amount of nearly Rs. 19,75,000/-, being the minimum monthly charges for the period from 1-1-1990 to 7-4-1992. 2. The grounds urged to quash the said order, that the petitioner's predecessor, namely, Industrial Chemicals and Manomers Limited (ICL) was manufacturing of Calcium Carbide, and for the said purpose, it consumed electricity supplied by the second respondent. It is stated that the said company started functioning in 1960 and the operation of the company started declining from the year 1982-83 onwards due to powercuts, increase in powertariff, etc. Since manufacturing of Calcium Carbide involves power intensive process, there was steady decline in the capacity utilisation. Consequently, the said Company became sick and was declared as sick industrial company within the meaning of sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985. The operations of the Company were stopped during 1988-89, and the matter was referred to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi, to consider the question of rehabilitation. The Board, after hearing the parties, considered certain revival proposals and the same were accepted. Consequently, the said Company was taken over by the present petitioner/Company with effect from 17-3-1992. At the time of taking over the earlier assets and liabilities of the Company, the concession given was allowed to continue. It is further submitted that a demand was made by the second respondent for getting reconnection to the extent of Rs. 24,60,228/-, and the same was paid by the Company without any protest. Even after payment of the said amount, the second respondent has issued a notice calling upon payment of a further sum of nearly Rs. 19,75,000/- as monthly minimum charges payable in respect of the said service connection during the period 1-1-1990 and 7-4-1992, treating the said period as a disconnection period. It is alleged that the said notice is invalid, for, the Board cannot realise any amount during the disconnection period. It is said that electricity was not consumed during that period, and hence the demand for charges is illegal. It is further stated that even if the second respondent can make any demand, it can only be by modification of the scheme for revival. The principle of estoppel applies, according to the petitioner, in making the demand. 3. It is said that electricity was not consumed during that period, and hence the demand for charges is illegal. It is further stated that even if the second respondent can make any demand, it can only be by modification of the scheme for revival. The principle of estoppel applies, according to the petitioner, in making the demand. 3. At the time when the writ petition came for admission, notice of motion was ordered directing that the service connection will not be disconnected till 9-5-1995. 4. After service, the second respondent entered appearance, and opposed the granting of the relief sought for in the writ petition. 5. I heard learned counsel appearing on both sides, and I am of the view that the point in dispute is covered by a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1990 AIR(SC) 699, 1989 (4) JT 421 , 1989 (2) Scale 1196 , 1990 (1) SCC 731 , 1989 (S2) SCR 275, 1990 BBCJ 51 (Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna v. Green Rubber Industries). Their Lordships held in that case that even if the electricity is not consumed during the minimum guaranteed period, the consumer is bound to pay the minimum charges, and the contract entered into by the parties is valid. The defence that no electricity was consumed or that the service connection was disconnected is no defence in a contract of minimum guarantee. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as follows: - "The agreement in this case was in a standard form of contract. The standard clauses of the contract have been settled over the years and have been widely adopted because experience shows that they facilitate the supply of electric energy. Such a contract is presumed to be fair and reasonable. In such contracts a standard form enables the supplier to say:" * If you want these goods or services at all, these are the only terms on which they are available. Take it or leave it. "It is a type of contract on which the conditions are fixed by one of the parties in advance and are open to acceptance by anyone. The contract, which frequently contains many conditions is presented for acceptance and is not open to discussion. Take it or leave it. "It is a type of contract on which the conditions are fixed by one of the parties in advance and are open to acceptance by anyone. The contract, which frequently contains many conditions is presented for acceptance and is not open to discussion. It is settled law that a person who signs a document which contains contractual terms is normally bound by them even though he has not read them and is ignorant of the precise legal effect. In view of the clause providing for liability of consumer to pay minimum guaranteed charges irrespective of whether any energy is used or not, forming part of the contract, it cannot be said to be nudum pactum and the maxim nudum pactum ex quo non oritur actio does not apply. Considered by the test of reasonableness it cannot be said to be unreasonable inasmuch as the supply of electricity to a consumer involves incurring of overhead installation expenses by the Board which do not vary with the quantity of electricity consumed and the installation has to be continued irrespective of whether the energy is consumed or not until the agreement comes to an end. Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and the whole of its terms and accordingly the whole context must be considered in endevouring to collect the intention of the parties, even though the immediate object of enquiry is the meaning of an isolated clause. This agreement with the stipulation of minimum guaranteed charges cannot be held to be ultra vires on the ground that it is incompatible with the statutory duty. Difference between this contractual element and the statutory duty is to be observed. A supply agreement to a consumer makes his relation with the Board mainly contractual, where the basis of supply is held to be statutory rather than contractual. Difference between this contractual element and the statutory duty is to be observed. A supply agreement to a consumer makes his relation with the Board mainly contractual, where the basis of supply is held to be statutory rather than contractual. In cases where such agreements are made the terms are supposed to have been negotiated between the consumer and the Board, and unless specifically assigned, the agreement normally would have affected the consumer with whom it is made." * In that case, their Lordships also approved an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in 1936 AIR(Cal) 265 (Saila Bala Roy v. Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality) and also a decision of this Court reported in (1969) 1 Mad LJ 69 (M.G. Natosa Chettiar v. Madras State Electricity Board) and also the decisions of Punjab High Court and Allahabad High Court. 6. The Bihar State Electricity Board case 1990 AIR(SC) 699, 1989 (4) JT 421 , 1989 (2) Scale 1196 , 1990 (1) SCC 731 , 1989 (S2) SCR 275, 1990 BBCJ 51 (cited supra) again came up for consideration in 1995 AIR(SCW) 2398) (Orissa State Electricity Board v. M/s. IPL Steel Ltd.). Their Lordships approved the decision and held thus (at p. 2403 para 10 of AIR): ".. . . . . . Normally speaking, a factory utilises energy at a broadly constant level. May be, on certain occasions, whether on account of breakdowns, strike or shutdowns or for other reasons, the factory may not utilise energy at the requisite level over certain periods, but these are exceptions. Every factory expects to work normally. So does the Electricity Board expect - and accordingly produces energy required by the factory and keeps it in readiness for that factory - keeping it ready on tap, so to speak. As already emphasised, electricity once generated cannot be stored for future use. This is the reason and the manner of charging for it. There is yet another justification for this type of levy and it is this: demand charges and consumption charges are intended to defray different items. Broadly speaking, while demand charges are meant to defray the capital costs, consumption charges are supposed to meet the running charges. Every Electricity Board requires machinery, plant equipment, sub-sections, and transmission lines and so on, all of which require a huge capital outlay. Broadly speaking, while demand charges are meant to defray the capital costs, consumption charges are supposed to meet the running charges. Every Electricity Board requires machinery, plant equipment, sub-sections, and transmission lines and so on, all of which require a huge capital outlay. The Board like any other corporation has to raise funds for the purpose which means it has to obtain loans. The loans have to be repaid, and with interest, provision has to be made for depreciation of machinery equipment and buildings. Plants, machines, stations and transmission lines have to be maintained, all of which requires a huge staff. It is to meet the capital outlay that demand charges are levied and collected whereas the consumption charges are levied and collected to meet the running charges." * 7. In view of the concluded decision, which is binding on me, it has to be held that the contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 8. The question of estoppel does not arise in this case. The same is answered by the second respondent, rightly, in his letter dated 19-4-1995 wherein he has specifically stated that the concession that has been given is only from 13-4-1992 as a special case, and the same will not affect the right of the Board in demanding the charges under the minimum guarantee agreement. It is also not the case of the petitioner that he was misled by G.OK.Ms. No. 1143, Public Works (U2) Department, dated 2-8-1993 and that he has acted to its detriment. Under these circumstances, the said contention also has to fail. 9. In the result, the writ petition as well as the W.M.Ps. are dismissed. No costs.