SUBRAMANIM v. UNION OF INDIA — 1995 DIGILAW 494 (KAR)

K. S. BAKTHAVATSALAM, J. ( 1 ) THESE writ petitions are preferred against certain acquisition of lands made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short "the l. a. act") for the Karnataka state judicial department employees' house building co-operative society limited, high court building, Bangalore. The first two of these writ petitions are filed styling to be public interest litigation by two practising advocates of this court and the third one is filed by an owner of a piece of land involved in the acquisition. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the filing of these writ petitions can'be stated thus the Karnataka state judicial department employees' house building co-operative society (in short "the society") was registered under the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 on 11-8-1983. It seems the members of the society includes the members of the judicial department, members of the subordinate judiciary and also certain sitting, transferred and retired judges of this court. It seems the society originally made an agreement with individual owners for purchase of land, but ultimately it decided to request the government to initiate proceedings for acquiring the lands under the land acquisition act. Notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the gazettee on 18-2-1988. It was published in the local newspapers "sanjevani" and "samyukta karnataka" on 12-2-1988 and 13-2-1988. Public notice under Section 4 (2) was published in the village chavadi on 14-3-1988. Declaration under Section 6 was published in the gazettee on 27-2-1989. declaration under Section 6 was published in the local news-papers "sanjevani" and "prajavani" was on 25-2-1989 and 1-3-1989. Publication in the village chavadi was done on 15-3-1989. Award came to be passed on 13-3-1991. Under this acquisition an extent of 159 acres 261/4 guntas of land in the village allalasandra were acquired. ( 3 ) SUBSEQUENT to the formation of the society it seems the society entered into an agreement with one M/s. Devatha builders on 12-11-1986 long before the notification under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the gazettee. it is also seen from the records that the government has approved the acquisition of the lands for the society on 30-8-1985. The Bangalore development authority (in short "bda") has approved the layout on 28-11-1992 and it seems the allotment of sites has been made by the society (1700 sites) on 4-1-1993. it is also seen from the records that the government has approved the acquisition of the lands for the society on 30-8-1985. The Bangalore development authority (in short "bda") has approved the layout on 28-11-1992 and it seems the allotment of sites has been made by the society (1700 sites) on 4-1-1993. At this stage these writ petitions came to be filed before this court. ( 4 ) WE think it now necessary to extract the allegations made by the petitioners in each of these petitions and also the statement of objections filed by the respondents. ( 5 ) WRIT petition No. 35837 of 1994 is filed by a practising Advocate of this court as a public interest litigation. The petitioner alleges in the petition mainly on the ground that the acquisition violates articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and articles 38 and 39 of the directive principles of state policy of the constitution. The petitioner alleges that he learns that certain judges who own houses in the city of Bangalore have become members of the society. The petition contains Annexure-A the list of sitting judges and Annexure-B the names of retired judges, out of which some of them own houses in the Bangalore city. The petitioner states that writ petition nos. 3995 and 6156 of 1989 were filed by certain owners of land on the ground that final declaration was published beyond the limitation of one year and the award was published beyond the period of limitation and that those writ petitions were dismissed by shivappa, j. On 17-11-1992. It is stated that the appeals preferred against the said decision are pending. The petitioner refers to certain correspondences made with the society by which he wanted some information from the society with regard to membership. The petitioner challenges the validity of section 3 (f) of the Land Acquisition Act and states that the legislature passed Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1961 amending the principal act i. e. , Land Acquisition Act, 1894 substituting Section 3 (f) which defines the "public purpose" as to include acquisition of land for purposes of housing of poor, landless, or displaced persons etc. And where the land is needed by a building co-operative society or corporation for the construction of houses (section 3 (f) (viii) (b) ). And where the land is needed by a building co-operative society or corporation for the construction of houses (section 3 (f) (viii) (b) ). It is stated the parliament substituted a similar definition in Section 3{f) by enacting Central Act No. 68 of 1984. The petitioner alleges that by acquiring the lands under these Provisions thousands of small land owners whose primary income is from agriculture lost their lands and the land owners are paid a pittance of compensation. the petitioner alleges that agriculturists were thrown out of lands, their profession and employment and it violates article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of india. It is stated Section 3 (f) as it stands today does not lay down the guidelines on the basis of which the state may exercise their discretion to choose as to which of those co-operative societies deserve the facility of compulsory acquisition based on the status of income of the members of the co-operative society. The sum and substance of the allegations in the petition seems to be by invoking the Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act irrespective of the status of economic condition of the members thereof is making the rich richer and the poor poorer. This according to the petitioner of fends articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of india. It is alleged that when the membership includes high dignatories such as judges, sitting and retired, district judges, civil judges and magistrates, it can never be considered as a "public purpose" within the meaning of Section 3 (f) of the act. The petitioner further alleges that the judges of the high court and supreme court, appointed by the president of india can by no stretch of imagination can be described as employees of the judicial department either of the government of Karnataka or any other state and that the respondent-judges both sitting and retired cannot be stated as employees of the Karnataka judicial department. according to the petitioner the ministerial staff of the department can alone be described as employees of the judicial department. it is also stated that article 14 of the Constitution is infringed insofar as the judges have become members of the society as the owners of the lands would not be able to get protection of law and equality under different laws. it is also stated that article 14 of the Constitution is infringed insofar as the judges have become members of the society as the owners of the lands would not be able to get protection of law and equality under different laws. It is alleged that the acquisition proceedings made for the respondent- judges, sitting and retired of this court and the Supreme Court and subordinate judiciary who seek benefit of allotment of sites can never be considered as public purpose and if such power is exercised it is a colourable exercise of power. Certain allegations are made with regard to town planning act and the Bangalore development authority Act, 1976 and we do not think it necessary to refer those allegations as we think they are irrelevant. the petitioner contends that there is fraud on the exercise of the powers of the authorities concerned with the land acquisition. the petitioner states that the object of the co-operative society is for the promotion of the economic interest or general welfare of its members or of the public in accordance with the co-operative principles and in furtherance to this object the said act has made Provisions for the state aid in the finance of the society and instead of negotiating with the owners for a price in the open market with voluntary exchange of agreements and contracts the respondents 2 and 3 have arbitrarily permitted the society to avail of the facility of compulsory acquisition. ( 6 ) THE petitioner in writ petition No. 11211 of 1995 alleges that the 2nd respondent-society by allowing the judges of the high court to become its members indirectly prevailed upon the first respondent and other statutory bodies to sanction permission for acquisition and also for formation of layout. The petitioner alleges that judges have been the principal beneficiaries of the 2nd respondent-society and sites of dimensions of 100' x 100' and 120' x 100' were allotted in favour of judges sitting, transferred and retired. The petitioner has given the list of judges who have become members in paras 7 and 8 of the petition. It is alleged by the petitioner that allotment of sites to the judges of the high court and supreme court is basically opposed to the laudable object underlying the society which has to strive for providing house sites to low paid employees in the judicial department at economically viable rates. It is alleged by the petitioner that allotment of sites to the judges of the high court and supreme court is basically opposed to the laudable object underlying the society which has to strive for providing house sites to low paid employees in the judicial department at economically viable rates. It is also alleged that judges by becoming members of the society indirectly prevailed upon all the statutory bodies and persons in power at the relevant point of time to issue notification for acquisition of lands, formation of layout and distribution of sites etc. It is alleged by the petitioner that in view of the judgment of the division bench of this court in narayana reddy and another v state of Karnataka and others and affirmed by the Supreme Court in hm. t. house building co-operative society v syed khader and others , holding that the acquisition made in favour of house building societies through middlemen is bad applies to the facts of this case and as such the acquisition in this case also got to be set aside applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above said decision. The petitioner alleges that the 2nd respondent-society entered into an agreement with the middlemen known as devatha builders on 11-12-1988 and the terms and conditions have been entered extracted in para 13 of the petition. The petitioner also states about the audit report for the period 1991 to 1994 where adverse comments are made about the payment made to devatha builders. It is also alleged in para 15 of the petition that the society has paid a sum of Rs. 94,33,572/- to the builder who was not able to account for and for what purposes the said money was used. The petitioner alleges that the money must have been paid to persons in power to get the acquisition notification issued in respect of the lands wherein agreements have been entered with the land owners. The petitioner further alleges that looking into the agreement entered into by the society with the middlemen will show that the agreement is opposed to public policy and innocent landlords are deprived of their lands. A reference is made to Mr. G. v. k. rao committee which is appointed to enquiry into the affairs of 98 house building co-operative societies functioning in Bangalore. An extract of the report of the Mr. A reference is made to Mr. G. v. k. rao committee which is appointed to enquiry into the affairs of 98 house building co-operative societies functioning in Bangalore. An extract of the report of the Mr. G. v. k. rao committee is given at para 18 of the petition in which a comment is made by the committee stating that "considering that the land cost and acquisition cost are in addition to these payments, the amount payable to the agent is very much on the higher side". The conclusion of the committee extracted at page 16 reads thus:"having entered into agreement with individual landlord and having made advance to the landlords the necessity of the agent was not there for the society. The agent has been engaged purely to pursue acquisition proceedings and to get the layout plan approved and executed by the statutory bodies. The rates agreed upon is very much on the higher side and perhaps society could have saved substantial amounts without the agent and without causing any undue hardship/delay". the petitioner alleges that respondents 3 to 31 knowing quite well that they own sites and houses deliberately have sworn to false affidavits to the effect that they are not owning any houses or sites to comply with Section 8 (a) of the bye-law of the society. it is alleged in the petition that false and incorrect statements made by the judges goes to show that they are prepared to swear to the contents of any affidavit to achieve their object in securing sites. It is also stated that amendment to Section 7 of the bye-laws of the society is ultra vires of Section 12 of the Karnataka state Co-Operative Societies Act. Petitioner alleges that the action of respondents has to be tested on the touch stone of legality, morality, propriety and judicial integrity. According to the petitioner as constitutional heads of the high court of karnataka, the judges, are a class themselves cannot become members of the society and there has been breach of oath of office by the judges. The petitioner alleges that the acquisition is bad in law and the acquisition is not for public purpose and it has been made under colourable exercise of power. The petitioner alleges that the acquisition is bad in law and the acquisition is not for public purpose and it has been made under colourable exercise of power. It is also stated that the lands acquired by the society comes within the green belt area and the society cannot acquire the land for formation of house sites. According to the petitioner the judges are not eligible to be the members of the society and if they want to become members the bye-law should be get amended and there is no amendment brought about to the bye-laws of the society and if it is amended it would defeat the very object of the society and Section 12 of the Co-Operative Societies Act. It is also stated that there is no prior approval of the scheme by the government as contemplated under Section 3 (f) (vi) of the land acquisition act and the power under sections 4 (1) and 6 (1) has been exercised for extraneous considerations at the instance of persons who had no role in the decision making process. It is also stated that the declaration made by the judges under clause 8 (a) of the bye-laws to become a member the information furnished is false and incorrect. The petitioner refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in h. m. t, house building co-operative society's case, supra. It is also stated by the petitioner in the additional grounds raised that respondents 3 to 31 and subordinate judiciary can never be termed and described as employees of the Karnataka state judicial department in view of the mandate under articles 217, 233 and 234 of the Constitution of india. It is also stated that the ministerial staff of the judicial department alone can be described as employees of the judicial department. ( 7 ) THE petitioner in writ petition no, 28707 of 1995 is the owner of 9 acres and 34 guntas of land in sy. No. 89/1 of all alasandra village, yelahanka hobli, Bangalore north taluk. after giving the facts which led to the acquisition the petitioner attacks the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the action is vitiated by fraud and therefore not sustainable. No. 89/1 of all alasandra village, yelahanka hobli, Bangalore north taluk. after giving the facts which led to the acquisition the petitioner attacks the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the action is vitiated by fraud and therefore not sustainable. The petitioner alleges that the societies are not bona fide co-operative institutions carrying on the aims and objectives of the co-operative movement, but they are fraudulent institutions set up by vested interests to grab the lands by back door methods and to amass wealth by indulging in the real estate business. It is also stated that the 4th respondent-society has appointed middlemen and through them the hands of all the relevant men in authority were greased by way of paying exhorbitant sum as a quid pro quo. It is alleged that no co-operative society can function through middlemen nor it can encourage middlemen. the petitioner alleges that the judges cannot become members of the society and how can such judges decide any matter which comes before them against any such house building co-operative societies. The petitioner alleges that the society has entrusted the job of getting the lands acquired to a middleman called "devatha builders" and entered into an agreement. The petitioner states that Rs. 100/- per sq. Yd. Is to be paid to the middleman and the amount is obviously meant for bribing the authorities to push through the land acquisition. It is alleged that the society got the land acquisition proceedings initiated and completed only by paying crores of rupees illegal gratification and therefore the said acquisition cannot be for public purpose at all. It is also stated that the petitioner opposed the land acquisition proceedings before the authority to the extent possible. the petitioner states that when his land was acquired he was not aware that the 4th respondent-society is a fraudulent institution and the acquisition is the result of fraudulent exercise of power. A reference is also made to an offer said to have been made by the president of the society by which the petitioner was requested not to challenge the acquisition before court and that the 4th respondent would get 21/2 acres of land would be reconveyed to the petitioner and as such the petitioner states that he has not approached this court earlier challenging the acquisition proceedings. According to the petitioner the principle laid down by a division bench of this court in narayana reddy's case, supra, is attracted in the instant case and the said decision has been approved by the Supreme Court in hm. t. house building co-operative society's case. The petitioner alleges that prior sanction of the government has not been obtained as contemplated under Section 3 (f) (vi) of the land acquisition act and in the instant case the proper procedure has not been followed and no prior approval of the housing scheme has been obtained and the acquisition cannot be held to be for public purpose. The petitioner alleges that the award has been passed in violation of Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the instant case the award has not been passed within the period prescribed and as such the entire acquisition is bad in law. The petitioner alleges that the acquisition is only for commercial purpose and it is an act of favouritism on the part of the first respondent and the impugned action is arbitrary, capricious and tainted by mala fides. It is also stated that the action of the 4th respondent-society is not in conformity with the main objectives of the co-operative movement and as such it is contrary to law and opposed to the public interest and therefore cannot be held to be for public purpose. ( 8 ) AN amended petition has been filed by the petitioner in writ petition No. 11211 of 1995 by which the petitioner seeks for quashing the allotment of sites made to respondents 3 to 31 and also to direct an enquiry by the registrar of co-operative societies under Section 64 of the Karnataka co-operative societies act and also to direct respondents 3 to 31 to surrender the membership of the society. ( 9 ) WHEN these writ petitions came up for preliminary hearing notice was ordered to all respondents-sitting judges, transferred and retired judges of this court and also of the Supreme Court. notice has been taken by the registry and almost all respondents have been served and certain respondents have filed statement of objections and certain respondents thought fit not to file any statement of objections. ( 10 ) RESPONDENTS 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 27 and 29 have filed statement of objections, apart from the house building co-operative society and devatha builders. ( 10 ) RESPONDENTS 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 27 and 29 have filed statement of objections, apart from the house building co-operative society and devatha builders. ( 11 ) THE 2nd respondent-society in writ petition No. 11211 of 1995 has filed a detailed statement of objections. It is stated therein that the petitioner is not a member of the society and has also no interest in the acquired land or sites formed therein and therefore he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the Constitution and he is in no way affected by the impugned action of the society. It is stated that the Karnataka state judicial department employees' house building co-operative society ltd. Has been duly registered under the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act. It is also stated that it is not "state" or "authority" within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution of India and that its function is not amendable to attack at the instance of utter strangers to the society like the petitioner and that the society is not amendable to writ jurisdiction of this court. It is stated that the members of the public have no locus standi to call in question the acts and omissions of the society or to take exception to the acquisition of land for the society, making of layout therein and allotment of sites. It is stated that it is entirely a matter of internal administration of the society and the total strangers like the petitioner has no right to question the same. It is also stated that in the petition wrong statements of facts and distortions thereof have been indulged in and on such basis wild allegations have been made against the society and respondents 3 to 31, who are members thereof. It is stated that the writ petition has to be thrown out on the ground that the writ petition is filled to scandalise the judiciary and the judges and that the attack against the society is wholly unjustified. It is stated in the statement of objection that the society is registered on 11-8-1983 and those serving in the judicial department in Karnataka as also the judges of the high court and the subordinate courts are eligible to be admitted to its membership. It is stated in the statement of objection that the society is registered on 11-8-1983 and those serving in the judicial department in Karnataka as also the judges of the high court and the subordinate courts are eligible to be admitted to its membership. One of the objects of the society is to acquire land, make a layout of house sites therein and allot them to its members. It is stated that there are at present 2560 members on the rolls of the society and out of which there are 36 judges of high court including retired judges. The society selected an area of about 200 acres situated at allalasandra, chikkabommasandra and jakkur plantation villages in Bangalore north taluk on the outskirts of the corporation of the city of Bangalore and thereafter the society contacted the land owners numbering about 70 and were able to obtain agreements from them in january, 1984 at mutually agreed prices which were in no way less than the then prevailing market value. It is stated that in order to solve the problem arising under the Land Reforms Act and questions of title at a later stage it was felt that it would be better to get the lands under the Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. So the government was approached for acquisition of these lands and by communication dated 30-8-1985 sent by the government to the special deputy commissioner, Bangalore district steps have been taken as per annexure-rl. In pursuance of this a preliminary notification was issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is stated that none of the land owners whose lands were notified for acquisition filed any objections, as in fact none of them had any objections because they had all prior to 16-1-1984 and agreed to convey the lands to the society and this was followed by execution of agreements upto 30-6-1984, approval of acquisition was given on 30-8-1985 and a final declaration under Section 6 (1) of the act was issued on 24-2-1989. An award was passed by the land acquisition officer on 11-2-1990. It is stated that all except two owners namely papaiah and muniswamappa accepted the award and received the comepensation and delivered possession of the lands acquired. These owners filed writ petition nos. 3995 and 6556 of 1990 and they were dismissed by shivappa, j. On 17-11-1992. An award was passed by the land acquisition officer on 11-2-1990. It is stated that all except two owners namely papaiah and muniswamappa accepted the award and received the comepensation and delivered possession of the lands acquired. These owners filed writ petition nos. 3995 and 6556 of 1990 and they were dismissed by shivappa, j. On 17-11-1992. It is stated that after acquisition of lands a layout of sites has been made by the society and the number of sites formed in the layout is 2,048. Formal inauguration of the layout work was made on 1-5-1991 and the work is nearly complete except for drawing of electrical mains. In para 8 of the statement of objections the description of the sites formed in the layout is mentioned. It reads as follows: ( 21 ) LEARNED advocate-general for the state referred to the amended Provisions of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, especially the definition "public purpose" and contended that the state is satisfied about the need of the society for the lands for allotment of houses to the employees who are members of the society and gave an approval in 1985 itself for acquiring these lands. According to the learned advocate-general, there is no inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Act with regard to the term "public purpose" and when once the lands are acquired for public purpose under part ii of the land acquisition act it is not necessary to follow the procedure under part vii of the Land Acquisition Act. He contended that even before the amendment the Supreme Court has held that acquisition for co-operative societies is for "public purpose" and referred to a decision in state of gujarat and another v musamigan imam haider bux razvi and another. Learned advocate-general took very strong objection for the two advocate-petitioners making reckless allegations against the judges of this court and wanted this court to take a serious view of the whole issue. He contended that when it is the duty of the bar to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and it is surprising to note that members of the bar are making reckless allegations and wide a publicity is given as if some irregularity has been committed by the learned judges of this court and this has made the entire Karnataka high court as a laughing stock in the mind of the public. Learned advocate-general went to the extent of stating that the two petitioners who preferred the writ petitions as public interest litigation cannot be entertained as there is no public interest at all and requested this court to take serious view about the conduct of the advocates who have preferred those petitions by making false and reckless allegations. The learned advocate-general has produced the entire records before us and contended that there is no procedural irregularity in the acquisition proceedings and this court need not interfere especially when the petitioners had approached this court after long delay. ( 22 ) SRI Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for devatha builders contended that the writ petition has got to be dismissed on the ground of laches and referred to a decision in p. chinnanna and others v state of Andhra Pradesh and others. according to the learned counsel the recitals in the agreement made with devatha builders are entirely different and the principles laid down in h. m. t. house building co-operative society's case, will not apply to the facts of this case. The learned counsel argued that no owner of the land has come up before this court challenging the acquisition except the petitioner in writ petition No. 28707 of 1995 and that too after suppressing certain material facts and after receiving part of the compensation. According to the learned counsel when no owner has thought fit to challenge the acquisition proceedings and when they are satisfied with the award amount, it is not open for the two petitioners in writ petition nos. 35837 of 1994 and 11211 of 1995 to prefer these petitions styled as public interest litigation. The learned counsel further pointed out that once the lands are acquired for the public purpose under section 3 (f) (viii) (b) of the Land Acquisition Act, the procedure in part vii of the Land Acquisition Act need to be followed and referred to a decision of this court in narayan raju v state of karnataka and others, which according to the learned counsel this view has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. The learned counsel stated that the acquisition proceedings was taken by the government in 1985 itself long prior to the devatha builders came into the scene and as such the decision in h m. t. house building co-operative society's case, will not apply to the facts of this case. The learned counsel stated that the acquisition proceedings was taken by the government in 1985 itself long prior to the devatha builders came into the scene and as such the decision in h m. t. house building co-operative society's case, will not apply to the facts of this case. ( 23 ) MR. Vasudeva, the petitioner in writ petition No. 11211 of 1995 in his reply contended that according to clause 7 of the bye-laws, no high court or Supreme Court judge can become member of the society and the clause 7 of the bye-laws is only meant for the employees of the judicial department and if at all it can be extended it is only to the extent to the subordinate judiciary and surely the high court or Supreme Court judges cannot become members of the society. Learned counsel referred to article 217 of the Constitution and strenuously contended that independence of judiciary is lost in the sense the very presence of the judges in the list of members of the society has pressurised the government to proceed with the acquisition of lands for the purpose of the society. According to the learned counsel the principle laid down in sankalchand himatlal sheth's case, supra has got to be looked into to appreciate his contention as to how the presence of judges in the list of members of the society can vitiate the entire acquisition proceedings himself. ( 24 ) WE have given our careful consideration to the arguments made by the learned counsel on either side and the learned advocate-general for the state. ( 25 ) THE first and foremost point to be decided in these cases is whether Section 3 (f) of the land acquisition (karnataka extension and amendment) Act, 1961 and also the term "public purpose" as found in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is valid. In Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the expression "public purpose" has been expanded by amendment made by Central Act No. 68 of 1984. So far this case is concerned, it is suffice to extract Section 3 (f) (vi) which reads as follows:" 3. Definitions. In Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the expression "public purpose" has been expanded by amendment made by Central Act No. 68 of 1984. So far this case is concerned, it is suffice to extract Section 3 (f) (vi) which reads as follows:" 3. Definitions. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, xxx xx xxx xx xxx xx xxx xx (f) the expression "public purpose" includes xxx xx xxx xx xxx xx xxx xx (vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by government or by any authority established by government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the societies Registration Act, 1860, or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a state, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any state". (emphasis supplied) to the same effect the state of Karnataka has passed an act no. 17 of 1961 which is called the land acquisition (karnataka extension and amendment) Act, 1961 substituting clause (f) in the original act. With regard to this case we are concerned with Section 3 (f) (viii) (b), which reads as follows:"3 (f) the expression "public purpose" includes xxx xxx xxx xxx (viii) the provision of land for a company, (a) where the land is needed for construction of some work and such work is likely to prove substantially useful to the public; or (b) where the land is needed by a building co-operative society or corporation for the construction of houses". ( 26 ) A reading of the Provisions clearly show that there is no in consistency and that whenever land is needed for public purpose for a society, it can be acquired as if it is for the public purpose. We do not think that any argument can be built up as contended by the petitioner in writ petition No. 35837 of 1994 that no guidelines are given by the parliament. A look at the Provisions itself will show that the definition is an inclusive definition and the lands can be acquired for a co-operative society. We do not think that any argument can be built up as contended by the petitioner in writ petition No. 35837 of 1994 that no guidelines are given by the parliament. A look at the Provisions itself will show that the definition is an inclusive definition and the lands can be acquired for a co-operative society. We are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel that the Section has to be struck down as no guidelines are given. We do not think that we can read anything into the Section and strike down the provision as if no guidelines are framed. It is for the government to decide whether there is "public purpose" or not. A reading of the provision of the land acquisition act will show that it is for the government to decide about the public purpose and when once the government has come to the conclusion that it is for a public purpose, it is final and it is not for this court to sit in appeal over the issue of "public purpose". It is well-settled by the decision of the supreme court in Smt. Somawanti's case, supra. Though the decision was rendered before the amendment of the Section, it is enough to refer to a passage at page 162 (paras 29 and 36) which reads as follows:"29. Learned counsel put the mutter in a slightly different way and said that Section 6 (3} pre-supposes that the juris- dictional fact exists, namely, that there is a public purpose or a company behind the acquisition and, therefore, the question whether it exists or not is justiciable. The act has empowered the government to determine the question of the need of land for a public purpose or for a company and the jurisdiction conferred upon it to do so is not made conditional upon the existence of a collateral or extraneous fact. It is the existence of the need for a public purpose which gives jurisdiction to the government to make a declaration under Section 6 (1) and makes it the sole judge whether there is in fact a need and whether the purpose for which there is that need is a purpose. The Provisions of sub-section (3} preclude a court from ascertaining whether either of these ingredients of the declaration exists". 36. The Provisions of sub-section (3} preclude a court from ascertaining whether either of these ingredients of the declaration exists". 36. Now whether in a particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the state government to be satisfied about. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the state is within the legislative competence of the state the declaration of the government will be final subject, however, to one exception. that exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The power committed to the government by the act is a limited power in the sense that it can be exercised only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a company. if it appears that what the government is satisfied about is not a public but a private purpose or no purpose at all the action of the government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the act and its declaration will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the declaration of the government will be final". (see also bajirao t. Kote (dead) by l. rs. And another v state of maharashtra and others ). we are of the view that there cannot be any doubt that the acquisition in these cases is made for public purpose for allotment of house sites to the members of the Karnataka judicial department employees. In musamigan imam haider bux razvi's case, supra, the Supreme Court has referred to an earlier decision at page 596 (para 3) which reads thus:"3. although two important points were raised in the aforesaid writ petitions viz. In musamigan imam haider bux razvi's case, supra, the Supreme Court has referred to an earlier decision at page 596 (para 3) which reads thus:"3. although two important points were raised in the aforesaid writ petitions viz. , (1) whether the acquisition of land for co-operative housing society is a public purpose and (2) whether the government could cancel the notification dated April 29, 1963 issued by it under Section 6 of the act and issue a fresh notification dated April 28, 1966 under the said Section of the Act, the first point does not survive and has rightly not been canvassed before us in view of the decisions of this court in ratilal shankarbhai and others v state of gujarat and others ; pandit jhandu lal and others v State of Punjab and another' and ram swamp v the district land acquisition officer, aligarh and others. In these cases, it has been made clear that ordinarily the government is the best authority to determine whether the purpose in question is a public purposeor not; it cannot be contended that a housing scheme for a limited number of persons cannot be considered as a public purpose and the need of a Section of the public may be a public purpose". as such we are of the view that there is no substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel in writ petition no. 35837 of 1994 that the Section is not valid insofar as no guidelines are framed by the government and it is not for this court to decide whether the acquisition was for a public purpose or not. 26a. The argument putforth before us mainly centres round the terms "fraud on power" and "colourable exercise of power". learned counsel for the petitioners tried to build up their arguments, if we may say so, from the end. In other words, just because certain sites are allotted to some judges of the high court and the Supreme Court (sitting, retired and transferred), this court should come to the conclusion that the acquisition itself is bad in law. learned counsel for the petitioners tried to build up their arguments, if we may say so, from the end. In other words, just because certain sites are allotted to some judges of the high court and the Supreme Court (sitting, retired and transferred), this court should come to the conclusion that the acquisition itself is bad in law. The learned counsel wanted us to arrive at a conclusion that just because certain members of the society happen to be judges of this court the government was pressurised in acquiring the land and as such the exercise of power by the government in acquiring the land is a fraud on power and is a colourable exercise of power. We are not able to understand this argument, nor there is any material to accept this argument. When the concerned society has been formed in 1983 and from the records it is very clear that the society has been asking the government for acquiring lands for allotment of sites to its members, the government have come to the conclusion in august, 1985 itself, as borne out by the records, to acquire these lands. It is true that notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act and declaration under Section 6 of the act came much later, but the decision making authority has arrived at a decision to acquire the land in 1985 itself. From the tabular statement given by the counsel for the society it is seen that on 28-8-1984, 10 of the judges have become members and on 23-11-1984 another judge has become a member of the society. So, it is not correct to say that all the judges of the high court were members of the society when the decision was taken by the government in 1985. It is true that almost all judges of this court have become members or have applied for membership upto 21-4-1995. ( 27 ) AS we have already stated, when the government have arrived at a conclusion to acquire the lands even in 1985 itself, it cannot be said that there is colourable exercise of power on that date. It is not in dispute that out of 2000 and odd members, 39 sites have been allotted to judges. ( 27 ) AS we have already stated, when the government have arrived at a conclusion to acquire the lands even in 1985 itself, it cannot be said that there is colourable exercise of power on that date. It is not in dispute that out of 2000 and odd members, 39 sites have been allotted to judges. As such it cannot be said that just because 39 sites have been allotted to judges by the society, the entire acquisition proceedings are invalid and gets vitiated. it is for this court to see only whether there is public purpose at all. We are fully satisfied that there is public purpose in acquiring these lands for the purpose of providing house sites to the employees of the judicial department. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel to the contrary are not appealing to us. The argument that the presence of judges in the list of membership of the society has quickened the acquisition is far-fetched. Equally the argument made before us that the acquisition is against the directive principles of the state policy under the Constitution is not sustainable. Nowhere it is stated that agricultural lands should not be acquired. In so far as the power exists and the power is given by the parliament or legislature to acquire lands, this court cannot read something into the Provisions of Land Acquisition Act and say that lands of the poorer Section of the society cannot be acquired for the purpose of a co-operative society. In law, we do not think that such an argument is sustainable. ( 28 ) THIS takes us to the main plank of attack made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, relying upon a division bench decision of this court in narayana reddy's case as affirmed by the Supreme Court in h. m. t. house building co-operative society's case. The learned counsel for the petitioners strenuoulsy contended that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts of this case and as such the entire acquisition made for the society is bad in law. According to the learned counsel as there is a middleman in this case (devatha builders) and there is an agreement between the society and the middleman, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court has to be applied to the facts of this case. According to the learned counsel as there is a middleman in this case (devatha builders) and there is an agreement between the society and the middleman, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court has to be applied to the facts of this case. this necessitates us to look into the agreement made with the devatha builders. The agreement is between the karnataka state judicial department employees' house building co-operative society ltd. , high court building, Bangalore and M/s. Devatha builders, engineering contractors, represented by its managing partner Sri R. M. B. aradhya and entered into on 12-11-1986. It is necessary to extract certain portions of the agreement as below:"whereas the first party is a registered house building co-operative society, registered under the Karnataka co-operative societies Act, whose main object is to procure lands round about the Bangalore and forming layouts and sites and to cater the needs of its members by allotting sites for purposes of construction of dwelling houses on the sites. whereas the second party is a registered partnership firm registered under the Partnership Act, as an estate agent and engineering contractor doing estate agency and carrying out the work of private layouts. and whereas the first party has entered into agreement with land owners of allalasandra, chikkabommasandra and jakkur chikka plantation villages, yelahanka hobli, Bangalore north taluk, for sale/acquisition of their lands to it, more fully described in the schedule hereunder. whereas the said lands being agricultural lands and have to be acquired and converted for non-agricultural residential purposes and for formation of a residential layout for the benefit of the members of the first party. whereas the first party with the consent of the said land owners was contemplating to have the acquisition proceedings processed by the government of karnataka. whereas in the meantime the first party received certain offers for undertaking the time bound formation of its private layout and that the said offers were considered by the managing committee of the first party at its meeting held on 20-10-1986. whereas the second party's offer dated 18-8-1985 was found to be more competitive and acceptable both in respect of the rate offered and also the items of works to be undertaken relating to formation of layout and also general assistance for co-ordination of works related thereto inclusive of assistance in respect of litigation free and timely acquisition of lands. whereas the second party's offer dated 18-8-1985 was found to be more competitive and acceptable both in respect of the rate offered and also the items of works to be undertaken relating to formation of layout and also general assistance for co-ordination of works related thereto inclusive of assistance in respect of litigation free and timely acquisition of lands. xxx xxx xxx xxx now this agreement witnesseth as follows: the first party has hereby agreed to entrust the second party the work of attending to the acquisition proceedings and forming layout in the lands so acquired as litigation free and the second party in turn has hereby agreed to undertake the said work and in compliance thereof to act as hereunder:2. To appear before government and other various public authorities to represent the first party and help to process of the acquisition of lands and to see that acquisition of land in allalasandra, chikkabommasandra and jakkur chikka plantation villages, yelahanka hobli, Bangalore north taluk, described in the schedule here under initiated by government of Karnataka is completed. (i) by issue of preliminary notification under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act within 2 months from the date of this agreement. (ii) to arrange for conducting an enquiry under Section 5 (a) by competent authorities as prescribed under the Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act within 4 months from the date of this agreement. (iiij to arrange for issue of notification under Section 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act within 5 months from the date of this agreement. xxx xxx xxx xxx (viii) to arrange for putting the first party in possession of the acquired land by state government within 6 months from the date of this agreement. xxx xxx xxx xxx (5) the first party agrees to pay to the second party. . . . An amount calculated at Rs. 110/- (rupees one hundred and ten only) per square yard based on the present. . . . Actual sital area depending upon the progress made in the execution of the works in the following modes: