ORDER 1. In this petition preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the quashing has been prayed of the orders filed as Annexure P/I0 and P/12 passed respectively by Second Civil Judge Class-II, Gwalior, in Execution Case No. 47N60-91 and by the Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Revision No. 171/92. 2. Before dealing with the contentions advanced by both the parties, it is relevant to mention here the broad features and facts of the case: Respondent No.1 Gomti Bai W/o Bhagwandas had filed the suit in the year 1961 against the petitioner for eviction from the suit house on the basis of tenancy. In the suit, she had in the alternative also claimed possession on the basis of her title in the suit property. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 3. The petitioner had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. He had asserted his possession on the suit house as owner of the property. His case was that the rent house was an evacuee property and under a conveyance deed, executed by President of India, in his favour, he was the landlord himself and the respondent had no right title or interest in the suit house. It may be relevant to mention here that during the pendency of the suit, the petitioner had transferred the suit house by way of the sale deed in favour of his two brothers named Mulak Raj and Baldev Raj and had allegedly parted with its possession. 4. In second appeal, respondent No.1 had moved an application for amendment, for the trial of the suit only as a suit for possession on the basis of title. This Court in S.A. 179 of 1977 in the circumstances of the case observed that :-"3. xx xx xx xx xx It is true that the suit had remained pending for more than 12 years. This Court in S.A. 179 of 1977 in the circumstances of the case observed that :-"3. xx xx xx xx xx It is true that the suit had remained pending for more than 12 years. It is also apparent that despite there being a claim for possession on the basis of title, no specific issue was framed on that count and the matter was also not tried accordingly." Since the plaintiff/respondent No.1's claim was not purely on the ground of relationship of landlord and tenant as it was based also on the title and the defendant/petitioner was denying the relationship of landlord-tenant, the defendant/respondent gave up those grounds for his eviction on that count. The application was allowed. 5. This Court then remitted the case to the trial Court for trying the suit in view of the amendment made in the plaint. The judgment of this Court was also challenged in vain before the Apex Court. The suit was again tried and decreed by the learned trial Court vide Annexure P/4. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed under judgment (Annex. P/5) and again a second appeal No. 95/90 was preferred by the petitioner, but that too was dismissed under Annexure P/6. The petitioner had further approached the Apex Court, but his that effort too went in vain. After the second round of litigation, respondent No.1 pressed the execution of the decree passed by the trial Court, which was affirmed upto the Apex Court and sought the possession of the house. The petitioner resisted the execution and filed objections under section 47 of C.P.C. The objections of the petitioner were rejected by the Executing Court under Order Annexure P/10 and the revision preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed vide Annexure P/12. Thereafter, this petition has been preferred and the quashing of the order passed by the Executing Court Annexure P/10 and the order of confirmation passed in revision by the lower Revisional Court Annexure P/12 is sought. 6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, has strenuously argued that since respondent No.1 had recognised the status of the petitioner as that of a tenant, his eviction could be sought only under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, has strenuously argued that since respondent No.1 had recognised the status of the petitioner as that of a tenant, his eviction could be sought only under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Since no decree was passed on any of the grounds provided under section 12 of the Act, respondent No.1 was not entitled to the actual possession of the suit house and could only seek the symbolic possession thereof. 7. On the above contention, it is argued that the orders passed by the Executing Court and the Revisional Court (Annexures P/10 and P/12, respectively) were against the law and could not be allowed to stand. 8. The argument may appear to be attractive, but is without substance. After the remand of the case to the trial Court, it was tried as a declatory suit with possession and for the recovery of the mesne profits. Though the grounds in the alternative were taken in the original plaint for the eviction of the petitioner on the relationship of landlord and tenant but such relationship was denied by the petitioner and he had claimed title on the suit house. In the second appeal No.179/77, those grounds were given up by the respondent and the suit was sought to be proceeded with as a declatory suit with possession. The prayer of respondent was allowed by this Court and the judgment was confirmed by the Apex Court. In view of this Court's judgment Annexure P/7, the trial Court after the enquiry into the respective claim of title set up by both the parties decreed the suit holding that respondent No.1 had the title in the suit property and was entitled to possession. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was confirmed upto the stage of Apex Court. The contentions which are being raised now by the petitioner in this petition are against the stand which was taken by him in the earlier round of litigation. The judgment and decree has attained finality. The Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was confirmed upto the stage of Apex Court. The contentions which are being raised now by the petitioner in this petition are against the stand which was taken by him in the earlier round of litigation. The judgment and decree has attained finality. The Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. In view of his denial of relationship of landlord and tenant and his defence that he was in possession of the suit house under his own title acquired under a deed of conveyance, the suit was converted to be one for the declaration of title and possession by the respondent No. 1 in the year 1979 and under the judgment of this Court passed in second appeal. The suit was thereafter tried as a title suit with the relief of possession against the petitioner. The petitioner cannot now be permitted to take a somersault and claim that his eviction cannot be sought without determining his tenancy as the relief for his eviction could be allowed to respondent No.1 only under the provisions of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 9. Admittedly, the petitioner was not inducted as tenant either by respondent No.1 or her predecessor-in-title. No rent was ever paid by the petitioner to any of them. The suit property having been wrongly taken as evacuee property, was later on released in favour of heirs of Ameer Bux. His heirs thereafter executed the sale-deed in the year 1961 in favour of respondent No.1, as such she became the owner of property. 10. Petitioner claimed title on the basis of a deed on conveyance executed in the year 1962 in the name of President of India treating the property as evacuee property curiously after its release by Custodian Department in the year 1961 and even after the execution of sale deed in favour of respondent No.1 by the owners of suit property. The issue was adjudicated and has been held in favour of respondent No. 1 by the Courts at all levels. 11. The Custodian Department had no right of any kind in the property nor could the petitioner claim any right after the release of property by the department since he was inducted as a tenant by Custodian Department. The issue was adjudicated and has been held in favour of respondent No. 1 by the Courts at all levels. 11. The Custodian Department had no right of any kind in the property nor could the petitioner claim any right after the release of property by the department since he was inducted as a tenant by Custodian Department. On the objection raised by petitioner under section 47 of C.P.C., the Courts below have found that he could not be held to be a tenant of respondent No.1, who had acquired title in the house not from the Custodian Department, but from its owners i.e. heirs of Ameer Bux. 12. The petitioner through objections filed in the executing Court claimed protection of the provisions of section 12 (1) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'), submitting that his eviction from the suit house could be sought only on the grounds enumerated in the section. As no decree was passed on any of the grounds, he could not be actually evicted under the decree, which has been put to execution. 13. It would be relevant to reproduce section 12 (1) of the Act which runs thus: "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx The provision envisages the relationship of landlord and tenant. Protection against eviction, except on the grounds enumerated under (a) to (P), has been provided to a tenant. The term 'landlord' under the Act means a person, who; for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any accommodation, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the accommodation were let to a tenant and includes every person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord. The Act also defines "tenant". The Act also defines "tenant". "Tenant" means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or but, for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also, any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act; but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made. 14. Now the question is whether respondent No. 1 could be taken as "landlord" and petitioner as "tenant" so as to attract the operation of provisions of section 12 of the Act. 15. The meaning of the term 'landlord' as given in the definition is wide enough and is based on the receipt of rent by such person. A person can receive the rent or will have right to recover it only on the existence of 'landlord' and 'tenant' relationship. That would mean that there must be privity of contract between the two. In the absence of privity of contract even an owner could not be a 'landlord' under the definition as contained in the Act. But a purchaser of the landlord's interest in the accommodation would become 'landlord' from the date he purchases the interest. 16. In the instant case, the situation is different. The petitioner was inducted as tenant by the Custodian Department. The department had no right in the property and, therefore, could not pass any right, interest or title to petitioner. This has been finally held up to the stage of Supreme Court. If a person is inducted as a tenant by the other, who has no right or title in the property, the person inducted as tenant would also have no right, title or interest in such property. When the department had released the property in favour of its owner, the release also terminated the relationship of landlord and tenant, and in the circumstances, the same could not be said to run with the property. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be claim protection of the Act. See Purshottam v. Ram Charan Lal and others ( 1966 JLJ 1069 = AIR 1967 MP 237 ) and by Supreme Court in Pomal v.Vraj Lal ( AIR 1989 SC 436 ). 16. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be claim protection of the Act. See Purshottam v. Ram Charan Lal and others ( 1966 JLJ 1069 = AIR 1967 MP 237 ) and by Supreme Court in Pomal v.Vraj Lal ( AIR 1989 SC 436 ). 16. Further the petitioner had also denied the relationship of tenant and landlord between him and respondent No.1 in the first innings of litigation and had also challenged the right title and interest of respondent No. 1in the suit property. The petitioner had asserted his possession on the property as its owner, having purchased it from Custodian Department. Respondent No. 1 in the circumstances had given up the grounds for his eviction under section 12 (1) of the Act, in the earlier second appeal No. 179177 which was preferred by the petitioner in this Court. 17. In view of the pleadings of the parties and the prayer of respondent No.1 under the order of remand passed by this Court, the suit was thereafter tried as a title suit for declaration and possession and respondent-decree holder succeeded upto the Apex Court. Even when a defendant denies the status of tenant and compels the plaintiff to pay ad-valorum court-fee, he would not be entitled to protection under the Act. See Chandra Prakash v. Jiwan Ram (1981 MPRCJ NOC 70). The objection raised in the execution proceedings is as such devoid of any substance and has rightly been rejected by the two Courts below holding that the petitioner was not a tenant and was not entitled to any protection under the Act. In this view, the authorities cited by the petitioner are not relevant and of no consequence. 18. Before parting with the order, I cannot resist expressing that the pangs of pending litigation have been suffered by the decree-holder/respondent, a woman of about 78 years of age for the last 35 years, but she is yet to taste the fruits of the long fought litigation. It was observed in Court of Wards v. Maharaja (14 MIA 605 : 17 WR 159) that difficulties of a litigant in India, begin when he obtains a decree. The Courts in the scenario have to be vigilant against frivolous objections. 19. It was observed in Court of Wards v. Maharaja (14 MIA 605 : 17 WR 159) that difficulties of a litigant in India, begin when he obtains a decree. The Courts in the scenario have to be vigilant against frivolous objections. 19. In the above context, it is pertinent to mention at this stage that when the decree obtained by respondent No. 1 was put to execution, the two brothers of petitioner filed a suit against the petitioner, respondent No.1 and Union of India, claiming their title in the suit property, having purchased it from judgment-debtor/petitioner, during the pendency of respondent No.1's suit against him. They had also succeeded in obtaining an order of injunction from the trial Court against respondent No. 1 restraining her from executing the decree. The order was appealed against by respondent No.1 successfully in this Court. In this context it was observed by this Court in M.A. No. 17/93 on 25.7.94 that :- "The execution was moved by her for getting the decree passed in her favour executed. In execution several opportunities were given to Hansraj to file the objection, but no objection was filed. He got this suit filed by his brothers." 20. Later on, the present objection was filed by Hansraj, i.e. the present petitioner. The petitioner in the objection dated 20.4.92, copy whereof is Annexure P/9 at page 93 of the paper-book, which was filed by him in the present executing case. He had averred in para 4 thereof that 'the petitioner had admitted himself to be the tenant of respondent No.1 but such statement is wholly incorrect in view of para 3 of the judgment passed in petitioner's appeal No. 9A/90 on 12.4.90 by learned 7th Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Gwalior, Annexure P/5. 21. The objection, therefore, appears to be taken with such misstatement of a material fact in order to prolong the litigation and to confuse the issue. The ulterior mala fide motive is apparent therefrom. Such attempts must be frustrated under stem action and exemplary costs should be imposed. When the litigations abound, the litigants suffer. The answers in the Court should be swift. Unfortunately, the congestion of the calendar operates as an unadmirable speed breaker on the road of justice and even this order has consumed sometime. Such attempts must be frustrated under stem action and exemplary costs should be imposed. When the litigations abound, the litigants suffer. The answers in the Court should be swift. Unfortunately, the congestion of the calendar operates as an unadmirable speed breaker on the road of justice and even this order has consumed sometime. Surely such a lis which has travelled twice upto the Supreme Court, does not need polygraph test or long life. None should opt to see justice crying in silence for such a long time. Procedural wrangle should not be seen in action for erosion of faith in the system. People are tried of waiting. The dispensation of justice should be sure and swift. Justice should not be made to appear as a teasing illusion. 22. As sequel of the above discussion, the petition is dismissed being meritless. The learned Executing Court shall ensure early disposal of proceedings. In the peculiar circumstances, the petitioner shall bear his own costs as also of respondent No.1. Counsel's fee Rs. 500/- if certified. Ordered accordingly.