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1995 DIGILAW 495 (DEL)

UNION OF INDIA v. PRATAP SINGH

1995-07-13

MANMOHAN SARIN

body1995
Manmohan Sarin ( 1 ) THE petitioners by this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. are assailing the orders dated 28th Janury, 1985 (annexure c ) passed by the Additional Collector, Delhi and order dated 2nd August, 1985 (annexure d ) passed by the Financial Commissioner, whereby the appeals preferred by the Union of India against the order dated 28th May, 1984 passed by the S. D. M. , Delhi declaring the respondents as Bhoomidars under Section 85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, were dismissed on the ground that there was a delay of 18 days in filing the first appeal. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the filing of the petition may be briefly stated. (I) The respondents had moved an application under Section 85 of the Land Reforms Act seeking to be declared Bhumidars in respect of khasra No. 1147 min. half (part) and 1194 (84 Bigh. 05bis) half part of which new khasra No. 43/7 (4bigh-16 Biswas), 43/8 (4-16), 43/9 (4-16), 43/12 (4-16), 43/13 (4-16), 43/14 (3-8), 43/17 (4-00), 43/18 (4-14) and 43/19 (5-3) situated in village Sanoth, Delhi The petitioner had opposed the same on the ground that the land belonged to the Gaon Sabha and respondent No. l, who was the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha, had illegally occupied the land. The Revenue Assistant accepted the application of the respondents and declared them as Bhumidars in respect of the aforesaid lands vide orders dated 28. 5. 1984. (II) The petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 28. 5. 1984 preferred an appeal against the said order on 1. 9. 1984 before the Additional Collector Delhi. The petitioners had applied for a certified copy of the said order on 1. 6. 1984 and the same was made available on 23. 7. 1984. The appeal should have been preferred by 20. 8. 1984 but as noted above was preferred on 1. 9. 1984 entailing a delay of eleven days. (III) The peitioners while filling the appeal had moved an application for condonation of delay wherein it was staled that immediately upon receiving the certified copy, the same had been handed over to their counsel for preparation and filing of the appeal. However, the mother of the counsel for the petitioner had suffered a paralytic attack and ultimately expired on 16. 8. 1984. However, the mother of the counsel for the petitioner had suffered a paralytic attack and ultimately expired on 16. 8. 1984. The counsel on account of these circumstances could not prepare and file the appeal within lime. (IV) It was urged before the Additional Collector as well as the financial Commissioner that the counsel for the petitioner had to go out of town on account of his mother s illness, who ultimately expired on 16. 8. 1984 and the counsel returned after the customary mourning period of thirteen days and immediately preferred the appeal. (V) The application for condonation of delay was opposed by the respondents staling that the petitioners had failed to explain each day s delay and to give precise particulars regarding the dale of the illness of counsel s mother, his date of leaving station and returning, the absence of which was precisely pointed out by them "in their reply to the application for condonation of delay but the petitioners failed to furnish the said details or to file a rejoinder to the same. (VI) The Additional Collector as well as the Financial Commissioner had dismissed the appeal holding that the appellants/petitioners, herein, have not explained each day s delay in filing the appeal and the counsel for ,the appellant had not given the dates of his leaving and coming back to Delhi. The Financial Commissioner observed that explaining each day s delay was a condition precedent for allowing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He, further held that the appellants have failed to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay. ( 3 ) IN the event the above petition Filed by the Union of India was admitted to hearing on 5. 11. 1985. The respondents on 23. 7. 1986 were further restrained from disposing or alienating the lands in question. ( 4 ) THE approach adopted by the Additional Collector as well as the Financial Commissioner regarding the requirement to explain each day s delay strictly has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Kaliji And Others reported at (1987) 2 SCC 107 wherein the Apex Court has commended a liberal approach in the following terms:- "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Mst. Kaliji And Others reported at (1987) 2 SCC 107 wherein the Apex Court has commended a liberal approach in the following terms:- "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parlies. 3. "every day s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour s delay, every second s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and. technical considerations arc pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injsutice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. " THE above authority has again been followed by the Apex Court in (. 1988) 2 SCC 142 titled Basavalingappa Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore wherein the Court, inter alia, observed that there is no general principle saving the parly from all the mistakes of his counsel. Each case will have to be considered on the particulars of its own special facts. However, the expression sufficient cause in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive aliberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals arc required to be condoned in the interest of justice, where no gross negligence or deliberate in action or lack of bona fides is imputable to the parly seeking condonation of delay. Reference may also be usefully made to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported at AIR 1995 Delhi 57 titled Union Of India Vs. Reference may also be usefully made to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported at AIR 1995 Delhi 57 titled Union Of India Vs. R. P. Builders which enumerates the relevant and peculiar factors and consideration to be kepi in mind while considering the application for condonation of delay by Government Departments. ( 5 ) APPLYING the ratio of the aforesaid judgments to the facts of the present case, it would be seen that the delay here is only of eleven days. Admittedly, the counsel s mother had fallen sick, suffered a paralytic attack and ultimately died within the short span in which the appeal was to be preferred. Counsel for the appellant had duly explained that as he had to suddenly leave, the file could not be handed over to other counsel by him and the matter could only be attended on his return. This is a plausible explanation. There was no negligence or lack of bona fides and this was a fit case in which the delay in filing of the appeal deserved to be condoned as there was sufficient cause for the same. ( 6 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion the order orders dated 28. 1. 1985 and 2. 8. 1985 cannot be sustained and are hereby set aside. The petition is allowed. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. It is further directed that appeal of the Union of India be heard and disposed of on merits within four months.