Honble SAXENA, J. - This petition has been filed under Section 482 read with Section 407 (1) Cr.P.C. for recalling this courts order dated 19.9.94, which was corrected vide order dated 22.9.94 passed in S.B. Cr.Misc. Petition No. 584/94 "Rajeev Joshi vs. State", whereby the sessions case arising out of FIR No. 150/91, Police Station, Amba Mata, Udaipur, which was committed by the learned Addl.CJM, S.P.E. Cases, Jaipur, was withdrawn from the file of learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District and transferred to the file of learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur for trial in accordance with law. (2). Petitioner is the real brother of deceased Smt. Manisha, who was married in February, 1985 to accused non-petitioner Rajeev Joshi & who died on the night intervening 8th and 9th Oct. 1991 due to extensive burn injuries inside the house of her husband situated in Udaipur. She was immediately taken to the hospital, where she is alleged to have made two dying declarations orally one to Dr. Miss Savita and other to a Magiestrate. The dying declaration said to have been made to the Meagistrate could not be completed because of her serious condition. Accused non- petitioner Rajeev Joshi reported the incident to the S.H.O., P.S., Amba Mata, Udaipur alleging that Smt. Manisha had committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene and torching her to fire. Subsequently Crime No! 150/91 Police Station, Amba Mata, Udaipur was registered on the report of petitioner for the offences u/ss. 498A and 304-B IPC, which was initially investigated by the Dy. S.P., Incharge of the Police Station. Thereafter, the investigation was transferred to the Addl. S.P., C.I.D. and S.P., C.I.D., Crime Branch. Ultimately, the petitioner filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7022/91 in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur and vide order dated 12th Aug. 1992, the said writ petition was allowed and it was directed that investigation of the said case be transferred from the C.I.D., (C.B.) to the C.B.I., and that henceforth the C.B.I. shall investigate the case and proceed further in the matter. After completing investigation, the C.B.I. filed the challan in the court of learned A.C.J.M., S.P.E. Cases, Jaipur, who by his order dated 26.8.94 committed the case to the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District for the offence u/s. 304 B IPC. After completing investigation, the C.B.I. filed the challan in the court of learned A.C.J.M., S.P.E. Cases, Jaipur, who by his order dated 26.8.94 committed the case to the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District for the offence u/s. 304 B IPC. On 8.9.94, accused Rajeev Joshi submitted a petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. read with Sec. 407 Cr.P.C. against the order dated 26.8.94 passed by the learned A.C.J.M., S.P.E. Cases, Jaipur, in this court at Jodhpur, which was allowed by order dated 19.9.94. (2-A). I have heard Mr. D.S. Shishodia, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K.L. Thakur, learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. M.L. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the accused non-petitioner No.2 Rajeev Joshi and Mr. Kamal Dave standing counsel for the C.B.I. at length and carefully perused the relevant record. (3). Mr. Shishodia has strenuously canvassed that the accused non- petitioner No.2 did not implead the petitioner as a party in his S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 584/94 and suppressed material facts about the rejection of his bail applications u/ss. 438 and 439 Cr.P.C. by the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District and the High Court Bench at Jaipur and the fact that on the writ petition filed by the petitioner in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, the investigation of the case was entrusted to the C.B.I. and, as such, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him, which has resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice. His another limb of the argument is that the State Government under Sec. 11 (1) (A) Cr.P.C. by its notification dated 22.8.78 has established a court of A.C.J.M., Jaipur District for conducting enquiry and trial in respect of the cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment having jurisdiction for whole of the Rajasthan and that under Sec. 14(3) of the Code, he did not commit any illegality in committing the case to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District. (4). Mr. Shishodia has relied on the cases of State of Raj. vs. Ramkishan alias Sufan (1) and Mohd. (4). Mr. Shishodia has relied on the cases of State of Raj. vs. Ramkishan alias Sufan (1) and Mohd. Mahir vs. State of U.P. (2), wherein interpreting the provisions of Sec. 14(3) of the Code, it has been held that where the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate extends to an area beyond the district in which he ordinarily holds court, any reference in the Criminal Procedure Code to the Sessions Court shall throughout the area within his local jurisdiction be construed as a reference to that court of Session, which is exercising jurisdiction in relation to the said district, where such Magistrate ordinarily holds court. According to him, since ACJM, SPE Cases, Jaipur exercises jurisdiction for whole of the Rajasthan in respect of the cases investigated by the C.B.I, under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, he could not have committed the case to the court of learned Sessions Judge. He has urged that the S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 584/94 filed by accused Rajeev Joshi u/s. 407 Cr.P.C. was legally not maintainable because no affidavit in support of the said petition was filed and that the provisions of Sec. 407 (3) Cr.P.C. being mandatory, his prayer for transfer of the case was legally not competent and, as such, the impugned order deserves to be recalled. For this, he has placed reliance on the cases of Suresh Kumar vs. State & Ors. (3) and Mahindra Kumar vs. The State of Raj. and Anr. (4), wherein it has been held that the provisions of Sec. 407 (3) Cr.P.C. are mandatory and that every application for an order for transfer of a case, except when the applicant is the Advocate General of the State, be supported by an affidavit or affirmation and that such application without an affidavit is liable to be dismissed for non-compliance. He has urged that as per calendar of witnesses, the prosecution has cited 115 witnesses and that out of them, 59 witnesses are residents of Jaipur or nearby places, whereas only 46 witnesses are the residents of Udaipur and, as such, it is not in the general convenience of the parties and the witnesses if the Sessions case is to be tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur. He has submitted that after the impugned order was passed, Ramesh Chandra Sharma, elder brother of the father of deceased, received an unsigned inland letter from Udaipur possibly from the accused side threatening that he and his brother should not go to Udaipur else they will not be able to return back and that material witnesses including Dr. (Mrs.) Savita has also received continuous threats not to appear before the Sessions Judge, Udaipur else there would be great risk to their life, liberty and honour and, as such, the impugned order be recalled and the Sessions Case be re-transferred/retained in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur. (5). Mr. K.L. Thakur, learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. Kamal Dave, Standing Counsel for the C.B.I., have not opposed this petition. (6). On the other hand, Mr. M.L. Garg, learned counsel for the accused non-petitioner No.2, has seriously contested this petition and asserted that there was no suppression of material facts in the petition filed by him; that since it was a State case and the investigation was conducted by the C.B.I., petitioner Radhesh Chandra was not a necessary party in that petition nor he has a locus standi to file this petition for recalling the impugned order, which was passed in the presence of the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Standing counsel for the C.B.I. after hearing them. (7). Mr. Garg has submitted that in State of Rajasthan vs. Babu Khan and Ors. D.B. Criminal Reference No. 1/1981 and Bharat Singh vs. State of Raj., the D.B. Criminal Revision No. 5/1980 the D.B. of this court at Jaipur Bench vide order dated 15.2.84, after interpreting the provisions of Section 14(3) and 177 Cr.P.C. has held that on account of use of the words "unless context otherwise requires" appearing in Sec. 14 (3) Cr.P.C, where the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate appointed under Section 11 extends to an area beyond the district in which he ordinarily holds the court, any reference in this Code to the court of Session, shall, in relation to such Magistrate, throughout the area within his local jurisdiction, be construed as a reference to the court of Session within whose local jurisdiction, the offence was committed. Thus, Ramkishans case (supra) is no more a good law and this principle of law has been consistently followed by this court in Ram Niranjan vs. State Road Transport Corporation (5) and Ghanshyam Acharya vs. State of Rajasthan (6). (8). Mr. Garg has asserted that petitioner has no locus standi to file this petition and it was on Rajeev Joshis report that inquiry u/s. 174 Cr.P.C. was conducted; that inland letter Annex. 1 is a manufactured letter; that no threats were ever given to any prosecution witness by the accused side and that such an allegation is quite vague, bald and shorn of material particulars. He has submitted that accused Rajeev Joshi had submitted his petition u/s. 482 read with 407 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, for want of the affidavit, his petition was neither legally incompetent nor was liable to be rejected. (9). After perusing the judgment rendered by the D.B. of this Court in Babu Khan and Bharat Singhs case (supra), which was a reportable judgment, but which has( not been reported in any Law Journal so far, Mr. Shishodia has submitted that the interpretation of the learned D.B. as to specific provisions of Sec. 14(3) and Sec. 177 Cr.P.C is patently faulty and the same negates and neutralises the purpose and object of the enactment of Sec. 14(3) Cr.P.C. and, as such, this matter should be referred to a larger Bench. (10). I have given my most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made before me. The accused non- petitioner did not suppress any material fact because his petition filed u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. r/w Sec. 407 Cr.P.C, it was specifically mentioned that the alleged incident took place at Udaipur and that a case was registered at Police Station, Amba Mata, Udaipur on the application of the petitioner Radhesh u/ss. 498A and 304-B IPC; that the case was initially investigated by the Dy. S.P. of the said Police Station and later-on, the investigation was handed over to the Addl. S.P., C.I.D., Udaipur and thereafter to the S.P.,CID, C.B. It was also mentioned therein that on the writ petition filed by complainant Radhesh, the High Court Bench at Jaipur directed the C.B.I. to conduct the investigation in this case. S.P. of the said Police Station and later-on, the investigation was handed over to the Addl. S.P., C.I.D., Udaipur and thereafter to the S.P.,CID, C.B. It was also mentioned therein that on the writ petition filed by complainant Radhesh, the High Court Bench at Jaipur directed the C.B.I. to conduct the investigation in this case. It was further mentioned that after investigation, the C.B.I. submitted the challan in the court of learned A.C.J.M., SPE Cases, Jaipur, whose local jurisdiction extends to whole of the Rajasthan in respect of the C.B.I. cases. Simply by non- mentioning of the fact of rejection of the bail applications filed by accused Rajeev u/ss. 438 and 439 Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District and the High Court Bench at Jaipur, it cannot be held that accused Rajeev Joshi had suppressed material facts. Therefore, it is not at all a valid ground for recalling the impugned order. Accused Rajeev Joshi in the said petition, had arrayed the State of Rajasthan and later- on C.B.I, as the non-petitioners. Since a case was registered at Police Station, Amba Mata and investigation thereof was handed- over to C.B.I., the State of Rajasthan and the C.B.I., were the necessary parties. It is true that petitioner Radhesh is the brother of the deceased and that on his report, a case was registered but simply for this, it cannot be held that he was a necessary party in that petition. It may also be mentioned here that Radhesh Chandra had filed the writ petition in this court at Jaipur Bench and in that writ petition, accused Rajeev Joshi was not arrayed as a party. In such circumstances by not impleading him as a party in S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 584/94, it cannot be said that there was any violation of the principles of natural justice. (11). As regards the locus standi of petitioner Radhesh Chandra to file this petition u/s. 482 r/w. Sec. 407 (1) Cr.P.C, it will suffice to mention that he is positively a party interested in this case being the brother of the deceased as also the complainant on whose report, a case was registered against the accused Rajeev. A petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. as also under Sec. 407 Cr.P.C. can be filed by a party interested. A petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. as also under Sec. 407 Cr.P.C. can be filed by a party interested. Section 482 Cr.P.C. proclaims that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 407 (2) specifically lays down that the High Court in respect of transfer of cases and appeals, may act either on the report of the lower court or on the application of a party interested or on its own initiative. (12). In Nafis Agha vs. State (7), the Allahabad High Court interpreting the words "party interested" appearing in Section 407 (2) Cr.P.C., has held that the expression "party interested" also includes the person lodging the police report as also the victim of the offence and that such a person is competent to file an application for transfer of the case u/s. 407 (1) Cr.P.C Therefore in my considered opinion, petitioner Radhesh Chandra is a person interested in this case and is competent and has locus standi to file this petition u/s. 482 read with Sec. 407 (1) Cr.P.C. Hence the contention of Mr. M.L. Garg on this count is devoid of any force and the same is hereby repelled. As mentioned earlier, accused Rajeev Joshi had filed the S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 584/94 u/s. 482 read with Sec. 407 Cr.P.C. Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not require that a petition filed under this section should be supported by an affidavit or affirmation. It is true that the provisions of Section 407 (3) Cr.P.C. require that every application for transfer of a case or appeal, shall be supported by affidavit or affirmation and that this provision is mandatory in nature but since the accused Rajeev had also filed the petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C, in my considered opinion, the same was legally competent and maintainable and for that reason only, the impugned order cannot be recalled. (13). Now, we come to the crucial controversy between the parties. (13). Now, we come to the crucial controversy between the parties. Section 7 (1) of the Code declares that every State shall be a sessions division or shall consist of sessions divisions; and every sessions division shall, for the purposes of this Code, be a district or consist of districts. In Rajasthan, the State Government has established sessions divisions in every revenue district and the Sessions Judge, Udaipur and the Sessions Judge, Jaipur District have their local jurisdiction, co-extensive with the revenue district of Udaipur and Jaipur District excluding the Jaipur City i.e. the Jaipur District (Rural) respectively. By a State Amendment vide Rajasthan Act 10 of 1977, sub sec. (1-A) has been inserted in Section 11 of the Code, which declares that the State Govt. may likewise establish as many courts of judicial Magistrates of the first class and the second class in respect to particular cases or to a particular class or particular classes, or in regard to cases generally, in any local area. This amendment has come into effect from 5.3.77. Section 14 Cr.P.C. deals with the local jurisdiction of judicial Magistrates. The State Govt. vide notification No. F4717/Judl.76 dated 22.8.78 in exercise of its powers under Sec. 11 (1) (a) Cr.P.C. after consultation with the Rajasthan High Court has established a court of A.C.J.M., Jaipur District, Jaipur for enquiry, trial and committing the cases to the Sessions Court in respect of the cases investigated under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act having jurisdiction for whole of the Rajasthan State. It is needless to mention that C.B.I. is a creature of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. Thus, the ACJM, SPE Cases, Jaipur District, Jaipur is a special court of a judicial Magistrate of a First Class to enquire, try or commit the case to the Sessions Court in respect of the cases Investigated under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act having its local area extending to the whole of the Rajasthan State. Thus, the ACJM, SPE Cases, Jaipur District, Jaipur is a special court of a judicial Magistrate of a First Class to enquire, try or commit the case to the Sessions Court in respect of the cases Investigated under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act having its local area extending to the whole of the Rajasthan State. Section 14(3), which has been inserted by Section 5 of Cr.P.C. Act 1978, runs as under: "Sec. 14 (3) — Where the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate, appointed under Section 11 or Section 13 or Section 18, extends to an area beyond the district, or the metropolitan area, as the case may be, in which he ordinarily holds court, any reference in this Code to the court of Sessions, Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall, in relation to such Magistrate, throughout the area within his local jurisdiction, be construed, unless the context otherwise requires, as a reference to the Court of Sessions, Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Matropolition Magistrate as the case may be, exercising jurisdiction in relation to the said district or metropolitan area." (14). In Ramkishans case (supra), when the goods train was coming from Bayana to Bharatpur and was at station Jaycholi, a stone was hurled at the cabin of the driver which damaged glass panes, by which both the eyes of the driver were damaged, but he was saved. A case under Sec. 127 of the Railways Act was registered at G.R.P., Bharatpur. The accused persons were admittedly below 16 years of age and children within the meaning of Rajasthan Children Act. The police after investigation submitted the challan in the court of Railway Magistrate, Kota, which has been created u/s. 11 Cr.P.C. The Railway Magistrate committed the case to the court of Sessions Judge, Kota, who in turn transferred the same to the court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Kota. Since the accused were children, the case was transferred to the Children Court i.e. the C.J.M. Kota by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge holding that u/s. 27 Cr.P.C, only those offences are to be tried by him which are punishable with imprisonment of life or with death sentence and all other cases are to be tried by the CJM dealing with the children case. The offence u/s. 127, Railways Act is punishable with imprisonment of life. Sessions Judge holding that u/s. 27 Cr.P.C, only those offences are to be tried by him which are punishable with imprisonment of life or with death sentence and all other cases are to be tried by the CJM dealing with the children case. The offence u/s. 127, Railways Act is punishable with imprisonment of life. The CJM relying on the amended Sec. 14 (3) of the Code made a reference to the Rajasthan High Court. The learned S.B. of this court interpreting the provisions of Sec. 14 (3) Cr.P.C. answered the reference in the following terms : "Where the local jurisdiction of the Railway Magistrate extends to an area beyond the district in which he originally holds courts any reference in Cr.P.C. to the Sessions Court shall throughout the area within the local jurisdiction of the Railway Magistrate be construed as a reference to that court of Sessions, who is exercising jurisdiction in relation to the said district where the Magistrate ordinarily holds courts and directed the case to be sent to the Sessions Judge, Kota and not to Sessions Judge, Bharatpur in whose local jurisdiction, the offence was committed holding that the Children Act being a special Act shall prevail upon Section 27 and Sec. 177 Cr.P.C." (15). In Babu Khans case (supra), the murder was committed on the platform of Bhawani Mandi Railway Station. Bhawani Mandi is a part of the revenue district of Jhalawar, but is within the jurisdiction of Railway Magistrate, Kota, who holds his sitting normally and ordinarily at Kota, for which the revenue district was of Kota. Bharat Singhs case (supra) was a case of dacoity with murder. The offence was committed in train between Railway Station of Bharatpur and Helak and that area admittedly fell within the jurisdiction of Bharatpur revenue district and sessions division Bharatpur. The Railway Magistrate, Kota had the jurisdiction in respect of the railway tracks where the alleged offence was committed and he ordinarily held his court at Kota. The D.B. of this court consisting of Honble Mr. G.M. Lodha and Honble Mr. The Railway Magistrate, Kota had the jurisdiction in respect of the railway tracks where the alleged offence was committed and he ordinarily held his court at Kota. The D.B. of this court consisting of Honble Mr. G.M. Lodha and Honble Mr. G.K. Sharma, as they then were, interpreting the words "unless the context otherwise requires" appearing in Sec. 14(3) and Sec. 117 Cr.P.C, which lays down the general rule that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed, held as under: — "We have given a thoughtful consideration in order to understand the implication, ambit, scope and the meaning which should be given to this phrase "unless the context otherwise requires". We are conscious of the fact that the legislature never uses unnecessary words or phrases and every word or phrase used has to be given its due meaning. In a situation like the one in which the present two cases referred to above, it is obvious that normally the Sessions Court of the revenue area is incharge of the entire cases and the commitment if any, made to that very Sessions Court. The difficulty arises in case where the Magistrate ordinarily holds the Court at one place and the Sessions Court is located or situated at different place. The Railway Magistrates have been assigned jurisdiction in order to segregate the cases arising from the railway areas particularly the Trains and the Plate-forms located within that area so that the cases can be disposed of conveniently and they should not be distributed with the ordinary cases before the Magistrates. This ensures convenience and will save time and expense. However, when the question comes up for trial of a case, which is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, normally the principle that the Sessions Court of that area within which the offence was committed should try the case, should be followed. It was to ensure this that the legislature used the word "unless the context otherwise requires", in sub-clause (3) of Sec. 14. In our opinion, the context in the case, where reference is made to the Sessions Court requires that the Sessions Court must be of the area in whose jurisdiction the offence is committed or as required by Sec. 181 (1) Cr.P.C. either the offence is committed or the accused is found. In our opinion, the context in the case, where reference is made to the Sessions Court requires that the Sessions Court must be of the area in whose jurisdiction the offence is committed or as required by Sec. 181 (1) Cr.P.C. either the offence is committed or the accused is found. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that on account of the use of word phrase "unless context otherwise requires" preference to the court of Sessions in the cases of Railway Magistrate would mean the Sessions Court within whose jurisdiction or revenue area, as the case may be, the offence was committed or if it falls within Section 181 (1) when the offence was committed or the accused was found, as the case may be." (16). The said Division Bench also considered the case of Lakhpat Singh vs. State of Raj. S.B. Cri. Revision No. 142/79 decided on 28.1.79 and Ramkishans case (supra) and observed that the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" appearing in Section 14(3) of the Code was not noticed in those judgments. The Division Bench, therefore, held that Babu Khans case should be tried by the Sessions Judge, Jhalawar while Bharat Singhs case should be tried by the court of Sessions Judge, Bharatpur in whose jurisdiction the offences were committed respectively. Thereafter, the view taken by the Division Bench has been followed in Ram Niranjans case and Ghanshyam Acharyas case (supra) by two different S.Bs. of this court and by all the subordinate courts. The cases of such special Judicial Magistrates, whose local jurisdiction extends to an area beyond the district, are being committed to the respective Sessions Judges, where the offences are being committed. (17). Rule 59 of the Rules of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952 deals with the reference of a case to larger Bench and authorises the Chief Justice to constitute a bench of two or more judges to decide a case or any question or questions of law formulated by a bench hearing a case. (18). In Kishna Ram vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (8), it has been held that a valid D.B. judgment must be followed by a Single Bench and it is not open to the S.B. of this court to consider and decide whether a D.B. of. (18). In Kishna Ram vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (8), it has been held that a valid D.B. judgment must be followed by a Single Bench and it is not open to the S.B. of this court to consider and decide whether a D.B. of. this Court was justified in holding the notification and its explanation as valid or not and that the best judicial traditions established by principles of precedence, decency & decorum of the judicial functioning warrant that no attempt should be made by a S.B. to undermine or in any way to sit over the judgment of the D.B. (19). Mr. D.S. Shishodia has contended that the D.B. judgment in Babukhans case (supra) does not correctly read Section 177 Cr.P.C. which uses the expression "ordinarily" which means "except where provided otherwise in the Code." According to him, Sec. 177 Cr.P.C. itself contains non obstante clause and that provisions contained in Sec. 14 (3) of the Code would be read as an explanation. According to him, Section 14(3) has been enacted for special situation as a special legislation to achieve the object as mentioned in the objects and reasons of the Amending Act, which implies that the subsequent legislation had a definite object and that object has to be upheld. He has submitted that both the Sections 14(3) and 177 contain non obstante clause and later in time should prevail and since Sec. 14(3) is a special legislation, it should prevail over the general provisions of Section 177 and a harmonious construction would be that which saves the object of enactment of Section 14(3) Cr.P.C. (20). In my considered opinion, the interpretation and the view taken by the Division Bench in Babu Khans case and Bharat Singhs case (supra) takes into consideration the words "unless the context otherwise requires" contained in Section 14 (3) of the Code. The interpretation of Secs. 14(3) and 177 Cr.P.C. taken by the D.B. appears to me to be harmonious and in favour of the accused persons. Moreover, this S.B. cannot sit as a court of appeal on the interpretation given by the learned D.B. in Babu Khans case (supra) and the best judicial tradition established by principles of precedence, decency and decorum of the judicial functions also do not warrant this S.B. to hold that the interpretation given by the learned D.B. is faulty. Moreover, this S.B. cannot sit as a court of appeal on the interpretation given by the learned D.B. in Babu Khans case (supra) and the best judicial tradition established by principles of precedence, decency and decorum of the judicial functions also do not warrant this S.B. to hold that the interpretation given by the learned D.B. is faulty. To my mind, in this case, reference to a larger Bench under R. 59 of the Rules of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952 is not warranted as there are no two divergent opinions of different D.Bs. of co- ordinate jurisdiction regarding the interpretation of Sec. 14(3) and 177 Cr.P.C. Hence, it is not at all a fit case for making a reference. (21). Therefore, in view of the law laid down by D.B. of this court in Babu Khans case (supra)., the Sessions Judge, Udaipur has the jurisdiction to try this case because the offence was admittedly committed within his local jurisdiction. (22). The allegation regarding the alleged threatening made from the accused side to the material witnesses is quite vague and shorn of material details. The alleged inland letter Annex. 1 has not been signed by any person and its author is not known. The trial of this case has still not commenced. In such circumstances at this stage, it cannot be held that the accused side is threatening and overawing the prosecution witnesses. It may be mentioned here that neither any affidavit of Ramesh Chandra nor that of Dr. Savita nor any other material witness has been filed. Therefore, on the basis of such an unsupported and uncorroborated assertion, no case for transferring this case from the file of learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District is made out and on this ground also, the impugned order cannot be recalled. To my mind, the impugned order is neither illegal nor void ab initio nor is tantamount to abuse of the process of the court nor it entails gross injustice to any party. (23). Hence for the reasons mentioned above, this petition is devoid of any force ana substance and the same is hereby dismissed. To my mind, the impugned order is neither illegal nor void ab initio nor is tantamount to abuse of the process of the court nor it entails gross injustice to any party. (23). Hence for the reasons mentioned above, this petition is devoid of any force ana substance and the same is hereby dismissed. However, it is made clear that if during trial, the prosecution witnesses are overawed and/or threatened by the accused or his relatives directly or indirectly or they cause any inconvenience to the prosecution witnesses then the State or the party interested shall be at liberty to file petition u/s. 407 (2) Cr.P.C. in accordance with law. The interim order dated 17.11.94, whereby the proceedings in the concerning sessions case were stayed, is hereby vacated. The learned trial Judge is directed to expedite the disposal of this case at his earliest convenience. A copy of this order be sent to him |for compliance.-